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Preface
Welcome to the annual Convention of the Society for the Study of Artificial
Intelligence and the Simulation of Behaviour (AISB). We are delighted to host this
in the year of the 50th anniversary celebrations of the University of Bath. AISB is
the oldest conference in the field of AI, having been founded in Edinburgh 53
years ago.
This year, we as organisers chose to reinstitute the idea of a convention theme.
We chose the topic of “Society with AI”. We wished to emphasise that AI is not
science fiction that may or may not come in the future, but something here now,
affecting us all. This theme is reflected in some, although of course not all, the
various symposia and papers.
This year’s symposia are:
I Social Aspects of Cognition: Human and Artificial Life Symposium
II The Power of Immergence: Simulating language, decision-making and the
evolution of culture
III Social Interactions in Complex Intelligent Systems (SICIS)
IV 4th Computational Creativity Symposium
V Computational modelling of emotion: theory and applications
VI Cognition And OntologieS (CAOS) 2017
VII The power of passion: Human reason and its emotional foundations
VIII AISB Symposium on Computational Architectures for Animal Cognition
(CAAC)
IX AISB Symposium on AI & Games
X The 10th AISB Symposium on Computing and Philosophy: language,
cognition, and computation
The symposia accepted the 71 papers which constitute these proceedings. This
year seemed also to mark a phase transition for the AISB, as there were also a
good number of contributed talks and demos which are not reflected in this
proceedings, being published elsewhere. It is interesting to see AI becoming
more like a natural science and less like a computer science in the drive to
publish in journals and other venues; we are glad that the AISB meeting can
bend to accommodate this, and thank again our symposia organisers for their
creativity and flexibility.
Our theme is also reflected both in a special public plenary panel, and in the
keynote talks in the plenary sessions starting each day. The panel, taking place
at the end of the first day, is on the topic of “The Ethical Impact of AI on Society”.
The panel is chaired by Alan Winfield (University of the West of England), with
panellists Mandy Chessell (IBM), Nello Cristianini (Bristol), Danit Gal (University
of Beijing) and Bjo¨rn Schuller (Passau). The plenary talks are:
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• Amanda Chessell “Ethics, algorithms, and the pursuit of human flourishing”
• Filippo Santoni De Sio (TU-Delft) “Meaningful Human Control Over
Autonomous Systems”
• Bjo¨rn Schuller “Artificial Emotional Intelligence – A Game Changer for AI
and Society?”
The theme is put into practise and further strengthened in this edition of the AISB
convention by reaching out to the wider community. The panel is free to members
of the public due to generous and substantial support from the AHRC and the
ESRC via David Galbreath (University of Bath), whom we gratefully
acknowledge. We are also offering for the first time a free tutorial and hackathon
day on “AI systems for society” to anyone interested, but with particular support
from the businesses and programmers in the local technical community of the
City of Bath and surrounds. Thanks again to the tutors; their topics are:
• Tools to support and research the Process of Policy Making, creating Online
Deliberation environments supported by AI (Virginia Dignum, TU Delft)
• Reactive Planning for Robotics and Agent Based Models (Rob Wortham,
University of Bath)
• Cognitive Systems for Automated Story Comprehension (Antonis Kakas and
Loizos Michael, Open University of Cyprus)
• Generating Paths through Interactive Stories with Answer Set Programming
(Matt Thompson, University of Bath)
The organizers thank the sponsors of this year’s convention (see over), our
symposia and tutorial/hackathon organizers, our student volunteers and
especially Kirstie Morrison, who went well beyond her two days of allocated time
to help with the local administration.
The proceedings are organised by symposium, each of which is introduced by
the symposium organizers.
We do hope you enjoy Bath and participating in the 2017 AISB convention.
Joanna Bryson, Marina De Vos, Julian Padget
(2017 convention organizers)
Bath, April 2017.
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Symposium I
Social Aspects of Cognition: Human
and Artificial Life Symposium
This Symposium (which is the continuation of the past AISB2015 and AISB2016) aims at stimulating a lively
discussion on the social dimension of knowledge, behavior and ontology by crossing Philosophy, and AI. We
point on the following topics (but not exclusively):
I. Strategies for analyzing the problem of the rela- tionship between language, society and AI. Searle
presented an interesting theory of representation based on the mind’s capacities to represent objects and to
the linguistic capacities to extend the representation to social entities. Brandom introduces compelling
notion of representation in social terms and explores the differences between human and artificial mind.
Moreover, we would like to focus on the issues of the embodiment and embodied co- gnition (Clark) and the
role of social and bodily dimension in linguistic meaning in AI perspectives (Cangelosi et al., Minski).
Emotions play a funda- mental epistemological role in the “unspoken dimension”.
II. The later philosophy of Wittgenstein, classical pragmatism and contemporary analytic pragmatism provide
fruitful conceptions of social practices. Social epistemology stresses on their role in human cognition to
motivate the overcome of classical individual epistemology. Several important notions are analyzed (social
behavior, social norms, testimony, etc.). McDowell and Davidson mention the role of the social within the
process of acknowledgement. There are several examples of the bias between AI and human ability to react
on various different problems, such as the problem of translation. Google translation generator is capable to
of translatinge from one language to another only to certain extent. When it comes to larger textual corpus,
Google ultimately fails to produce meaningful contents. What is it that human possesses and AI does not?
Wittgenstein would perhaps call it a form of life, a social dimension. If human cognition is preconditioned by
this social dimension, what this social dimension is? How does AI intelligence respond to these social
precondition of human knowledge; or how is the absence of social aspect limiting for AI? What is it that
human possesses and AI does not? Wittgenstein would perhaps call it a form of life, a social dimension. If
human cognition is preconditioned by this social dimension, what this social dimension is? How does AI
intelligence respond to these social precondition of human knowledge; or how is the absence of social
aspect limiting for AI?
“Can sociological approaches rooted in cybernetics and systems-theory (Luhmann) give us a direction for
analyzing, describing and constructing social systems inhabited by humans and machines?”
III. Interactions on social media such as Twitter or comment sections differ from “natural” dialogues in ways
which present challenges for theories of discourse, dialogue and argumentation such as RST, SDRT or
models influenced by Traum, Cohen & Levesque, Walton & Krabbe and others; as well as philosophical
(Brandom, Habermas) semiotic (Eco) and linguistic (Crystal, Spilioti) approaches. On the one hand,
12
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SYMPOSIUM I. SOCIAL ASPECTS OF COGNITION 13
participation in online dialogue is typically fluid; interlocutors can join or leave a conversation without
formality, it is problematic to assign distinct roles such as “addressee” or overhearer or 2nd vs 3rd person,
participants may be unknown to each other and have only sparse models of each others’ backgrounds and
beliefs. On the other, there may be direct access to participants’ posting history from which can be extracted
a (possibly partial and/or inconsistent) “commitment store” in the sense of Hamblin or Walton & Krabbe.
Raffaela Giovagnoli, Pontificia Universita` Lateranense
Claudia Stancati, Department of Humanities, University of Calabria, Italy
Giusy Gallo, Department of Humanities, University of Calabria, Italy
David Moffat, (Glasgow Caledonian University)
Josefina Formanova, Dept. of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Charles University, Czech Republic
Organizers
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Understanding Learning Strategy as Conversation
Steve Battle 1
Abstract. The goal of this research is to understand the learning
strategies employed by students using so called Intelligent Tutoring
Systems (ITS), with the aim of supporting efforts to improve the ef-
fectiveness of this type of educational technology. An experiment is
conducted in which we observe and record online interactions be-
tween the participant and the ITS, with the goal of discovering learn-
ing strategies used by students. Gordon Pask’s Conversation The-
ory defines a social constructivist account of learning and teaching,
and the hypothesis explored here is whether analysis of the observed
data encoded using CT will help to identify behaviours that repre-
sent meaningful learning strategies. These strategies are identified
with Markov Processes, enabling the use of Hidden Markov Mod-
els to discover clusters of distinct patterns of behaviour within the
observational data.
1 INTRODUCTION
Intelligent Tutoring Systems (ITS) are teaching software designed to
take a student through a series of exercises; facilitating learning-by-
doing [38]. These exercises are carried out in a simulated environ-
ment supporting active learning. We investigate the use of an ITS
known as SQLTutor that teaches students ‘Structured Query Lan-
guage’ for databases by taking them through a series of practical
exercises.
Our goal is to model the conversations between the learner and the
ITS to identify recurring patterns of interaction with specific learn-
ing strategies. The foundation of this research is the work of Gordon
Pask on Conversation Theory [25]. This is a social constructivist the-
ory of learning [41, 3] in which the role of the teacher, and the con-
versations between teacher and student, are made explicit. According
to Pask [26], “Learning depends on the strategies used by a student
in order to direct his [or her] attention” and “at the other extreme,
the strategies may be imposed upon the student as teaching strate-
gies by a programme, a teaching device, or a training routine.” The
term learning strategy used in this paper acknowledges this dialectic
between teaching and learning strategy in the observed data.
We are particularly interested in the way that a learning strategy
may switch between different levels of learning. Pask’s Conversa-
tion Theory [27] states that a conversation can exist on many lev-
els [34], with the lowest level engaged directly with a learning en-
vironment. In Conversation Theory, learning becomes a process of
negotiation with peers and teachers to construct “shared meaning”
[36]. We can relate this to Bloom’s Taxonomy of Learning Domains
[4, 40] in which there are six major categories of cognitive learning
processes including simple recall, understanding and application of
knowledge, upon which higher level processing involving analysis,
1 The University of the West of England, Bristol, UK, email:
steve.battle@uwe.ac.uk
evaluation and ultimately creativity are built. These higher level pro-
cess of comprehension require an awareness of context and the place
of this knowledge in the overall curriculum [15].
For the purposes of this research, the observational data [6, p.82]
may be thought of as a stochastic process [9]. A learning strategy can
then be identified as a Markov Process [2] enabling the use ofHidden
Markov Models (HMMs) to “automatically discover which strate-
gies are used in practice.” [5] Furthermore, recognising that learners
may use different strategies according to the context and tasks they
face, HMM Clustering is used to identify and cluster different sub-
sequences into a number of distinct learning strategies [37, 39]. It is
hoped that future development of this theory may support a better
understanding of how students learn [12, p.9].
2 CONVERSATION THEORY
“Language does not transmit information” claims Humberto Matu-
rana [23, p.57], “its functional role is the creation of a cooperative
domain of interactions between speakers.” Shannon’s Information
Theory [35] tells only part of the story, quantifying the information
capacity of the channel alone, whereas for learning we are interested
in the level of order in the system as a whole [33], comprising both
the learner and the teacher. The theory of cognitive constructivism
rejects the simplistic transmission model of information in favour of
a model pioneered by Piaget [29, p.77] where, “knowledge results
from continuous construction.”
Building on Piaget, David Kolb states [17, p.49], “Learning is the
process whereby knowledge is created through the transformation
of experience.” Kolb’s Experiential Learning Cycle in Figure 1 is a
four-stage cycle describing an effective learning experience. It be-
gins i) with a new or revisited concrete experience, followed by ii)
observation of, and reflection upon the experience leading to iii) new
concept formation, which may in turn iv) suggest new hypotheses
which can then be tested in the concrete environment.
i) Concrete
experience
◆◆
iv) Active
experimentation
11
ii) Reflective
observation
rriii) Abstract
conceptualisation
WW
Figure 1: The Kolb Experiential Learning Cycle.
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Figure 2: The Skeleton of a Conversation
However, the Kolb cycle is open to criticism [16], the first being
that the cycle neglects social learning, particularly the conversation
between teacher and learner. The Kolb cycle focuses on the learner as
though they were working in isolation. Furthermore, the stages may,
in reality, occur out of sequence or not at all. For example, the learner
may perform any number of concrete experiments and observations,
before later reflecting on the experience as a whole. This would be
typical of a practical session where a series of experiments might be
conducted en bloc. The reflective stage might be skipped altogether if
nothing unexpected occurred that would require the underlying con-
ceptualisation to be modified. Indeed, a learner engaged purely in
surface learning may simply decide to skip the reflective stage for
other reasons; with the reflective and concept formation phases seen
as deep learning [21, 22, 32].
The theory of social constructivism, developed by Lev Vygotsky
[42] rejects the idea of transmission but embraces that of conversa-
tion. It argues that learning takes place because of a learner’s interac-
tions within a group. It supports the idea of reaching understanding
by consensus, and it is this idea that finally makes sense of the role
of the teacher, and of peers in a learning community. Furthermore,
Vygotsky rejected Piaget’s notion that a child’s egocentric language
disappears altogether, countering that this private speech is simply a
stage in the development of inner speech; an internal conversation in
all major respects [41].
The cause of Social Constructivismwas taken up by British Cyber-
netician, Gordon Pask, who saw intelligence as an emergent property
of conversation. From the mid-1950s onward, Pask developed a wide
range of teaching machines, the first of which, the Solartron Adap-
tive Keyboard Instructor (SAKI), led eventually to the development
of the world-famous Mavis Beacon typing trainer [30]. His research
focused on understanding conversations between teacher and learner,
learning peers, a teaching machine interacting with a learner, or in
the extreme as an internal dialogue in the mind of an autodidact. Be-
cause he is interested in adaptation at a psychological or conceptual
level, Pask’s Conversation Theory [25] is very applicable to these
learning conversations. We will use Pask’s theory as a framework for
understanding the conversation between the learner and an Intelligent
Tutoring System in the role of teacher.
Sheila Harri-Augstein and Laurie Thomas, for The Centre for the
Study of Human Learning (CSHL) at Brunel University, describe a
learning conversation [14] as means of recalling experiential mem-
ories into awareness, thus being a key enabler for reflection. More-
over, they see learning itself as a skill which can be learned. How-
ever, unlike Kolb’s Learning Styles and Experiential Learning cycle,
they view this as a set of parallel conversations occurring at different
levels, with task-level conversations ranging over practical activities,
and higher level conversations focusing on the learning process it-
self. We can relate this stratification to Bloom’s taxonomy with the
task-focused conversation spanning simple recall, through to com-
prehension involving an appreciation of the wider context, and the
place of this knowledge in the overall teaching curriculum. They also
observed that traditional teaching practices based on an expert com-
municating their knowledge, may inadvertently reduce a learner’s ca-
pacity for self-organised learning. This result emphasises the need
for good conversation design [20] in the development of Intelligent
Tutoring Systems.
In his Conversation Theory, Gordon Pask develops a similarly
stratified model, but one in which the participants of the conversa-
tions are explicitly identified. Figure 2 illustrates what Pask calls the
‘Skeleton of a Conversation’. The rounded rectangular boxes repre-
sent ‘Psychological Individuals’, or what Pask calls P-Individuals.
Pask is not particularly concerned with specific learning conversa-
tions nor the number of levels, so with Scott [34] we adopt a model
that includes individuals that can be loosely identified with Kolb’s
stages. Both ‘Concrete experience’ and ‘Propose learning activities’
deal with the problem of operational learning and involve reasoning
directly about action. The ‘Conceptualisation of learning outcomes’
and ‘Reflective observation’ work at a higher level, and are con-
cerned with overall comprehension; and are placed correspondingly
higher up in the diagram.
The ellipses represent verbal exchanges, or conversational do-
mains that psychological individuals are able to engage in. Only indi-
viduals at the same level, connected horizontally, interact with each
other in this way. The high-level conversations deal with questions
about ‘Why’ the world works the way it does, while the operational
levels deal in questions about ‘How’ the world works; each level hav-
ing it’s own distinctive language.
The vertical connections represent non-verbal, causal connections
with feedback. The behaviour of the lower-level process can be re-
flected upon and selectively modified in the light of some kind of
failure; for example, when some action fails to produce the predicted
outcome. To ground the operational conversation, individuals at the
lowest level level interact with a real or simulated environment; indi-
cated by the heavier box at the bottom of Figure 2. Interaction with
this environment is similarly understood as a causal or physical in-
teraction.
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Figure 3: Conversational framework used to encode the data for training the Hidden Markov Models. Each conversational act belongs to one
of four classes discriminated by the level of conversation and teaching vs. learning strategy axes.
The P-Individuals in Figure 2 are labelled T0, T1, L0, L1 to re-
flect the most obvious configuration in which the left hand side rep-
resents the ‘Teacher’ (T0 & T1) and the right-hand side, a ‘Learner’
(L0 & L1). Where Kolb describes a solitary learner, this configu-
ration allows us to treat T1 as being concerned with the Int nded
Learning Outcomes whereas L1 represents the learners own inter-
nally constructed and tacit model of their experience. The Teacher
may observe the learner’s progress and at T0, ask the learner lead-
ing operational questions or suggest further experiments. The learner,
L0, puts these suggestions into practice through interaction with the
learning environment E. In this case the processes T0 and T1 are
grouped together as are L0 and L1. Pask called these groupings M-
Individuals, or ‘Mechanical Individuals’, named in a bold attempt
to capture both biological and non-biological embodiments of P-
Individuals, in a move that allows us to admit teaching machines into
the role of Teacher.
Following Kolb more literally, we may arrange individuals T0,
T1, L0, L1 within a single group – within the mind of an auto-
didact or self-learner. The self-learner internalises both the teacher
and learner, and learning proceeds through an internal dialogue be-
tween them. Execution of the cycle would haveL0 engaging with the
environment E; a performance error at this point would be fed up a
level to L1 for reflection, and then across to T1 with the self-learner
asking themselves why the error occurred. Modifications to the con-
ceptual model may suggest new experiments in the environment E
at T0 which are then proposed to L0, and the cycle repeats.
Conversation Theory also allows us to describe scenarios that are
more student-centric, focusing on peer-to-peer collaborative conver-
sations. Collaborative tools are suited to extending the conversation
beyond the lecture theatre and have a place in supporting teams of
students working together on projects. These are generally conversa-
tions at the conceptual level, with T1 and L1 understood as learning
peers; with the model admitting any number of participants into the
conversation.
Collaborative learning environments define define a space where
learning opportunities are provided in the form of technological arte-
facts and computer-mediated environments. The so-called flipped
classroom [11] focuses on an environment E containing tangible ar-
tifacts, and ponderables introduced by the teacher as facilitator T0.
Drawing directly on constructivist theories, it focuses on the learning
experience of the learner L0 and their peers where “the involvement
of others can become both catalyst and catharsis in social learning
contexts.” [13] As before the teacher has a defined set of Learning
Outcomes defined at T1, and there is an expectation that based on
their studies outside the classroom the learner brings Learning In-
comes [31] to the table at L1.
Pask was also concerned with the content of conversations; not the
fine-grained structure of knowledge, but the relationships between
topics [27]. He describes just two relationships:- entailment and ana-
logical relationships. A so-called entailment mesh represents the im-
portant precursors to a given concept [28] and in the ITS this corre-
sponds to the order in which exercises are presented. The sequence
of the questions is set by the conversation designer, each question
building on previous answers. This idea can be related to the idea
of threshold concepts [24] acknowledging the necessity of building
concepts hierarchically. The ITS can also present examples and ask
the student to apply the same idea elsewhere, reinforcing a learned
concept through analogy. The resulting heterarchy of topics is more
like a web of concepts that can be approached from any angle, and in
this case the order is not critical. In the SQLTutor this concept map
is represented very simply as a hypertext, and the conversation is the
exploration of this curriculum by the learner.
3 EXPERIMENT
The primary data for this research are collected through observation
and recording of online interactions between the participant and the
SQLTutor running in a standard web-browser. SQLTutor guides the
student through a number of exercises using a sequence of readings,
demonstrations, and questions. These questions must be answered
in the form of SQL statements that are evaluated by the software
and checked against a model answer. It offers guidance where the
student’s answers are incorrect. While the student is guided along a
path that presents challenges in a logical order, the student is actually
free to move backwards in the sequence to revise content, or to break
out of the sequence entirely and visit any point in the curriculum; no
page is more than 3 clicks away from any other. The student may also
consult online help or refer to the data model underlying the worked
examples. This observational sequence is recorded in a dataset that
is uniquely associated with each participant.
Interactions between the participant and the SQLTutor are cap-
tured by a proxy server to which the participant directs their browser
for the duration of the session. This provides an electronic record
of the Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) visited during the exper-
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imental session. A short checklist is presented to the participant be-
fore the session, to identify any worksheets they may have previously
completed with SQLTutor to estimate their prior knowledge. This in-
formation, combined with the observed record is used to determine
whether participants are revising existing content or exploring new
content.
Analysis identifies a number of learning strategies from the obser-
vational data. The qualitative intent behind these discovered strate-
gies is then recovered by triangulating these observations with
follow-up interviews [7, 6]. These semi-structured online interviews,
carried out via email [8, p.197], mirror back to those participants rel-
evant excerpts from their observed sessions, asking them what they
were trying to achieve. No interpretation was suggested to the partic-
ipant, leaving them free to provide their own interpretation.
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2 0.00
3 0.78
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3 demo/question
1 0.00
2 0.07
3 0.09
4 0.83
4 answer/revise
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2 0.10
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0.08
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0.35
(a) Cluster 1 - “straightforward Q&A” then “trial and error.”
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(b) Cluster 2 - “seeking help” then “straightforward Q&A”.
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2 help/overview
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3 0.00
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0.38
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(c) Cluster 3 - “stuck on a question” and “seeking help”.
Figure 5: Three discovered HMM clusters, each one representing a
distinct learning strategy. Each state is represented by a node, and
transitions between states are shown as directed arcs, labeled with
the conditional probability of that transition occurring. In each state a
symbol can be emitted, and the probabilities of emitting a symbol (1-
4) shown within each state. The symbol with the highest probability
is indicated beneath each state along with its conversational acts.
Five subjects participated in the investigation. For analysis these
five datasets are merged and segmented at the ‘start’ points that
indicate entry to a new worksheet. Segmenting the data at equiv-
alent points, rather than arbitrarily, allows each HMM to start in
the same state. Each visited URL is a page generated by SQLTutor.
The recorded URLs are assigned an initial encoding that indicates
what kind of page has been visited; the meaning of these conver-
sational acts is defined in Table 1. The merged dataset contains 50
sequences, with an average length of 17.28 acts, which are then ran-
domly shuffled to minimise presentation order bias. During training
of the HMMs, the shuffled sequences are divided equally into sepa-
rate training and test sets of 25 sequences each, to reduce over-fitting.
Act Description
overview Index listing worksheets, and subjects
start Worksheet introduction listing contents and related worksheets
read Topical commentary or summary
help Help pages and and documentation for the worked example
demo Demonstration of an SQL command
question Concrete task proposed by the ITS
answer Response in the form of an SQL command, and its evaluation
revise Student revisits an earlier demo, question, or answer page
Table 1: Conversational acts
After Laurillard [19] we re-classify the acts along two dimensions
giving us four separate categories as seen in Figure 3. The first (ver-
tical) dimension distinguishes (level 0) task focused or performance
centric conversations from higher-level (level 1) conversations which
have learning itself as their subject. The learner who lacks the nec-
essary resources to answer a question may explore the range of top-
ics available by returning to a general overview page from which
they can dip back into and revise specific subject areas. They may
also consult general help pages accessible from SQLTutor. Perfor-
mance is grounded in the learning environment, in this case a re-
lational database against which SQL commands can be evaluated,
so performance level conversations are those that demo a command,
ask questions & proffer answers, or revise earlier tasks. Along the
second (horizontal) dimension we discriminate between actions ini-
tiated by the SQLTutor, such as the start of a workshop or an in-
troductory reading, from those initiated by the student learner. This
dimension throws into relief the differences between teaching and
learning strategies.
This provides us with a reduced set of four encodings, representing
four distinct classes of conversational act within Conversation The-
ory. This merging of conceptually similar acts significantly reduces
the size of the search space for Hidden Markov Model clustering.
1. start/read (teacher initiated, learning centric)
2. help/overview (learner initiated, learning centric)
3. demo/question (teacher initiated, performance centric)
4. answer/revise (learner initiated, performance centric)
4 HIDDEN MARKOVMODEL CLUSTERING
Hidden Markov Models are used to model potential learning strate-
gies. HMMs are used because we are only able to observe the ex-
ternal actions that appear in a conversation. We do not, of course,
have access to the internal ‘mental’ states of the learner. A HMM
is a graphical model where each state is represented by a node, and
transitions between states are shown as directed arcs, labeled with
the conditional probability of that transition occurring. In each state
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observing a symbol at time t depends only on the state at time t. If
there are any historical dependencies, these must be somehow encap-
sulated in the current state, in other words the current state is the only
‘memory’ of the HMM.
Each HMM is defined by a pair hT,Ei defining a transition matrix
T and an emission matrix E. These matrices hold the conditional
probability of a given transition, and emission of a symbol, given the
current state. The HMMs representing distinct strategies are initially
unknown so an HMM clustering algorithm [37] is employed to learn
the parameters for a set of HMMs that are, in effect, competing to
represent the observed data.
The MATLAB R  Statistics and Machine Learning Toolbox2 is
used to train a set of HMMs to recover the (hidden) sequence of
states that generated a given set of observed data. The clustering al-
gorithm takes an initially random set of HMMs and partitions the
data by finding the best fitting HMM for each datum (a sequence).
The number of states and clusters is deliberately kept low (between 1
and 3) to counter over-fitting to the data. The HMM is then trained on
that partition (5000 iterations) and the data is re-partitioned and the
process repeated for a fixed number of iterations (50). This employs
the MATLAB function hmmtrain using the Baum-Welch algorithm
[1] which is a hill-climbing search that will converge to a local max-
imum from an initial randomised HMM.
To achieve a global maximum an evidence accumulation tech-
nique is used [10] in which co-occurrences of pairs of sequences in
the same cluster count as votes towards their eventual association.
In addition these co-occurrence counts are weighted by the quality
of the solution as evaluated against the test set. After many voting
rounds (5000), a consensus global clustering is achieved.
To recover the clusters from the weighted co-occurrence matrix,
a minimum-spanning-tree is constructed [18] over the nodes repre-
senting the input sequences and the weakest links are cut below a
threshold in order to form the clusters shown in Figure 4. The indi-
vidual nodes in this figure are sequences of observational data from
the test set, and it can be seen that there are three clusters, labeled as
clusters 1 to 3.
Representative HMMs are then regenerated from the resulting
2 MathWorks http://uk.mathworks.com/products/statistics/
clusters, again using MATLAB’s hmmtrain function, as shown in
Figure 5. Each has 3 states with the transition probabilities indicated
on the directed arcs, and the probabilities of emitting a symbol (1-
4) (the emission vector) is shown within each state. These symbols
correspond to the classes in the framework of Figure 3, and to as-
sist interpretation the symbol with the highest probability is shown
beneath each state along with its corresponding conversational acts.
In most cases the HMM training has identified a single high-
probability emitted symbol for each state. The only exception to this
is the first state in cluster 2 with two approximately equiprobable
symbols (1 and 2). This means that the strategy represented by this
state does not distinguish between Level 1 learning-centric acts, but
does distinguish these from Level-0 performance-centric acts.
4.1 Triangulation by thematic analysis
Given the results of this analysis, the next step was to conduct semi-
structured interviews with the participants to obtain their views on
the strategies they were using at the time. This enables us to trian-
gulate the results of the observational analysis with qualitative com-
ments from each participant, who were asked about representative
examples of their own activity falling within different clusters. Not
all participants exhibited activity from every cluster. Table 2 sum-
marises the results of these interviews. A simple thematic analysis of
the comments, generalising across participants, allows us to pull out
qualitative features which we can use to describe each cluster.
An NVivo R 3 based analysis enables us to encode the appearance
of specific keywords within a comment. These keywords are aggre-
gated to code for certain terms suggested by the discovered learning
strategies. These terms may then be combined in ways that reflect
the learning strategies more closely. For example, the combination
of terms, “seeking help” and “straightforward Q&A” should select
for strategies matching cluster 2.
To test the hypothesis that these combinations of terms discrimi-
nate between the Hidden Markov Model clusters a contingency table
is constructed in Table 3. The rows and columns of this table are
nominal values; clusters 1 to 3 are arranged in columns, and each
row represents criteria expressed as a term or combination of terms.
A row called ‘other’ captures any unmatched comments, so that all
comments are accounted for. The null hypothesis is that these criteria
and the the clusters are independent. A chi-square test cannot be used
3 NVivo http://www.qsrinternational.com/nvivo-product
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here because the expected values are less than 5, so an exact contin-
gency table test is used to calculate the probability of the observed
table. The sum of probabilities for this table is p = 0.008 < 0.05
(5% significance), so we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that
the terms found in thematic analysis are sufficiently discriminatory.
This provides additional support for the learning strategies discov-
ered by Hidden Markov Model clustering.
The following points enumerate the terms used to encode the par-
ticipant’s comments, represented as aggregations of keywords.
• trial & error
– “wrong”
– “trial and error”
– “see what would happen”
– “attempts”, “attempting”
• stuck on a question
– “stuck”
• straightforward Q&A
– “valid”
– “trying”
– “straightforward”
– “confident”
• seeking help
– “structure of the tables”
– “look”
– “help”
– “familiarise”
Drawing on this thematic analysis we are now in a position to
construct an interpretation of the Hidden Markov Models.
Cluster 1 - “straightforward Q&A” then “trial and error.” in Fig-
ure 5(a) begins with a cycle of “straightforward Q&A”, of
demo/question then answer/revise. There is repetition around
‘demo/question’ where SQLTutor provides a sequence of demon-
strations. However, a difficult question may be followed by a flurry
of “trial & error” activity where the same question is answered in-
correctly multiple times. Crucially, and for whatever reason, the
student is not accessing the help system. According to Sleeman
[38] incorrect answers are not always bad, “some floundering can
be vitally important. The crucial meta-skill of knowing when one’s
floundering is useless can only be discovered by trial and error.”
In other words, this floundering can be seen as a learning strat-
egy in which the learner comes to understand how to apply their
knowledge.
Cluster 2 - “seeking help” then “straightforward Q&A”. in Fig-
ure 5(b) is often seen at the beginning of a session where the
learner is following the provided reading matter while trying
to familiarise themselves with the learning environment. This
serial activity [26, p.269] around reading is expected as this
is the default offered by the available teaching strategy. In the
discovered learning strategy this is seen to be followed by a
sequence of “confident” question answering where the subject
correctly answers all the questions. This combination is most
likely to be seen early on when the subject is both unfamiliar with
the environment and the questions are simpler.
Cluster 3 - “stuck on a question” and “seeking help”. in Figure
5(c) contains a question and answer with multiple visits to help
pages interposed between them. Even when an (incorrect?)
answer has been given, there is high probability of need for
further help.
Cluster Subject Comment
1 1 “...simply me working through the worksheetnormally.”
1 1
“...got myself confused using the program,
was attempting to recall how to access certain
parts.”
1 1 “Stuck on a particular question, came down tosyntax of SQL statement.”
1 2 “to pull information from multiple tables in asingle query.”
1 3 “likely to be the straightforward questions, orpages that Ive (sic) opened only once.”
1 3 “questions that I got wrong multiple times. Iused trial and error to get to the answer.”
1 4 “The simple SQL statements sections wasfairly straight forward.”
1 4
“With this cluster I got the arithmetic wrong,
... after a few attempts though I finally
realised my mistake and corrected it.”
1 5
“I’d forgotten the ‘emp’ table name, so I just
put in the incomplete SQL fragment to see
what would happen.”
2 2 “I was trying to familiarise myself withSQLTutor and trying out the SQL sandbox.”
2 3 “questions that I was confident about. Got allof those on first try.”
2 4
“I started off a little confused and began going
back and forth between the help sections and
the first task.”
3 1 “was stuck on a question, so went to look forinformation within the program.”
3 3 “getting familiar with the software andstructure of the tables.”
3 5
“I just needed to use the DESCRIBE
statement for two tables. I already had the
‘help’ page open...”
Table 2: Triangulation of the results of the observational analysis with
qualitative comments from each participant, who were asked about
representative examples of their own activity falling within different
clusters. Not all participants exhibited activity from every cluster.
Cluster: 1 2 3
trial & error 4 0 0
seeking help and straightforward Q&A 0 2 0
stuck on a question and seeking help 0 0 2
other 5 1 1
Table 3: Contingency table where clusters 1 to 3 are arranged in
columns, and each row represents criteria expressed as a term or
combination of terms. The discrimination provided by these crite-
ria provides additional support for the learning strategies discovered
by Hidden Markov Model clustering.
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5 CONCLUSION
This investigation demonstrates the efficacy of using HMM cluster-
ing to discover learning strategies in observational records of inter-
actions with an ITS. The benefit of HMMs is that they provide a
bottom-up approach to learning strategy discovery, rather than defin-
ing them in advance of the investigation. These discovered strate-
gies are seen to recur within sessions and, perhaps more significantly,
across multiple students. Triangulation enables us to recover student
intent via interviews, and verify that these learning strategies have
a stable meaning. This confirms the hypothesis that Conversation
Theory provides an adequate framework for understanding learning
strategies.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Chris Wallace for the continuing development
of SQLTutor4, used extensively in our teaching of Structured Query
Language.
REFERENCES
[1] L. E. Baum, T. Petrie, G. Soules, and N. Weiss, ‘A maximization tech-
nique occurring in the statistical analysis of probabilistic functions of
Markov chains’, Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 41(1), 164–171,
(1970).
[2] Leonard E. Baum and Ted Petrie, ‘Statistical inference for probabilis-
tic functions of finite state markov chains’, Ann. Math. Statist., 37(6),
1554–1563, (12 1966).
[3] P.L. Berger and T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, Open Road Media, 2011.
[4] B.S. Bloom, Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The Classification
of Educational Goals, number v. 1 in Taxonomy of Educational Objec-
tives: The Classification of Educational Goals, D. McKay, 1956.
[5] Kristy Elizabeth Boyer, Eun Young Ha, Michael D. Wallis, Robert
Phillips, Mladen A. Vouk, and James C. Lester, ‘Discovering tutorial
dialogue strategies with hidden markov models’, in Proceedings of
the 2009 Conference on Artificial Intelligence in Education: Building
Learning Systems That Care: From Knowledge Representation to Af-
fective Modelling, pp. 141–148. IOS Press, (2009).
[6] E. Cleaver, M. Lintern, and M. McLinden, Teaching and Learning in
Higher Education: Disciplinary Approaches to Educational Enquiry,
SAGE Publications, 2014.
[7] Louis Cohen, Lawrence Manion, and Keith R. B. Morrison, Research
methods in education (5th edition), Routledge, Oxon, UK, 2000.
[8] M. Denscombe, The Good Research Guide: For Small-scale Social Re-
search Projects, Open UP study skills, McGraw-Hill Education, 2014.
[9] J.L. Doob, Stochastic Processes, Wiley Publications in Statistics, John
Wiley & Sons, 1953.
[10] Ana L. N. Fred and Anil K. Jain, ‘Combining multiple clusterings using
evidence accumulation’, IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell., 27(6),
835–850, (June 2005).
[11] P. Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Continuum, 1970.
[12] H. Fry, S. Ketteridge, and S. Marshall, A Handbook for Teaching and
Learning in Higher Education: Enhancing Academic Practice, Taylor
& Francis, 2003.
[13] Susan Greener, ‘Flipped or blended? what?s the difference and does it
make a difference to learning in he?’, in Proceedings of the 10th Inter-
national Conference on e-learning (ICEL2015), (June 2015).
[14] S. Harri-Augstein and L.F. Thomas, Learning Conversations: The Self-
Organised Learning Way to Personal and Organisational Growth,
Routledge, 1991.
[15] Janet Holland and Marcus Childress, ‘conversation theory conceptual-
ized in e-learning environments’, in Handbook of Conversational De-
sign for Instructional Applications, IGI Global, (2008).
[16] Peter Jarvis, ‘Learning to be a person in society’, in Contemporary The-
ories of Learning: Learning Theorists ... In Their OwnWords, ed., K. Il-
leris, Taylor & Francis, (2009).
4 ‘The Wallace Line’ http://thewallaceline.blogspot.co.uk/2009/02/data-
modelling-tutor.html
[17] D. A. Kolb, Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learn-
ing and Development, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey,
1984.
[18] Joseph B. Kruskal, ‘On the Shortest Spanning Subtree of a Graph and
the Traveling Salesman Problem’, Proceedings of the American Math-
ematical Society, 7(1), 48–50, (February 1956).
[19] D. Laurillard, Rethinking University Teaching: A Conversational
Framework for the Effective Use of Learning Technologies, Rethink-
ing University Teaching: A Conversational Framework for the Effective
Use of Learning Technologies, Routledge/Falmer, 2002.
[20] Rocci Luppicini, ‘Introducing conversation design’, in Handbook of
Conversational Design for Instructional Applications, IGI Global,
(2008).
[21] F. Marton and R. Sa¨ljo¨, ‘On qualitative differences in learning: I – out-
come and process’, British Journal of Educational Psychology, 46(1),
4–11, (1976).
[22] F. Marton and R. Sa¨ljo¨, ‘On qualitative differences in learning: II –
outcome as a function of the learner’s conception of the task’, British
Journal of Educational Psychology, 46(1), 115–127, (1976).
[23] Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, Autopoiesis: The Or-
ganization of the Living, Springer Science & Business Media, 1993.
[24] J. Meyer and R. Land, Overcoming Barriers to Student Understanding:
Threshold Concepts and Troublesome Knowledge, Taylor & Francis,
2006.
[25] G. Pask, Conversation, Cognition and Learning: A Cybernetic Theory
and Methodology, Elsevier, New York, 1975.
[26] G. Pask, The Cybernetics of Human Learning and Performance: A
Guide to Theory and Research, Hutchinson Educational, Hutchinson
Educational, 1975.
[27] G. Pask, Conversation Theory: Applications in Education and Episte-
mology, Elsevier, 1976.
[28] G. Pask and B.C.E. Scott, ‘Caste: A system for exhibiting learning
strategies and regulating uncertainties’, International Journal of Man-
Machine Studies, 5(1), 17 – 52, (1973).
[29] J. Piaget, Genetic epistemology, Columbia University Press, New York,
1970.
[30] Andrew Pickering, The Cybernetic Brain: Sketches of Another Future,
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2009.
[31] P. Race, The Lecturer’s Toolkit: A practical guide to assessment, learn-
ing and teaching, Taylor & Francis, 2014.
[32] P Ramsden, Learning to teach in higher education, Routledge, 2nd
edn., 2003.
[33] Erwin Schro¨dinger, What is Life?, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 1944.
[34] Bernard Scott, ‘Conversation theory: A constructivist, dialogical ap-
proach to educational technology’, Cybernetics and Human Knowing,
8(4), 25–46, (2001).
[35] Claude E. Shannon, ‘A Mathematical Theory of Communication’, The
Bell System Technical Journal, 27(3), 379–423, (1948).
[36] Mike Sharples, ‘Learning as conversation: Transforming education in
the mobile age’, in Seeing, Understanding, Learning in the Mobile Age,
pp. 28–30, (2005).
[37] Benjamin Shih, Kenneth R Koedinger, and Richard Scheines, ‘Discov-
ery of student strategies using hidden markov model clustering’, Inter-
national Conference on Educational Data Mining, (2010).
[38] D. Sleeman and J.S. Brown, Intelligent tutoring systems, Computers
and people series, Academic Press, 1982.
[39] Caitlin Tenison and Christopher J. MacLellan, ‘Modeling strategy use
in an intelligent tutoring system: Implications for strategic flexibil-
ity’, in Intelligent Tutoring Systems: 12th International Conference,
ITS 2014, Honolulu, HI, USA, June 5-9, 2014. Proceedings, eds., Ste-
fan Trausan-Matu, Kristy Elizabeth Boyer, Martha Crosby, and Kitty
Panourgia, 466–475, Springer International Publishing, (2014).
[40] Kenneth E. Vogler, ‘Improve your verbal questioning’, The Clearing
House: A Journal of Educational Strategies, Issues and Ideas, 79(2),
98–103, (2005).
[41] Lev Vygotsky, Thought and Language, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA,
1962.
[42] Lev Vygotsky, Mind in Society, Harvard University Press, 1978.
SYMPOSIUM I. SOCIAL ASPECTS OF COGNITION 20
Co
nfe
re
nc
e
ed
itio
n
Does the brain encode information?
Jakub Mácha1
Abstract.  Our common sense intuition says that when remem-
bering something we store a piece of information in our memory, 
that is, in our brain. We can go further by claiming that the brain 
computes a program by processing information. The computa-
tional theory of the mind treats minds as information processing 
systems. These claims are the main tenets of contemporary cogni-
tive science and neuroscience. Drawing on Searle’s famous Wall 
argument, I argue, counter to these claims, that the brain cannot 
carry information by any reasonable definition of information 
(Shannon, semantic, algorithmic, quantum). Possessing infor-
mation cannot be an intrinsic feature of any material object, in-
cluding the brain. If the brain cannot store any information, it can-
not compute any function or run any program, for non-trivial 
functions and programs presuppose the input information. Hence, 
the analogy between hardware/software and brain/mind is flawed 
in this respect. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
There has been always a human desire to explain the mind with 
the help of an analogy to the most developed technology of the 
time, and a desire to build a machine that would be (like) a human 
mind. Once it was a wax tablet, then it was a hydraulic system, a 
mechanic system, the steam engine, the phonograph, a camera, a 
hologram. And since the middle of the 20th century, it has been 
the computer.2 
The analogy between the human mind and the computer is appeal-
ing. Some of its parts are clearly correct and worth further re-
search. The central tenet of this analogy is that the human brain 
(or body) is analogous to the hardware and the human mind is 
analogous to software. There is some truth in this. For instance, 
there is the fact that the causal mechanical processes in the hard-
ware, which cause programs to run, is analogous to the fact that 
certain (biological, molecular, causal) processes in the brain give 
rise to the appearance of the human mind. To put this in negative 
terms, not having software without hardware is analogous to no 
mind without a brain. This relationship is nowadays called super-
venience: any change in a mental state implies a change in a phys-
ical state. What kind of processes and on which level are these 
responsible for the appearance of the human mind is one of the 
big questions facing cognitive science and philosophy today. 
The core of the analogy is: Since computers process information, 
i.e. compute, brains must be able to compute as well. The analogy, 
thus, depends on the notions of computer and computation. In 
computer science, computers are usually modelled as Turing ma-
chines, the notion of computation remains somehow vague and 
ambiguous (cf. Searle’s “standard textbook definition” of compu-
                                                 
1 Department of Philosophy, Masaryk University, Arna Nováka 1, 602 00 
Brno, Czech Republic, email: macha@mail.muni.cz. 
2 See [1] as an exemplary article: “The Memory Code” with the subtitle: 
“Researchers are closing in on the rules that the brain uses to lay down 
tation below). I shall focus on one component of the Turing ma-
chine: the tape which is the machine’s memory. In Turing’s 
words: “The machine is supplied with a ‘tape’ (the analogue of 
paper) running through it, and divided into sections (called 
‘squares’) each capable of bearing a ‘symbol.’” [2] In our analogy, 
the tape is a model of human memory. Here is an outline of the 
first part of my argument: If brains are computers, they must be 
able to process information. If they are able to process infor-
mation, they must be able to store and retrieve it in their memory. 
In short, the brain must be able to encode information. Before we 
focus on the notion of information, which is the main topic of this 
paper, let us discuss a stronger instance of our analogy, which is 
the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). 
Although there are different versions of CTM, its core can be 
summed up as follows: the brain is essentially a computer (hard-
ware) and the mind is essentially a program (software). Mental 
states and processes are essential computational states and pro-
cesses. So, for instance, Jerry Fodor says: “Insofar as we think of 
mental processes as computational (hence as formal operations 
defined on representations) it will be natural to take the mind to 
be, inter alia, a kind of computer. That is, we will think of the 
mind as carrying out whatever symbol manipulations are consti-
tutive of the hypothesized computational processes. […] we may 
thus construe mental operations as pretty directly analogous to 
those of a Turing machine. There is, for example, a working 
memory (corresponding to a tape)” [3, p.65]. David Chalmers 
claims “that computational descriptions of physical systems serve 
to specify their causal organization (or causal topology), and that 
cognitive processes and properties are organizational invariants 
that are determined by the abstract causal organization of the sys-
tem.” [4, p.3]  
John Searle, in a series of thought experiments and arguments, ar-
gued that the brain-computer analogy and especially CTM are 
misguided. He came out with the following structure of his argu-
ment (which captures his Chinese room argument, although not in 
the form of a thought experiment): 
– Axiom 1. Computer programs are formal (syntactic). 
– Axiom 2. Human minds have mental contents (semantics). 
– Axiom 3. Syntax by itself is neither constitutive of nor suffi-
cient for semantic content. 
– Conclusion 1. Programs are neither constitutive of nor suffi-
cient for minds. [5, p.27] 
By this argument, Searle maintained that a computer can produce 
a perfect simulation of the human mind’s cognitive capacities like 
understanding a language without having these capacities. I take 
Searle’s Chinese room argument to show, inter alia, that seman-
tics cannot be ascribed to an agent on the basis of observing its 
behavior (e.g. on the basis of the Turing test).  
memories. Discovery of this memory code could lead to the design of 
smarter computers and robots and even to new ways to peer into the human 
mind”. 
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As we have seen for Fodor, computational states are defined on 
representations, i.e. semantically. There are, however, versions of 
CTM that do not rest on semantics. That is, it doesn’t matter what 
computational states represent or what they refer to. Chalmers 
clearly endorses this view: “Semantic notions such as that of rep-
resentation played no role in that account.” [4, p.6] The Chinese 
room argument therefore does no harm for such a version of CTM. 
What all versions of CTM have in common is that it is essential 
for the computation, and ergo for the mind, that the computer ma-
nipulates symbols, i.e. that computers are syntactical machines. 
Hence, Turing, Fodor and Chalmers, all accept Searle’s Axiom 1.3 
In 1992, Searle [7] published an even more radical argument: Any 
material object can compute any program; for instance, the wall 
behind me can be interpreted as computing the Wordstar program 
(a word processing program from the 1980s). If this were so, the 
fact that an object computes a program would be trivial. This ar-
gument is sometimes called a triviality argument against function-
alism or computationalism about the mind.4 Why can Searle claim 
that a wall is implementing the Wordstar program? He presup-
poses, what he calls the standard textbook definition of computa-
tion, which is equivalent to Axiom 1 above: that computation is 
defined syntactically as a manipulation of symbols. Now, given a 
syntactical description of an object, we can say “there is some pat-
tern of molecule movements which is isomorphic with the formal 
structure of Wordstar”. 
One may wonder, however, what the formal structure of Wordstar 
actually is. Is it a particular run of the program when it is editing 
a particular text? I think we can assume that there exists such a 
description of the wall that is isomorphic to this instance of Word-
star. Or there is a single description of the wall that is isomorphic 
with the formal structure of any run of Wordstar? Not the actual 
run of the program, but also every possible run. Chalmers [9] crit-
icized such triviality arguments (especially Putnam’s version of 
them) against CTM that they cannot accommodate possible, but 
non-actual (counterfactual) situations. Definitely, there does exist 
a description of the wall where it is isomorphic with a particular 
run of Wordstar. However, given Chalmers’ argument, there is no 
single description of the wall that would cover every possible run 
of Wordstar. There is, of course, a single description of any desk-
top computer that covers every run of Wordstar. Or in today’s 
terms, there is a natural description of a PC so that it is isomorphic 
to every possible run of MS Word 2016. This amounts to the al-
most trivial fact that MS Word 2016 can be run on every contem-
porary PC, but not on every wall. 
Did, then, Chalmers provide a knock-down counter-argument 
against triviality arguments? In my view he didn’t, because the 
notion of computation is not the main focus of Searle’s argument. 
I think the central claims of the argument are: “Syntax […] is not 
intrinsic to physics. […] Syntax and symbols are observer rela-
tive.” [10, p.35] 
                                                 
3 Objection (by J. Haugeland [6]): Computers run programs which are se-
quences of instructions. They are able to interpret these programs accord-
ing to an encoding. They do something more than just manipulating sym-
bols. Hence, computers have a syntax as well as semantics. My reply: 
When a computer runs a program, it gets the program on its input. In ab-
stract terms, a universal Turing machine gets a program on its input tape. 
There must be an encoding of this input data, i.e. information. Then, how-
In short, the Chinese room argument says that semantics is ob-
server relative; and Searle’s Wall argument says that syntax is ob-
server relative as well. Both aren’t intrinsic to a physical system 
like a brain. Because the notion of computation involves either 
syntax alone or both syntax and semantics, computation cannot 
capture the intrinsic features of a brain. 
I’m going to argue that we can arrive at these claims without in-
voking the notion of computation or implementation. I will em-
ploy the notion of information instead. As I have argued above, 
computation is in fact information processing. The notion of in-
formation is thus a part of the notion of computation in the fol-
lowing sense: If information is not intrinsic to a system, then com-
putation is neither. The advantages of this approach are that 
information doesn’t involve any temporal or modal dimension 
that is liable to Chalmers’ argument (i.e., that storing or encoding 
information means encoding any possible piece of information at 
any time, given physical limits) and that the notion of information 
is clearly defined. I’m going to consider every relevant notion of 
information in order to show that they involve syntax or seman-
tics. 
There are many conceptions of information. Primarily, we have to 
focus on those conceptions that are relevant in computer science. 
These are, no doubt, Shannon information, algorithmic (or Kol-
mogorov) information and more recently, quantum information. 
Moreover, I will consider semantic accounts of information as 
well. 
2 SHANNON INFORMATION 
Shannon [11] defines the information of a message or symbol S 
as –log2pS where pS is the probability of the occurrence of S. If the 
probability of the occurrence of S is 0.5, i.e. that it is equally prob-
able that S occurs and that S does not occur, then S generates in-
formation of 1 bit (= –log20.5). 
First, we have to make clear what counts as a message or symbol. 
It can be a letter, a binary code, a continuous function, a vector of 
several functions or any combination of these [11]. In fact, any 
object can generate information. Let us take for example a toaster 
that can be in two states: on and off. Let the probability of being 
on be p and the probability of being off be 1–p. The average 
amount of information the toaster generates is then –p.log2p – (1–
p).log2(1–p). If a toaster can generate information, then a neuron 
can do so as well. Let us assume that a neuron can fire an action 
potential, and that the probability of its firing is p. Then the neuron 
can generate information of –log2p. 
Two interrelated points are our focus now: 
(1) Every phenomenon can be interpreted as a symbol and as a 
bearer of information. I’ll call this fact a syntactic point.5 
(2) It does not matter what this symbol means or refers to. This is 
a semantic point. 
Let us now focus on the syntactic point. Every phenomenon (sit-
uation, state of affairs, event) can be interpreted as a symbol, i.e. 
ever, the computer or the universal Turing only manipulates these sym-
bols. Computational semantics can be, thus, accounted for in syntactic 
terms. 
4 Putnam [8] came up with a similar and more detailed argument. Nothing 
in my account rests however on Putnam’s version of the argument. 
5 Cf. Dretske [12]: “Any situation may be taken, in isolation, as a generator 
of information.” Or Searle [7]: “The ascription of syntactical properties is 
always relative to an agent or observer who treats certain physical phe-
nomena as syntactical.” 
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as a bearer of information. This means that there must be an ex-
ternal agent that decides which phenomena are taken or recog-
nized as symbols. “S” may by a symbol, or a random shape on the 
screen. Lower case “s” may be the same symbol or another sym-
bol. We can consider the toaster as capable of being in two states: 
on and off. The toaster can encode any number as its temperature. 
It can be a natural number or even a real number (up to a certain 
accuracy of measurement). Finally, we can say that a neuron is 
either firing (emitting its action potential) or not firing. Then a 
neuron would encode one bit of information (like the toaster ca-
pable of being either on or off). There are, however, many ways 
how to interpret the state of a neuron, i.e. there are many neural 
encoding schemes.6 We can look at the duration, the amplitude, or 
the shape of actions potentials. Or, we can consider the frequency 
of neuronal firings (spike firings). More importantly, we can, in-
stead of a single neuron, take blocks of neurons as the basic unit 
of information encoding. 
As I have argued above, every computation presupposes an infor-
mation encoding. In fact, even a stronger claim can be put forward 
here: that different information encodings lead to different com-
putations on the same physical states. Here is an example of such 
a case taken from Shagrir [14]: 
Consider a physical system P that works as follows: It 
emits 5-10 volts if it receives voltages greater than 5 
from each of the two input channels, and 0-5 volts oth-
erwise. Assigning ‘0’ to emission/reception of 0-5 volts 
and ‘1’ to emission/reception of 5-10 volts, the physical 
gate implements the logical AND-gate: ‘0’,’0’ → ‘0’; 
‘0’,’1’ → ’0’; ‘1’,’0’ → ‘0’; ‘1’,’1’ → ‘1’. 
Let us suppose it turns out that flip detectors of P are 
actually tri-stable. Imagine, for example, that P emits 5-
10 volts if it receives voltages greater than 5 from each 
of the two input channels; 0-2.5 volts if it receives under 
2.5 volts from each input channel; and 2.5-5 volts oth-
erwise. Let us now assign the symbol ‘0’ to emission/re-
ception of under 2.5 volts and ‘1’ to emission/reception 
of 2.5-10 volts. Under this assignment, P is now imple-
menting the OR-gate: ‘0’,’0’ → ‘0’; ‘0’,’1’ → ‘1’; 
‘1’,’0’ → ‘1’; ‘1’,’1’ → ‘1’. 
Two different encodings are considered in this example. On the 
first encoding, the emission/reception of 0-5 volts encodes ‘0’ and 
the emission/reception of 5-10 volts encodes ‘1’. On the second 
encoding, the emission/reception of 0-2.5 volts encodes ‘0’ and 
the emission/reception of 2.5-10 volts encodes ‘1’. Let us assume 
that voltages are intrinsic properties of the physical system (they 
don’t need to be, see below). These encoding are, however, as-
signed by an external agent. Thus, they are not intrinsic to the 
physical system.7 A mere choice of the encoding can determine 
what function is computed by the system, whereas the underlying 
physical states are the same in both cases.  
Shagrir concludes from his example that “the very same physical 
system P simultaneously implements two distinct logical gates”. 
But why simultaneously? The two encodings are mutually exclu-
sive. The system implements either the AND-gate, or the OR-gate, 
depending on the choice the encoding. Blackmon [16] proposes to 
treat the implementation of a computation as “a three-place rela-
                                                 
6 See [13] for an overview. 
7 This point is indicated in Dennett’s 1969 dissertation: “The electrical 
characteristics of an impulse sequence, or the molecular characteristics of 
tion over causal structures of physical things, programs, and map-
pings”. This mapping which maps causally related physical states 
to symbols is our information encoding. Given this terminological 
clarification, no physical system can simultaneously implement 
different computations. 
All these considerations lead us to the following: Does infor-
mation encoding depend on the encoding agent, i.e. is encoding 
observer-relative? Advocates of CTM have to come up with an 
account of information that is independent of the encoding agent. 
It is clear now, however, that Shannon-information is not. This 
leads to the following conclusion: If one is interpreting a physical 
state (S, a toaster, a neuron) as a bearer of (Shannon-)information, 
the agent has to come up with an encoding, i.e. a method of rec-
ognizing physical states as symbols. 
This is, however, precisely Searle’s point: “For any program and 
for any sufficiently complex object, there is some description of 
the object under which it is implementing the program.” [6, p.208] 
Now amending this point to the present case: For any information 
content and for any sufficiently complex object, there is some en-
coding under which the object encodes this information content. 
3 SEMANTIC INFORMATION 
The semantic point has sometimes been seen as the reason why 
Shannon’s theory has been accused of neglecting the semantic as-
pect of information [17, p.1]. It does not matter whether symbol S 
means “It is a day” or “The number of my hairs is even”. And it 
does not matter whether the fact that the toaster is on means that 
it is heating or that the sky is blue. The firing of a neuron may 
mean that this neuron has been stimulated (for example, by an-
other neuron or, in the causal chain, by an object in the visual 
field). The connection between a symbol and what it means or re-
fers to, can be natural or conventional. A natural connection is a 
law-like connection between two states (without any intermediate 
agent), the most common being a causal regularity (but other reg-
ularities are also conceivable, e.g. visual resemblance). A conven-
tional connection between two states is a semantic function that 
mediates between these states and is set up from outside by an 
agent (or agents). There is a natural connection, for example, be-
tween the number of growth rings on a stump and the tree’s age 
(this is an example of environmental information). There are also 
connections that are partly natural and partly conventional, e.g. 
visual resemblance may depend on a perspective which presup-
poses an external agent. 
There are various accounts of semantic information, e.g. Bar-Hil-
lel and Carnap [17], Dretske [12], Floridi [18], which compute the 
amount of information according to the probability of obtaining 
situations, states of affair, events, possible worlds. In contrast to 
these accounts, what affects the amount of (Shannon-)information 
are the relative probabilities of the occurrence of a symbol. We 
may learn about these probabilities by considering what these 
symbols mean (e.g. we can research the relative probabilities of 
letters, words, expressions in a language). The semantic accounts 
of information are, however, not relevant in computer science. 
When we say that a hard disk has the capacity of 80 GB, all that 
matters are the probabilities of its states (which are all equal in 
a nerve fibre could not independently determine what the impulses mean 
[i.e. the semantic point], or what message [i.e. the syntactic point] the 
nerve fibre carries” [15]. 
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this case). It doesn’t matter what is stored on the hard disk. What-
ever content is stored there, its capacity remains unchanged. In 
sum, computer science works neither with environmental seman-
tic information, nor with conventional semantic information. 
4 ALGORITHMIC AND QUANTUM INFOR-
MATION 
There are two other accounts of information that are relevant in 
computer science: algorithmic information and quantum infor-
mation. I am now going to argue that neither of these accounts can 
do without encoding. 
The motivation for the algorithmic information theory (Solomon-
off [19], Kolmogorov [20], Chaitin [21]) was the problem of as-
signing a priori probabilities to symbols (in Shannon) or to situa-
tions (in Bar-Hillel and Carnap). The problem is that there is no 
universal method of assigning these probabilities. The main idea 
is as follows: The information content of a string x is the length of 
the shortest program that gives x on its output on a given reference 
universal Turing machine. Formally: AI(x) = minp{l(p): U(p) = 
x}, where l(p) gives the length of p in bits, U is a universal Turing 
machine and U(p) = x means that program p, when run on U out-
puts x. Intuitively, this definition gives us the length of the shortest 
description of a given string, i.e. the length of the best compres-
sion of it.8 
There might be the hope that algorithmic information would over-
come the problem with arbitrary encodings which fuels the core 
of Searle’s Wall argument. Algorithmic information strives after 
the best encoding of a given string. Instead of choosing an arbi-
trary encoding, algorithmic information takes the best one. This 
move allows us to overcome the arbitrariness of the encoding of 
semantic information. In other words, it allows us to cope with the 
arbitrariness of encoding within the semantic point (2) above. The 
present argument is, however, based on the arbitrariness of the 
encoding of symbols (the syntactic point (1) above). The algorith-
mic information is the amount of information of a string. It is left 
open here what actually counts as a string, however. Hence, there 
must be an encoding that says which phenomena can count as 
symbols. This encoding is however as arbitrary as in the case of 
Shannon-information. And there is another additional problem 
with algorithmic information: and that is that it is always relative 
to a referential universal Turing machine. 
 
Let us turn now to quantum information which is another account 
of information that has been successfully applied in computer sci-
ence as well as in the brain sciences. Quantum mind is the idea—
made famous by Roger Penrose—that considers that genuine 
quantum processes can (at least partly) explain the relation be-
tween mind/consciousness and the brain (cf. Penrose [22]; Beck 
and Eccles [23]; see Atmanspacher [24] for an overview). There 
have already been numerous ways proposed for how quantum pro-
cesses might cause or correlate consciousness. They are all very 
intricate, but also controversial. The present perspective is slightly 
different. Can the mind/brain problem be explained with the help 
of an analogy to quantum processing and computers? If so, we 
have to ask how quantum information can be stored or encoded in 
a brain while being considered as a quantum system. 
                                                 
8 The aim of compression programs is to be close to this best rate. 
Quantum information is much closer to Shannon-information than 
to algorithmic or semantic information. The basic idea is that in-
formation is represented by quantum states which can be in a su-
perposition (i.e. more states can be added – superposed together). 
There are many peculiarities of such states that go beyond classi-
cal mechanics, e.g. quantum states cannot be cloned (duplicated), 
destroyed, without the loss converted into classical states; they 
can be, on the other hand, teleported, i.e. transported into other 
underlying physical substratum. It seems, hence, that quantum 
mechanics allows what classical physics does not: to transfer a 
quantum state into another underlying medium. My response to 
this is that even if this were possible (and we are far from knowing 
it), there is no need to invoke the notion of information. There is 
no added value from speaking of quantum information instead of 
speaking of quantum states in explaining quantum processes in 
the brain. 
In the end, we can reemploy the argument from section 2: A quan-
tum state must be recognized or taken as a bearer of quantum in-
formation (the syntactic point (1) above). For example: quantum 
states A and B are realized in the spin of certain electrons. This is, 
however, encoding similar to the encoding of classical Shannon-
information. Without such an encoding, there would be no use of 
invoking the concept of quantum information. 
5 POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
The Homunculus objection: The encoding agent is in the brain or 
in the mind. It’s called a homunculus. Such a homunculus is a 
mind-like entity and we would need an independent explanation 
of its nature and skills in order to avoid a potential infinite regress. 
The other problem is that even if there were a homunculus that 
could come with the encoding, we (as external observers) 
wouldn’t have any epistemic access to this encoding. Dennett [25] 
proposed that there is a way of getting rid of the homunculi re-
gress. As complex computational operations can be analyzed or 
decomposed into simpler operations so the homunculus in the 
mind is a substantially simpler (or stupider) entity. The regress 
reaches its bottom when the homunculus performs simple opera-
tions. Then there can be a mechanistic account of such a way of 
functioning. Dennett says explicitly that this machine may be “a 
neurone, or a flip-flop in a computer that only has to remember 0 
or 1 as its only expertise” [26, pp.87–88]. However, as we see 
from this brief quotation, even the machine-like homunculus op-
erates with symbols, i.e. with bearers of information. Even if this 
homunculus were as simple as the neural gate discussed above, 
there would have to be another agent that would supply an infor-
mation encoding. Converting the simplest computer into a ma-
chine thus fails. The homunculi regress is, hence, not blocked. As 
Searle puts it: “the only way to get the syntax intrinsic to the phys-
ics is to put a homunculus in the physics” [10, p.29]. 
 
Let us move now to another attempt of putting syntax and seman-
tics into the physics, or better into say, in nature – to the evolu-
tionary and teleological theories of mental content, sometimes 
called teleosemantics. Dretske’s semantic account of information 
may be seen as a kind of teleosemantics. Let us first look at Ruth 
Millikan’s influential account. Millikan claims that human brains 
(as well as other organs and parts of bodies) have biological pur-
poses which are “functions that they have historically performed”. 
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[27, p.330] Such functions are, in Millikan’s account, the results 
of meme selections (there are other accounts of selections and 
other accounts of the origins of biological functions such as learn-
ing or conditioning). 
If evolutionary design is responsible for the selection of a compu-
tational function, then the same evolutionary mechanism must be 
responsible for the selection of the right information encoding. If 
the encoding were undetermined, then it could be undetermined 
likewise whether the AND-gate or the OR-gate has been selected. 
The underlying physical states and causal structures implement-
ing the one gate or the other are thus identical. An advocate of a 
teleological explanation of computational functions is, thus, com-
mitted to the claim that the evolutionary mechanism is able to se-
lect between two different features that have physical and causal 
powers. This means that the evolutionary mechanism could be 
able to distinguish non-naturalistic properties. 
This initial objection against my account from a teleosemantic po-
sition can be turned into an objection against teleosemantics itself. 
This objection has been discussed under the label “functional in-
determinacy problem”, cf. Dennett [28] or Fodor [29]. 
 
Simon Blackmon recently objected to Searle’s Wall argument that 
on the three-place notion of computation (see above), the univer-
sal realization is blocked, and the conditioning on the existence of 
an encoding possesses no real problem to still seeing a scientific 
character of the computational investigation of the mind. This ar-
gument is by an analogy to motion and location in physics and to 
meaning in linguistics. In physics, motion and location is assigned 
relative to frames of reference. In linguistics, meaning are as-
signed relative to an interpretation. Physics and linguistics both 
hold nevertheless the status of sciences. Computation is assigned 
relative to an encoding. Computational cognitive science holds a 
scientific status too. Information encoding is, thus, like a frame of 
reference or an interpretation. If physics is able to discover the 
intrinsic features of the world, then cognitive science is able to 
discover the intrinsic features of the brain. 
This is a serious objection. I accept most of Blackmon’s presup-
positions: On his analysis of the notion of computation, the uni-
versal realization is, indeed, blocked and information encoding is 
like a frame of reference in physics or a linguistic interpretation. 
However, motion or location are not intrinsic features of a brain. 
Suppose that brain research discovers the brain centrum A is lo-
cated 9 cm from the brain centrum B. This doesn’t imply that the 
number 9 is an essential feature of the brain. We can use another 
unit of length and say that the distance between these centrums is 
3.54 inches. By the same argument, neither voltages are intrinsic 
features of the brain. Arguably, different units of length don’t 
bother physics so much, for there are simple methods of convert-
ing one unit into another one; there is no room for any indetermi-
nacy.9 Things get more complicated when we consider meanings 
and interpretations. As we know from Quine’s and Davidson’s 
well known arguments on linguistic indeterminacy, to translate 
one language into another or to interpret one language in another 
can be at times a very complicated affair. Blackmon writes: 
Significant attributions of program implementation, like 
those of motion and meaning, are comparative and con-
trastive acts. What we seek empirically is some default 
standard mapping, that mapping by which we can make 
                                                 
9 This holds for classical (Newtonian) physics only. 
objective discoveries of relevant similarities and differ-
ences holding not only among the brains of various bi-
ological organisms but also among artificial systems. 
[16] 
According to this suggestion, there is a default interpretation by 
which we can make objective discoveries of linguistic behavior. 
But this idea is futile, as to interpret one’s linguistic behavior is a 
one-time affair, cf. for example Davidson’s essay “A Nice De-
rangement of Epitaphs” [30] for a detailed argument. The same 
indeterminacy concerns information encoding (except that Da-
vidson argued for a semantic indeterminacy, while I am arguing 
for a syntactic indeterminacy). Information encoding is therefore 
more like linguistic interpretation rather than like a frame of ref-
erence in physics.   
 
The Intentionality objection: The present argument rests on 
Searle’s notion of intentionality. The advantage of my argument 
is, however, that it doesn’t rest on Searle’s conception of inten-
tionality, esp. his distinction between the original intentionality, 
which is the feature of genuine mental states, and the derived in-
tentionality, which can be applied onto the states of computers. 
This is, of course, due to the fact that I don’t provide any positive 
account of the mind/brain relation. 
6 WHAT ARE INFORMATIONAL EXPLANA-
TIONS FOR: TWO POOL CUE BALLS 
Before we proceed to the concluding section, allow me to illus-
trate my point that describing a system in terms of information 
processing is an epistemological or a pragmatic choice. 
Let us have two balls on a pool table, and call them A and B. Let 
us assume ball A is moving and directly hits ball B. The law of 
the conservation of linear momentum says that the linear momen-
tum (i.e. the product of mass and velocity) of A is transferred to 
the linear momentum of B (disregarding the influence of the en-
vironment). Now, assume an agent α stipulates that the linear mo-
mentum of an object encodes information (as a real number up to 
a certain accuracy, in gram meter per second). A ball that is not 
moving encodes 0, a ball weighing 10 g that is moving at a veloc-
ity of 1 m/s encodes number 10, the same ball when moving at a 
velocity of 0.5 m/s encodes 5 etc. Given this encoding, we can say 
that there is an information transfer from ball A to ball B after the 
collision. Or on colliding, ball A informs ball B about its momen-
tum. However, an agent β could bring up another encoding by 
stipulating that the weight of an object encodes information. 
Given this encoding, we cannot then say that ball A informs ball 
B on collision. There is no information transfer, because the 
weights of the balls remain unchanged after a typical collision on 
a pool table. 
On α’s encoding, a collision between A and B counts as a transfer 
of information, but on β’s encoding the same event doesn’t count 
as a transfer of information. The crucial question is now: What 
description of the collision is preferable? We can describe the sit-
uation by Newton Laws (which include the law of conservation of 
linear momentum) or in terms of information transfer, either by 
α’s encoding or by β’s encoding (and there are infinitely many 
encodings). From an ontological point of view, a mechanical de-
scription is fundamental, because it is observer independent. 
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There might be epistemological reasons, however, to prefer a de-
scription in terms of information transfer and furthermore practi-
cal reasons to prefer α’s encoding or β’s encoding. 
It is convenient to describe computers in terms of information 
transfer, because they were designed for information processing. 
It might be useful to describe the brain (or its parts) also in terms 
of information processing. But to say that the mind/consciousness 
is not intrinsically biological, but rather that it is computational, is 
conceptually flawed. 
7 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Let me now recap my argument: My starting point is the analogy 
between hardware/software and brain/mind. The brain is analo-
gous to a computer. As computers have memory in which infor-
mation can be stored, brains also must be capable of storing infor-
mation. The analysis of every account of information that is 
relevant for this analogy shows, however, that storing information 
presupposes its encoding. Encoding means taking or recognizing 
certain physical properties (e.g. voltages in the brain) as symbols 
or messages. Information encoding is analogous to the syntax of 
a language (i.e. recognizing certain shapes as letters and words). 
I argued that every encoding presupposes an encoding agent. The 
notion of storing information in a computer or a brain is relative 
to this agent (it’s an observer-relative notion in Searle’s words). 
The brain itself doesn’t encode any information (where “itself” 
means “in an absolute / intrinsic / ontological / observer-independ-
ent sense”). Information encoding as well as syntax is not intrinsic 
to physics. Dennett proposed that what we need are “systems 
which store, transmit and process information in non-syntactic 
form” [15, p.87]. I hope to have shown that all relevant accounts 
of information cannot do without encoding, i.e. without syntax 
and that syntax cannot be accounted for in physicalist terms. 
An immediate implication of this is: If the brain cannot store any 
information, it cannot compute any function or run any program, 
for non-trivial functions and programs presuppose some input in-
formation. Hence, the analogy between hardware/software and 
brain/mind is flawed (or it is “the most far-fetched and least use-
ful” in Dennett’s words). Nevertheless, the computational theory 
of the mind might be still true. The burden upon an advocate of 
CTM is however—following Dennett’s suggestion—to provide 
an account of the information encoding/syntax that is observer-
independent (or to get rid of the syntactic indeterminacy discussed 
in sect. 5). That would, in my view, involve accounting for the 
independent ontological reality of abstract entities (for syntax is 
an abstraction, i.e. recognizing particular features out of phenom-
ena as symbols). It seems, thus, that CTM is committed to some 
kind of metaphysical realism in the end. 
In the broad perspective, information is an epistemic notion. It is 
a syntactic notion (in Shannon’s, the algorithmic or quantum 
sense) and it is a semantic notion (in Bar-Hillel–Carnap’s and 
Dretske’s sense). Using the concept of information in a non-epis-
temic, i.e. in an ontological sense is inconsistent with these ac-
counts. 
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Let the Machines out.
Towards Hybrid Social Systems.
Michael Straeubig 1
1 INTRODUCTION
When Alan Turing proposed the imitation game as a method to in-
vestigate the question if machines can think, he described a social
system. However, the various disciplines that have pursued this sem-
inal enquiry rarely touch base with sociological concepts. Cybernet-
ics developed into various interdisciplinary fields, yet it was mainly
rooted in physiological models. In the meantime, the mainstream of
AI focused on cognitive problem solving, predominately from a top-
down approach. Traditional cognitive science rests on the concept
of organisms as information processing systems - so does Artificial
Life, but from a biological simulation perspective. The recently revi-
talised branch of machine learning has been successful in deploying
bottom-up models combined with large amounts of data. Large scale
simulations of the brain are expected to deliver new knowledge about
the human brain. ”Second-generation” cognitive science and devel-
opmental robotics are embodied and apply neural computation.
One might be tempted to say that progress has been made on
brains, bodies and on models of minds. I claim that there is some-
thing largely missing in this picture, which is the social aspect. There
is Social AI, and it embraces a wide variety of topics and concerns
- from Stafford Beers cybernetic vision of society to simulations
of interacting agents, complex systems theory, language, imitation
and social learning, social network analysis and social bots, enact-
ment, human-machine interaction, augmented and virtual environ-
ments, robot assisted therapy and behavioural game theory, to name
a few. I also would like to include autonomous weapons, computer
worms and viruses, in particular crypto-ransomware, into this context
of social systems. From the other side, an interdisciplinary bridge is
constructed under the label of digital sociology. The process of mu-
tual approximation is accompanied by prolific discourses around ma-
chine ethics and emerging legal issues. A recently introduced topic
of discussion is if robots should pay taxes.
So AI observes sociology, and sociology observes AI - yet they
do not share a coherent theoretical program and fundamental on-
tological questions are still left to the philosophers. To propose an
alternative route, I consider Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social sys-
tems as a suitable foundation for guiding the development of hybrid
social systems. A hybrid social system is understood as a social as-
semblage in which minds and machines mingle: humans, machines,
certain things, cyborgs. Some animals are welcome, too.
To this end, I present a few selected features of Luhmann’s theory
and briefly visit some of their theoretical foundations: distinctions, in
particular the distinction between system and environment, autopoi-
etic systems, radical constructivism, and (second order) cybernetics.
1 Cognovo and School of Art, Design and Architecture, Plymouth University,
UK, email: michael.straeubig@plymouth.ac.uk
I speculate about some of the implications that arise from developing
hybrid social systems based on this particular direction of systems
theory.
2 ROOTS
The following description focuses on five major influences of Luh-
mann’s theory that are relevant for the present discussion.
Distinctions: The abstract foundation for Luhmann’s theory lies
in the distinction between distinction and identity. The formal back-
ground has been developed by George Spencer-Brown in his calculus
of indications. While his work ”Laws of Form” can be read as the de-
scription of a specific logical calculus, Spencer-Brown’s intention is
”proto-logical”. It demonstrates that the fundamental operation of a
system is drawing distinctions (as opposed to constructing identities).
System/Environment distinction: There are two fundamentally
different ways to observe a system. Traditionally systems are under-
stood by relations between their elements. In AI, these elements are
constructed as agents that perceive, act and communicate. The be-
haviour of the system is then observed and analysed according to
certain metrics, either derived from the individual behaviours or as
emergent properties. The second approach, going back to Ludwig
von Bertalanffy, identifies the relevant distinction for a system as the
one between the system and its environment. Those systems are op-
erationally closed and are located within the respective environments
of each other.
Autopoietic systems: the term ”autopoietic system” was coined
by Chilean biologists Humbero Maturana and Francisco Varela. Au-
topoiesis denotes the capability of a system to produce and when
necessary reproduce their own elements. To observe autopoiesis, the
respective system references are crucial. Biological cells are autopoi-
etic systems; they (re-)construct their own elements. Humans grow
legs, but do not re-grow a lost one. Axolotls do, however, with the
help of some friends.
Radical constructivism: An epistemological position regarding the
distinction between a system and its environment arises from the
school of radical constructivism. According to this view, knowledge
is not construed as a representation of an external reality, but as a
state of the system that enables some fit with the environment. Theo-
ries of acting/enactment arrive at similar conclusions from different
premises.
Second order cybernetics: the original concept of cybernetics was
developed by Norbert Wiener in his groundbreaking description of
self-regulating control loops. Second order cybernetics developed
these concepts further by introducing the observer into the obser-
vation. We arrive at systems of observers observing each other. This
paradigm shift is comparable to the one from Newton to Einstein. It
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also leads to a significant but - I would argue - unavoidable concep-
tual complication.
3 SOCIAL SYSTEMS
Luhmann ties up these strands into an intrinsically general theory
of systems. He himself focuses on the development of a social the-
ory based on the work of Talcott Parsons. He incorporates Spencer-
Browns concepts of distinction and indication as the fundamental
operations of a system. In general, he distinguishes biological, psy-
chic, and social systems. These systems can be structurally coupled,
say, while writing a paper about systems theory. Yet spiking neu-
rons, thoughts and an almost finished draft that is expected for pub-
lication are located in different systems that operate with fundamen-
tally different distinctions. For Luhmann, these systems are opera-
tionally closed, They are operating in an autopoietical manner by re-
constructing their own elements, and are irritated but not determined
by their respective environments. This means that in Luhmann’s con-
text we cannot talk about concepts like social aspects of cognition,
or observe an external environment that is part of the cognitive sys-
tem. Nor can a biological system itself be social. In my opinion this
separation has the benefit to be precise about the distinctions that we
observe: in this case that the part/whole distinction has been replaced
by the one between system and environment.
Social systems (interactions, organisations and institutions) and
psychic systems (minds) operate with meaning. Meaning is under-
stood as a medium in which a system can observe the distinction be-
tween actual and potential as a form. Communication can only take
place through a social system. It requires the structurally coupled
minds to be able to distinguish between information and utterance
(Mitteilung) and to form expectations about future communication
from the side of the counterpart. Luhmann also locates knowledge
within the social system, rather than in the individual mind or brain.
4 HYBRID SOCIAL SYSTEMS
Let us return to the imitation game, and ask how the perspectives I
have sketched out above point to hybrid social systems. I have men-
tioned that the imitation game constitutes a social system, one in
which the participants have well-defined roles and tasks. Still it is
a playful setting, which is a point that is widely overlooked. The ob-
jective for the machine is to cheat, by pretending to be a woman in
place of the original male participant. It is also a game that hasn’t
been won for the machines yet, despite the current enthusiasm for
conversational interfaces.
More importantly, Turing devised the test to operationalise an idea
while avoiding definitions of the concepts he had set out to inves-
tigate. Within a distinction-based approach we can be comfortable
with the idea that no a priori definition is possible or needed for this
kind of endeavour. Instead, we need to construct and observe the on-
tological theatre, as Andrew Pickering calls it.
The system/environment distinction likewise supports Turing’s ap-
proach. We do not need to model a system from the biological ground
up and hope it will display social behaviour. Instead, we may begin
with the affordances of the social system. An agent participating in a
hybrid social system should be able to act contingent on the kind of
system, e.g. an interaction, organisation or institution. As an autopoi-
etic system, it needs to be able to develop and reproduce its elements.
It also requires an environment to co-develop with under evolution-
ary pressure. The task of the agent, its operation on a fundamental
level, is to draw distinctions.
Radical constructivism suggests that social systems involving ar-
tificial agents may construct knowledge in a way that is not only
structurally different from human knowledge - it may outright con-
tradict some of our beliefs. During a debate, we treat the statements
of our counterpart as opinions, not as facts. In the same manner, an
artificial agent forms opinions as consequences of the autopoiesis of
the system. These opinions might not necessarily be ours. In a so-
cial system, dissent does not cause logical contradictions. Instead it
is processed through different selections in the medium of meaning.
Finally, artificial social agents need to be exposed to social situa-
tions in order to develop. What the machines need to do is to learn
continuously without (permanent) supervision. They also need to ex-
pose a sufficiently large surface of perception and interaction: ma-
chines that play, robots that go hitchhiking or share our beds or roam
the campus while politely avoiding humans, machines that perform
art for a robotic audience, artbots that judge each other, exhibitions
where humans need not apply, social bots that influence elections.
These approaches are being explored and we need more of them.
When we design hybrid social systems, the key lies not in design-
ing the system, it lies in the interaction between the system and its
environment. This suggests to release the machines from the lab as
soon as a minimum of functionality is implemented. The machines
need to be out there and they need to be among us.
5 CONCLUSION AND FURTHERWORK
Nearly three quarters of a century after Turing devised his test, the
imitation game is still suitable to direct our efforts towards hybrid so-
cial systems. Even when deep learning has successfully tackled con-
versation (I imagine based on a similar strategy as the one for playing
Go), Turing’s methodology is still valid for pursuing the puzzles that
remain unsolved.
Cybernetics and Artificial Intelligence have in more than one sense
parted ways during the last decades. While AI has been more and
more able to demonstrate practical success, it rarely reflects its epis-
temological foundations. Cybernetics, on the other hand, has been
abandoned for the wrong reasons. In my view the complexity im-
posed through second order observation is a necessary condition for
understanding social interactions. The question is not how to evade
the problem but how to implement it. I think it will be fruitful to re-
examine both paradigms, especially in the light of recent progress in
robotics and machine learning. With this in mind, Luhmann’s the-
ory has the benefit to enable analysing, describing and constructing
systems within a coherent ontological framework that accounts for
biological, psychic and social systems. Therefore I propose to model
interactions between human and non-human agents as hybrid social
systems. Only on the level of social systems the machines will be-
come more human.
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Persons, robots and responsibility. 
How an electronic personality matters 
Giusy Gallo1 and Claudia Stancati2 
Abstract.  The recent debate raised from the motion that the 
Committee on Legal Affairs (Rapporteur Mady Delvaux) 
presented for a European Parliament resolution with 
recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on 
Robotics in order to establish rules to arrange the relationship 
between robots and human beings, anticipates the issue about the 
new kind of society in which the future generations will live in. 
The most relevant point of the motion is the concept of 
‘electronic person’ to be ascribed to the robots. We will try to 
understand which concept of person should be used in order to 
define the ‘electronic person’, investigating the philosophical 
work of thinkers as Kelsen, Scarpelli, Radin, Wolff and Nèkàm.
3.  1
Keywords. Legal entity, legal personality, electronic person, 
person, robot. 
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1  
In “Alienable rights” [1], Minsky plays out a dialogue between 
two aliens speaking of the rights to be granted to the human 
beings. He wonders if we need to allow that the world is 
‘pollute’ with ‘redundant intelligences’.  
We are ever closer to the moment in which we must seriously 
respond to the crucial question on Artificial Intelligence: which 
features human beings and artificial beings share? Recently, 
Luciano Floridi has expressed his concern about this point: “the 
issue is not to decide whether the robots, as autonomous agents 
which are able to learn, are such a kind of person or not, but we 
should understand that the question is badly formulated”[2].  
Actually, the question is particularly complex not only because 
we are considering the human being close to the artificial one, 
but because the term “person” is everything except that defined 
in univocal way. Our aim is to look for some hints in the facets 
of the debate on this notion in order to define the ontology of 
these entities which in the long run could make decisions or act 
autonomously. 
This is the symmetrical case to the one which claims for the 
concepts of the extended mind and the electronic body, which 
have been made actual by the new technologies and have 
reshaped the borders of the old philosophical debate of the mind-
body problem [3]. 
The semantic adventure of the term ‘person’ led the mask to 
what is essential: the persona ficta became what is essential of a 
subject. 
The concept of the person has now entered the common 
language and it defines every individual in its unique peculiarity. 
Philosophically speaking the concept of the person has a long 
history which also crosses the religious tradition and particularly 
Christianity; today this concept has landed at the center of the 
discussion in bioethics, in cognitive sciences, passing through 
sociology, from Marcel Mauss onwards [4]. In this story, 
‘individual’ and ‘person’ have been considered different 
concepts but only in relatively recent times they have been 
opposed one another: the first one has been managed such as a 
naturalistic category and the second one such as an ethical 
concept or a notion which can define a center of action. 
The concept of the person, superimposed on the problem of 
subjectivity and strictly tied to the theme of the values and their 
intention acceptance, is not clear in its ethical and 
epistemological implications. We would mention the differences 
among the notion of person forged by Peter Singer or Martha 
Nussbaum and the role played by the ability to act, the biological 
nature and biography in defining those ideas. 
The different notions of the person refer to different ontological 
levels and because of them we would like to consider here a 
concept of person drawn in legal field in order to verify whether 
this one, once opportunely adjusted, could be the right tool to 
define the status of robots and androids.  
The crucial point of the question is to recollect a definition of the 
person suitable to the electronic personality with reference to the 
attempt of replicating human behavior, emotion and way of 
thinking [5], facing the issue of the imputation of liability, since 
the future could lead us in a dimension of co-working with 
robots. 
2  
In Roman law, the term ‘persona’ is equivalent to homo; then  it 
evolves to an abstract meaning to designate who has a juridical 
role. This is a tendency which lead to the concept of the persona 
ficta or rapraesentata like the “fictum positum pro vero” [6, . D. 
48, ii9, 16,10]. 
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A very long process of doctrinal elaboration, which is parallel to 
the history of the Western law, particularly but non only Roman 
juridical tradition , lead to dissociate the concept of the juridical 4
person from the legal entity, the imputation of liability from the 
conferring of the legal personality. The last concept does not 
necessarily refer anymore to the man but it’s linked to the 
powers and the interests of the man, which are concentrated in 
accordance with predicative structures and normative schemes, 
or it refers to complex subjects to whom have been conferred 
features suitable to action both in the field of private law and 
public law. 
This sort of persons are distinguished from natural elements, or 
rather the juridical person arises as opposed to the natural 
element as persona ficta, both with reference to a single 
individual and to a groups of persons. Law breaks down bodies 
and subjects to compose persons namely masks which could 
personam sustinere o gerere, personam vicem gerere. The same 
individual can be invested with different personae; many 
subjects can represent one unique persona, whose unity is not 
superimposed to the unity of a physical or psychological subject. 
Moreover, in some subjects there can be the rights in the absence 
of a dead physical or unborn person, and on the other hand the 
concept of physical person renames, for the purposes of the law, 
the biological bodies (e.g. let’s consider bioethics). 
The notion of legal person adapts to the definition of the 
artificial subjects which are allowed on a merely functional level 
and, then, to every artificial individual. 
In his Reine Rechtslhere Hans Kelsen maintains that: “one might 
consider (…) not individuals such as, but only their actions and 
omissions set out in legal rules” [7] so that the physical person 
“is not a man but the personified unity of legal rules that give 
rights and duties to the same man. It is not a natural reality but a 
legal construction” in order to describe “legally relevant 
facts” [7] . 5
This way Kelsen, who obviously in the time he wrote can apply 
law only to human beings, makes a legal person without 
biological constraints and he rejects the anthropomorphic view 
of the concept of the person. 
Both the physical and the legal person are social realities such as 
the same law and this allow us to understand that whether “the 
law does not create the persons” [7] , society can regulate a new 6
reality described by technology using this kind of concept of 
person. 
Uberto Scarpelli, who has introduced analytical philosophy in 
Italy, reached the thought of Kelsen; according to Scarpelli, the 
condition of use of the concept of the legal person “is in the 
normative forecast of a plurality of actual and possible facts, 
mere facts or actions, a connection among them, which consists 
in the reference to a same legal system and the attribution to 
such facts of an in operation juridical importance of relationships 
among them intervening”[8] . 7
We can use this “limitedly technical” [9]  concept to regulate 8
new experiences and new realities the way it arose to answer to 
the new situations in which “individual subjects finds multiplied 
and widened their limited life in a lot of new realities” [9] . 9
Also in Anglo-saxon legal literature we find similar positions. 
According to Radin, legal personality is “a convenient symbol, a 
short-hand expression by which a great many factors can be 
designated by a single word or a single phrase” [10, p. 625, 643] 
and the concept of person is “a means of making reference to 
complex situations easy, and is only an inexperienced person that 
is deceived by it, or fancies that calling the series a, b, c,…n, by 
the name of x, add a new item to the series”[10, 665]. Wolff 
speaks about abbreviation and a formula of fiction. Starting from 
the natural extra-legal concept of personality and of entities 
considered such as persons despite the lack of human dignity[11, 
494, 505]. 
Rules are a fundamental mechanism of connection between the 
social and the mental by the means of the so-called “multiagent 
structure” that expresses itself in the plurality of the recipient of 
the majority of legal rules. This structure allows an education 
which falls beyond the one imagined by Kant, for whom from 
the concept of legal entity emerges only and necessarily the 
relationship between free and equal people and for this reason, 
according to him, legality cannot connote neither our 
relationship with animals nor the one with God or, we can say 
today, with the androids. However, the process of de-
psychologizing, abstraction, de-naturalization that features the 
rule of laws allows to them to refer to different models of social 
organization and it shows how they are semantically multipotent 
thanks to the ability to use natural elements in an artificial 
context, in which sometimes by the means of the rule “x counts 
as y in the context c”[12] it occurs the transition from the 
physical object to the social one. 
According to Nèkàm the feature that makes a legal entity is the 
fact that the collectivity considers it as a unity which has 
interests that need or deserve social protection: “and it is 
completely irrelevant that such entity exist as an objective 
reality, that has its will, and that it possess or less a natural or 
artificial, imagined or proven personality”[13, 21]. Following 
this perspective, we can think to look for the theoretical grounds 
to reshape the new legal challenges that Artificial Intelligence 
begins to set. 
3  
 The term ‘person’ is not present in the Code Napoléon, but one can find it in the common law, as it shows the Judicial Dictionary by Frederick Stroud 4
[18].
 Translation from the Italian: La dottrina pura del diritto, Torino, Einaudi, 1952, p. 193.5
 Translation from the Italian: La dottrina pura del diritto, Torino, Einaudi, 1952, p. 198.6
 Translation from the Italian: Contributo alla semantica del linguaggio normativo, Milano, Giuffrè, 1959, p. 142.7
 Translation from the Italian: Il problema della scienza del diritto, n. ed. ac. P. Piovani, Milano, Giuffrè, 1962, p. 81.8
 Translation from the Italian: Il problema della scienza del diritto, n. ed. ac. P. Piovani, Milano, Giuffrè, 1962, p. 82.9
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The recent developments in the field of Artificial Intelligence, 
particularly in robotics, claim for a philosophical approach to the 
newborn (and future) relationships between human beings and 
robots. The continuous online life we are experiencing is shaping 
our way of living in the information society asking – as Luciano 
Floridi [14] underlines – for a new ethical framework, in which 
we should ward off the anthropocentric view over robots 
allowing to accept them as co-workers, including the huge 
amount of legal, social and ethical issues at the stake. 
Despite the fight between cyber-optimists and cyber-pessimists 
[15], it is no longer possible to image our life without Artificial 
Intelligence: algorithms follow and support us in a series of daily 
actions (withdraw from an ATM, watching a TV series on 
Netflix, booking a doctor’s appointment, applying online at 
university and so on). Also if we accept these kinds of examples 
of Artificial Intelligence, generally speaking, we are skeptics 
about robots and androids. Because of science fictions films and 
TV series, one might conceive human world invaded by robots, 
condition which presupposes a fight for supremacy won by 
artificial systems created by the losers human beings. Obviously 
this is a naïve and false view on Artificial Intelligence, since we 
are not facing an invasion, but those artistic perspective could 
give us some hints in order to imagine the new challenges for the 
future infosphere [16]. 
Science fiction showed us the chance to have driverless cars (or 
any other transport). Now, the project of a driverless car is under 
construction: Google, Tesla, Uber and Nissan are testing their 
prototypes of driverless or autonomous car. Although there 
occurred little accidents, there are recent news about the 
capability of autonomous car to prevent bigger accidents, like 
the one prevented in December by a Tesla car running for testing 
along a Dutch highway . Let’s consider for a while that in the 10
same situation, there occurred a malfunction of the ‘Forward 
Collision Warning’ onboard the Tesla car: instead of preventing 
the accident, the autonomous car provokes it, investing a car 
carrying three people, including a child. The result of the 
accident is little damages to the three people and huge damage to 
their car. Who is responsible for this accident? This is the real 
question at the point of the robotics revolution. There is no need 
to be afraid of robots, since they could help us with machine 
learning, overall in medicine for application in health systems 
for improvement in cancer and other rare diseases research. 
The proposed example shows that we need to think the 
relationship we would like to experience with those artificial 
systems. Following this perspective, the Committee on Legal 
Affairs (Rapporteur Mady Delvaux) presented a motion for a 
European Parliament resolution with recommendations to the 
Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics  in order to begin 11
to establish rules and a kind of ethical and legal code to arrange 
relationships between human beings and Artificial Intelligence 
artifacts. The main issue is to protect persons from the damages 
eventually provoked by Artificial Intelligence systems. Stressing 
the increasing production and use of Artificial Intelligence 
systems, the motion faces legal, ethical and social issues. 
Luciano Floridi [14] offers us a clear analysis of the motion, 
stating that its most relevant features are the issue of 
unemployment and liability. We could add to these issues that  
developments in robotics and artificial intelligence can and 
should be designed in such a way that they preserve the dignity, 
autonomy and self-determination of the individual, especially in 
the fields of human care and companionship, and in the context 
of medical appliances, 'repairing' or enhancing human beings 
[17, p.5].  
This idea covers the chance that developments in robotics and AI 
could be helpful to people but their application need to be 
constantly checked since one cannot ignore the users are not 
simply individual but persons which sometimes have a reduced 
autonomy but they have the right to preserve their dignity. 
Back to the two features stressed by Floridi, we should recall the 
example of the driverless or autonomous car. Let’s say, for 
example, that within a couple of years we could travel with a 
Google or Tesla car. It makes sense that taxy service companies 
might fire their drivers, just like bus and train companies since 
there is no more need to pay people for a job they don’t do 
anymore. So that there might be a lot of unemployers. If this 
scenario should happen, this means that the social relapse will be 
dramatic, so that today there is already the need to think about an 
economic support for people who will lose their job because of 
robots and algorithms. Then, companies will save money and 
will reduce complaints, but the social systems of some Nations 
will be troubled by this new developing situation. The only 
solution is to tax robots, which means to tax the companies 
which use them and replace a lot of human workers with robots.  
What if an autonomous car crashes against another car drawn by 
a human being? Who is legally liable for the accident? 
Apparently nobody or, at least, the company who has produced 
the car if there is a malfunction or the owner who made a 
mistake in running the system. However, the main question 
concerns whether our legal systems are ready to face these 
situations and what are the consequences on the notion of the 
person. 
The previous paragraph showed that there is not a univocal 
notion of the person. Since concepts such as rights, 
responsibility, ethics, privacy have been ascribed to persons and 
not to material things such as robots, how to shape the concept 
of the person? 
The motion proposed to the European Parliament seems to solve 
the problem creating the notion of ‘electronic person’, a new 
legal status to be given to autonomous robots: 
creating a specific legal status for robots in the long run, so that 
at least the most sophisticated autonomous robots could be 
established as having the status of electronic persons responsible 
for making good any damage they may cause, and possibly 
applying electronic personality to cases where robots make 
autonomous decisions or otherwise interact with third parties 
independently [17, p. 18]. 
Unfortunately, the term ‘electronic person’ appears only once in 
the whole motion (the last version is a document of 68 pages). 
This recommendation to the European Parliament is not deeply 
explained or investigated.  
It seems that the legal commission, taking into account the 
difficulties in investigating the notion of the person as it is clear 
in the history of the philosophy of law, has proposed the notion 
 Link: http://www.carscoops.com/2016/12/teslas-autopilot-anticipates-huge-crash.html.10
 Link: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/juri/subject-files.html?id=20170202CDT01121.11
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of ‘electronic person’ in order to begin to think to the 
consequences of robots on human beings.  
The purpose of the commission which uses the term ‘electronic 
person’ seems a mistake: since an ‘electronic person’ is a robot, 
then it is an artifact, which is sometimes, in particular, an 
Information Technology artifact, and it has to be considered an 
artificial system. Unfortunately, this artificial system could be 
invested of rights, duties, legal liability. If this should happen, 
then it will make sense to start thinking about robots such as 
Isaas Asimov’s Bicentennial Man, ascribing to robots – in future 
– also emotions, according to the most wide meaning this word 
can cover. 
The anthropomorphic view risks to make us think the problem of 
the relationship between robots and persons – the persons we are 
– following the path which sometimes we run thinking about the 
relationship between human beings and animals. However, there 
is a big question: animals are not artificial systems, but robots 
behavior is always governed by rules imposed by their creators.  
We can say, agreeing with Luciano Floridi, that the relevance of 
the issue needs to be considered changing the point of view. So 
then, we need to reshape the notion of electronic person, giving 
sense to the terms electronic and person in a philosophical 
perspective. In particular, in the previous paragraphs, we showed 
that the philosophy of law of Scarpelli, Kelsen and Nèkàm, for 
example, ward off the biological constrain which generally is 
ascribed to the person, trying to describe a new kind of society in 
which there is a widespread co-working with robots and 
androids. 
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Autonomy and Social Attitudes 
Raffaela Giovagnoli 1, Josefina Formanova 2  
Abstract.  We’ll follow a line of thought that 
suggests to intend “personal autonomy” in a 
social sense. The urgency to undertake this 
move arises because of the wide variety of 
informational sources we are exposed which 
influence our behavior. Social background 
represents the basis for autonomy; at the same 
time, interaction with others (real or virtual) 
enlarges the possibility for autonomous 
judgements. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The notion of “personal autonomy” defines 
those philosophical views that prefer to intend 
autonomy not only in a “moral sense”. 
Moreover, my discussion does not concern the 
classical debate on free will (determinism/
indeterminism). There are several theories of 
personal autonomy, that suggest to overcome 
the “individualistic” views (Giovagnoli 2007). 
Nevertheless, they are “social” in different 
senses, which I’ll briefly describe. 
Some phi losophers maintain that an 
autonomous person must show not only 
“p rocedura l ” bu t a l so “ subs t an t i a l ” 
independence, which rightly requires the 
consideration of the social context in which an 
action can be judged as autonomous. 
Procedural personal autonomy requires the 
fulfillment of conditions for rationally deciding 
and acting, ranging over a wide spectrum of 
individual idiosyncratic desires and volitions 
(Dworkin, Frankfurt, Ekstrom). Several 
authors try to add “historical” conditions which 
examine the process of the formation of 
judgment or decision to act (Fisher, Ravizza, 
Christman). Very interesting and powerful are 
the substantive theories, that in the individual 
variant start from the Kantian inheritance 
(Korsgaard, Hills, Wolf). 
Our  argument focuses on substantive views 
which consider the social contexts as sources 
of norms which favor or diminish development 
and exercise of the capacity for personal 
autonomy. 
2  SOCIAL  CONCEPTIONS  OF 
AUTONOMY 
The Habermasian account of “communicative 
action” represents a good model to relate 
au tonomy to a l ingu is t i c normat ive 
competence. According to Habermas, 
autonomy is bound to the acknowledgment of 
presuppositions or linguistic rules as conditions 
of universal validity of theoretical and practical 
claims. Differently from other theories of 
“recognition” (nota), he plausibly introduced 
the issue of “interpersonal recognition” related 
to formal linguistic conditions of a rational and 
egalitarian dialog [7]. Habermas account of the 
r e l a t i onsh ip be tween au tonomy and 
socialization is convincing because it 
shows plausible arguments against the 
contemporary reduct ionis t s t ra tegies . 
Autonomy is directly bound to the notion of 
“communicative action”, which, differently 
from instrumental and strategic action, aims at 
a rational consent. It is not only a question of 
an ideal point of view under procedural 
conditions (introduced from an external 
perspective), rather the development of the 
p o s s i b i l i t y f o r a u t o n o m y t h r o u g h 
communicative action is based on a well-
known process of socialization explained also 
by reference to different disciplines (Piaget, 
Kohlberg). 
To become an autonomous individual being, 
i.e. to become a self, means for Hegel in 
Brandom’s interpretation (Brandom 1999) to 
take it or treat it as one by those that are taken 
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or treated as ones by this very being. For the 
individual autonomy depends on the condition 
of being recognized as one simultaneously with 
recognizing the other (treating me as one) as 
one as well, the process may be called a mutual 
r e c o g n i t i o n  (based on Hegel’s 
phenomenological  viewpoint). Under such a 
treatment the recognized one is fully ascribed 
the status of capability of being responsible 
and of becoming a subject of commitments. To 
reach such a status is the kind of social 
achievement  that conditions the individual’s 
autonomy. This would, however, sound too 
restrictive if we admit that one’s autonomy 
depends strictly on the others’ decision to 
ascribe her this kind of freedom. Therefore, 
there is one more condition that makes this 
de f in i t i on sound l e s s pa radox ica l ly 
constrained. Speaking of autonomy one shall 
also take to account the fact that the one’s 
ability to take responsibility also means the one 
is entirely free to reject it. “According to the 
autonomy thesis, one is in a strict sense bound 
only by rules or laws one has laid down for 
o n e s e l f , n o r m s o n e h a s o n e s e l f 
endorsed.” (Brandom 1999) 
Procedural theories [5] underestimate the role 
of the internalization of oppressive norms; 
from a substantive point of view, even if a 
person has to some extent the option of 
choosing alternative values, it is the content of 
the norms she internalized that diminishes her 
autonomy. We must consider the nature of 
values that come from the social context 
(Stolyar, Benson, Oshana among others). For 
instance, Benson focuses on a fundamental 
point in order to understand the normative 
source of autonomy. He addresses directly to 
the social and discursive dimension of “taking 
ownership” that explains how internalized 
invisibility (internalization of oppressive norms 
diminishing autonomy) can defeat agents’ 
capacity “to take ownership” of what they do 
[6]. The active dimension of taking ownership 
implies the capacity of the agent of giving 
reasons for her actions and so of responding to 
potential “challenges” arising in the social 
context from her own point of view. This move 
gives the agent the possibility of taking 
responsibility in a public context and also the 
possibility of speaking for people who are 
marginalized. 
    
Faculty of Philosophy, Pontifical Lateran 
University, giovagnoli@pul.it  
2 Faculty of Philosophy, University of Prague, 
fina.formanova@gmail.com 
   
3  A U T O N O M Y  A N D 
COMMUNITY 
Several relevant authors in the field of social 
epistemology think that the model for an ideal 
knower must be abandoned (see Hardwig, 
Welbourne, Schmitt, Baier, Webb, Goldman, 
Jones, Fricker Faulkner, Lipton, Kusch, 
Lackey). These authors generally think that we 
cannot neglect ethical and social dimensions of 
inquiry. A strong view among social 
epistemologists is that an individual cannot be 
said to know, via testimony, that p, unless p is 
known in the community (see Welbourne, 
Brandom, Faulkner). The autonomy of 
individual reason become a chimere. 
In Brandom’s account of “recognition” in 
scorekeeping terms the possibility to undertake 
an autonomous perspective is bound to 
“deontic attitudes” and “deontic statuses”. 
Recognition seems a fundamental requirement 
for an agent to be autonomous, but reciprocal 
recognition is possible by virtue of “shared 
commitments”. Beside the basic form of 
“simple recognition” through which we 
recognize each other by virtue of our common 
intentionality toward natural environment, self-
consciousness requires “robust” recognition. 
Simple recognition entails to have a conception 
of the self in a double sense. First, an agent 
recognizes herself as something as a self, i.e. as 
able differentially to respond to environmental 
stimuli moving from the satisfaction of basic 
desires (such as the attitude of “hunger”). 
Second, an agent must have a capacity for 
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recognition. She must have a conception of the 
self as able to do what is required in order to be 
taking or treating something as a self, namely a 
subject of normative statuses of authoritative 
(in the sense of probative, though still 
provisional and defensible) commitments  as to 
how things are. This second sense implies 
reflexivity, because the agent recognizes 
oneself among those who she recognizes. 
Starting from simple recognition, the agent can 
reach the dimension of “robust” recognition if 
she is disposed to acknowledge the simple 
recognitions of others and undertaking the 
consequent commitments by herself. In 
Brandom’s terms: «Thus robust self-
consciousness is achievable only through 
reciprocal  recognition: being robustly 
recognized by at least some of those one 
robustly recognizes. This means that a 
community  (a kind of universal) is implicitly 
constituted by one’s own robust recognitions, 
and actually achieved insofar as they are 
reciprocated. That is the sort of reciprocally 
recognitive community within which alone 
genuine (robust) self- consciousness is 
possible: the “I” that is “We” and “We” that is 
“I”» 3. 
The result is that autonomy is not thinkable 
without shared knowledge and testimony is a 
fundamental source of knowledge. An 
interesting observation simply suggests that an 
epistemic agent whose beliefs does not depend 
upon testimonial transmission knows very 
little. So, we must consider our limitations and 
our need to economize. If we do not ignore 
these, autonomy will appear irrational for 
accepting a huge loss of information, ignoring 
how we exploit a division of epistemic labor 
(Putnam, Kitcher). 
4  HOW  TO  AVOID  THE 
PARADOXICAL  CONSTRAINT 
OF AUTONOMY 
As was remarked, Brandom assesses on the so-
called autonomy  thesis  developed by Kant 
based on his Rousseau 
3 Ivi, p. 32. 
reading (Brandom 1999). On the one hand, 
there is the authority of the others’ over me that 
is, on the other hand, constrained by my 
acknowledgement of this authority. At this 
stage, the autonomy thesis seems symmetrical. 
Autonomy thesis means basically that one has 
the capacity to bound herself by norms, i.e. to 
apply  certain concept  according to the norm. 
But this capacity of mine depends on the others 
to lay the responsibility towards to norms, 
according to which I apply the concept, upon 
me. This, in Brandom’s view merely seemingly 
paradoxical, constraint may, however, cause 
huge difficulties once we want to hold the idea 
of autonomy in a strict sense of the term. My 
authority over my activity seems real but 
partial. Is it possible to keep the idea of 
autonomy sensible despite its partiality? How 
are we, therefore, to solve this paradox? 
Let us sketch an example that should enlighten 
the paradox in terms of Wittgensteinian 
conception of language  game. If one wants to 
join certain language game, i.e. respond to an 
imperative: “Do the dishes!” correctly, what 
shall the one get to know and embrace. First, 
one need to understand the sentence, i.e. 
understand the language both structurally and 
semantically. That alone requires the one to has 
apprehended certain social background already. 
Second, one need to decide whether to listen to 
the imperative and yield to it. This analysis 
shows that even though the one rejects to obey 
the order or request, there remains one 
condition, i.e. the first concerning her 
understanding of the order, that disturbs the 
balance of the whole recognitive structure. The 
second condition represents the exact 
symmetrical structure Brandom offers in his 
reading of Hegel: one appreciates certain 
language game, norm respectively, but lays his 
authority over it by making a free decision to 
apprehend it at the same time. Yet, the first 
condition, as was concluded, does not possess 
this symmetry, and therefore makes the whole 
idea of autonomy fallacious. 
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In On Certainty Wittgenstein clearly states that 
there is no such thing as the last belief that 
would ground all the other beliefs so to say. 
Similarly, if we infer from this argument, we 
could say there is no such thing as the last 
language game either. Davidson states there is 
a kind of interdependency between all beliefs. 
The conceptual, including the capacity of 
naming  objects and forming  beliefs needs to 
rely on some other ground, therefore. This 
ground is the social  ground, for if it were 
merely empirical, the argument would result 
either on solipsism, or on the idea of the last 
grounding belief which has been rejected 
already. On this behalf, the paradoxical state of 
autonomy thesis should be solved as well. 
Language games , i . e . norms in our 
terminology, starts from certain social 
interaction. But, every social interaction 
always presupposes certain language or norms 
pre-established already. To speak about the 
beginning of language or sociality is, therefore, 
misleading, and only resulting in an infinite 
regress  (Formanova 2015). To erase the 
problem of asymmetry of autonomy thesis 
entirely, we shall, however, explain, how the 
language and the sociality works in time. 
Negotiating and adjudicating the claims of 
m u t u a l l y c o n d i t i o n i n g a u t h o r i t i e s , 
administering conceptual norms by applying 
them in distinct cases etc., is a process 
(Brandom 1999). Applying and instituting 
(administering) conceptual norms is not merely 
a temporal process but a historical one. That is 
what Hegel enlighten in his Phenomenology of 
Spirit, and what results from the fact that all 
that happens in time is socialized. The future 
application of certain concept has an authority 
over the past ones by assessing them in terms 
of their 
 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correctness or incorrectness. Simultaneously, 
the past applications have their authority over 
the future ones while holding the tradition 
according to which the future applications is be 
made, or at least respond to it in some way. 
Therefore, the present application, as a 
mediator between the future and the past ones, 
responds and lays its authority twice. Once 
towards the past applications of the concept 
with accord to or critical assessment of the past 
ones; once towards the future applications that 
are pre-established both in the past and the 
present ones, and which are at the same time 
authoritative towards the previous two by 
featuring as their future assessor and corrector. 
In these relations, we may see how the mutual 
recognition works in general. For anytime X 
has authority over Y, X needs Y in order to 
have something that would hold its authority 
on it. Therefore, both X and Y are equally 
important in this relation. 
5 CONCLUSION 
Recognition is recognition of inferentially 
structured commitments4. This thesis implies 
that I am not forced to follow commitments 
that are valid for a person or a group of persons 
or a community. If a person was educated in an 
open and flexible manner then she has concrete 
chances to be autonomous because she 
becomes ready to take part to the game of 
giving and asking for reasons, and this implies 
the consideration of all the reasons I can 
plausibly come to know. 
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Artificial Life, Artificial Unconscious
Mohammad Ali Rahebi
Abstract
The Unconscious is the Body
Michel Serres
Cybernetics and the Cartesian Problem 
The way the body works without knowledge or consciousness has been a complex and certainly 
consequential problem since Descartes at the latest. The question of how we do something without 
knowing how we are in fact doing so was a scandal that drove Cartesians to Occasionalism (a concept  
that is perhaps more true now than ever, with cloud computing and distributed computation). 
Since then, we have come very far indeed but it is in AI that we come to again feel the real force of this 
problem again. Minsky has famously stated that  
Social cognition qua language based and mainly representational, is a highly inefficient mode of signal 
processing or computation in general. As Minsky (despite his own strict adherence to the 
representational models, strangely enough)  said: 
It's mainly when our other systems start to fail that we engage the special 
agencies involved with what we call "consciousness."
As I shall try to while discussing the Peircean notion of “community of believers” and the way the 
Cybernetic schema manages to overcome its necessity, the most efficient manifestations of artificial 
intelligence are not representational, as is the case with the recent success of neural networks and 
machine learning. In fact, if we are to investigate artificial life instead of artificial consciousness (a 
failed project; consciousness qua delay is simply obsolete in machinic terms), we have to look at the 
body, at the habitual, that is to say at the non-representational, non-knowledge-based mechanisms and 
automations that are not language-based in the least. 
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Beyond Turing 
In a relatively recent book edited by Raffaela Giovagnoli, one of the organizers, Computing Nature, the 
issue of alternative computation models to Turing Machines was broached and discussed to some 
extent. Here I will argue that Cybernetics is one such alternative model that has been growing, from its 
origin as a strange interdisciplinary field in the late 1940s, to become the dominant model of 
computation. Although it is not named as such, the models that are not algorithmic and termination- 
oriented are all operating on the basis of the “cybernetic schema of intelligibility.” These are very 
familiar processes for all of us, being ubiquitous in “smart” machines and smart software. Giovagnoli 
et al describe Cybernetics as  computational processes where 
The main criterion of success of this computation is not its termination, but its 
behavior - response to changes, its speed, generality and flexibility, adaptability, and tolerance to 
noise, error, faults, and damage.
If consciousness is to be taken as linguistic and representational, and as such mediated by the social in 
its historicity and theoretical bias, Cybernetics would have to be seen as an artificial unconsciousness,  
and in fact, is much closer to artificial life than such AI trends as GOFAI or even most strands of 
embodied cognition.  
In French philosophy, under the influence of Derrida and his reading of Plato, the problem of 
technology has been tied to that of writing, as some form of Ur-Technics that contains the essence  of 
all future technics qua mnemotechnics. This idea has been also taken up by Bernard Stiegler who has 
taken it further by discussing all technologies as means of “retention” and “protention.”  All of this 
stars with Plato, however, for in his famous Phaedrus, he comes to barrage writing as a dangerous 
method, a supplement to spoken language, which unbeknownst to its to its users, had deleterious effects 
on memory as well as on truth and on the polis. We are not here concerned with all that; what is of 
interest is something he mentions in passing, namely that if you were to write down something that is 
true at one moment (‘it is day’), it would become false the next (as night fell) because unlike the 
speaker, it did not the ability to correct itself according to its surrounding reality, its environment. In the 
same manner, he says that when you write down the teachings of some philosopher, the written text 
will not be able to answer new questions or clarify obscure passage when asked to do so, in comparison 
to the person using living language. 
This is in fact the same thing that distinguishes Cybernetics completely from all the technics that came 
before: cybernetic machines (think of your smartphone) can change their displayed content and their 
behavior in response to changes in their environment. Unlike previous forms of technology, which 
might have been mnemotechnics (or not), cybernetic technologies are adaptive, self-modifying, robust. 
In fact, this same Platonic problem occurs in Descartes (of whom we will not have time to speak) and 
later, Turing. In his famous “On Computation,” Turing states that although certain numbers might be 
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uncomputable for the Turing Machine, they might be very well computable for human mathematicians. 
The reason for this is that the human mathematician is capable of revising and changing “their strategy” 
completely from the ground up, while the Turing Machine, the representational computing machine, 
cannot change its own behavior when faced with an unsolvable problem. It does not have the ability to 
change its actions spontaneously and in response to its specific problem-environment. This is of course 
recognizable as the same Platonic problem that we encountered with writing and other technological 
artifacts. They are Leibnizian in principle, relying on some pre-established harmony, on the stability of 
the operations in the environment and thus are rendered absolutely inoperative once the smallest 
change occurs. 
 The cybernetic machine, moreover, does not start from a human-defined state or representation, but is 
an immanent, non-representational computing machine whose operations (e.g. in case of a neural 
network running Big Data analyses) cannot be even comprehended by a human observer. As long as 
there be no need for the cybernetic machine to interact with a human, there is no need for 
representational information; data is much more efficient. 
Peirce, Habits, Neural Networks 
Finally, I will present some of my current research on the relation between the American Pragmatist 
philosophies, the very important yet under-valued concept of habits, and the recently most successful 
manifestation of the cybernetic schema, namely Neural Networks. 
The importance of the Pragmatists lies in their discovery of the importance of habits (for they too were 
early fans of feedback mechanisms, having become familiar with the pre-cybernetic feedback control 
called the flywheel governor). Yet, though their philosophy managed to move to pure empiricism, it 
could not solve the notion of intelligent encounter without recourse to social mediation and meaning-
creation. This is now solved by the creation of neural networks that are in fact close analogs of Peirce’s 
community of believers if considered as a community of nodes holding specific weights and bias 
parameters. 
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Symposium II
The power of immergence:
Simulating language,
decision-making and the evolution
of culture
Distributed approaches to language, reasoning, and decision-making suggest that cognition is grounded in
three fundamental domains: internal, bodily mechanisms, external interactions with the choice environment
and other people, multi-temporal timescales that influence the possibility for cognition. While cultural norms
may emerge across time, simulated agents are both reactive and anticipatory and are capable of learning
from their immersion in a norm saturated environment. ABM enables agents to produce changing futures as
they self-configure. That is, the immergent emergence of cognitive function and culture occurs in interactive
relations and across different timescales (ranging from a few milliseconds to evolutionary millennia, which
suggests the need for models that explore the emergence and evolution of lived cognition in vivo).
While burgeoning evidence supports the interactive element of cognition, the multi-scalar temporal
hypothesis is harder to test in that not only do large timescales affect the evolution of culture and cognition,
but the process is also affected by a myriad of other phenomena. Therefore, research has typically lacked a
controlled method for testing the ontogenesis of cultural phenomena as well as their direct influence on
cognitive functionality.
In the past decade, researchers have increasingly made use of Agent-Based Models to simulate complex
interactions between agents and across timescales. This allows for highly controlled simulations of cognitive
models in computationally intractable environments. As such, Agent-Based Models provide a powerful tool
in exploring the emergence of inter-personal phenomena such as language, decision-making, and the
evolution of culture more generally. This symposium draws together researchers who have contributed to the
field of distributed cognition and how social norms can enrich Agent-Based simulations.
Language Distributed accounts of language argue that 1st-order usage of language (at a specific time and
place) draws on 2nd-order languages that have evolved across history. In a simulated Agent-Based Model,
contributors show that accents can indeed develop across time given interactions and mobility. Their models
track the development of accentual differences that result from these interactions, despite their agents
having identical cognitive design.
Decision-making Traditional models of decision-making isolate expected utilities and calculate optimal (or
just beneficial) strategies given the constraints to the specific situation. These approaches, however, neglect
44
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to discuss the dynamic actions of others, the fluidity of utilities, and the development of decision-making
across time and within social groups. Taking a point of departure in dynamic environments where other
agents engage with the same environment, we show that decision-making evolves across time, both for
each individual agent, but also for aggregates of agents. Given time and interactions, each agent will adapt
and engage in significantly different decision strategies.
Culture On a broad level, the models presented in the symposium show the importance of the d velopment
of cultural practices and norms. Although these develop slowly in simulated societies, they have a profound
effect on decision-making. This suggests that culture, which can only emerge across multiple timescales, is
profoundly influential on language and decision-making, meaning that models of either necessarily require
cultural, and thereby temporal, components. In this way, Agent-Based Models are used as proof of concept
to test the importance of timescales and interactions for language and decision-making.
In addition to the contribution to and testing of models of language and decision-making, the symposium
focuses on a discussion of Agent-Based Models as a novel methodology in cognitive sciences. We believe
this method will become increasingly useful in years to come, and we hope the symposium will provide
participants with a good understanding of the method, its requirements, its potential, and its limitations. As
such, the symposium reaches beyond the contributions of each contributor in isolation and points to a
general methodological discussion.
Please note: Bruce Edmonds’s paper is a standard AISB symposium publication. All the other
papers in this symposium are designated as abstracts. They are provided for the information of
AISB 2017 convention attendees and do not constitute citable publications, their inclusion in the
electronic proceedings notwithstanding.
Stephen Cowley, University of Southern Denmark
Jens Madsen, University of Oxford
Mario Paolucci, CNR, Rome
Davide Secchi, University of Southern Denmark
Organizers
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Power Analysis for Agent-Based Modeling
Determining the Appropriate Number of Runs
Davide Secchi1 and Raffaello Seri2
Abstract.
Agent-based modeling (ABM) is emerging as a powerful tool for
the analysis of human behavior in several situations in which direct
observation is impossible or unfeasible [4]. This computational sim-
ulation technique is still at its early stages in the social sciences [24],
with sociology starting before other disciplines [7] and management
reluctantly catching up [19]. The enthusiasm that many have shown
with ABM is witnessed by the increasing number of scientific outlets
that publish such simulations—among many are the journal of Com-
putational and Mathematical Organization Theory and the Journal
of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation.
It has been pointed out that the diffusion of ABM is to be found,
among other aspects, in an increase of available computational power
[6], a set of simplified tools for modeling [19], and the ability to
create extremely complex and descriptive simulations [5]. As a re-
sult, these simulations are usually employed to study configurations,
structures, and outcomes that are not directly intelligible by a simple
review of the initial conditions of a system. In other words, ABM are
a tool to study emergent properties of complex systems among other
characteristics.
In spite of the very significant use of these simulations, there is still
uncertainty on the conditions under which a simulated system pro-
duces relevant or irrelevant results—in relation to a given research
question. The issue is particularly relevant for the study of emer-
gent properties in that some of them may result from misinterpreting
the data of the simulated model. These issues can be divided into
two, separate but (probably) interconnected. We write ‘probably’ be-
cause, to our knowledge, there are no studies robustly and soundly
connecting these two issues together. The first issue relates to the
question: when is it the right time to stop the simulation in a single
run? This is a problem concerning the length of a run—some soft-
ware may call these ‘steps’—, given a certain configuration of the
simulation’s parameters. It can be rephrased as to when it is enough
time for emergent properties to emerge. Length may depend on the
research question, on the type of simulation, or it can be calculated
[20]. To partially address these issues, some propose steady state and
stationarity analyses [8]. The second issue relates to the number of
runs per configuration of parameters: how many times should one
run the simulation for each configuration of parameters? This is a
problem of establishing an appropriate number such that the data is
not biased or that effects are discarded when they should not. Some
have suggested power analysis as a viable technique to tackle with
this problem [16, 21, 22]. Given the relevance of this latter issue, this
abstract is dedicated to it, in an attempt to link emergent properties
of the ABM to the appropriate number of runs to be performed.
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The use of ABM in these situations is generally accomplished by
identifying some parameters whose impact on the results of the simu-
lations is deemed relevant. For each one of these parameters, a certain
number of values are chosen to represent the whole range of variabil-
ity of the parameters. The researcher then identifies a certain number
of configurations of values. For each configuration of the parameters,
the model is run several times, say n, and the values of one (or more)
outcomes for each run are collected. The impact of the values taken
by the configurations of parameters on the expected outcomes can
then be compared using an ANOVA test. The null hypothesis H0 of
the test posits that, for example, the different parameter configura-
tions have no impact on the average values of the outcome variable.
Failing to reject the null hypothesis when it is true is very important
and it is done to avoid what can be framed as a false positive, i.e.
accepting a result when it should be rejected. In statistics this event
is called Type-I error and, although it is considered good practice
to test for statistical significance as it relates to Type-I error avoid-
ance, this does not exclude the possibility that Type-II error mani-
fests itself. This corresponds to failing to reject the null hypothesis
when it is false, an error that can be referred to as a false negative.
In order to develop testing methodologies that reduce this mistake,
statisticians have since long identified a quantity of interest, called
statistical power [2, 14] and corresponding to the probability that
the null hypothesis is rejected when it is false, i.e. to one minus the
Type-II error rate. High power gives the researcher the confidence
that Type-II error is under control and that potentially meaningful re-
sults are not discarded on the basis of a false null hypothesis being
wrongly accepted. As statistical power increases with the number of
observations on which the test is performed, this concept allows the
researcher to answer to a different question, i.e. how many times a
simulation should run.
Therefore, we explore the issue of how many times a simulation
should run. This is an often neglected issue [16, 21] that, sooner
or later, all modelers dealing with simulations of complex systems
encounter. The literature takes an agnostic stance on how many
runs n—per configuration of parameters—a simulation is to be per-
formed. In fact, the focus has mostly been on defining the ‘steps,’
the time, or the interactions within each run through sensitivity and
convergence analysis [15, 17, 23]. Our central assumption is that the
number of runs to perform in a simulation is crucial for results to bear
some meaning. Of course, this is not true for all simulations and it de-
pends on scope, nature of the simulated phenomenon, purpose, and
level of abstraction. For social simulations with a strong stochastic
component where emergence and complexity [1] make results dif-
fer even within the same configuration of parameters, knowing how
many times are enough for differences to emerge (or not) becomes
an extremely relevant information.
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We discuss the use of statistical power to decide the number
of runs of an agent-based model. We first try to indicate—very
broadly—to what type of simulations this approach may apply. Then,
mediating from research on sample size determination for the be-
havioral sciences, we introduce some considerations on statistical
power analysis and testing theory. We provide an overview of how
statistical power analysis can be applied to agent-based models and
simulations. The objective is accomplished explaining why modelers
should employ measures of power. We highlight some of the impor-
tant positives of using this tool in ABM, specifically (a) determining
the number of runs, (b) avoiding models that can be better analyzed
with simpler tools, and (c) learning how to manipulate parameter val-
ues.
We also stress the dangers of underpower, i.e. the situation in
which power is not sufficient, and overpower, i.e. the situation in
which power is too high. As far as underpowered simulations are
concerned, tests may fail to reject null hypotheses that are, in fact,
false. Instead, in overpowered studies, the risk is that they may lead
modelers to notice effects so small that are not worth considering.
All in all, overpowered simulations end up being less reliable than
appropriately powered simulations. But it is clear that underpower
is generally more dangerous than overpower. As a consequence of
this, we discuss the appropriate levels of Type-I and Type-II error
rates to be used in computational simulations. We strongly advocate
that researchers choose a significance level α equal to 0.01 (while
the standard in social sciences is 0.05) and strive for a power pi of at
least 0.95 (while the standard in social sciences is 0.80). We justify
the strengthening of the usual values with the fact that the conditions
under which the ABM experiment is performed are at least partially
set by the researcher, so that imposing stricter requirements comes
quite naturally as a tool to prevent personal biases.
Once the values for α and pi have been set, the value of n can be
recovered if only a further quantity is specified, the so-called effect
size, a measure of how far the true data are from the null hypoth-
esis. Several techniques are available to infer a plausible value for
the effect size. A first technique is to compute the effect size on the
basis of the data just collected, in order to assess whether the level
of power is sufficient. However, for some technical reasons among
which the high variability, the use of post-experiment power calcu-
lations as a data analytic tool is considered inappropriate and should
be avoided as statistical malpractice [9]. A second technique is to use
“canned” effect sizes [2, 3], i.e. some average values obtained by a
review of the literature undertaken by Cohen. The use of these quan-
tities has been criticized in statistics [13], in spite of the fact that they
are generally used in social sciences and they pose less problems than
the first technique detailed above. A third technique is to use similar
studies that have been performed in the past [13, 11]. While this is
generally recognized as good practice when the literature on which
the effect size is computed is substantial, it has been criticized be-
cause it provides sample sizes with large variability [10] when the
number of studies is small. Therefore, we suggest that researchers
use an eclectic approach in which previous studies, pilot runs and
canned effect sizes are used to obtain a guess of the effect size that
goes under the name of smallest effect size of interest or SESOI (see
[12] for the definition in a different context).
As an illustration, we take an agent-based model (ABM) with a
strong stochastic component and provide two examples that show
how crucial the issue is and, at the same time, offer a practical guide
on how to conduct the computation. Implications and concluding re-
marks follow.
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Co-developing beliefs and social influence networks 
 – towards understanding Brexit
Bruce Edmonds1
Abstract. 1A relatively simple model is presented where the 
beliefs of agents and their social network co-develop. Agents can 
either hold or not each of a fixed menu of candidate beliefs. 
Depending on their type, agents have different coherency 
functions between beliefs, so that they are more likely to adopt a 
belief from a neighbour or drop a belief where this increases the 
total coherency of their belief set. With given probabilities links 
are randomly dropped or added but, if possible, links are made to 
a “friend of a friend”. The outcomes when both belief and link 
change processes occur are qualitatively different from either 
alone, showing the necessity of representing both cognitive and 
social processes together. Some example results are shown 
which moves a little towards modelling the processes behind 
divisive collective decisions, such as the Brexit vote. 
1. MOTIVATION 
Like many in the UK, I was shocked at the outcome of the Brexit 
vote. I am still in a kind of mourning, having lost the country I 
thought I was living in. Thus, it was natural to me to want to 
understand the processes that led to this. This paper describes the 
first tentative steps in that direction. 
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Figure 1. %Remain – %Leave in polls over time, leading up to 
Brexit vote (red dot is final result) 
Let us look at some of the data for clues about the kind of 
processes that might be involved. Figure 1 shows the raw 
%Remain – %Leave difference in polls leading up to the final 
vote. However, this graph is somewhat difficult to read. Figure 2 
shows the same data, but (a) adjusted for known biases between 
telephone and online polls and (b) exponentially smoothed using 
a factor of 25%. This shows definite medium-term trends, but 
also a lot of short term ‘noise’. 
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Figure 2. Adjusted, smoothed opinion poll differences between 
Remain and Leave (%) during run-up to Brexit vote, adjusted for 
known biases in online and telephone polls.  
One of the factors that graphs, such as the above, leave out is 
that a significant proportion of those polled are undecided. These 
people are important, because votes are often won by persuading 
the supporters of the other side to stay and home and not vote, as 
much as persuading the undecided to vote for yourself. 
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Figure 3. % for leaving vs. % undecided for opinion polls during 
run-up to Brexit vote, with linear regression line. (red dot is final 
vote, mapping non-voters to undecided) 
Figure 3 shows each poll plotted in terms of the proportion 
for leaving against the proportion undecided. These differ greatly 
in terms of the proportion undecided because each poll is 
designed very differently in terms of how easy it is to chose 
undecided as an option. Some polls strongly encourage users to 
make a decision (e.g. by not offering it as an option). Figure 4 is 
the equivalent graph but for remaining against undecided. One 
can see that the final result is consistent with the polls if one 
takes the undecided into account. If there were no undecided, 
this data suggests that the result might have been different.  
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Figure 4. % for remaining vs. % undecided for opinion polls 
during run-up to Brexit vote, with linear regression line. (red dot 
is final vote, mapping non-voters to undecided) 
Turning to the structure of social influence, there is no doubt 
that the social network along which influence can occur is 
clustered into those with similar beliefs. However, direct 
evidence for the structure of this is hard to come by and we have 
to be satisfied with indirect indications. Krasodomski-Jones of 
Demos [6] selected 2500 at random from a larger population of 
political twitter accounts, divided equally into Labour, SNP, 
Tory and UKIP supporters (as well as a control group that I do 
not include here). It then analysed over a million tweets from 
these users from May-August 2016. One of these analyses was to 
see who re-tweeted tweets from whom. Table 1 shows a 
summary of this analysed by the party they support. They then 
visualised the re-tweet network in a similar manner to [1]. 
Table 1. Percentage of users re-tweeted by user group, from [6]. 
(>40% in orange, ≤10% in blue, rest in green) 
	 	 Users	Re-tweeted	
	 	 Labour	 SNP	 Tory	 UKIP	
Users	
Re-tweeting	
Labour	 65%	 12%	 14%	 6%	
SNP	 18%	 78%	 8%	 3%	
Tory	 12%	 5%	 46%	 18%	
UKIP	 6%	 4%	 32%	 73%	
 
Figure 5. The re-tweet network between 4 groups of 500 
supporters of four UK parties, from [6]. 
The picture that emerges is that these actors are very much 
sorted by (a) their own party and (b) on a roughly linear political 
spectrum. That is most re-tweets were within their own party. 
There was some re-tweeting between: UKIP & Tory, Tory & 
Labour, Labour & SNP, but very low levels of re-tweeting 
between SNP and either UKIP or Tory or between UKIP and 
either SNP or Labour. 
Some lessons I take from these include, that: 
• opinion formation is noisy and not smooth, 
• undecided actors matter almost as much as those of 
decided or fixed opinion, and 
• people communicate with (and hence tend to influence) 
those similar to themselves, and in particular do not link 
to those with dissimilar beliefs. 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The “Social Intelligence Hypothesis” (SIH) [7] states that the 
crucial evolutionary advantages that human intelligence gives 
are due to the social abilities it allows. This explains specific 
abilities such as: imitation, language, social norms, lying, 
alliances, gossip, politics, group identification etc. Under this 
view, social intelligence is not a result of general intelligence 
being applied to social matters, but at the core of human 
intelligence. One might even go as far as saying that so-called 
“general intelligence” is a side-effect of social intelligence (e.g. 
linguistic ability and the ability to learn and beliefs from others). 
Consistent with SIH is the following evolutionary story. 
Social intelligence allows humans to develop their own (sub) 
cultures of knowledge, technologies, norms etc. (Boyd and 
Richerson 1985) within their groups. These allow the groups 
with their culture to inhabit a variety of ecological niches (e.g. 
the Kalahari, Polynesia) (Reader 1980). Thus humans, as a 
species, are able to survive catastrophes that effect different 
niches in different ways (specialisation) since it is unlikely that 
all inhabited niches will be wiped out. 
This means that different “cultures” of knowledge, skill, 
habits, norms, narratives etc. are significant (including how to 
socially organise, behave, coordinate etc.), and that these will 
relate to each other as a complete “package” to a significant 
extent. Under this view human cognition is (at least partly) 
evolved to make this group survival work, including the capacity 
of maintaining a complex set of beliefs that are coherent with 
others in the group, whilst retaining flexibility. The model 
described herein exhibits such a combination of local coherency 
and global variety corresponding to the social structure. 
Granovetter [5] Contrasted both under- and over-socialised 
models of behaviour of human behaviour – criticising 
sociologists in their picture of humans as culturally determined, 
and economists for their picture of agents characterised by self-
interested behaviour. That is that, the particular patterns of social 
interactions between individuals matter. In other words, only 
looking at either individual behaviour or aggregate behaviour 
misses crucial aspects. Under this view, to understand the 
behaviour of individuals one has to understand the complex 
detail and dynamics of the interactions between them. Agent-
based simulations, such as the one described does this as few 
other formal techniques do.  
In particular, it allows for the integration of cognition and 
social processes, going beyond emergence and immergence to 
allow for a relatively ‘tight’ loop between the processes that go 
on in the head of an agent, the interactions between agents and 
SYMPOSIUM II. THE POWER OF IMMERGENCE 49
Co
nfe
re
nc
e
ed
itio
n
their social structure. In agent-based simulations, these three 
things can be co-evolving, no aspect taking priority. 
There has been a stream of models that aim to directly model 
the evolution of opinions within a group of interacting agents. 
These are the “opinion dynamics” (OD) models (e.g. [2]). In this 
the opinions of agents lie on a continuous line and these opinions 
directly effect each other when agents are sufficiently 
similar/near to each other on this scale. An example run of such 
a model is shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. A typical evolution of opinions from an opinion 
dynamics model. Horizontal axis shows the strength of the 
opinions (from -1 = completely disagree, to 1 = completely 
agree). Time is along the x-axis. The colour shows the 
“certainty” of the agent from red = certain to blue = uncertain.  
However, such models exhibit resultant behaviour that is very 
different from that we observe (for example during the Brexit 
vote). Firstly, the behaviour in OD models results in a number of 
stable groups that subsequently do not change. Secondly, 
typically all agents are influenced to increase certainty, so there 
are no completely uncertain agents left at the end. Thirdly, after 
a while, all opinions settle down to stable values. Finally, and 
more fundamentally, these models conflate the results of beliefs 
– measurable opinions – with the underlying mechanisms. 
In this paper I wish to go behind such models. I want a model: 
• Where agents are socially embedded with a tight loop 
between cognition and social structure 
• That naturally develops a combination of some 
coherency within emergent groups but also with variety 
• Where opinions do not settle down, but continue to 
change in a “noisy” fashion 
• Where “opinions” do not directly act on each other but 
emerge from a meaningful discussion of belief  
3. THE MODEL 
The model to be described is quite abstract at the moment, much 
simpler than my usual style of model! It is merely a starting 
point, to point out that the intimate connection between the 
cognitive and the social can be represented and to stimulate 
discussion. I am looking for suitable data to enable its 
assessment and further development, and would welcome the 
suggstion of any rich data sets or qualitative research that I might 
compare this to. 
In this model: 
• There is a network of a fixed set of nodes and arcs (that 
can change) 
• There are, n, different beliefs {A, B, ....} circulating 
between nodes 
• Beliefs are copied along links or dropped by nodes 
according to the change in coherency of the node’s belief 
set that this would result in 
• Links can be randomly made  
• Links are dropped when beliefs are rejected for copy 
between nodes 
NODE PROPERTIES 
Each node has: 
• A (possibly empty) set of these “beliefs” that it holds 
• A fixed “coherency” function from possible sets of 
beliefs to [-1, 1] where 1 is completely coherent, 0 is 
neutral and -1 is maximum incoherency. 
• A fixed scaling function that maps changes in coherency 
to the probability of a change in beliefs 
• A record of the last node it “rejected” a belief from 
INITIALISATION 
Beliefs and social structure are randomly initialized at the 
sta t according to some global parameters. In the present version 
there can be up to 3 types of agent, which are distinguished by 
their coherency and scaling function.  
COHERENCY FUNCTION 
Key to this model is the model of belief coherency, which is a  
generalisation of Thagard’s pairwise (in)coherence. It gives a 
measure of the extent to which whole set of current beliefs are 
coherent. This assumes a background of shared beliefs which are 
not represented – this is important as the model only captures 
what might happen to a few foreground beliefs that are changing 
against all other beliefs. If one chose a different set of 
‘foreground’ candidate beliefs from all possible beliefs then 
different coherency functions would be needed. 
This allows for great flexibility in choices of belief structure, 
for example we could have the coherency evaluations: {A}è0.5 
and {B}è{0.7} but also {A, B}è-0.4 if beliefs A and B are 
mutually inconsistent, but individually coherent (against the 
background beliefs). The process of belief change is as follows. 
The probability of gaining a new belief from another or 
dropping an existing belief in this model is monotonically 
dependent on whether it increases or decreases the 
coherency of the node’s belief set 
BELIEF CHANGE PROCESSES 
Each iteration the following occurs: 
• Copying:  each arc is selected; a source end and 
destination end selected; a belief at the source is 
randomly selected; then copied to the destination with a 
probability related to the change in coherency it would 
cause (due to the scaling function described next). 
• Dropping: each node is selected; a random belief is 
selected and then dropped with a probability related to 
the change in coherency it would cause 
SCALING IMPACT OF COHERENCY FUNCTION 
There is a variety of ways to map a change in coherence to a 
probability (of a change occuring). The function that maps from 
changes in coherency to probability could be any that: (a) is 
monotonic (b) such that a -1è1 change has probability of 1 (b) a 
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1è-1 change has probability of 0. Two example such functions 
are illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Two example mappings from a change in coherency to 
a probability (of either a “copy” or a “drop” of a belief). 
The scaling function thus affects how amenable an agent is to 
change and the extent to which it may change. E.g. whethere 
only to increase coherency or if it can occasionally decrease. 
NETWORK CHANGE PROCESSES 
There are two processes for changing the influence network. 
Each iteration the following occurs for each agent: 
• Link Drop: with a probability: if a belief copy was 
rejected by the recipient, then drop that in-link.  
• New Links: with another probability, create a new 
random link with a random other (with a friend of a 
friend if possible, otherwise any) 
OTHER 
In order to maintain the average link density I added the 
following ‘kludge’: If there are too many links (as set by arcs-
per-node) slightly increase the rate of link drop, if there are not 
enough, slightly reduce the rate of link drop. Also, nodes have to 
have at least one link, or one is added, to stop isolates forming. 
Finally there is a small probability that a belief is randomly 
added or dropped, this adds a little bit of extrinsic noise into the 
system and stops beliefs disappearing (through chance) from the 
entire population (as discussed in [3]). 
The “opinion” of agents is derived from the belief state of the 
agents. This is a function from the belief set to [-1, 1]. The 
global opinion is an average of this function applied to each 
agent. There is obviously a choice as to how this is done, but we 
do this uniformly.  
More about the model can be found in the Appendix and [4]. 
4. PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
If not otherwise mentioned parameter values for the runs below 
are those listed in the appendix. For purposes of exposition, 
beliefs are arbitrarily assigned colours and types of agents 
shapes. In both examples discussed: 
• There are 50 agents 
• Simulations last 1000 ticks 
• There are, on average 3 arcs per node 
• The copy-rate parameter is 0.3 (the probability that one 
belief is considered for being copied along any link) 
• The drop-rate parameter is 0.075 (the probability that an 
agent considers dropping one belief in a tick) 
• Probability of dropping a link is 0.2 (if there is a suitable 
candidate where a copy has been rejected) 
• Probability of a random belief change is 0.001 
The derived opinions reduce to the number of “blue” beliefs 
minus the number of “yellow” beliefs divided by the population. 
AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE WITH 3 BELIEFS AND 2 
KINDS OF AGENT 
This example helps give a flavour of the model. In this: 
• There are 3 beliefs: “yellow”, “blue” and “red” 
• The probability of a new link is 0.01 
• Two kinds of agent, a strong-minded minority (stars) and 
a more open-minded majority (circles). 
The two kinds of agent are as follows:  
• 20% of agents (stars) are such that the ‘yellow’ beliefs 
are attractive and the ‘blue’ ones unattractive (due to 
coherence with background beliefs), they are also ‘strong 
minded’ in the sense that they only change their mind if 
it increases their coherence (a strong mapping function) 
• 80% of agents (circles) are such that the ‘blue’ beliefs 
are attractive and the ‘yellow’ ones unattractive, they are 
also ‘weak minded’ in the sense that they only have a 
tendency to change their mind if it increases their 
coherence (more probabilistic in their belief change) 
Both kinds change their links (or not) similarly and both are 
agnostic with respect to the ‘red’ belief. Atomic beliefs: yellow, 
red, blue. Runs are initialised with random beliefs and network. 
Here we try 10 runs of each variant: with no belief change 
and no link change; with belief change only; with link change 
only; and with both belief and link change. Output shown in 
terms of some typical runs and some summary graphs. In 
snapshots of the runs, agents shown in colours indicating the 
mixture of beliefs held (or if none, grey) – so blue if they only 
hold the Blue belief, green if they hold yellow and blue, etc. 
 
Figure 8. 4 snapshots of the run only allowing beliefs to change 
When only beliefs are allowed to change, there is some 
sorting of agents, so agents who are connected are more likely to 
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hold similar beliefs, but the fixed network structure limits the 
extent to which this can occur. There has been a shift in the 
balance of beliefs – a shift towards blue. (Figure 8) 
 
Figure 9. 4 snapshots of the run only allowing links to change 
When only links are allowed to change, then some structure 
can evolve that partially separates agents with different beliefs. 
The balance between blue and yellow beliefs is largely 
unchanged (remember there is some random change). (Figure 9) 
 
 
Figure 10. 4 snapshots of a run where both beliefs and links 
change 
When both beliefs and network can change we find that a 
considerable sorting of kinds of agents has occurred, with the 
“stars” being marginalised. There has been a marked shift in 
overall opinion towards the blue (remember the purple are agents 
that hold the blue belief but also the red etc.). (Figure 10) 
Figure 11 and Figure 12 show the average shift in belief 
averaged over 10 runs to 1000 ticks of the four model variants. 
 
Figure 11. Average Opinion at end of four kinds of run, (where 
“drop & add” is link change, “bel ch” is belief change) 
 
Figure 12. Opinion change, with and without changing links and 
beliefs (average over 10 runs) 
 
Figure 13. Proportion of same kinds together at end (av. over 10 
runs, “drop & add” = link change, “bel ch” = belief change) 
Figure 13  the proportion of links with the same kind of agent 
at its ends by the end of the simulations variants, averaged over 
10 runs. This shows that the combination of belief change (a 
cognitive process) and link change (a social process) produces 
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qualitatively different results from either belief change only or 
link change only.  
TOWARDS A BREXIT EXAMPLE 
In the second set of results we move towards the kind of 
situation that occurred in the Brexit referendum.  Here we have 3 
groups: floaters (most voters), yellows (Leave campaigners) and 
blues (Remain campaigners). Thus the model is composed of: 
• 70% Floaters (circles), these are weakly positive towards 
having either yellow or blue beliefs, but not both. They 
have a weak scaling function so they are more open to 
change and more tolerant of temporarily tolerating 
moves to lower coherence 
• 10% Leavers (stars) are for yellow and against blue with 
a strong scaling function (leave) 
• 20% Remainers (triangles) are for blue and against 
yellow, with a medium scaling function (remain) 
Groups start separate (to allow for self-reinforcement), so that 
initially nodes are only linked with others of their type. They are 
initialised with random beliefs. 
There are two beliefs: blue and yellow, the opinion function is 
the same as before (blue-yellow). For some reason that I cannot 
recall, the probability of a new link is 0.025 in these runs. 
There are no variants of the run (other than having different 
random seeds), all runs have the same proportions of agents, 
kind of initialization and parameters. 
 
Figure 14. Distribution of final average opinions over 1000 runs. 
When the simulation is run 1000 times, we get the 
distribution of final average opinonis as shown in Figure 14. One 
can see that, given this set-up there is a slight overall bias 
towards blue (remain) outcomes. 
Below I will merely display 4 specific runs to show the kinds 
of dynamics that this model can display. For each of these I will 
show 4 snapshots of the state of the model (as before) plus a 
graph that shows how the average opinion changed over time. 
Example run 1 
In this run the stars connect with floaters first, followed by the 
circles which has the effect of polarising the floaters, which then 
separate off into two groups. In each of these groups, the 
campaigners slowly convert the floaters to their own colour. One 
can see how the campaigners of both sides are now embedded 
within tightly formed groups (Figure 15). The average opinion 
oscillates between blue and yellow over time but the blues gather 
the biggest group in the end and win (Figure 16). 
 
Figure 15. Four snapshots of example run 1 
 
Figure 16. The changing average opinion in example run 1 
Example run 2 
 
Figure 17. Four snapshots of example run 2 
In the second run a similar thing happens, two groups are 
established (earlier) which are stable for a while. Then some 
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yellow mutate within the blue island, which then pulls apart. The  
yellow group then integrates into other and converts some more 
of the floaters (Figure 17). Figure 18 shows the stability of the 
overall opinion for blue until towards the end where the yellow 
group manage to connect into the main group and shift some 
more floaters to their side, winning in the end. 
 
Figure 18. The changing average opinion in example run 2 
Example run 3 
 
Figure 19. Four snapshots of example run 3 
In this run, we have a ‘Westminster bubble’ of stars and 
triangles forming, separate from the floaters (Figure 19).  Free 
from influence from campaigners, floaters flip each other back 
and forth but in a random walk, which happens to end with more 
yellow (Figure 20). 
 
Figure 20. The changing average opinion in example run 3 
Example run 4 
In this run, both starts and triangles connect with floaters, but 
triangles more intimately, stars always on the peripheral. The 
yellow stars connect repeatedly to the main group but are 
isolated again each time, so they do not ever gain enough 
influence to convert many floaters (Figure 21). The average 
opinion oscillates but always on the blue side (Figure 22). 
 
Figure 21. Four snapshots of example run 4 
 
Figure 22. The changing average opinion in example run 4 
 
Figure 23. A scatter graph of the diversity of beliefs between 
linked nodes and the homogeneity of types of agents linked at 
the end of 1000 runs of 1000 ticks. 
If one measures the end diversity of beliefs in linked nodes 
and the homogeneity of types (circles etc.) linked over 1000 runs 
one ends up with two distinct clusters of outcome (Figure 23). 
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5. DISCUSSION 
In this model, here are ‘competing’ processes of social influence 
(suggestion) vs. internal coherence with existing set of beliefs; 
also between social influence vs. social linking. Thus, an 
‘extreme’ group may be good at convincing another group when 
well connected to that group but groups tend to disconnect from 
those with very different views to themselves. 
How processes actually happen may matter a lot, so it may be 
that this model has these wrong. We just do not know what 
influences people’s change of links – do people have a 
‘whitelist’ of those they are willing to allow to influence them? 
In addition, this model does not touch upon the development of 
people’s belief structures within their society during 
acculturation or youth. 
However, this model does suggest possibilities.It may be that 
how we act collectively is not through a direct spread (imitation) 
of action but via a spread of beliefs, norms, stories, habits etc. 
from which directed action springs. This would allow for 
specialisation and diversity of action whilst maintaining 
coherency. In this picture culture (any pattern, knowledge, 
norms, technology passed down the generations etc.) is 
important, but the group-structure of society is dynamic and can 
be complex (almost fractal in structure). 
It does vividly show that if one modelled only the belief 
change/influence processes or only the social network processes 
then one could be missing significant aspects of what might be 
happening during these complex socio-cognitive processes. 
 
Figure 24. A tethered goat 
Like a tethered goat (Figure 24), individuals may find it hard 
to wander too far from the beliefs of the group it is attached to, 
but we might be able to choose to which group we are tied. 
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APPENDIX – MORE ABOUT THE MODEL 
This model is an extension of the one discussed in [3], but 
network change processes. The full model has quite a number of 
options and extensions not discussed here. The full model can be 
downloaded and inspected from OpenABM [4]. 
PARAMETERS 
A full list of parameters with descriptions maybe be found in 
the “Info” tab of the model [4]. Important parameters for our 
purposes include the following (the default value is shown in 
brackets following the description). 
• num-agents – number of agents in the simulation (50) 
• num-beliefs – number of atomic beliefs around (2) 
• init-prob-belief – probability that agents hold each of the 
atomic beliefs at the start (0.5) 
• copy-prob – the probability that a (random) belief from 
one agent will be attempted to be copied to anther during 
the copy process (0.3) 
• drop-rate – the drop-rate is the probability that an 
individual will do the drop process once (per simulation 
tick) (0.075) 
• mut-prob-power – this is the power of 10 of the 
probability that a random belief of an agent is flipped 
each time click (so -3 is a probability of 0.001)  
• arcs-per-node – how many arcs lead into each node on 
average (3) 
• init-sep-prob – the probability that types only link to 
their own kind at the start (1) 
• init-prob-drop-link – the probability of dropping a link 
(0.2) 
• prob-new-link –this is probability of adding a new 
random link (0.025) 
• Opinion-Fn-Name – The function that is used for 
recovering the opinion from the beliefs of agents which 
is then averaged for the global Opinion (blue-yellow) 
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The Social Dependence of Cognition:
An Agent-Based Simulation of the Perception of Scientific
Value as a Function of Impact Factor
Davide Secchi1
Abstract.
0.1 Introduction
The work on metrics for academic publishing has been growing sig-
nificantly in the last decades, among enthusiasts and critics. One such
measures has topped the others for use and institutionalization. This
is ISI Thomson’s Impact Factor (IF) and it has been widely used as a
proxy to determine the quality of a selected number of journal publi-
cations.
It is not until very recently that academics started to point out the
limits of this index [14]. In fact, IF falls short of what some—mostly
administrators at universities and research institutions—claim are its
most important advantages. IF should be able to discriminate be-
tween high and low quality journals using a formula that counts the
number of citations each article in a given journal attracts in one
(or five) year(s). This assumption on journal quality faces two ma-
jor issues. One is that academics have repeatedly pointed out that
there is no direct connection between the distribution of citations
of articles published in a journal and the IF [10]. This gave rise to
strong counter-actions, such as banning the use of IF among certain
academic circles [2]. The problem seems to be that highly cited pa-
pers skew the distribution, hence the mean—roughly represented by
the IF—does not fairly represent the average quality of papers. The
second major issue relates to the logical fallacy of attributing the
(alleged) characteristics of a system—i.e. a journal—to its individ-
ual components—i.e. the articles. This is the so-called composition
and division fallacy [16]. Another fallacy that a logician might evoke
is the appeal to authority fallacy, otherwise called ad verecundiam.
This happens when one uses IF to point at the value of a given article
due to the prestige of the journal where it has been published [16].
In another work, I connected these fallacies to point at the limits of
rational decision making [5] and the argument fits the case here too.
Whether one criticizes the IF for the first or the second reason, it
is undeniable that there are institutional aspects of the measure that
play a role in the way academics approach it. What is the relation
between the use of IF and the perception of scientific value of an ar-
ticle? Does it vary depending on the influences from the academic
community one is part of?
This article is an attempt to assess whether cognitive processes
around perceived scientific value (PSV) vary depending on the in-
stitutional understanding of IF that their reference group has. This is
a study of how social dynamics are key to understand cognitive pro-
cessing. The theoretical background to frame these questions is that
1 University of Southern Denmark, Denmark, email: secchi.davi@sdu.dk
of distributed [4], systemic [3], or E cognition [7] and tied to a model
developed in [8, 7].
0.2 The Model
To simplify, two categories of academics can be hypothesized. Some
scholars are less critical and embrace the logic behind those who
propose IF and want to use it as a measurement of research quality.
Hence, they push for those in their ‘circle’ to publish in high IF jour-
nals as much as possible. For these individuals, IF is a reflection of
the inner scientific value (PSV) of an article. Instead, there are other
academics that discard IF completely, hence they have a publication
strategy that is not at all related to the measure. For these scientists,
PSV is independent from IF and subjectively evaluated through an
assessment of the article. In order to highlight the combined social
impact of group membership, these two groups are defined intelli-
gence units (IU), in line with a tradition started with Herbert Simon
[13].
I modeled two categories of academics as agents in an agent-based
simulation model (ABM) that features an organization—i.e. a re-
search institution or a university—where the two groups share simi-
lar environmental conditions but differ in the way they regard IF and
understand PSV of articles. In the real world, these two groups can
be departments, research centers, or else. The choice of ABM is in
line with finding a method that effectively tackles emergent proper-
ties of a system where a number of agents are diversely defined. The
conditions for agents’ interaction, behavior, and change are set and
their adaptive dynamics shape the properties of the system [6]. The
simulation was coded and implemented using NetLogo 5.2 [15].
All parameters for this simulation are specified in Table 1 and fur-
ther details are in the article. In the following, we summarize some of
the most relevant parameters to provide sufficient details to explain
how the simulation works.
Besides being randomly allocated to these two groups—one of IF
enthusiasts, IU2, and the other of IF skeptics, IU1—research of each
agent’s publications are evaluated 24 times in the simulation. This is
a process that mimics the yearly review or appraisal processes that
most institutions run their staff through. When the evaluation period
comes, each agent is randomly allocated a number of up to four pub-
lications (pub) that are considered for assessment. Each publication
is assigned an IF and this also happens randomly, so that high or low
IF are allocated to articles independent of the group the agent belongs
to. In this way, the wish to publish in high IF journals is not neces-
sarily what actually happens. In addition to a value representing IF,
each publication has a ‘value’ assigned to it that may or may not be
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in line with the IF—i.e. the actual quality of the article may (or may
not) differ from the relative IF.
At the beginning of the procedure, each agent is assigned an atti-
tude towards IF aif on a random normal distribution with mean = 0
and standard deviation = 0.5. Its affiliation to IU1 or IU2 depends
on the strong or weak value of aif . In addition to that, each agent is
attributed a value that signifies the tendency towards accepting and
using recommendations, information, and advice coming from other
agents. Using a more technical jargon, we call this element ‘human
docility’ [12, 5, 1]. As seen in Table 1, there are three distributions
in which the mean assumes different values, to test how much this
social orientation of agents affects PSV. This latter is distributed dif-
ferently depending on agent’s affiliation to IU1 or IU2. IF enthusiasts
from IU2 have a higher mean for PSV because they believe that IF
truly discerns higher value of a publication in relation to lower val-
ues. Hence, they perceive those low (or no) IF publications as partic-
ularly weak.
The simulation also allows for members of the same IU to be close
to each other. Here ‘closeness’ is to be intended as a mental/cognitive
state more than physical closeness. Switching ‘on’ or ‘off’ the pa-
rameter group enables this outcome. Agents can also change IU de-
pending on whether their PSV becomes more aligned to the average
of PSV agents of other group have. This is the parameter change.
Also, in a way to mimic real life situations, agents can leave or join
the organization however, the number with which they do is a value
that, at every year/period, may take any number between 0 and the
upper bound of the selected parameter (see Table 1 for details).
Table 1. Parameter Notations and Values
Parameter Values Description
steps 500 The maximum number of opportunities that agents have to interact with each other when dealing
with problems. The simulation may stop earlier, if pub_waves reaches 24 sooner than when
steps= 500.
runs 25 Number of times a simulation is performed with each given configuration of parameters.
publications, pub ∼ [0, 4] This is a number of publications, between 0 and 4, that each agent presents every time there is an
evaluation (publication wave, see below). It is randomly assigned.
publication IF, pubIF ∼ [0, 5] This is the IF associated with the journal where the publication is accepted, hence it is attributed
to the publication. It is randomly assigned and varies between 0 and 5.
publication value,
pubv
∼ [0, 1] The value of a scientific contribution assigned to each publication on a random basis.
IF attitudes, aif ∼ N (0, 0.5) This is the attitude each agent has towards the impact factor (IF) of a journal publication.
docility, d ∼ N (0.6, 0.2),
∼ N (0.9, 0.2),
∼ N (1.2, 0.2)
This is the docility level associated randomly to each agent in the simulation — higher values in-
dicate higher probability to adapt to the respective IU as well as less autonomy from the respective
IU.
perceived scientific
value, PSV
∼ N (1, 0.25) This is the value attributed to a scientific output by an agent that is not affiliated with any IU.
∼ N (1, 0.15) This is the value attributed to a scientific output by an agent that is affiliated with IU1 — smaller
st.dev means that values are more grouped around the mean.
∼ N (1 + α, 0.15) This is the value attributed to a scientific output by an agent that is affiliated with IU2 — the higher
mean signifies stricter criteria to assess PSV .
PSV difference be-
tween IU1 and IU2, α
0.25, 0.50 The average difference in the perceived scientific value that members of IU2 have in relation to
those from IU1 — this value affects directly the mean of the random-normal distribution for IU2;
st.dev. is unaffected.
group [true, false] The tendency to be socio-cognitively closer to the other members of the IU the agent is affiliated
with.
change [true, false] The possibility to change IU depending on the distance of one’s PSV to the mean PSV of either
IU1 or IU2.
leaving, l [0, 3, 5] A random number of agents between 0 and l exits the system.
joining, j [0, 5, 15] A random number of agents between 0 and j enters the system.
range 4, 8 This is the value used to explore the environment that surrounds each agent.
Finally, every agent can reach other agents using a proximity or
range parameter, hence limit or extend its reach but never having a
clear perspective of the entire organization.
0.3 Procedures
The procedure uses three steps. First, agents select one paper to eval-
uate from other agents next to them (using the value of the parameter
range) and they conduct an assessment according to the rules of their
own intelligence unit. This is based on IF for those belonging to IU2
and to perceived value for the others from IU1.
The second step of the procedure sees agents selecting another
paper to assess. This would—depending on vicinity—very likely be
another from their own IU. The rules for the assessment are the same
as in step one, however the paper is “handed in” to the agent by an-
other agent in something that may mimic the suggestion of a good
read.
The third step introduces a socialization mechanism in that every
agent passes through a process of additional assessment. At first, the
agent updates its own assessment of the papers using a function of
their docility so that those with higher d values are more prone to
think carefully and adjust their first evaluation towards something
they believe is more congruous. The second update compares one
agent’s assessment with those of other agents around it. While highly
docile individuals compare their assessment and update it indepen-
dent on the affiliation of the other agents they are comparing it with
[1]. Low docility agents would only consider updating their judge-
ment if the recommendations come from agents affiliated with the
same IU as their own.
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0.4 Findings and Conclusions
The simulation is equivalent to a factorial design of 27 × 33 and,
given its size, data was collected using Abacus 2.0, a supercomputer
available through the Danish e-infrastructure cooperation (DeIC) to
the University of Southern Denmark. Following a procedure involv-
ing power analysis [9, 11], the simulation was performed 21 times
per configuration of parameter, each covering at least 24 evaluation
periods (i.e. up to 500 steps).
Results show that range has a small impact on PSV of agents from
both IU1 and IU2. The effect of the group is mostly visible for mem-
bers of IU2—i.e. the IF enthusiasts—especially when the unit can tie
relations among its members more strongly because affiliation num-
bers remain stable over time. In that case, there is an increase in PSV,
independent of the IF of the evaluated papers. This happens when
the parameter leaving takes the value 5, and PSV increases as the
simulation runs.
When agent are left free to switch IU—i.e. change is ‘on’—, most
agents switch to IU1. Especially when there is a high turnover and
relatively high docility levels there is a vast majority of agents affili-
ated with IU1 and PSV tends to decline. Instead, opposite conditions
lead to radicalization and polarization of PSV, with IU1 maintaining
a stable view and IU2 increasing their perceptions over time.
The simulation is an attempt to show that cognitive processes
around a simple number do not depend solely on individual char-
acteristics but are vastly dependent on institutionalization and social-
ization mechanisms.
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Attitudes and ideologies: how do political issues map on 
an ideological left-right scale? 
Extended abstract on political attitude dynamics 
Martin Neumann
1
 
Abstract.  Agent based models of opinion dynamics can broadly 
be divided into dimensional, numerical and non-dimensional 
approaches. This divide can also be revealed in research on 
political ideologies. Whereas political science research on 
ideologies is focussed on a one-dimensional scale of left- and 
right wing attitudes, non-dimensional approaches in the 
psychology of attitude formation reveal (more or less consistent) 
clusters of attitudes about certain objects. Notwithstanding a left-
right divide remains persistent across these clusters. However, 
what kind of specific attitudes are counted as left- or right wing 
remains to a large degree historically and culturally contingent. 
By relying on psychological theories of attitude formation a 
mechanism is identified how attitude clusters map on a one-
dimensional ideological scale. This finding demonstrates that the 
dynamics of political1attitudes reveals a co-evolution of culture 
and cognition. Bodily dynamics on timescales of milliseconds is 
shaped by historical contingencies evolving on timescales 
ranging up to centuries.  
1 INTRODUCTION 
‘EUSSR’ is a slogan of Geert Wilders and right wing populists 
all over Europe and even the USA. This is a simple ‘catch word’ 
that has a certain appeal in political communication. It sticks in 
the memory even if people disagree just because it connects a 
message about a political agenda with emotional appeal. Given 
certain cultural background knowledge it is immediately 
recognizable as a right wing challenge. However, how does it 
come that the particular political issue is perceived as right 
wing? Consider for example the year 1980. Conservatives would 
immediately have blamed such a statement as ridicule of the 
victims of the Prague spring (and likewise in Hungary 1956 or 
the GDR in 1953). It could not have been accounted as a right 
wing statement. If possible at all, presumably in the 1980s it 
could only have been a radical left-wing thesis of critics of 
capitalist economy. For instance, still in 2006 the French 
rejection of a European constitution was dominated by a left 
wing discourse on the economic constitution of Europe. How 
does it comes that particular political issues map on a one-
dimensional ideological scale of left-and right wing ideologies? 
The example shall demonstrate that concrete items are 
historically contingent. Nevertheless, at least since the time of 
the French revolution in which opponents and proponents of the 
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ancient regime sat on the left or right side of the French 
assembly political ideology is shaped by a left-right division [1]. 
2 ABM OF OPINION DYNAMICS 
The question of political attitude dynamics is extensively studied 
by agent-based models of opinion dynamics, one of the success 
stories in agent-based modeling. In broad terms the modeling 
approaches can be differentiated in dimensional and non-
dimensional approaches to political ideologies [2]. Paradigmatic 
examples of dimensional models are represented by [3] or [4]. 
These models solve a puzzle of the psychology of attitude 
dynamics already highlighted by Abelson in the 1960s [5]. 
Robust findings of mathematical models of the psychology of 
persuasion indicate that in the long run communication should 
reach at consensus. How does it come that factually political 
communication might even foster polarization of convictions as 
it can be observed for instance currently in the Western World? 
Dimensional models of opinion dynamics provide an answer: If 
one assumes a ‘bound of confidence’, in which differing 
opinions are taken into account whereas outside the bound of 
confidence opposing convictions are not even considered the 
emergence of polarized opinion clusters can be generated. This 
is similar to social judgment theories [6, 7] which postulate 
latitudes of acceptance and rejection. However, dimensional 
opinion dynamics models have been seriously been criticized [8] 
as not being empirically verified. For instance, the question why 
a particular issue such as EU opposition became an ingredient of 
a right-wing ideology cannot even be posed within this 
framework. Non-dimensional accounts apply a more empirically 
oriented approach to attitude formation. Edmonds (unpublished 
presentation at CHIAS IV) developed an agent-based model of 
attitude formation and change based on minimizing cognitive 
dissonance [9]. This model provides a framework for integrating 
substantial issues of political debate in agent based models of 
opinion change as for instance the dynamics of attitudes towards 
the Brexit referendum. Agents adopt attitudes towards certain 
topics in order to increase the coherence of their belief system. 
In a similar vein, [2] developed the methodology of cognitive 
affective mapping for empirically investigating ideological 
world views. As an example they provide a map of statements 
typically positively and negatively valued by US tea party 
supporters. In the common sense Breixt (at least proponents such 
as Nigel Farage) as well tea party supporters are mostly 
perceived as right wingers on the ideological continuum. 
However, non-dimensional methodological approaches do not 
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per se lay open a one-dimensional continuum of left- and right 
wing ideologies. 
3 PSYCHOLOGY OF THE EMERGENCE OF 
ATTITUDE CLUSTERS 
By what mechanisms do substantial topics become arranged in a 
left-right scale? Research revealed much empirical evidence 
what psychological features foster liberalism or conservative 
attitudes [e.g. 1, 10-12] such as basic human needs for cognitive 
closure or openness [11]. However, the more basic question of 
why and how attitudes become perceived as liberal or 
conservative is less in the focus of political science. In the 
following some considerations shall be provided. Cognitive 
psychology of the 1980s and 90s developed theories of why 
persons adopt certain attitudes from the perspective of cognitive 
processes (for a critical review of the brain-as-computer 
metaphor which can also be revealed in these approaches see 
[13]). In particular, the elaboration-likelihood model [14, 15] 
postulates a dual process of reasoning: a central and a peripheral 
route. Individuals need to be both motivated and able to invest 
cognitive resources for an elaborate reasoning about messages. 
For instance in cases which are of personal relevance people 
may have both the experience to evaluate a message and the 
motivation to carefully consider an argument. If a peripheral 
route is taken, a more heuristic reasoning is activated [16] in 
which other factors than the argument quality become relevant. 
This approach might be insightful for comprehending political 
communication. Factual political processes and decisions are to a 
large degree far away from everyday experience and mostly not 
of direct personal relevance. While political decisions may 
strongly influence individual life (one may think of war), the 
effects are often indirect and cannot immediately be traced back 
to these decisions. Thus it is likely that a peripheral route is 
taken in processing political information. Therefore it is a 
rational strategy of political communication to reduce complex 
tasks and issues in simple and catchy messages. Slogans such as 
‘EUSSR’ are easy to memorize even – and in particular – if not 
processed in the central route of reasoning. It is thus likely that 
agenda setting [17] in political communication is more 
successful if appealing to peripheral modes of information 
processing. The elaboration-likelihood model provides a 
framework for explaining the emergence of subjectively 
perceived consistent cluster of attitudes [18] as they can be 
identified by non-dimensional models of opinion dynamics such 
as cognitive affective mapping. The fluidity of the ideological 
classification can be explained by the peripheral route of 
information processing: if a certain issue is perceived as a left- or 
right wing agenda is determined les by the argument quality but 
by heuristic cues. For instance it cannot a priori be deduced 
whether and what kind of attitudes about European integration 
count as left – or right wing attitudes. This can be revealed by 
non-dimensional accounts of attitude to attitude formation such 
as recent research indicating that Toyota Prius is a left wing car 
[23]. Thus even a mobility device may become a political 
statement. 
4 EMERGENCE OF AN IDEOLOGICAL 
SCALE 
For investigating why these clusters at least often are arranged 
on a one-dimensional scale of left and right wing political 
opinions it might be useful to refer back to the more general 
theory of attitudes in psychology going back to [19] and [20]. 
[21] describes attitudes as object-evaluation associations. For 
instance, chocolate or Scotch whisky may be associated with 
delight whereas kissing a frog might be associated with disgust. 
[22]. Likewise political convictions are not simply beliefs about 
the factual state of the world. Being a left-or right winger is also 
an expression of values. If it is taken into account that attitudes 
are object-evaluation associations it follows that either positive 
or negative affect is stimulated. Thus attitudes become arranged 
on a continuous one-dimensional scale, namely either positive or 
negative. It has to be noted that this is not exactly the scale 
postulated by dimensional models of opinion dynamics as the 
scale from positive to negative implies a meaningful midpoint 
(i.e. neutral stimuli) which is not inherent in these models. 
However, at least a reduction of complexity to a one-
dimensional scale takes place.  
The question remains how the one-dimensional scale takes 
the shape of a left - right distinction in the domain of politics. 
For answering the question it might be useful to keep in mind 
that in democratic societies constituents are requested to make a 
decision. In consequence political attitudes take the shape of 
being in favour or opposition of one or another political party. 
Moreover a number of Western democracies are characterized 
by a two party system or at least dominated by two main parties. 
This refers back to ancient regime in which pro and con where 
seated on the left or right side of the French assembly: Being in 
favor of one party implies refusal of the other. From this 
perspective the one dimensional scale of left right can be traced 
back to the attitudinal scale of positive or negative affect. This 
explains that despite the flexibility of ideologies in questions of 
concrete issues at the same time a one dimensional scale of 
political ideologies as left – or right wing ideologies remains 
persistent. In this context it has to be taken into account that 
research on political ideologies is mostly undertaken in Western 
Democracies. In authoritarian regimes the left-right wing scale is 
less investigated [10]. Likewise the (rare) empirical evidence 
seems to indicate that the divide becomes more blurred [10]. 
This indicates that in an authoritarian context political attitudes 
are forced back to the pro-con decision as in the ancient regime.  
5 CONCLUSIONS  
In more abstract terms the example of integrating the two 
approaches in agent-based modeling of political attitude 
dynamics shows the need for an integrated socio-cognitive 
science and the power of immergence.  Internal bodily 
mechanisms (such as Hebbian learning, which describes the 
amplifying of connections in neuronal nets [24]) are triggered by 
political communication. Political communication and the 
persuasiveness of political slogans in turn which builds upon 
contingent frames which might invoke decades or centuries of 
cultural historical legacy [24]. Thus political attitude dynamics is 
a co-evolution of culture and cognition operating on a multitude 
of timescales ranging from milliseconds to centuries [25].    
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What changes in language change? A deflationary model
of the emergence of intrusive and linking /r/ in nonrhotic
varieties of English
Matthew Isaac Harvey1 and Jens Koed Madsen2
1 Abstract
Agent-based models are an underutilized investigative 
tool in linguistics, largely because their application has 
been misunderstood. Their abstraction is often confused 
for a simple lack of external validity, and structural 
correspondence between a model and modeled 
phenomena is easily misunderstood as nothing more than 
the results of interpretive bias on behalf of the modeler. In 
the present paper we pursue two goals: first, we attempt to
outline what we see as the most immediately fruitful use 
of modeling to elucidate linguistic findings and suggest 
further avenues of linguistic research, and second, we 
offer a model that we hope serves as an example of our 
recommended strategy, which builds on previous models 
with several crucial changes. We conclude by highlighting
the many ways our model can be expanded to address 
additional aspects of the phenomena that serve as its real-
world counterpart. 
On our view, the most persuasive applications of 
ABM in linguistics to date have used it as a deflationary 
tool with respect to complex mentalist explanations for 
linguistic findings. The goal in these cases is not to 
produce a model that accurately captures all aspects of the
relevant situation (i.e., grammatical, semantic, and 
phonetic structure as well as environmental, social, and 
cultural pragmatic constraints on speech). Rather, it is to 
accurately reproduce extremely narrow aspects of 
linguistic behavior whose explanation has ben taken to 
require complex, agent-internal cognitive systems, such as
the putative mechanisms taken to underly grammatical 
generativity. A good example of this kind of work is De 
Boer’s (1997, 2000, 2001) work on vowel systems. The 
narrow aspect of linguistic behavior in question is the 
distribution of vowel system types among human 
languages - how many languages include 5-vowel systems
with two front vowels, two back vowels, and one high mid
vowel, for instance - which has typically been explained 
in terms of innate human predispositions for certain 
system-features, such as dispersion and feature 
conservation (see e.g., Lindblom, 1986; Schwartz, et al., 
1997). De Boer’s models effectively deflate the need for 
explanations of this kind, by creating populations of 
mobile agents whose interactions (consisting of “vowel” 
utterances and feedback about the success or failure of 
“vowel” recognition) gradually produce population-
general similarities in the “vowel”-inventories of the 
member agents. He found that under a wide range of 
initial parameters, populations of this kind stabilize their 
collective vowel inventories - that is, their population-
wide “vowel systems” - at equilibria that closely resemble 
human vowel systems in number of elements and 
distribution within the available feature space. They do 
this, moreover, without any innate predispositions. 
The present paper borrows De Boer’s overall 
investigative strategy as well as his basic thesis, namely, 
that inter-agent interactions (provided these are 
geographically constrained and have some kind of 
success/failure criterion) produce population-wide 
patterns of utterance activity which match observed 
patterns in human populations along several specific 
dimensions. It is worth noting that the same strategy has 
been pursued, with positive results, by Stanford and 
Kenny (2013, working with Labov’s description of the 
Northern Cities vowel shift) and Oudeyer (2005b) as well 
as Zuidema and De Boer (2009), both working with the 
emergence of minimal combinatoriality in phoneme 
systems. 
Our target phenomenon is the persistent emergence
of /r/-sandhi phenomena in non-rhotic varieties of English.
Many English dialects and idiolects are mostly or 
completely non-rhotic, such that their speakers only 
reliably produce /r/ phonemes in word-initial positions. 
These varieties very often display ‘linking’ and 
‘intrusive’ /r/s, however, which labels denote the addition 
of /r/ phonemes at word and morpheme boundaries that 
are followed by vowels. The two terms are equivalent 
except that ‘linking’ /r/s occur at locations that are 
orthographically appropriate (i.e., where there is also a 
written “r”), whereas ‘intrusive’ /r/s are not 
orthographically marked. Thus a speaker of standard 
British English (which is non-rhotic) who articulates “car 
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alarm” with an audible /r/ on the end of “car” displays 
linking /r/, whereas one who articulates “ma and pa” with 
an audible /r/ after “ma” displays intrusive /r/. Together, 
linking and intrusive /r/ comprise /r/-sandhi phenomena. 
A structuralist explanation for /r/-sandhi is 
necessarily one that assumes homogeneity of articulatory 
behavior within a particular variety of English, with each 
variety characterized by a specific set of ‘contexts’ (that 
is, sequences of adjacent phonemes) in which intrusive 
and linking /r/ appear. Such an explanation can then 
account for the observed contexts of occurrence of /r/-
sandhi in a given variety by proffering a set of 
phonological rules that predict, or generate, a matching set
of contexts. 
Of course, observed instances of /r/-sandhi are not 
homogeneous within varieties of English, or indeed in the 
speech of individual speakers. In addition, Hay and 
Sudbury (2005) report in their overview of the 
sociolinguistic literature that many communities are in 
fact variably rhotic rather than simply non-rhotic (see e.g.,
Williams & Kerswill, 1999). While most non-rhotic 
varieties of English display both linking and intrusive /r/, 
some display only or primarily linking /r/ (as in the case of
some speakers of RP British English, see Wells, 1982), 
and others display neither (Southern American English as 
well as - possibly - South African English, see Harris, 
1994; Trudgill & Hanna 1982). This variability of /r/-
sandhi phenomena even within highly localized varieties 
and within idiolects means that a probabilistic, tendency-
based explanation for their distribution is more 
parsimonious than an explanation in terms oh 
phonological rules plus production errors on the part of 
individuals, as the former comes with appropriate 
variability “built in”, so to speak.
With this in mind, our model explores the relation 
between spatial distribution and interaction rate in creating
apparently-phonological variability. The model is 
initialized by placing locating agents in a scale-free 
network structure to create community-like spatial 
clusters. Agents are individually initialized with an 
internal list of 5 articulation-items (“phonemes”, although 
the label isn’t significant) and 5 values on a continuous 
internal scale, each associated with a single articulation 
item (“contexts”); contexts are generated with a high-
variability Gaussian distribution, to create a situation with 
significant variability among agents that has no direct 
relation to “community” placement. Agents then interact 
with one another, randomly selecting partners within their 
spatial “reach” and exchanging phoneme utterances, 
attempting to categorize partner utterances by comparing 
them to the agent’s own internal phoneme-context 
pairings. If the “listening” agent identifies the uttered 
phoneme as matching one of its own phoneme-context 
pairs, then it provides feedback to its partner that the 
utterance was successful; the categorization mechanism 
introduces a probabilistic element to the success or failure 
of interactions, which agents then use to update their 
internal phoneme-context pairings. The model also 
includes birth and death, with progeny added periodically, 
initialized in close proximity to a parent, with unweighted 
phoneme-context pairs, and with reduced interaction 
reach, such that they tend to assume pairing-weights 
typical of their communities rather than weights typical of 
agent-clusters further away. The preliminary results from 
the model show that agents tend to develop similar sets of 
phoneme-context pairings within their spatially clustered 
communities, despite the random priors, the presence of 
inter-cluster interaction, and the lack of any difference 
between the agents of different clusters.
The most significant implication our model has
for the study of /r/-sandhi phenomena is that a rule-based
explanation  is  probably  not  needed  to  account  for
observed  patterns  of  intrusive  and  linking  /r/.  Rather,
specific  patterns  of  /r/-sandhi,  on  both  individual  and
community  levels  of  analysis,  can  -  in  principle  -  be
attributed  to  effects  of  interaction  rate  and  small-scale
details of individual cognitive and linguistic biases, which,
in aggregate and via generalization though feedback-rich,
pattern-sensitive interaction, produce trends on the scale
of  whole  populations.  This  style  of  explanation  is
naturalistically  plausible,  invites  exploration  and  testing
using increasingly rich and detailed models, and doesn’t
require the theoretical baggage of structuralist accounts.
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Symposium III
Social Interactions in Complex
Intelligent Systems (SICIS)
A complex intelligent system is a large network of interacting agents with no central control, in which
complex behaviors emerge from, usually simple, behaviours of single agents. Social interactions in complex
intelligent systems give rise to emergent behaviors and collective properties that hold at the macroscopic
level, and that cannot be easily inferred from the analysis of the behaviour of single agents at the
microscopic level. The study of complex intelligent systems represents a novel approach to investigate how
social interactions among agents lead to emergent behaviors which exhibit some sort of intelligence.
Methodologically, social interactions in complex intelligent systems accommodate both local and global
phenomena, and therefore they are a key concept to understand the behaviour of a complex intelligent
system. Social interactions are also the key concept to explain how real and artificial societies behave. The
models used to study interactions among agents may derive from various fields, such as statistical physics,
information theory, and non-linear dynamics. They are used to describe the effects of interactions among
agents from a microscopic point of view, and the derivation of observable behaviors of the system may be
addressed using various approaches, such as analytic and simulative tools, statistical methods, and
empirical observations. Sophisticated research methodologies are being developed and used in social
analysis of complex intelligent systems at both microscopic and macroscopic levels of analysis. Such
methods include, graph theory, bifurcation diagrams, network analysis, agent-based modeling, theoretical
physics, non-linear modeling, and computational models including cellular automata, and multi-agent
systems.
Complex intelligent systems and models of social interactions are used to describe processes in various
fields, such as Artificial Intelligence, Computer Science, Mathematics, Biology, Economics, Physics,
Sociology, Economy, and many others. Hence, they represent a promising multi-disciplinary research field.
The proposed symposium on Social Interactions in Complex Intelligent Systems is meant to offer an
interdisciplinary forum on all aspects related to social interactions in complex intelligent systems. The aim of
the symposium is to stimulate discussions and synergies among participants, which are expected to have
diverse and complementary research background.
Stefania Monica, University of Parma
Federico Bergenti, University of Parma
Vincenzo Nicosia, Queen Mary University of London
Organizers
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A Kinetic Framework to Study
Opinion Dynamics in Multi-Agent Systems
Federico Bergenti and Stefania Monica1
Abstract. In this paper we summarize an analytic framework to
study opinion dynamics. Such a framework is inspired from physics
and, in particular, from the kinetic theory of gases with different
types of molecules, known as gas mixtures. By reinterpreting the
molecules of gases as agents, and the collisions among molecules
as interactions among agents, we show how to adapt the kinetic
approach to the study of opinion dynamics in multi-agent systems.
First, we briefly introduce the key ingredients of the kinetic theory of
gas mixtures to clarify nomenclature and to emphasize the substan-
tial differences with the proposed framework. Then, we show how
the kinetic approach can be used to study opinion dynamics in multi-
agent systems, and how a variety of sociological phenomena can be
accommodated in the proposed framework. In the last part of the pa-
per we focus on two sociological phenomena, namely compromise
and diffusion, and we describe analytic results concerning stationary
profiles of the distribution of opinion, and of the temporal evolution
of the average opinion and of the variance of the opinion.
1 Introduction
Besides a notable interest witnessed in the research on agent-based
models (see, e.g., [5]), a significant interest on opinion dynamics is
found in many research areas. Opinion dynamics and the effects of
social interactions are studied in the context of sociology to derive
scientific theories and models to explain collective behaviors and
socio-cultural differentiation (see, e.g., [8]). Opinion dynamics has
been investigated in the field of artificial life [7], which proposes
common models for many types of agents, such as: plants and ani-
mals in ecosystems, vehicles moving in the traffic, pedestrians walk-
ing indoor or outdoor, and actors in large-scale organizations. Fi-
nally, opinion dynamics has been studied in various fields related to
artificial intelligence, such as cooperative multi-agent systems (see,
e.g., [2, 17]). The interest in the study of opinion dynamics is still
very high because of its central role in very challenging applications
like social networks.
The majority of existing agent-based models used to study opin-
ion dynamics are based on simulations, and obtained results are valid
within the scope of the type of systems that have been actually simu-
lated. On the contrary, in this paper we propose to study opinion dy-
namics from an analytic point of view, whose results are valid within
the scope of the hypotheses used to obtain them. The analytic ap-
proach that we adopt is inspired by physics, and we acknowledge
that other models of opinion dynamics inspired by physics are doc-
umented in the literature, such as those based on statistical mechan-
1 Dipartimento di Scienze Matematiche, Fisiche e Informatiche, Universita`
degli Studi di Parma, Parco Area delle Scienze 53/A, 43124 Parma, Italy
{federico.bergenti,stefania.monica}@unipr.it
ics [21] or on thermodynamics and Brownian motion [20]. In detail,
the approach that we consider in this paper is based on the kinetic
theory of gas mixtures, a branch of physics that aims at formalizing
observable macroscopic properties of gas mixtures, which are com-
posed of different types of molecules. The observable macroscopic
properties of interest in kinetic theory are, e.g., the pressure and the
temperature of the gas mixture, and the theory moves from a descrip-
tion of microscopic interactions among molecules.
Kinetic theory studies the microscopic collisions among
molecules in gases and it relies on the details of such collisions to de-
rive macroscopic properties of gases, using proper balance equations.
Similarly, when dealing with opinion dynamics, one typically starts
from the description of microscopic interactions among agents and
aims at deriving macroscopic properties of the system concerning,
e.g., the temporal evolution of the average opinion [18,23]. Hence, by
reinterpreting the molecules of gases as agents it is possible to adapt
the kinetic framework to analyse opinion dynamics in multi-agent
systems. Notably, very few results of kinetic theory of gas mixtures
are applicable to the study of opinion dynamics because microscopic
collisions among the molecules are significantly different from mi-
croscopic interactions among agents, as considered typically by soci-
ologists. For this reason, while the general approach of kinetic theory
remains valid, the two theories are substantially different. In this pa-
per, we show that it is possible to derive analytic relations between
the microscopic laws that describe the effects of interactions among
agents and the distribution of the opinion after a sufficiently large
number of interactions, which is normally called stationary profile.
Moreover, we show that the use of the proposed kinetic framework
allows macroscopic characteristics of the system, such as the average
opinion or the variance of the opinion, to be determined analytically.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the ba-
sic nomenclature of the kinetic theory of gas mixtures. Section 3
presents the proposed framework using the nomenclature of kinetic
theory. Section 4 discusses relevant sociological phenomena which
can be accommodated in the proposed framework, and it shows ana-
lytic results obtained considering some interesting sociological phe-
nomena. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and outlines ongoing
and future work.
2 Overview of Kinetic Theory of Gas Mixtures
Classic kinetic theory of gas mixtures formalizes an explanation of
observable macroscopic properties of gas mixtures, e.g., pressure
and temperature, starting from the analysis of microscopic collisions
among molecules. The basic idea of the theory is to describe mi-
croscopic collisions among molecules of a gas from a probabilistic
point of view, with the objective of deriving a description of observ-
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able macroscopic properties by means of proper balance equations.
Normally, kinetic theory of gas mixtures is described by first study-
ing the case of gases with only one type of molecules. In this par-
ticular case, the theory assumes the existence of a single distribu-
tion function f(x, v, t), which represents the density of molecules
at position x ∈ R3 with velocity v ∈ R3 at time t ≥ 0. Typi-
cally, it is assumed that the distribution function evolves according
to the Boltzmann equation, which is an integro-differential equation
whose unknown is function f(x, v, t). The spatially homogeneous
Boltzmann equation is
∂f
∂t
= Q(f, f)(x, v, t) (1)
where the term on the right hand side is related to the effects of binary
collisions among molecules, and for this reason, Q(f, f) is called
collisional operator. Given the distribution function f(x, v, t), it is
possible to define macroscopic properties typically associated with
gases. First, by integrating f(x, v, t) with respect to v, one obtains
n(x, t) =
∫
R3
f(x, v, t) d3v (2)
which represents the number of molecules per unit volume at time t
with position x. The average velocity of molecules, instead, can be
computed as
u(x, t) =
1
n(x, t)
∫
R3
v f(x, v, t) d3v. (3)
Finally, the local temperature T (x, t) at time t can be computed ac-
cording to the following equality
3
2
n(x, t)kT (x, t) = m
∫
R3
|(v − u(x, t))|2f(v, x, t)d3v (4)
where k is the Boltzmann constant, and m is the mass of molecules.
Observe that the Boltzmann equation (1) is relative to a gas where
all the molecules are equal. Instead, a gas is typically composed of
different kinds of molecules. For this reason, kinetic theory of gas
mixtures, namely of gases with different types of molecules, typi-
cally called species, was introduced. In this case, denoting as M ≥ 1
the number of species in the considered gas,M distribution functions
{fs}Ms=1 are defined. When considering a gas mixture, the temporal
evolution of each density function can be described as
∂fs
∂t
=
M∑
r=1
Qsr(fs, fr)(x, v, t) 1 ≤ s ≤M (5)
where the right-hand side represents the collisional operator relative
to species s, which is written as the sum of the collisional operators
Qsr(fs, fr) relative to collisions among molecules of species s and
any species 1 ≤ r ≤ M . Observe that the collisional operator rela-
tive to species s depends on the distribution functions {fs}Ms=1 of all
species. As in the case with only one species, it is possible to com-
pute macroscopic properties, as follows. The number of molecules
of species s per unit volume at time t with position x is obtained by
integrating the distribution function relative to species s with respect
to v
ns(x, t) =
∫
R3
fs(x, v, t) d3v 1 ≤ s ≤M. (6)
The average velocity of molecules of species s can be computed as
us(x, t) =
1
ns(x, t)
∫
R3
v fs(x, v, t) d3v 1 ≤ s ≤M. (7)
Finally, the local temperature Ts(x, t) of species s, for all
s ∈ {1, . . . , M}, is computed according to
3
2
ns(x, t)kTs(x, t) = ms
∫
R3
|(v− us(x, t))|2fs(v, x, t) d3v (8)
where ms is the mass of molecules of species s.
3 A Kinetic Framework for Opinion Dynamics
In this section, we use the kinetic approach described in Section 2 to
investigate opinion dynamics in multi-agent systems. Before going
into the details of the proposed framework, it is worth mentioning
the basic assumptions which underlie the framework. Opinion has
been modeled in the literature both as a discrete [24] and as a con-
tinuous [6] variable. While discrete models are typically used to ad-
dress situations where a finite number of options are available, e.g.,
in political elections, continuous models are typically used to study
opinions related to a single topics, varying from strongly disagree
to completely agree. In the proposed framework, we model opinion
as a continuous variable. In general, the interactions that govern the
dynamics of opinion may involve two [13] or more [10] agents, and
in the first case they are called binary interactions. In the proposed
framework, we focus on binary interactions. Finally, opinion mod-
els differ due to the phenomena used to describe how the opinions
of agents change after single interactions. Opinion may change be-
cause of a variety of phenomena, which has been classified into an
accepted nomenclature by sociology. Single models typically include
a specific subset of such phenomena depending on the specific char-
acteristics of the studied multi-agent systems, on targeted application
scenarios, and on the background of authors. The proposed frame-
work accommodates various phenomena to update the opinions of
interacting agents, as detailed in Section 4.
As in kinetic theory, we aim at studying interesting macroscopic
properties of a system made of interacting peers, now called agents
and not molecules, starting from the analysis of the effects of single
interactions. Inspired by kinetic theory, we assume that all agents can
interact with each other, and we consider binary interactions among
agents. While in kinetic theory the molecules of gases are associ-
ated with physical parameters, such as their positions and velocities,
here we assume that each agent is associated with a single scalar pa-
rameter v which represents its opinion, and we assume that v varies
continuously in a proper closed interval, denoted as I ⊆ R.
We first start with a system in which all agents are equal, and
then we extend the framework to a system made of different types
of agents. When agents are all equal, we assume the existence of a
distribution function for the opinion, denoted as f(v, t), which rep-
resents the number of agents with opinion v at time t, and which
is defined for each opinion v ∈ I and for each time t ≥ 0. Obvi-
ously, due to its definition, function f(v, t) is non-negative. Using
the distribution function f(v, t), the number of agents at time t can
be written as
n(t) =
∫
I
f(v, t)dv, (9)
and the average opinion u(t) at time t can be computed as
u(t) =
1
n(t)
∫
I
vf(v, t)dv. (10)
The number of agents at time t is obviously related to the number of
molecules in a gas as in (2), while the average opinion u(t) is related
to the average velocity of the molecules of a gases as in (3). Given
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the average opinion u(t), it is also possible to compute the variance
of the opinion as
σ2f (t) =
1
n(t)
∫
I
(v − u)2f(v, t)dv. (11)
Observe that σ2f (t) is related to the temperature of gases in (4).
As in kinetic theory, we assume that function f(v, t) evolves on
the basis of the Boltzmann equation (1), whose form is now
∂f
∂t
= Q(f, f)(v, t). (12)
Using the same nomenclature of kinetic theory, we refer to Q as col-
lisional operator. However, we remark that the explicit expression
of the collisional operator used in kinetic theory is substantially dif-
ferent from that adopted to study opinion dynamics, as outlined in
Section 4.
Following consolidated practice in kinetic theory, we focus on
the weak form of the Boltzmann equation, as usual when trying to
find solutions of a non-trivial integro-differential equation. The weak
form of a differential equation is obtained by multiplying both sides
of the considered equation by a smooth function with compact sup-
port, typically called test function, and then integrating the obtained
equation. Hence, the weak form of the Boltzmann equation (12) is
d
dt
∫
I
f(v, t)φ(v)dv =
∫
I
Q(f, f)(v, t)φ(v)dv (13)
where the right-hand side is called weak form of the collisional oper-
ator Q with respect to test function φ(v). Functions that satify (13)
are called weak solutions of the Boltzmann equation, and they are
useful to study macroscopic properties of a system, as follows:
1. The left-hand side of (13) with φ(v) = 1 represents the derivative,
with respect to time, of the number of agents n(t);
2. The left-hand side of (13) with φ(v) = v is proportional to the
derivative, with respect to time, of the average opinion u(t); and
3. The left-hand side of (13) with φ(v) = (v−u)2 is proportional to
the derivative, with respect to time, of the variance of the opinion
σ2f (t).
The explicit expression of the weak form of the collisional opera-
tor which appears at the right-hand side of (13) is essential to analyse
the temporal evolution of the characteristics of the systems. More-
over, the weak form of the Boltzmann equation is also used to derive
the stationary profiles of the opinion [22].
The proposed kinetic framework can be also used to study multi-
agent systems where agents have different characteristics. Assuming
that the agents of the considered multi-agent systems are divided into
M ≥ 1 classes, each of which has different characteristics, it is pos-
sible to define M functions {fs(v, t)}Ms=1. The number of agents of
class s at time t can be written as
ns(t) =
∫
I
fs(v, t)dv 1 ≤ s ≤M, (14)
and the total number of agents is
n(t) =
M∑
s=1
ns(t). (15)
The average opinion of agents of class s can be computed as
us(t) =
1
ns(t)
∫
I
fs(v, t)vdv 1 ≤ s ≤M, (16)
and it is the analogous of the average velocity of each species in a gas
mixture in (7). Given the average opinions of all classes, it is possible
to compute the global average opinion of the system at time t
u(t) =
1
n(t)
M∑
s=1
ns(t)us(t). (17)
Finally, the standard deviation of the opinion relative to agents of
class s can be computed as
σ2s(t) =
1
ns(t)
∫
I
(v − us)2fs(v, t)dv. (18)
Observe that σ2s(t) is related to the temperature of each species in a
gas mixture (8). As in kinetic theory, we assume that each distribution
function fs(v, t) evolves according to the Boltzmann equation
∂fs
∂t
(v, t) =
M∑
r=1
Qsr(fs, fr) 1 ≤ s ≤M. (19)
From (19) it is evident that the collisional operator relative to class
s corresponds to the sum of the contributions Qsr(fs, fr) of the
collisions between the agents of class s with the agents of class
r ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. As in the case where agents are all equal, the study
of the weak form of the Boltzmann equation, which can be written
as
d
dt
∫
I
fs(v, t)φ(v)dv =
M∑
r=1
∫
I
Qsr(fs, fr)φ(v)dv, (20)
allows deriving differential equations relative to:
1. The number of agents of each class, using test function φ(v) = 1;
2. The average opinion of each class, using test function φ(v) = v;
and
3. The variance of the opinion of each class, corresponding to the
test function φ(v) = (v − us)2.
4 The Collisional Operator for Opinion Dynamics
The explicit expression of the collisional operator in the Boltzmann
equation strongly depends on the details of the description of the
effects of single interactions among agents. Hence, proper micro-
scopic interaction rules need to be defined to be able to derive the
explicit expression of the Boltzmann equation and, hence, to analyt-
ically study opinion dynamics.
4.1 Supported Sociological Phenomena
The following is a non-exhaustive list of the most common sociolog-
ical phenomena which can be used to model how opinions change
after interactions:
• Compromise. The tendency of agents to change their opinions to-
wards those of agents they interact with [1].
• Diffusion. The process according to which the opinion of each
agent can be influenced by the social context [4].
• Homophily. The tendency of individuals to communicate only
with those with similar opinions [16].
• Negative Influence. The phenomena according to which agents
evaluate their peers on the basis of some parameters and they only
interact with those with positive scores [9].
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• Opinion Noise. The phenomena according to which a random ad-
ditive quantity leads to arbitrary opinion changes with small prob-
ability [19].
• Striving for Uniqueness. The process that is based in the idea that
agents may want to distinguish from peers and, therefore, they
may decide to change their opinions if too many peers share the
same opinion [10].
All mentioned phenomena can be accommodated in the proposed
framework by means of specific terms in the expression of the colli-
sional operator, as detailed in various papers [3, 11–15]. Among the
wide variety of such phenomena, in this paper we focus on compro-
mise, which is the key ingredient of almost all models of opinion
dynamics models, and on diffusion, which allows modeling systems
where consensus is not reached.
4.2 Examples of Compromise and Diffusion
For the sake of simplicity, the following discussions assume that
the multi-agent system contains only one class of agents, i.e., that
all agents are equal. Similar, but more involved, results can be ob-
tained considering different classes of agents (see, e.g., [3]). The sim-
plest rule for changing the opinions of two interacting agents involve
only compromise, namely the sociological phenomenon for which
the opinions of two interacting agents get closer. Mathematically, if
only compromise is considered, the effects of an interaction among
two agents can be modeled as{
v′ = v + γ(w − v)
w′ = w + γ(v −w) (21)
where v′ and w′ are the post-interaction opinions of the two agents
and γ is a parameter in (0, 1) which quantifies compromise. Observe
that negative values of γ may be used, instead, to quantify the phe-
nomenon of negative influence. As shown in [14], rules (21) can be
used to derive the explicit expression of the weak form on the colli-
sional operator as∫
I
Q(f, f)φ(v)dv = β
∫
I2
f(v)f(w)
(
φ(v′)− φ(v)
)
dvdw (22)
where β represents the probability of interaction between two agents.
It is easy to observe that if we set φ(v) = 1 in (22), the weak
form of the collisional operator is 0 and, hence, the weak form of
the Boltzmann equation is
d
dt
n(t) = 0, (23)
which means that the number of agents in the system is constant,
and called n. If we consider, instead, test function φ(v) = v, sim-
ple algebraic manipulations of (22) show that the weak form of the
collisional operator equals 0. Then, the weak form of the Boltzmann
equation relative to φ(v) = v is
d
dt
u(t) = 0 (24)
so it can be concluded that the average opinion is constant and called
u. Finally, considering test function φ(v) = (v−u)2, the weak form
of the Boltzmann equation can be written as the following first-order
differential equation
d
dt
σ2f (t) = −2βnγ(1− γ)σ2f (t) (25)
from which, recalling that γ ∈ (0, 1), it can be easily obtained that
the variance of the opinion σ2f (t) exponentially tends to 0 as t in-
creases. This shows analytically that the opinions of all agents con-
verge to the same value, which, according to (24), corresponds to the
initial average opinion. Hence, consensus is reached, in agreement
with other models involving only compromise [1].
Instead of considering only compromise, let us introduce also dif-
fusion, which is modeled as a stochastic addend in the rules to update
the opinions of two interacting agents. More precisely, we consider
the following rules{
v′ = v + γ(w − v) + ηD(|v|)
w′ = w + γ(v − w) + η∗D(|w|)
(26)
where η and η∗ are two random variables with the same distribution
ϑ(·) whose support is denoted as B, and D(·) is the so called diffu-
sion function. In this case, the explicit expression of the weak form
of the collisional operator is
Q(f, f) =
∫
I2
∫
B2
ϑ(η)ϑ(η∗)f(v)f(w)·(
φ(v′)− φ(v)
)
dvdwdηdη∗.
(27)
It is possible to show that the number of agents and the average opin-
ion are conserved, as in the case without diffusion [12,13]. Concern-
ing the variance of the opinion, simple algebraic manipulation of the
weak form of the Boltzmann equation relative to φ(v) = (v − u)2
results in the following equality
d
dt
σ2f (t) = −2nγ(1− γ)σ2f (t) + σ2
∫
I
f(v)D2(|v|)dv. (28)
Due to the second addend at the right-hand side, in this case we can-
not conclude that the variance of the opinion tends to 0 as the number
of interactions increases. As a matter of fact, due to the contribution
of diffusion, consensus is not reached in this case and, hence, opin-
ions do not converges to a single value. In order to simplify notation,
let us introduce the function
g(v, τ ) = f(v, t) (29)
where τ is a temporal variable proportional to t according to param-
eter γ which appears in (26), namely
τ = γt. (30)
The stationary distribution of the opinion, also known as stationary
profile, can be found analytically by solving the following second
order differential equation [22]
λ
2
∂2
∂v2
(D(|v|)2g) + ∂
∂v
((v − u)g) = 0, (31)
with
λ = σ2/γ. (32)
and σ is the standard deviation of the random variables η and η∗.
Observe that λ is the ratio of σ2, which is related to diffusion, and
γ, which is related to compromise. Hence, values of λ close to 0
correspond to models where compromise has a stronger impact than
diffusion (γ >> σ2). At the opposite, if large values of λ are con-
sidered, the contribution of diffusion is more important than that of
compromise (σ2 >> γ). In [13] it is shown that setting
D(|v|) = 1− |v|
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Figure 1. The stationary profiles in (33) are shown for λ = 1/8 (blue line), λ = 1 (red line), and λ = 8 (green line) and for: (a) u = 0; (b) u = 1/3.
in (26) leads to the following stationary profile
g∞(v) = cu,λ(1− |v|)−2−
2
λ exp
(
− 2(1− uv)
λ(1− |v|)
)
(33)
wheret cu,λ is a constant that must be set to satisfy∫
I
g∞(v) = n. (34)
The properties of the stationary profile in (33) differ on the basis of
the values of the parameters involved. In particular, g∞(v) can have
one or two maxima, depending on the values of u and λ, as shown
in [13]. In Fig. 1, some illustrative results are shown for different
values of λ, namely: λ = 1/8 (blue line); λ = 1 (red line); and
λ = 8 (green line). Fig. 1 (a) refers to the case in which the average
opinion is u = 0. In this case, the stationary profiles are symmetric
functions and, regardless of the value of λ, they have two points of
maximum. Fig. 1 (b), instead, refers to the case in which the average
opinion is u = 1/3, and in this case, the stationary profiles are not
symmetric. If λ = 1/8, the stationary profile has only one point
of maximum, which is positive. In the remaining cases, namely with
λ = 1 and λ = 8 the stationary profiles have two points of maximum
and the value of the positive maximum is far larger than that of the
negative one. Instead, if we consider the diffusion function
D(|v|) = 1− v2
in (26), it is possible to show that the stationary profile has the fol-
lowing explicit expression [12]
g∞(v) =cu,λ(1 + v)
−2+ u
2λ (1− v)−2− u2λ ·
exp
(
uv − 1
λ(1− v2)
) (35)
where, once again, cu,λ must be set to satisfy (34). In this case, the
stationary profile may have one, two, or three maxima, depending on
the values of u and λ, as shown in [12]. In Fig. 2, some illustrative
results are shown for different values of λ, namely: λ = 1/8 (blue
line); λ = 1 (red line); and λ = 8 (green line). Fig. 2 (a) refers to
the case in which the average opinion is u = 0. In this case, the sta-
tionary profiles are symmetric functions. If λ = 1/8, the stationary
profile has one point of maximum, corresponding to v = 0, while the
stationary profiles relative to λ = 1 and λ = 8 have two points of
maximum. Fig. 2 (b) refers to the case in which the average opinion
is u = 1/3. In this case, the stationary profiles are not symmetric.
The stationary profiles corresponding to λ = 1/8 and λ = 1 have
two points of maximum, while if λ = 8 the stationary profile has one
point of maximum, which is positive.
As stated in the Section 1, when dealing with problems related to
opinion dynamics, one may be interested in deriving the opinion dis-
tribution that is obtained as a consequence of given interaction rules
which describe the effects of interactions among agents. This can be
done also by simulations, even though the results may be less sig-
nificant than those obtained analytically, as they depend on various
factors like the duration of the simulations, the parameters used for
the simulations, and the numerical stability of the simulation process.
At the opposite, one may be interested in finding interaction rules
leading to a desired distribution of opinion, which can correspond to
collective agreement or to other profiles. Analytic approaches may
be useful to address also these problems because the proper setting
of the parameters involved in the model can be used as a method to
obtain the desired stationary profiles.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we discussed a class of models to study the dynamics of
opinion in multi-agent systems using an analytic framework inspired
by kinetic theory of gas mixtures, a branch of physics which studies
the macroscopic properties of gases starting from the analysis of mi-
croscopic collisions among molecules. We remark that this work is
only inspired by kinetic theory because, even if the general approach
of kinetic theory was adopted, the resulting framework is substan-
tially different from kinetic theory. Such a difference originates from
the adoption of different forms of interactions, and only basic re-
sults of kinetic theory remain valid in the proposed framework. After
a short introduction on kinetic theory of gas mixtures, we showed
how to reinterpret the laws of physics in the field of opinion dynam-
ics. In particular, we showed how to use the Boltzmann equation to
study macroscopic properties of a multi-agent system and to derive
the asymptotic profile of the distribution of opinion. Finally, after
a brief description of various sociological phenomena involved in
opinion dynamics, we showed the explicit expressions of the station-
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Figure 2. The stationary profiles in (35) are shown for λ = 1/8 (blue line), λ = 1 (red line), and λ = 8 (green line) and for: (a) u = 0; (b) u = 1/3.
ary profiles obtained considering two of such phenomena for multi-
agent systems where all agents are equal. We showed that, if only
compromise is considered, the average opinion remains constant and
the variance of the opinion exponentially tends to 0 as the number of
interactions increases. Hence, consensus is always reached and the
opinion of each agent tends to the initial average opinion. Instead,
if diffusion is considered together with compromise, stationary pro-
files with different characteristics can be derived depending on the
parameters of the model. Similar results hold for a multi-agent sys-
tem where agents are grouped into classes on the basis of the values
of the parameters which characterize their propensity to change their
opinions [3]. Further work on this topic involves the modeling of
microscopic phenomena not yet studied using the proposed frame-
work. As explained in the paper, the choice of different microscopic
rules to update the opinions of two interacting agents has a strong
impact on the collisional operator and, hence, on the macroscopic
characteristics of the systems and on stationary profiles. Moreover,
the inclusion of locality of interactions is a significant improvement
of the proposed framework which requires adopting a non-spatially
homogeneous form of the Boltzmann equation, or introducing a form
of distance among agents in microscopic rules.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to thank the Gruppo Nazionale per il Calcolo
Scientifico (GNCS) for support.
REFERENCES
[1] R. P. Abelson, Contributions to Mathematical psycology, Frederiksen
N., Gulliksen H. eds., New York, 1964.
[2] F. Bergenti, E. Franchi, and A. Poggi, ‘Selected models for agent-based
simulation of social networks’, in Procs. Symposium on Social Net-
works and Multiagent Systems, pp. 27–32, (2013).
[3] F. Bergenti and S. Monica, ‘Analytic study of opinion dynamics in
multi-agent systems with two classes of agents’, in Proceedings of 17th
Workshop “Dagli Oggetti agli Agenti” (WOA), Catania, Italy, (2016).
[4] E. Bonabeau, ‘Agent-based modeling: Methods and techniques for sim-
ulating human systems.’, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci, 7280–7287, (2002).
[5] G. Castellano, S. Fortunato, and V. Loreto, ‘Statistical physics of social
dynamics’, Reviews of Modern Physics, 81, (2009).
[6] R. Hegselmann and U. Krause, ‘Opinion dynamics and bounded confi-
dence models, analysis, and simulation’, Journal of Artificial Societies
and Social Simulations, 5(3), (2002).
[7] C. Langton, Artificial Life: An overview, MIT Press, 1998.
[8] P. J. Di Maggio and W-Powell, ‘The iron cage revisited institutional iso-
morphism and collective rationality in organizational fields’, American
Sociological Review, 48, 147–160, (1983).
[9] M. Ma¨s and A. Flache, ‘Differentiation without distancing. Explain-
ing bi-polarization of opinions without negative influence’, PLOS One,
8(11), (2013).
[10] M. Ma¨s, A. Flache, and D. Helbing, ‘Individualisazion as driving force
of clustering phenomena in humans’, PLOS One, 6(10), (2010).
[11] S. Monica and F. Bergenti, ‘Opinion dynamics in multi-agent systems:
Selected analytic models and verifying simulations’, Computational
and Mathematical Organization Theory.
[12] S. Monica and F. Bergenti, ‘A kinetic study of opinion dynamics in
multi-agent systems’, in Atti del Convegno (AI*IA), Ferrara, Italy,
(2015).
[13] S. Monica and F. Bergenti, ‘Simulations of opinion formation in multi-
agent systems using kinetic theory’, in Proceedings of 16th Workshop
“Dagli Oggetti agli Agenti” (WOA 2015), Napoli, Italy, (June 2015).
[14] S. Monica and F. Bergenti, ‘A study of consensus formation using ki-
netic theory’, in Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on
Distributed Computing and Artificial Intelligence (DCAI 2016), pp.
213–221, Sevilla, Spain, (June 2016).
[15] S. Monica and F. Bergenti, ‘Kinetic description of opinion evolution in
multi-agent systems: Analytic model and simulations’, in 18th Inter-
national Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems
(PRIMA 2015), pp. 483–491, Bertinoro, Italy, (October 2015).
[16] A. Nowak, J. Szamrej, and B. Latan, ‘From private attitude to public
opinion: A dynamic theory of social impact’, Psycol. Rev., 97, 362–
376, (1990).
[17] R. Olfati-Saber, J. A. Fax, and R. M. Murray, ‘Consensus and coop-
eration in networked multi-agent systems’, Proceedings of the IEEE,
95(1), 215–233, (January 2007).
[18] L. Pareschi and G. Toscani, Interacting Multiagent Systems: Kinetic
Equations and Montecarlo Methods, Oxford University Press, 2013.
[19] M. Pineda, R. Toral, and E. Hernandez-Garcia, ‘Noisy continuous opin-
ion dynamics’, Journal of Statistical Mechanics, 9, 1–13, (1982).
[20] F. Schweitzer and J.A. Holyst, ‘Modelling collective opinion formation
by means of active brownian particles’, European Physical Journal B,
15, 723–732, (2000).
[21] D. Stauffer and T. J. P. Penna, ‘Crossover in the Cont-Bouchaud perco-
lation model for market fluctuations’, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics
and Its Applications, 256, 284–290, (1998).
[22] G. Toscani, ‘Kinetic models of opinion formation’, Communications in
Mathematical Sciences, 4, 481–496, (2006).
[23] W. Weidlich, Sociodynamics: a systematic approach to mathematical
modelling in the social sciences, Harwood Academic Publisher, Ams-
terdam, 2000.
[24] E. Yildiz, A. Ozdaglar, D. Acemoglu, A. Saberi, and A. Scaglione, ‘Dis-
crete opinion dynamics with stubborn agents’, ACM Transactions on
Economics and Computation, 1, (2013).
SYMPOSIUM III. SOCIAL INTERACTIONS IN COMPLEX INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS (SICIS) 70
Co
nfe
re
nc
e
ed
itio
n
An Overview of Kinetic Approaches
to Study Consensus Formation
Stefania Monica and Federico Bergenti1
Abstract. This paper discusses some recent results in the study of
opinion dynamics and consensus formation in multi-agent systems.
While results in these fields are typically obtained by simulation, the
adoption of the approach inspired by kinetic theory of gases allows
deriving analytic results. More precisely, analytic relationships be-
tween the parameters of the model and the asymptotic characteristics
of the systems can be analytically determined. Various models in-
spired from kinetic theory of gases have been studied. For instance,
different microscopic phenomena can be investigated, such as com-
promise and diffusions, and both deterministic and stochastic param-
eters have been used to model such phenomena. Recently, models
inspired from kinetic theory of gas mixtures have also been intro-
duced in the context of opinion dynamics. Such models allow study-
ing multi-agent systems in which different classes of agents coexist.
Agents belonging to different classes may be associated with differ-
ent features, such as the initial distribution of the opinion and the
propensity of agents to change their opinions when interacting with
other agents. A discussion on the features of different models is pre-
sented in this paper.
1 Introduction
This paper discusses analytical approaches to opinion dynamics and
consensus formation. Such disciplines are considered important in
the fields of multi-agent systems and distributed computing and they
apply to various areas, such as robotics, control theory, mathematics,
and sociology (e.g., [5, 9]). For this reason, they have been studied
using various approaches, among which it is worth recalling those
based on graph theory and properties of graph Laplacians [3, 11],
on thermodynamics (e.g., [10]), and on Bayesian networks [4]. In
this paper we focus on models inspired from kinetic theory of gases,
a discipline which studies macroscopic properties of gases, starting
from the modeling of microscopic interactions among molecules.
According to such models, a parallelism between molecules in gases
and agents in multi-agent systems can be defined, so that the kinetic
framework can be extended to study the effects of interactions among
agents in multi-agent systems.
In this paper we focus on models inspired from kinetic the-
ory of gases, a discipline which studies macroscopic properties of
gases, starting from the modeling of microscopic interactions among
molecules. Following the ideas behind such models, a parallelism be-
tween molecules in gases and agents in multi-agent systems can be
defined, so that the kinetic framework can be extended to study the
effects of interactions among agents in multi-agent systems. More
1 Dipartimento di Scienze Matematiche, Fisiche e Informatiche, Universita`
degli Studi di Parma, Parco Area delle Scienze 53/A, 43124 Parma, Italy
{stefania.monica,federico.bergenti}@unipr.it
precisely, we consider multi-agent systems where each agent is as-
sociated with a continuous parameter v which represents its opinion.
Such parameter can be defined on a closed interval, typically chosen
as I = [−1, 1] [7], or on R [1]. The aim of the considered models
is to study, analytically, the temporal evolution of opinion, starting
from the details of single interactions among agents. Of course, dif-
ferent interaction rules lead to different macroscopic properties of the
system, as it will be discussed in the following. However, the pro-
posed kinetic-based approach allows deriving a general framework
which can be used to study different interaction rules and to derive
the respective asymptotic opinion distributions, denoted as station-
ary profiles. The kinetic-inspired approach relies on some assump-
tions. First, any agent can change its opinion only as a consequence
of an interaction with another agent. Moreover, it is assumed that
each agent can interact with any other agent in the multi-agent sys-
tem and that each interaction is binary, namely it involves only two
agents [6]. Observe that this last assumption is not restrictive, since
interactions involving many agents can be modeled as a set of bi-
nary interactions. Finally, time is modeled as a sequence of discrete
steps, which do not necessarily have the same duration. Each step
corresponds to a single interaction between two agents [8].
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview
of different models inspired from kinetic theory, starting from differ-
ent rules that model the post-interaction opinions as functions of the
pre-interaction ones. Section 3 concludes the paper.
2 The Kinetic Formulation of Opinion Dynamics
In this paper, we describe results derived according to different mod-
els, obtained by considering different interaction rules among agents.
We remark that such rules are inspired by phenomena typically stud-
ied by sociologists and their explicit formulation differs from that
used to model interactions among molecules in kinetic theory. De-
spite these differences, the kinetic framework can be successfully
adopted to obtain analytic results in the field of opinion dynamics
in multi-agent systems. Analytic results are independent from the
tools and from the actual values used for simulations. The avail-
ability of analytic results also allows the design of systems with de-
sired properties, without having to repeatedly simulate the behaviour
of the system with different parameters until the desired properties
are obtained. For these reasons, the availability of analytic results
should be considered as a key advantage of the proposed framework.
In the remaining of this paper, we associate to each agent a scalar
parameter v, which represents the agent’s opinion. We assume that
v ∈ I = [−1, 1], so that ±1 represent extremal opinions, while val-
ues close to 0 correspond to moderate opinions. This choice is not
restrictive and any other interval could be considered.
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Following the approach of kinetic theory, the proposed model re-
lies on the definition of a function f(v, t) which represents the den-
sity of opinion v at time t and which is defined for each opinion v ∈ I
and for each time t ≥ 0. Since f(v, t) is a density function, the inte-
gral over I of f(v, t) with respect to v equals the number of agents
in the considered multi-agent system at time t, which is denoted as
n(t). In order to describe the opinion evolution using a kinetic ap-
proach, we assume that the function f(v, t) evolves according to the
Boltzmann equation. In particular, we consider the following (homo-
geneus) formulation of the Boltzmann equation
∂f
∂t
= Q(f, f)(v, t) (1)
where the left-hand side represents the temporal evolution of the dis-
tribution function and Q is known as collisional operator, since it
takes into account the effects of interactions. The explicit expression
of the collisional operator is strongly related to the microscopic rules
used to describe the effects of interactions among agents. The follow-
ing model has been considered in the literature, according to which
the post-interaction opinions of two interacting agents are obtained
from the formulas{
v′ = v + γ(w − v) + η∗D(|v|)
w′ = w + γ(v − w) + ηD(|w|) (2)
where: (v′, w′) denote the post-interaction opinions of the two agents
whose pre-interaction opinions were (v, w); γ is a deterministic pa-
rameter in Iγ = (0, 12 ); η and η∗ are two random variables; andD(·)
is known as diffusion function. In this case, it is possible to prove that
the number of agents n and the average opinion u of the systems are
constant parameters [7]. Stationary profiles g for opinion distribution
can be found as solutions of
λ
2
∂2
∂v2
(D(|v|)2g) + ∂
∂v
((v − u)g) = 0 (3)
and they depend on the explicit expression of the diffusion function
D(·). We remark that if D(·) = 0, then consensus is reached.
More recently, the kinetic approach has been extended to the study
of opinion formation in multi-agent systems with different classes of
agents [2]. In the following, we assume that M classes of agents
coexist inside the same system and we denote as ns the number of
agents of class s and as us(t) the average opinion of agents of class
s. We assume that the post-interaction opinions of the two interact-
ing agents depend on the pre-interaction opinions according to the
following rules {
v′ = v − γsr(v − w)
w′ = w − γrs(w − v)
(4)
where v, w, v′ and w′ have the same meaning as in (2) and
{γsr}ms,r=1 are deterministic parameters defined in Iγ . The value of
γsr measures the propensity of an agent of class s to change its opin-
ion in favor of the opinion of an agent of class r. In this case, a proper
differential equation for each class needs to be defined, namely
∂fs
∂t
(v, t) =
m∑
r=1
Qsr(fs, fr) ∀ s ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. (5)
Under these assumptions, it can be proved that the number of agents
of each class is conserved and that the asymptotic average opinions
of all classes are equal. Under these assumptions, it can be proved
that the number of agents of each class is conserved and that the
asymptotic average opinions of all classes are equal.
3 Conclusion and Ongoing Work
In this paper, we discussed analytic models for the study of opin-
ion dynamics and consensus formation in multi-agent systems. The
considered models are inspired from a framework related to kinetic
theory of gases and of gas mixtures. Kinetic theory is typically used
to derive macroscopic properties of gases starting from the descrip-
tion of the effects of microscopic collisions among molecules. Sim-
ilarly, by reinterpreting molecules as agents and collisions among
molecules as interactions among agents, one can adopt the same
framework to study opinion dynamics in multi-agent systems. In par-
ticular, the adoption of kinetic theory of gas mixtures allows mod-
eling multi-agent systems composed of various classes of agents,
where each class is associated with different features. We showed
that the proposed kinetic approach is sufficiently general to incorpo-
rate different models leading to different stationary profiles for the
opinion.
Ongoing work involves the modeling of different microscopic phe-
nomena, considering different rules to update the opinions of two
interacting agents.
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The benefits of Linked Data for the social sciences 
Analysing economic drivers and network effects of international 
migration based on semantically integrated data 
Francesca Ceolan1,2, Dimitris Alivanistos3,4, Kathrin Dentler3,5, Albert Meroño-Peñuela3, Richard 
Zijdeman1, Rinke Hoekstra3, and Auke Rijpma6 
Abstract. International migration is a phenomenon hard to analyse 
comprehensively, partly because of the lack of a single database 
that contains all the required data. Therefore, we converted three 
different datasets and recollected the data with the use of a single 
query. In this study, we demonstrate the utility of Linked Data as a 
flexible technology to manage data, and the possible use it can 
have in social sciences.  Based on the selected data, we performed 
several regression analyses to validate two theories of the 
migration studies field: neoclassical economic theory and ethnic 
networks theory. 
Keywords: linked data, migration theories, semantically 
integrated data, migrant integration, unified migration portal. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Linked Data has been proven to be a flexible technology to 
describe, integrate, manage, expose and query many kinds of data 
in various domains, including the humanities [1], [2] and history 
[3]. However, Linked Data technology is rarely applied in social 
science. Therefore, we want to showcase with our study that 
Linked Data can be applied successfully to social science research. 
Specifically, we investigate international migration in several 
European countries. In our project, we use Linked Data technology 
to create an open, easily accessible and comprehensive data model 
with data on international migrants in the 28 European countries. 
Much has been written on the subject of international migration, 
but in recent years it has become an even more widely discussed 
topic, holding many societal implications [4]. For this paper, we 
take European countries as a case study. Europe has been a popular 
immigrant destination for many decennia, and is nowadays 
experiencing one of the most significant inflows of migrants in 
history, both from outside the continent and within. 
Our application of Linked Data to the field of migration studies 
shows that the benefits of this technology can be exploited also in 
social science. Our aim is not to research an innovative topic of 
migration studies, but to demonstrate that important, well-
established analyses can be conducted based on Linked Data. The 
lack of literature on this topic [5] shows how this is an original and 
innovative study. Consequently, our contribution to the scientific 
community is the application of a recently developed technology to 
a different and differently established field.  
 
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• RQ1: How can Linked Data technology help to understand 
international migration studies, a branch of social science? 
• RQ2: How are the unemployment rate and the presence of 
immigrants in a country related to immigration to the 
country? And how does this relation differ between countries? 
We aim to answer these questions through the creation of a 
Unified Migration Portal (UMP), which consists of data about 
migration, refugees and countries converted to RDF (Resource 
Description Framework). Our UMP wants to be accessible and 
easily integrated through its shared vocabularies that make the 
expansion of variables easier.  
2 DATASET DESCRIPTION 
To answer our research questions, we use three different datasets, 
selected because they provide reliable data with indicators that 
have already been harmonized between countries [6], [7]. 
The first dataset is from the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development7 and contains information regarding 
inflows of population between countries all over the world. 
Specifically, it contains the following columns: Code (referring to 
country code), Country of birth/nationality, Variable (in our case 
the Inflows of foreign population by nationality), Gender, Country, 
Year, Value.  
The second dataset is from the Directorate-General of the 
European Commission, well known as Eurostat8, and contains 
information about the population of European countries. 
Specifically, there are the GEO column containing the country the 
row corresponds to, the CITIZEN column which contains the type 
of population (e.g. Total population and Foreign-born population), 
the TIME column, corresponding to the time period that the 
population was measured and the VALUE where the population 
value is stored. Moreover, the AGE, SEX, and UNIT columns 
contain information about the age group (e.g. 12-25), gender (male, 
female, total) and the unit of the measurement (Number, 
Percentage etc.). 
The third dataset is also from Eurostat9, holding information 
about the unemployment rate of countries that are part of the 
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7 OECD.Stat, International Migration Database, Inflows of foreign 
population by nationality. Available at: 
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8 Eurostat, population database, “Population on 1 January by age, sex, and 
broad group of citizenship (migr_pop1ctz). Available at:  
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9 Eurostat, unemployment database, total unemployment rate (tsdec450). 
Available at: 
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Eurozone. As it follows the structure of Eurostat datasets, it 
contains the same columns as the population dataset.  
3 ONTOLOGY DESIGN 
Conceptualizing a Unified Migration Portal is a non-trivial task. A 
variety of multi-dimensional data has to be taken into account, 
such as unemployment rate and population, which in turn have 
more dimensions such as gender, time, and type. We modelled 
country data as Indicators of a country, indicating whether a 
country is or will be a possible destination for migration and why. 
Furthermore, we modelled inflow and outflow of population and 
asylum seeking data as Movement Of People. The reason behind 
this design choice is that migration can be regarded as movement 
of a number of people from one place to another (in our case from 
country to country), in a specific time period (e.g. year).  
This concept can be even more generic and extendible by 
adding other types of information like the gender of those who 
moved, their age group, etc. The unifying entity is Country, as it 
provides the link between movement_of_people and 
country_indicators. The resulting ontology is visualized in Figure 
1. 
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of our ontology10. 
 
                                               
10 A bigger version of Figure 1 and 2 can be found in the appendix. 
 
 
Figure 2. Visualization of the graphs in our triplestore. 
 
Figure 3. The pipeline for the data input to our Unified 
Migration Portal. 
4 DATA CONVERSION AND STORAGE 
We converted the data according to our ontology. The goal was to 
convert each dataset to RDF [8]. We used [9] RDFlib11 to perform 
programmatic additions of class terms and individuals. During the 
conversion phase we also linked entities in our ontology with well-
known online datasets, such as DBpedia [10] for countries, SDMX 
[11] for gender and geonames [12] for country codes.  
To meet the requirements of the multi-dimensionality of the 
data, we made a specific design choice that needs to be 
emphasized. In our data model, we chose to have our main entity in 
our default graph and the different converted data sets in separate 
named graphs that connect to the default graph via the Country 
entity. This results in high extensibility of the Unified Migration 
Portal as it enables us to further link different types of data using 
the same infrastructure as described above. We present a visual 
representation of the resulting graphs in Figure 2. 
5 THE TRIPLESTORE  
For creating the endpoint where the migration portal can be 
reached, we chose an enterprise data unification platform 
                                               
11 RDFLib is a pure Python package to work with RDF. 
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leveraging smart graph technology, called Stardog 4.212. It is an 
OWL/RDF data store, which supports the RDF graph data model 
and the SPARQL [13] query language.  
Stardog provides us with a query endpoint, where we tested the 
proper integration of each dataset after every conversion. This 
feature has also been proven useful for the evaluation of our work, 
which we will discuss in a later section. 
6 SPARQL QUERIES 
To ensure that we have indeed established the foundation for a 
Unified Migration Portal, we had to make sure in every step of the 
process that our triplestore would produce the desired results. 
Thus, we tested a variety of different SPARQL queries against the 
different datasets separately but also against the resulting unified 
graph. Some of the use cases we looked into were to gather the 
total population of European countries in a specific calendar year, 
getting countries that have a total population below a specific 
threshold (according to the user’s research needs) and returning all 
countries that had an unemployment rate below 5 percent. 
However, the effectiveness of Linked Data lies in the combination 
of such query results. In the Appendix, we include the query that 
returns the multidimensional data from three graphs, upon which 
we investigate the correlations between population (native, foreign-
born), unemployment rate and inflow of population per year for the 
past decade.  
7 THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES 
We used the queried data to find a pattern in the migration (inflow) 
to 28 European countries. In the following section, we test two 
previously established theories in the migration field. 
According to the definition provided by the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), international migration is “the 
movement of people, either across international borders or within a 
state”13. We will focus on the first part of the definition, namely 
international (as opposed to national) migration. What is of interest 
for this paper is studying whether there are some underlying 
factors, common to all European countries, which help to 
understand how the inflow of migrants works across countries. The 
focus is on two well-developed theories in the migration field, 
namely neoclassical economic theory and migration networks 
theory. Each one is measured with a main immigration predictor, 
respectively the economic situation of the host country and the 
immigrant networks already present. 
7.1 NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMIC THEORY  
This theory uses the economic concept of push and pull factors to 
explain international migration. The main assumption this theory 
makes is that individual migration happens based on cost-benefit 
                                               
12 Stardog enterprise data unification platform. Available at: stardog.com 
13 IOM Key migration terms. Available at: http://www.iom.int/key-
migration-terms 
calculations, and migrants will move where their wellbeing is 
maximized [14]. 
Here, the unemployment rate in the country of destination is 
taken as an indicator of how well a country is doing economically, 
when it is low it is assumed that it will be easier for the migrant to 
find employment, making it a more attractive destination [15]. The 
likelihood to find a job is thus considered a pull factor, as a low 
unemployment rate will “pull” people to a country as it means less 
competition on the labour market, and this results in more 
opportunities to find a job.  
Unemployment is taken as a proxy of how well a country is 
doing economically, as previous literature has shown that 
migration tends to happen from “poorer” countries to “richer” 
ones. As Janissen [17] found, unemployment has a negative impact 
on net migration.  
Therefore, we expect that: the lower the level of unemployment 
in a country, the higher will the number of immigrants be (H1). 
7.2 NETWORKS THEORY 
As Castels [18] states, “a purely economic understanding of 
migration can be misleading”. Therefore, this paper also uses 
another driver to try to explain migration to European countries, 
namely network theory. 
The networks we refer to in this paper are ethnic ones, and they 
are measured by the number of foreign-born people living in the 
host country (i.e. number of foreigners of a specific nationality). 
The presence of an already existing co-ethnic network means 
that immigrants are assumed to be more likely to receive support 
from immigrants from the same origin country already established 
in the host country. This would reduce both migration costs and 
risks [19], incentivizing migrants to move to countries where there 
is already a big community of fellow citizens. 
This is true even when the immigration policies of a country 
become rather restrictive, as it accounts for family reunification 
migration. Moreover, Pedersen and colleagues (2008) found that 
the presence of immigrants from one’s own nationality already 
residing in a country has a large and significant positive impact on 
immigration inflow. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that the more foreigners reside in a 
given country, the higher will the number of immigrants to that 
country be (H2). 
According to the two theories, Figure 4 reports the conceptual 
model that we operationalized. 
 
Figure 4. Conceptual model 
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8 VARIABLES AND DESCRIPTIVE 
STATISTICS 
8.1 MEASURES 
The variables we use to assess the level of immigration to the 28 
European countries are retrieved by querying our previously 
constructed triplestore, and measured as follows. The predicting 
variables foreign population size and unemployment rate are 
measured across countries, from 2006 to 2015. Due to the lack of 
data for most counties, the year 2015 was dropped from the 
analyses. The variable foreign-born population is used as a proxy 
to measure the size of ethnic networks as it reports the number of 
born-abroad people per country. Unemployment rate is used as a 
proxy for how well the country is doing economically, and it is 
reported for all the years. Inflow of foreigners is also reported for 
each country for the respective years and being the dependent 
variable, all countries with missing values were excluded from the 
analyses14. This resulted in the loss of 95 cases (see Table 1), most 
of which were clustered in countries that joined the EU more 
recently. 
To account for the various size of the population, the analyses 
were conducted with relativized values for inflow and foreign 
population data. The relativized results do not differ in significance 
and direction of relation from the ones with absolute values, but are 
easier to interpret. Therefore, all the following results report values 
relative to the countries populations’ size. 
Furthermore, the variables inflow and foreign population were 
highly skewed, and to improve their distributions we imputed their 
natural logarithms. The variable inflow was also divided by 10, 
since its variance was otherwise too big to be manageable.  
8.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables before the 
transformations used for the regressions. It is possible to observe 
that the countries report a wide range of inflow of foreigners, as 
well as population and unemployment rate.  
Table 2 reports the correlations between the main variables in 
the study, in absolute values. Inflow is significantly correlated to 
foreign population and unemployment. As expected, with the first 
one it has a positive correlation, and with the latter a negative one. 
9 ANALYSIS 
To assess the impact of unemployment and ethnic networks on 
immigration to EU countries, we performed regression analysis in 
IBM SPSS Statistic 2415 and in Mplus (version 7.4) [20]. As the 
variables were not normally distributed, we used maximum 
likelihood estimation with robust standard errors. 
                                               
14 The countries with no data for the inflows: Croatia, Cyprus, Lithuania, 
Malta, Romania and Slovakia. 
15IBM Corp. Released 2013. IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 
22.0. Armonk, NY: IBM Corp 
We proceeded in three different steps. First, we analysed all the 
countries together. Second, we selected Germany as case study, 
because of its size, central geographical position and long history 
as migration country. Third, we split the countries into four 
geographical groups (south, north, centre and east Europe16, to test 
whether they present significant differences between them. 
The first regression shows that inflow is negatively related to 
unemployment (b=-14.08, S.E.=6.11, p<.05)17 and positively to 
ethnic networks (b=88.86, S.E.=26.47, p<.001), confirming both 
our hypotheses. 
The second regression, performed on Germany, again confirms 
our hypotheses. Inflow is positively related to ethnic networks 
(b=363.34, S.E. = 3.7, p<.001) and negatively to unemployment 
(b=-7.02, S.E. = 2.766, p<.05). 
The third regression, performed simultaneously with multiple 
group analysis on the four geographical groups, shows non-
significant, mixed results. While the hypotheses are confirmed for 
the central and eastern European countries, the relations are 
reversed for the southern countries and for the Nordic ones they are 
both negative. This might be because of the contextual differences 
between countries with regard to immigration policies, welfare 
system and other further country-specific factors. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  Range Mean SD N Missings 
Inflow 1107- 
1342529 
140599.10 
 
21433
9.11 
194 95 
Year 2006/2015     289 0 
Total 
population 
37366- 
82437995 
18274133.6
3 
23111
486.29 
289 0 
Unemploy
ment 
2.5-27.5 8.97 4.479 289 0 
Foreign 
population 
12000- 
7289149 
1147383.51 17900
83.64 
289 0 
Relative 
foreign 
population 
0-.86 .081 .097 289 0 
Relative 
inflow 
0-.04 .008 .007 194 95 
Geo 1-4 2.53 1.19 239 50 
SD; standard deviation, N: number of observations; Missings: missing 
values for each variable 
 
 
 
                                               
16 South=France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain 
North= Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden 
Center= Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom. 
17 Where b denotes the regression coefficient, and S.E the standard error. 
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Table 2. Correlations of relative values 
  1 2 3 
Inflow (1)       
Population (2) -.222*     
Foreign population (3) .247** -.078   
Unemployment (4) -.361*** .066 -.059 
***p<.001; **p<.01, *p<.05 
10 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
With regard to our statistical analyses, some limitations should be 
noted. The data we used in the study has some restrictions 
regarding years, countries and information lacking some important 
predictors from immigration theories. However, future research 
could incorporate further data, as adding new databases is easy 
with Linked Data. This would enable researchers to answer more 
innovative research questions. For example, the addition of the 
migrants’ educational level would allow investigating the brain 
drain phenomenon [21], i.e. the migration of highly skilled workers 
towards countries that offer them better economic possibilities. 
With regard to the hypotheses derived from networks and 
neoclassical economic theories, two clarifications should be made. 
Firstly, the performed analysis, even though based on previously 
proved theories, is purely illustrative. Its aim is not to predict 
migration but to show that this can be done starting from Linked 
Data. Second, an assumption was made regarding ethnic networks 
theory, namely that immigrants are able to engage with the ethnic 
networks present in the country they migrate to. 
Moreover, the mixed results that appear when dividing the 
countries geographically demonstrate the need for further research 
to explain the substantial differences between the various 
countries. With Linked Data, this could be done with a query 
targeting the specific countries groups.  
11 CONCLUSION 
In this study, we integrated information from two trustworthy 
online databases, namely OECD and Eurostat, to demonstrate that 
important, well-established analyses can be reproduced based on 
Linked Data.  
Our results demonstrate the benefits of Linked Data technology 
to integrate and prepare data commonly used in social science. 
Linked Data provides a flexible way of integrating information 
from different sources, and to access it directly from one single 
source to conduct research. This way, data becomes accessible, 
easy to query, analyse and visualize. Moreover, studies become 
more reproducible, allowing other researchers to duplicate and 
validate the findings. In our case, we published everything online: 
our original datasets, the converters, the converted datasets and the 
queries on GitHub18, and all converted data ready to be queried in 
our SPARQL endpoint19.  
In the future, Linked Data can be game changing in allowing for 
collaborative efforts. Anybody can publish and link his or her own 
data to existing ontologies and other datasets in a sustainable way, 
and reuse data, queries and analyses published by others. Tools as 
qber [1] will hide the technicalities of Linked Data under the hood, 
while offering all its benefits. This will affect workflows: while 
traditionally, each researcher needs to integrate the required 
datasets himself, which is typically a time-consuming activity, 
integrated data will be available for use, allowing for research on a 
much broader scale. Such a unified portal might serve social 
scientists, data journalists or even (future) migrants themselves to 
gain access to more information. 
In conclusion, we demonstrated how Linked Data can be 
applied to social sciences, in particular to successfully analyse 
international migration. We regard Linked Data as a flexible 
pa adigm for gathering, implementing, analysing and describing 
data often used in social sciences.  
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APPENDIX A 
prefix mpo: <http://stardog.clariah-
sdh.eculture.labs.vu.nl/databases/the_migration_portal/vocab/>  
prefix mpr: <http://stardog.clariah-
sdh.eculture.labs.vu.nl/databases/the_migration_portal/resource/>  
PREFIX sdmx: <http://purl.org/linked-data/sdmx/2009/code#>  
prefix dbr: <http://dbpedia.org/resource/>  
prefix dbo: <http://dbpedia.org/ontology/>  
# Select Countries, with their labels, a time period and the values 
of their indicators at that timeperiod.  
# ValueP = Population Value  
# ValueU = Unemployment Value (rate)  
select distinct ?Country ?Label ?Time_Period ?ValueTotalP 
?ValueForeignP ?ValueU ?From_Country ?To_Country 
?InflowValue ?Inflow_Time_Period ?country  
where {  
graph mpr:population_eu_graph{  
select ?country ?Time_Period ?ValueForeignP where{  
?Population mpo:country ?Country ;  
mpo:time_period ?Time_Period ;  
mpo:population_value ?ValueForeignP ;  
mpo:population_type "Foreign country"^^xsd:string .  
bind(replace(str(?Country), "_\\(.*", "", "i") as ?country)}}  
graph mpr:population_eu_graph{  
select ?country ?Time_Period ?ValueTotalP where{  
?Population mpo:country ?Country ;  
mpo:time_period ?Time_Period ;  
mpo:population_value ?ValueTotalP ;  
mpo:population_type "Total"^^xsd:string .  
bind(replace(str(?Country), "_\\(.*", "", "i") as ?country)  
}}  
# graph mpr:population_eu_graph{  
# ?Population mpo:country ?Country ; 
# mpo:time_period ?Time_Period ;  
# mpo:population_value ?ValueTotalF ;  
# mpo:population_type "Foreign country"^^xsd:string .  
# }  
graph mpr:unemployment_eu_graph{  
?Unemployment_rate mpo:country ?Country ;  
mpo:time_period ?Time_Period ;  
mpo:unit "Active population"^^xsd:string ;  
mpo:indicator_value ?ValueU .  
bind(replace(str(?Country), "_\\(.*", "", "i") as ?country) }  
optional{  
graph mpr:inflow_graph{  
?Inflow mpo:from_country dbr:Total ;  
mpo:to_country ?To_Country;  
mpo:movement_time_period ?Inflow_Time_Period ;  
mpo:movement_value ?InflowValue .  
filter(str(?To_Country) = ?country) .  
filter(str(?Time_Period) = str(?Inflow_Time_Period))  
}}  
# Somewhere here we need to say : if ?Country = ?From_Country 
make it "country of origin" and To_Country  
order by (?Country) (?Time_Period) 
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Tools and Resources for Detecting Hate and Prejudice
against Immigrants in Social Media
Cristina Bosco and Viviana Patti and Marcello Bogetti and Michelangelo Conoscenti
and Giancarlo Ruffo and Rossano Schifanella1 and Marco Stranisci2
Abstract. This position paper describes the early stages of an on
going project for the development of artificial intelligence tools and
resources to detect and analyze hate speech and prejudice against im-
migrants: IHATEPREJUDICE3. It is the result of a multi-disciplinary
team that includes skills from computational linguistics and senti-
ment analysis, to social network analysis and visualization.
The approach follows a holistic and multi-lingual perspective, which
encompasses different knowledge sources to be meaningfully aggre-
gated. Thus, although the project is currently mainly focussed on
a local case-study (Piedmont, a region of Italy), it is scalable over
larger territories and different languages which can be considered
as representative, namely the European Union. Since this is quite
an innovative approach to the problem, this position paper aims at
reaching out colleagues with a potential interest in this area and/or
to solicitate feedback by those who are in the early stages of their
projects and wish to share their experience or join efforts.
1 INTRODUCTION
Nearly a quarter of a billion people, throughout the world, currently
live in a country other than their place of birth. This is an increase
of 41% from 2000 to 2015. This figure includes more than 21 mil-
lion refugees - often vulnerable and dissatisfied. Since 2015 Europe
is facing an unprecedented refugee crisis, the by-effect of the Syr-
ian civil war and the terrible living conditions in equatorial Africa.
A 1,300,000 people have generated this increased migration flow to
Europe which can only but increase, putting European stable soci-
eties, so far, under pressure.
Therefore, the implications for the European society and the way we
behave towards immigration, immigrant integration and social inclu-
sion for newcomers and their children, are becoming more decisive
and must be addressed either at a local or global level, considering
a political and social perspective. While this phenomenon stimulates
the generation and diffusion of hate speech and hate crimes, at the
same time several initiatives are promoted, but they should be further
improved to increase the awareness and empathy of receiving popu-
lations while avoiding polarization against immigrants.
In this paper we describe objectives, motivations and methodology
of a new research project, called IHATEPREJUDICE, aimed at ad-
dressing hate speech and prejudice against immigrants by exploiting
Artificial Intelligence (AI) methods and tools. It’s novelty consists
in the application, mainly to texts extracted from social media, of
1 University of Turin, Italy, email: {bosco,patti,ruffo,schifane}@di.unito.it
{michelangelo.conoscenti,marcello.bogetti}@unito.it
2 Acmos, Italy, email:marco.stranisci@acmos.net
3 Fund CSTO160598, Compagnia San Paolo, IT.
a multi-disciplinary and holistic approach which encompasses tools
and resources from different and complementary disciplines related
to data analysis, in particular referring to computational linguistics,
Sentiment Analysis (SA), Discourse Analysis (DA), computational
social science and data visualization.
This is done in order to analyze and detect contents related to immi-
gration to better understand the social dynamics of immigration and
thus managing the public debate on migrants’ integration by support-
ing social workers’ competences.
AI can play, indeed, an important role on both understanding and
managing the complexity of migration issues in order to define better
policies towards migrants’ integration and community building. On
the one hand, computational linguistics and SA techniques can be
twofold crucial for accessing and analyzing knowledge about migra-
tion and to detect in them hate contents and communication dynam-
ics useful to investigate the birth and diffusion of prejudice against
migrants. Since this knowledge is diluted in a huge variety of texts
from different sources, and because these texts can be considered a
case of big data, which humans cannot directly access in a reasonable
amount of time and manner, our integrated approach will facilitate
this task. On the other hand, data aggregation and visualization can
be applied for sharing such knowledge with operators working in the
local area or in a global perspective, but also to make citizens more
aware of these issues. Even policy makers can be helped in order to
make more informed decisions on matters related to migration man-
agement.
The way we address these challenges is innovative, focusing on iden-
tifying different patterns of hate and prejudice in on line expressions.
The involved phenomena will be studied in a bidirectional perspec-
tive, e.g. movements and communication dynamics of immigrants,
or the reactions of local community, media and single citizens.
Furthermore, we integrate NLP, data and network analytics, together
with visualization approaches based on maps showing the diffusion
of phenomena also as related to geographical locations. Data aggre-
gation and visualization will be applied for sharing such knowledge
with operators working in the local area, but also with citizens for
increasing awareness. A control sample from a multicultural com-
munity (UK based) will be generated as well.
We must apply both resources and technologies to these challenges
in creative and innovative ways. This means increasing the size of
the analyzed big data and the power of AI tools to analyze texts,
flows and patterns. By developing computational tools for access-
ing and analyzing small and big data from different sources/media
we will accomplish two goals: on the one hand, transforming ana-
lyzed data in actionable knowledge for territorial entities working
in raising awareness about discrimination and taking action against
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it; on the other hand, democratizing data, by improving their acces-
sibility and opening new opportunities for enhancing the quality of
citizen life.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section motivations are
presented. Then, section three clarifies how the different disciplines
involved in the project contribute to the project in an innovative way.
In the fourth section we describe the project and we illustrate the case
study for the first and prototypical application of our techniques. We
end with a section on the expected results and future development of
the project.
2 MOTIVATIONS
Population change occurs as a result of two factors: natural change,
defined as the difference between the number of births and the num-
ber of deaths, and net migration, commonly defined as the difference
between immigration and emigration.
Data released by European Community about population change [19]
show that from the 1990s onwards natural population change had a
diminishing role in EU demographic developments, while the role
of net migration became increasingly important. In the period 2011
to 2013, net migration contributed more than 80% to total popula-
tion growth, drawing an overall pattern of growth of EU’s popula-
tions driven increasingly by changes in migratory flows, which hides
a range of demographic situations among the EU Member States.
Between 2004 and 2013, indeed the population of 11 EU Member
States decreased, with the biggest reductions recorded in Germany
and Romania, but a high overall increase in population numbers was
recorded in the other countries like UK (a gain of 4.51 million inhab-
itants), Spain (3.96 million), France (3.54 million) and Italy (3.29
million). Among these countries, characterized by a negative natural
population change, also compounded by negative net migration, Italy
is affected by a negative natural change, that was completely offset
by net migration which accounted for 108% of the total population
change. This makes especially crucial to deal with immigration and
related phenomena in this country and motivates the selection of Italy
(and of an Italian region) as our case study for the beginning of our
project.
Given this scenario, European policies encourage to enforce integra-
tion at country, city and community level. Integration is the success-
ful outcome of acculturation, defined as the dynamic, two-way pro-
cess of mutual accommodation by immigrants and receiving com-
munities. In this perspective immigration can be a source of cultural
enhancement. However, negative attitudes to immigration increased
in recent years together with prejudice and more or less direct feel-
ing of hostility to foreign people: recent episodes related to the Brexit
electoral campaign in UK, to the refugee referendum in Hungary or
to the hosting of a small group of refugees in Gorino in Italy are
symptomatic of this very worrying trend. Therefore it is gradually
becoming more decisive to address in local and global, political and
social perspective the implications on Italian and European society
of our behavior towards immigration, immigrant integration and so-
cial inclusion for newcomers and their children. Anti-immigration
attitudes frequently fuels the spread of hate expressions in the vari-
ety of media exploited nowadays. Like a mirror of the political and
legal choices, of attitudes of the population and feeling encoded in
the collective memory of a nation, categories and words exploited
for defining migrants are coined and used by humans when faced
with the challenges represented by migration phenomenon. They are
relevant for determining who is migrant and who is instead not, and
for classifying different forms of migrants to be related to different
positions in society, often to be fossilized in prejudices. Language is
crucial for determining boundaries among groups and minorities, to
confer them specific social roles, rights and opportunities, in prac-
tice to describe migrants as others, as outsiders of our society, often
as dangerous and unwanted people notwithstanding their real nature.
But, on the other hand, language can be also be exploited by immi-
grants for react to the challenges of integration in a different society.
Starting from the relevance of language in the immigration phenom-
ena and the huge variety of linguistic data available as digital traces,
the main objective of our project is the development of computational
tools for accessing and analyzing small and big data from different
social media to acquire a deeper knowledge about anti-immigration
attitudes, related to prejudices and hate speech. We will first focus
on Italy and in particular on our region, Piedmont, which is the case
study of the project. The local context is crucial when studying at-
titudes towards immigrants: the type of neighbourhood, city, region,
country where an individual lives creates a filter which conditions
perceptions and attitudes towards immigrants [13]. We integrate NLP
and data analytics, together with visualization approaches based on
maps showing the diffusion of phenomena in geographical locations.
Computational linguistics and sentiment analysis techniques will be
crucial for analyzing knowledge about migration diluted in the vari-
ety of texts from different sources, for detecting in them hate contents
and communication dynamics useful to observe birth and diffusion of
prejudice against migrants. Data aggregation and visualization will
be applied for sharing such knowledge with operators working in the
Piedmont local area, but also with citizens for increasing awareness.
A control sample from a multicultural community (UK based) will
be generated as well.
Hate speech analysis and hate maps allow both a greater under-
standing of social phenomena linked to the integration of migrants,
that more targeted actions to improve it. The integration of migrants
is strongly linked to the new cultural context where they try to re-
build their lives. The process of acculturation depends on personal
and social variables of the migrant, in large part in turn dependent
on the cultural context of his/her origin, on the characteristics of the
context of resettlement and on events occurring during this life pe-
riod. The different migrant’s strategies firstly affect the different out-
comes achieved. In particular, he can decide whether or not to main-
tain the cultural identity of origin and whether or not to establish and
maintain new relationships within the new contest. This gives rise
to four possible different outcomes: integration, assimilation, sep-
aration/segregation, marginalization [3]. The analysis of migrants’
ego-network allows a representation of these outcomes. Part of the
network of the country of origin tends to disappear and these rela-
tionships need to be redefined in form and contents. In the coun-
try of destiny new relationships with co-ethnics, natives and/or other
groups are formed. Social networks can thus take different config-
uration [20]: integration in the country of resettlement, by building
relationships with native people; regression, by increasing in rela-
tionships with people living in the countries of origin; local concen-
tration, by increasing in relationships in the country of residence, pri-
marily with coethnics but to a lower degree with native people too;
ethnic segregation, by increasing in relationships with coethnics, at
the cost of relationships with native people; “transnationalization”,
by increasing in relationships with others, either living in different
countries and / or with people from other countries; stability in com-
position (no change in composition). The integration in particular is
the outcome of a process of maintaining the own identity of origin but
at the same time of the expansion of relational system with natives,
and then of the exposure to the cultural context of insertion. How-
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ever, it requires the presence of a multicultural context. The outcome
of the process of acculturation and therefore the possibility that inte-
gration will occur, depend on a number of factors: in addition to the
strategy and personal characteristics (demographic, socio-economic,
country of origin) are in fact very important those of society of set-
tlement. Among them, a significant role is given by ethnic attitudes
of the native people, as the opening level or prejudice or even overt
hostility towards those who come from different cultures, especially
if very different from their own. Their interaction with the strategies
and the characteristics of newcomers, generates relational systems of
the migrants, which in turn are the basis of how the acculturation pro-
cess flows in one and the other of the possible outcomes. To know,
through the analysis of the online language, if, where and how inten-
sively the cultural context expresses opening / closing and even hate
towards migrants, allows, on the analysis plan, to understand given
the others characteristics- what kind of relationship they will prob-
ably create and, accordingly, what kind of social networks they will
rebuild and how that can in turn influence the result of the accultur-
ation process. From a practical point of view, there are at least two
possible uses. The first concerns the possibility to a certain extent to
intervene on migratory flows, in terms of addressing towards areas at
lower risk of hostility, or in any case greater awareness of the possi-
ble risks of insertion in potentially hostile environments. The second
concerns the possibility, as already mentioned, to program adequate
action enforcement efforts, that - knowing as hostility is expressed
and manifested in the language, and where the focus is more acute -
allows to design targeted education and communication campaigns.
3 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
The methodology will be based on the development of a computa-
tional framework for data semantic exploration. It will follow a holis-
tic approach, which integrates several sources of knowledge to de-
scribe a multi-faceted reality. The cooperation of a multi-disciplinary
team, but also the participation of associations working on immigra-
tion in our local area as stakeholders and domain experts, will ensure
an inclusive approach that can produce combined multidisciplinary
results greater than the sum of their separate effects. The success
of the project strongly depends on the synergetic application of the
methodologies from the different research areas, and in particular
those related to the linguistic and sociological analysis of communi-
cation (see sec. 3.1), those related to the automatic detection of hate
speech with the purpose of visualize their aggregations in hate maps
(see sec. 3.2), and those coming from the application of Discourse
Analysis techniques (see sec. 3.3).
3.1 Linguistic and Sociological Analysis of Hate
Speech
The complexity of communication dynamics related to immigration
makes challenging the development of novel forms of computational
analysis which can sustain the traditional ones and be also adequate
for approaching big data [22]. The study of this phenomenon can
be indeed fruitfully addressed by analyzing large-scale data, like
those represented by social media texts and their users’ digital traces,
where causes and consequences of hate and prejudice are diluted.
The project will apply for achieving this purpose a methodology
well known in corpus-based NLP, where data collections are care-
fully annotated by teams of experts to provide systems with ground-
truth information about the observed phenomena. In our project, this
methodology consists therefore in: i) collecting several text samples
from several media where hate speech expressions against immi-
grants are exploited; ii) analyze them for detecting a set of relevant
expressions; iii) select a set of texts to be annotated according to a
scheme that makes explicit those expressions, their targets and polar-
ization.
These corpora will drive the development of SA tools and data ag-
gregation, since these tools will be trained and tested on them.
3.2 Automatic Hate Speech Analysis and Hate
Maps
The framework to be developed during the project integrates inno-
vative techniques for collecting social data and analysing them by
data mining and aspect-based sentiment analysis, by applying highly
developed natural language processing to deal with the variety of
fine-grained aspects involved in hate speech and hostility towards
migrants, like e.g. irony and figurative uses of language. It will ag-
gregate and analyze data under several semantic perspectives, includ-
ing geographical and temporal components. Furthermore, geo-social
data will be exploited both to derive a geography of hate and preju-
dices about immigrants and to study immigrants mobility across our
territory.
This web-based platform will be moreover designed for supporting
interactive access to analyzed data and visualization of hate maps:
a powerful tool to be exploited in the variety of decisions humans
must take everyday with respect to their behavior towards commu-
nity or other people, i.e. for democratizing the knowledge about im-
migration. The platform will provide indeed a visual easy to read
representation of reports coming from the modules devoted to analy-
sis, showing the sentiment, the social and political reactions and the
dynamics of the information flow on the topic. The dashboard will
allow the different end users to gather the intelligence required, for
example, to make informed decisions on local policies or support in-
vestigations on on line hate speech and prevent crimes that would
potentially affect the stability of local communities.
With pervasive diffusion of mobile devices, social media data pro-
vides a spatial dimension that characterizes where a content is gen-
erated, providing an additional layer to study the geography of on
line information processes. We plan to implement an alternative car-
tography of a city that visually maps the spreading of hate speech
in time and space. This would allow, for example, to observe which
neighborhoods of a city are subject to a negative/positive sentiment
towards the immigration phenomenon, with the possibility to link
the online discourse to offline characteristics of the built environ-
ment like demographics, ethnicity, socio-economic conditions of the
population. The use of different spatial, e.g., at street, block, neigh-
borhood, city, region, and time aggregations, e.g., day, week, months,
years, will provide an effective tool to visually explore the complex-
ity of the phenomenon at different scales.
3.3 Discourse Analysis
In parallel, the Discourse Analyst, will apply and extend the proto-
col used in [9] to verify how the principles of Audience Architec-
ture [16] and Reverse Language Engineering [8] can integrate the
methodological framework discussed above with a double-goal per-
spective. Exploiting the concept of the “majority illusion, i.e. ”a state
that is globally rare in a network [is] dramatically over-represented in
the local neighbourhood of many individuals” [12] the DA approach
will make sure that data gathered with AI techniques are comple-
mented with a specific human filter that aligns the decoded and en-
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coded messages with the desired Audience Architecture through a
specific language engineering activity. In this way, management of
the public debate on migrant integration can be maximised in such a
way to increase awareness and empathy while avoiding polarization.
The methodological blend of working frameworks will thus ensure
an improvement of the responsive platform, even at natural language
level, so that message production on Social Media is aligned with
the desired master message and preventing a “weaponization” of So-
cial Media themselves. Thus, this approach will develop conceptual
maps that will favour a better memetic writing that resonates with
users expectations of a responsive and customized compelling nar-
rative experience [21]. This approach offers several advantages: it
is flexible as it adjusts to the users needs being the innovative ap-
proach that is able to accommodate the technological innovation. It
is multipurpose as it tracks a) shifts in language use with customised,
detailed focus (time and space); b) antagonists strategies; c) it is able
to detect and interpret rumours and background noise that are not
considered by standard software/reports based on big data, but that
can generate, because of the majority illusion undesired effect in the
language of the neighbourhood and thus, hate speech. In this way the
project should contribute to a better understanding of how belief sys-
tems work as networks [10], [11] and, on the other hand, how Social
Media networks foster certain belief systems to the point that they
develop into hate systems.
4 CASE STUDIES AND PROJECT SCENARIO
In this section, an application of our methodology to a case study,
where the availability of a computational framework for automat-
ically detecting hate speech against immigrants may contribute in
transforming information in actionable knowledge, is described.
According to the Council of Europe, the term “hate speech” shall be
understood as covering all expressions which spread, incite, promote
or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of
hatred based on intolerance4. So hate speech is a twofold concept:
it has both a semantic (the insult), and a pragmatic level (the public
incitement).
If we focus on the pragmatic perspective, considering the ability to
spread online hate contents to a wide audience, it is important to anal-
yse if, how, and how successfully newspapers incite their readers to
hatred, by spreading online hate contents. Italian authorities are very
sensitive to this topic: in 2008 the Carta di Roma, a code of conducts
about how to treat the immigration topic, was adopted by the Order
of Journalists5. Nevertheless, the presence of hate speech carried out
by Italian newspapers is still pervasive. Several cases can be found in
newspapers everyday. For instance, September 23, 2016 the Italian
newspaper Libero published the hatred content on immigrants shown
in Figure 1, both on its website and on its Twitter account.
Starting from the publication of this information, we can study
how hate speech spreads in Twitter. After being published on Twit-
ter, the news provoked negative reactions against refugees among
Libero’s readers, who are in synch with the incitement expressed in
the news. They expressed online their intolerance towards refugees,
by posting messages like the following:
‘Clandestini non profughi’
‘Illegals not refugees’
4 Recommendation no.R (97) 20 of the Committee of Ministers to Member
States on Hate Speech, October 30th 1997.
5 http://www.cartadiroma.org/
Figure 1. The title of an article that incites to hate: ”Vittorio Veneto, the
city where even refugees can vote”
Another reader, acting similarly, interpreted the possibility of voting
for refugees as a simple stratagem applied by the political party that
introduced this novelty, and expressed therefore his/her hate against
it by the following post:
‘Il PD (Partito Democratico) vuol vincere barando’
‘PD (Democratic Party) wants to win [the elections] by cheating’
This example shows what kind of dynamics feature the spread of
hate speech, and what kind of paths we have to follow in order to de-
tect hate and prejudice against immigrants. The main lesson learned
is that we need a direct access to data, and to data from different
sources and media. Following this type of indication, we are build-
ing a methodology aimed at creating a dataset of hate speeches that
spread from newspapers to social, thus focusing either on the seman-
tic and the pragmatic aspects of hate speeche. The methodology is
structured in four steps: first, the identification of Carta di Roma vi-
olations on the most important online newspapers; second, the anal-
ysis of their disseminations among readers. e.g., how many Twitter
users reply or retweet these news; third, the linguistic analysis of
data, aimed at informing SA tools; four, the visualization of these
discourses.
At the present stage we have built a small dataset of 1,312 crime news
of the Turin Metropolitan Area occurred in 2016, and published by
6 national newspapers: La Stampa, La Repubblica, Il Corriere della
Sera, Il Fatto Quotidiano, Il Giornale, Libero. We collected articles
using the Google Custom Search API6, then we searched for the ones
which contain references to the most prevalent nationalities among
immigrants: Romanian, Albanian, Moroccan, Tunisian, Chinese; and
two generic terms referring to immigration: immigrants and illegal
immigrants. Table 1 reports some statistics about the articles which
contain at least one term referred to nationality. Different columns re-
fer to different news’ portions where references to nationality occur
(i.e. in the title, in the tagline, and in the body of the news).
A team of linguists is now analyzing the dataset with two main
aims: find recurring linguistic expressions that convey hate contents;
understand which of these news are potential hate speeches and
6 Google strongly limits the number of searches a user can do, so we are
developing a number of scripts that collect news directly from newspapers
pages.
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newspaper title tagline article total
La Stampa 10 18 147 175
La Repubblica 1 2 24 27
Il Giornale 12 12 46 70
Libero 3 6 19 28
Il Fatto Quotidiano 3 4 18 25
Il Corriere della Sera 3 3 23 29
Table 1. Number of references to the most prevalent nationalities among
immigrants in six Italian newspapers
which not. The latter aim is crucial. Indeed it allows to focus on
counter-narratives: news that foster tolerance among citizens. For in-
stance, the newspaper Il Corriere della Sera published a news about
a young Moroccan student and peddler, that is almost achieving his
master degree at the Faculty of Engineering:
‘Rachid Khadiri, studente d’ingegneria marocchino
Vendeva accendini, ora dopo la laurea al Politecnico di Torino, sta
frequentando il biennio della specialistica’
‘Rachid Khadiri, Moroccan Engineering student
He sold lighters and now, after his graduation at Turin’s Polythecnic ,
he is attending the two-year master course’
Thus, the ongoing research provides both a system of hate speech
reporting, and a set of counter narratives that can be also used to train
journalists to avoid hatred contents and to spread tolerance.
5 RELATEDWORK
The immigration phenomenon stimulates the production and diffu-
sion of hate speech and hate crimes. Against it several initiatives are
promoted, let us mention the No hate speech movement, a youth cam-
paign of the Council of Europe to reduce the levels of acceptance of
hate speech, the Research - Report - Remove project7, and the Map
of Intolerance promoted by Vox Diritti8. Such initiatives are the most
often devoted to the detection of the target/diffusion of hate speech
or to their containment.
Few studies addressed the detection of sentiment about immi-
grants, like e.g. [7]. Our approach is novel and unique, to the best
of our knowledge, since 1) we propose to combine fine-grained com-
putational linguistics analysis, including sentiment analysis, and data
visualization based on interactive maps; 2) we address hate and prej-
udice about the specific immigration phenomenon in Italy (in partic-
ular in our region) and define strategies for increasing tolerance and
integration and enabling stakeholders to understand hate spreading
within communities. This has never been studied before.
As far as finer-grained tasks related to sentiment analysis are con-
cerned, let us mention two important tendencies that we will con-
sider in our work: on the one hand the recent and growing interest
of the NLP community in the development of aspect-based tech-
niques where the detection of sentiment targets (and orientation to-
wards/against them) is addressed beyond that of generic polarity of
expressions (see e.g. stance detection, [15, 14]); on the other hand
the reflections on the impact of using figurative language on sen-
timent analysis. They rise issues on the importance of taking into
7 http://www.inach.net/RRR-description.pdf
8 http://www.voxdiritti.it
account even non literal meanings expressed in texts whose presence
may undermine the results of SA systems, with a particular emphasis
on ironic contents [6, 18].
Among the aims of the project, the management of the public de-
bate on migrant integration devoted to increasing integration, aware-
ness and empathy with migrants, is crucial. Since debates are con-
texts where opinions are usually strongly polarized, in literature we
can find works about debates with a strong social impact where so-
cial media have been analyzed and annotated to be exploited in train-
ing and testing sentiment analysis systems. For Italian, which is the
language of the case study addressed first of all in our project, see
e.g. [6, 17, 1]. For French we developed a corpus on the debate on
the homosexual wedding [4]. Also for Catalan and Spanish will be
soon available a corpus about the debate on the separatism of Cat-
alonia [5]. The most of these corpora have been usefully exploited
also within the context of shared task on SA in evaluation campaigns
for NLP tools and resources [1, 2]. This is a guarantee of their qual-
ity and usability as benchmarks on which the tools developed in the
project can be trained and tested. In continuity with this line of re-
search about the analysis of sentiment and irony in political debates,
we will contribute to the development of lexical resources with a
specific and novel focus devoted to detect sentiment, hate and preju-
dice about immigrants in Italian social media in a multi- and cross-
linguistic perspective.
Visualization techniques will be applied for an interactive access
to maps and other data aggregation displays, which is advanced and
novel w.r.t. the state-of-the art related to the Hate Maps. Few initia-
tives for visualizing hate speech indeed exist, see e.g. the Geography
of Hate project in US9 and the Map of Intolerance promoted by Vox
Diritti in Italy, but they do not have a special focus on immigrants as
in the present project and do not provide any possibility to dynami-
cally interact with the map and with the source data.
6 IMPACT
The expected result of the project is the acquisition and spreading
of a wider knowledge about immigration, to be exploited in the edu-
cation to citizenship. The automatic analysis of hate speech and the
detection of immigration networks can be indeed exploited for better
designing activities related to the awareness of people, for improv-
ing the quality of the information diffused by newspapers and other
media, to more adequately deal with vocational training for young
people (born both into Italian or immigrant families), as a means
to support the teaching methodology for preventing disadvantages
and discrimination. This knowledge can be exploited in preventing
conflicts between groups, in promoting the tolerance and integra-
tion among citizens and immigrants, a dynamic, two-way process of
mutual accommodation by immigrants and receiving communities.
Since communities featured by successful integration of immigrants
are proved to be stronger economically and more inclusive socially
and culturally, and that adequate knowledge allows to prevent immi-
grants and citizens to be exposed to inhuman conditions and crimes,
this may produce an enhancement of citizen life quality in our terri-
tory.
We will develop tools and resources scalable across a European per-
spective (e.g. ready to be applied to different languages), but the ap-
plication on a local case study is twofold crucial: for testing and try-
ing the approach and for developing immediately impacting actions.
9 http://users.humboldt.edu/mstephens/hate/hate_map.
html
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The cooperation with three local associations will enhance the im-
pact of the project: Acmos10, Babelica11 and Fondazione Piazza dei
Mestieri12. They will be stakeholders expressing needs to be satisfied
by the project, but also domain experts, testers and will have a crucial
role for in dissemination of project’s results. We have a long-time
collaboration with Acmos for promoting an educational path about
hate speech in schools. The interest of Babelica on IHATEPREJU-
DICE is in line with their ongoing project for involving a new audi-
ence in the creation of a new culture of inclusion. Our cooperation
with Piazza dei Mestieri will be instead related to their work in train-
ing young people and supporting teaching methodologies aiming at
social inclusion policies. Beyond the activities devoted to the educa-
tion of citizens, our actions on territory will also impact on long-term
monitoring of the evolution of immigration phenomena, producing a
repository of knowledge to be exploited by policy makers for im-
proving integration.
7 CONCLUSION
Summarizing, the aim of the project we present is to build an inter-
active web tool for the collection, analysis and visualization of the
discourse on immigrants and the reactions of the community talking
in social media, with the goal of capturing in a quantitative fashion
through visuals how people perceive and share the hate and prejudice
against foreigners living in our area.
Our approach will be based on a holistic and multi-disciplinary
perspective, since the addressed topic inherently requires the ex-
ploitation of techniques from several different disciplines and the
collection of information also from sources other than social media
useful for defining the semantic interpretation context for social me-
dia posts. The results of the project will be evaluated according to
several perspectives, observing the quality of the sentiment engine
and of the interface for displaying results, but also considering the
usability and adequateness of these tools as detected by the users
(first of all the associations involved in the project). As far as usabil-
ity is concerned, we will organize trials with groups of users where
they will be asked to fill in a questionnaire to track user’s experi-
ence and collect feedbacks. Following well-established evaluation
methodologies, we will compare the results generated by the auto-
matic tools in SA, data analysis and aggregation with those produced
by a team of humans on the same task and having access to the same
gold standard data set. This evaluation will constantly run during all
the phases of the project. The role of local associations in the activi-
ties foreseen by the project will be crucial, as they will act as domain
experts along three main lines: needs assessment; testing and evalua-
tions; dissemination of the results of the project in their area of action
and integration of such results with their local activities related to the
immigration phenomenon.
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1D-Bin Packing with Stochastic Diffusion Search
Imran Khan 1 and Mohammad Majid al-Rifaie 2
Abstract. For the first time, this paper introduces the application of
a Swarm Intelligence algorithm, Stochastic Diffusion Search (SDS),
to the One-Dimensional Bin Packing Problem (1D-BPP), demon-
strating its power in finding diverse and encouraging solutions, ri-
valling well established meta-heuristic methods. Stochastic Diffu-
sion Search is a multi-agent swarm technique with a strong mathem-
atical framework. SDS utilises the exchange of information through
one-to-one communication and its test and diffusion phases to lead
to the convergence of solutions to theoretical optimums. The adapted
SDS algorithm presented in this work also combines various swarm
intelligence and evolutionary features, such as crossover and local
search. In BPP, the algorithm is tasked to partition a set of items into
a collection of disjoint subsets. The results of applying SDS agents to
the 1D-BPP along with a comparison with several other techniques
in order to demonstrate the algorithm’s ability is also presented.
1 Introduction
The 1D-Bin Packing Problem is a well known NP-Hard problem in
which a set of 1D items (lines or numbers) and the bins’ capacity are
given. The goal is to pack these items into the bins in such a way
that minimises the number of bins used and that the number of items
do not exceed the bins’ maximum capacity. An important reason for
tackling the Bin Packing Problem (BPP) is due to its wide range
of industrial applications. Such applications include loading trucks
with weight capacity constraints and creating file backups in media.
The BPP has immense importance in today’s world as the BPP can
ultimately reduce wastage of items and reduce the time it takes to
complete these applications to, thus, reduce cost.
Traditionally, the BPP has been tackled by fast heuristics. Fast
heuristics would produce solutions relatively quickly, but the solu-
tions produced would be sub-optimal. However, due to the emer-
gence of swarm intelligence, many swarm techniques have been de-
ployed to address this problem and have achieved optimal results for
very small problem instances. These algorithms include Ant Colony
Optimisation [12] and Artificial Bee Colony [4]. These swarm al-
gorithms manipulate the intensification and diversification of solu-
tions to produce theoretically optimal results (i.e. exact solutions to
the problems).Though, it should be noted that there is no guarantee
that such optimal results will be found.
Despite many swarm algorithms undertaking the BPP, Stochastic
Diffusion Search has not yet been applied to the BPP. Therefore, in
this study, the Stochastic Diffusion Search algorithm is proposed and
applied to the 1D-BPP with additional swarm and evolutionary fea-
tures (e.g. crossover) to enhance the produced solutions. Incepted in
1989, SDS has been inspired by one species of ants (Leptothorax
1 Corresponding author. Goldsmiths, University of London, UK, emails:
ma301ik@gold.ac.uk
2 Goldsmiths, University of London, UK
acervorum). This inspiration is based on the “tandem calling” mech-
anism employed by the ants. The “tandem calling” mechanism is a
one-to-one communication strategy where a forager ant will return
to its nest with food and will recruit one other ant and from this re-
cruitment, the location of the food is publicised [3, 14]. SDS has
been applied to many real world problems, these include a Hybrid
Stochastic Diffusion Network (HSDN) [7] and pattern recognition
[5, 6]. SDS has attracted many researchers due to its strong mathem-
atical framework [3] and its ability to converge to optimal solutions
even if the data is noisy [3].
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief his-
tory of SDS, section 3 provides further details of the 1D-BPP and
some related work on the 1D-BPP. Section 4 explains how SDS has
been applied to the 1D-BPP. Section 5 reports on the experimental
results. Results obtained by the SDS algorithm are compared against
established Swarm and non-Swarm Intelligence algorithms. Section
5 also includes a discussion of the results obtained, as well as the
strengths and weaknesses of SDS. Finally, section 6 provides a sum-
mary of the work presented and the potential future work on SDS.
2 Stochastic Diffusion Search
In this section, a brief history, the architecture and previous work
on the SDS algorithm is introduced. Stochastic Diffusion Search, in-
cepted in 1989 [5, 6], is part of a larger family of Swarm Intelli-
gence algorithms. It is based on the collective intelligence of sentient
agents to stochastically diffuse meaningful information to yield and
ultimately converge to the optimum. The SDS algorithm has its ori-
gins in pattern recognition [6] utilising the behaviour of decentralised
thinking and one-to-one communication to obtain the global optimal
solution. A wide range of complex real world problems have been
successfully tackled by SDS (e.g. HSDN [7], feature location [10]
and medical imaging [2]).
Algorithm 1 SDS algorithm
Initialise agents
All agents set to ‘‘ inactive ”
While(Condition not met)
Test phase()
Determine active / inactive agents
Diffusion phase()
Exchange information through one−to−one communication
End While
2.1 SDS architecture
The SDS algorithm uses a population of agents. Each agent is given
an activity, an agent’s activity can either be “active” or “inactive”.
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These activities determine whether an agent’s solution is a success-
ful solution or an unsuccessful solution. Agents that produce success-
ful solutions become “active” and agents that produce unsuccessful
solutions become “inactive”.
As shown in Algorithm 1, SDS starts by initialising a population
of agents. All agents are set to “inactive”. Each “inactive” agent then
constructs their solution to the problem (construction of solutions de-
pends on the problem being solved); each solution is called a hypo-
thesis (a potential solution to the problem). The agents then transfer
to two phases, called a test phase and a diffusion phase.
Figure 1. Test phase
The agents firstly enter the test phase. In the test phase, as shown in
figure 1, each agent is partially evaluated to determine whether their
solution is a successful solution (good solution) or an unsuccess-
ful solution (bad solution). Agents that produce successful solutions
become “active” and agents that produce unsuccessful solutions be-
come “inactive”. A partial evaluation is when a portion of an agent’s
solution is evaluated against a model/target. For example, if the prob-
lem to solve was to find a specific word (model/target), such as the
word “computation”, within a text document (search space), and an
agent had found the word “amputation”. Partial evaluation would be
randomly selecting a letter from the agent’s solution, for example,
the letter “m” and comparing it to the 2nd letter of the target, which
would be “o” (comparing the 2nd letter since the letter “m” is the
second letter of the agent’s solution). If the letter matches the target’s
letter, then the agent becomes “active”, if the letter does not match,
then the agent becomes “inactive”. Once the evaluation of agents is
complete, the agents move to the diffusion phase.
Figure 2. Diffusion phase
In the diffusion phase, as shown in figure 2, the “inactive” and
“active” agents undergo different procedures. Each “inactive” agent
randomly selects a single agent for potential information diffusion.
The selected agent can be referred to as the recruited agent and the
former agent as the recruiter agent. If the recruited agent is also “in-
active”, then the recruiter agent does not proceed to the next stage of
the diffusion phase and once the next iteration commences, the “in-
active” recruiter agent will once again create a new solution. Though,
if the selected agent is “active”, then the “inactive” recruiter agent
will adopt the “active” recruited agent’s solution (i.e. hypothesis).
Figure 3. Active agent
As demonstrated in figure 3, each “active” agent, on the other
hand, does not select another agent for one-to-one communication.
The “active” agents instead keep their solutions. The diffusion phase
is finished after this. During the next iteration, the agents that are
either “active” or have adopted an “active” agents solution will trans-
fer to the test phase and then the diffusion phase. The agents that are
still “inactive” will instead re-construct their solutions then transfer
to the test and then the diffusion phase.
These phases continue until a pre-defined condition is met, such
as convergence to the global optimal (i.e. finding the target goal to
the problem) or after a certain number of iterations.
3 Bin Packing Problem
The BPP, first introduced in 1979 by Garey and Johnson [9], is a
highly popular and well researched combinatorial optimisation prob-
lem. Its high popularity is due to the wide range of real world ap-
plications in which it has been applied to. The BPP has been applied
to the cutting and loading industry, the shipping industry in which
products must be placed into containers in such a way that allows for
more products to be shipped leading to the minimal amount of cost
required. It has also been applied to loading trucks with weight capa-
city constraints, creating file backups in media and resource storage.
Hence, with the proper management of space, a reduction of cost
associated with the storage of products and transport is possible.
Within the BPP domain there exists the 1D, 2D and 3D-BPP. How-
ever, in this paper, the main focus will be on the 1D-BPP. Even
though the 1D-BPP lends itself to being the easiest of BPPs due to its
dimensionality, it still remains part of the NP-Hard class of problems.
The 1D-BBP can be described as follows: Given a set of items wi
where i = {1, 2, ......, n} and each item is of size s and a number
of bins bj where j = {1, 2, .......,m} of finite capacity c. Find a
packing of items wi in the bins bj such that the total sum of a given
used bin should be as close to the bin’s capacity as possible, i.e. the
amount of wasted space in each used bin is minimised and the total
number of bins used is minimal. Wasted space means that if the total
sum of a bin is 140 and the bins capacity is 150, then there is wasted
space (leftover space) of 10. The 1D-BPP must also appease to cer-
tain constraints, such as each item is to be packed into only one bin
and the total sum of each used bin should not exceed the bin’s max-
imum capacity.
The Mathematical formulation of the Bin Packing Problem can be
shown as follows:
Minimise :
m∑
j=1
yj (1)
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With the following constraints:
n∑
i=1
wixij ≤ cyj , ∀ j ∈ {1, ...,m}, (2)
m∑
j=1
xij = 1, ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., n}, (3)
yj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ j ∈ {1, ...,m}, (4)
xij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., n}, j ∈ {1, ...,m} (5)
where ij indicate the index of the items and bins respectively, wi
represents the weight of the item i to be packed and c denotes the
bin’s capacity.
Equation (1) denotes that the number of bins assigned is to be min-
imised, which is the objective function. Equation (2) specifies that the
total sum of a given bin should not exceed the bin’s predefined capa-
city. Equation (3) proposes that each item to be packed is packed into
only one bin. Finally, equations (4) and (5) determine that yj and xij
are both binary variables.
3.1 Related work
Swarm Intelligence (SI), employed in works on Artificial Intelli-
gence, is often used in optimisation problems due to its strong found-
ations and ability to construct diverse and useful solutions even in un-
structured complex problems. Within the scope of the 1D-BPP, some
SI works include a FireFly algorithm [17], inspired by how fireflies
operate, it is based on the procedure of hill-climbing where solutions
are changed each time fireflies move closer to each other. The results
obtained from this algorithm outperforms well established heuristics
such as the First-Fit heuristic.
Abdesslem Layeb et al. [11] used a Quantum Inspired Cuckoo
Search Algorithm (QICSA) to tackle the 1D-BPP. QICSA integ-
rates the First-Fit heuristic to produce different good random solu-
tions, and QICSA outperformed the First-Fit Decreasing heuristic
when tackling benchmark problem instances. A successful approach
by Falkenauer’s Hybrid Grouping Genetic Algorithm (HGGA) [8]
has been applied to the 1D-BBP, where a local search and group-
ing Genetic Algorithm are combined. Tugrul Bayraktar et al. applied
Artificial Bee Colony (ABC) [4], which, enhanced with memory-
integration based on a tabu-list, outperforms standard ABC, First-
Fit and the Best-Fit algorithms. A Grammatical Evolution based al-
gorithm [16] has also addressed and tackled the 1D-BPP.
The most successful reviewed population based algorithm has
been John Levine and Frederick Ducatelle’s Hybrid Ant based al-
gorithm [12]. Their algorithm uses a pheromone trail along with a
local search procedure to produce optimal packing patterns. Their
Hybrid ACO algorithm outperforms Falkenauer’s HGGA algorithm
and Martello and Toth’s Reduction Algorithm (MTP) [13], to pro-
duce the best possible results to the benchmark problems they had
tackled.
Though, many non-SI techniques have also tackled the BPP, these
include Martello and Toth’ reduction based algorithm [13]. They also
presented a lower bounds and a dominance criterion to tackle the 1D-
BPP. Their algorithm aims to identify bins that dominate other bins,
so they can be fixed, resulting in a reduction of the size of the prob-
lem.
A hybrid solution procedure, called BISON, was proposed by Scholl
et al[15]. Bison combined a tabu search and a branch and bound pro-
cedure based on known and new bound arguments and a new branch-
ing scheme. The results produced by Bison were very effective and
outperfomed an MTP integration procedure.
4 Applying SDS to the 1D-BPP
This section describes how the SDS algorithm is applied to the 1D-
BPP. Section 4.1 explains which heuristic is used and how the fitness
function is applied. Section 4.2 explains the initial phase of SDS.
Section 4.3 describes the test phase and section 4.4 explains how the
diffusion phase is implemented and which operations were applied.
Finally, section 4.5 describes how local search is applied.
4.1 Heuristic and fitness function
The SDS algorithm uses a heuristic function to construct the solu-
tions. Though, the correct (best) choice of heuristic is needed. The
best choice in heuristic will guide the algorithm to produce better
solutions. Nurul Afza Hashim et al. [1] found that the First-Fit De-
creasing (FFD) heuristic produced the best results in the least amount
of processing time when applied to 8 different problem instances
compared to other heuristics, such as First-Fit, Best-Fit, etc. There-
fore, FFD is chosen as the heuristic for the SDS algorithm. The FFD
heuristic sorts the items to pack in descending order and packs each
item into the first bin that has enough room to accomodate the item.
A fitness function is also required in order to assess the quality of
solutions produced. In the proposed fitness function, each agent is
given a fitness value based on how densely packed the used bins in
their solution is. To obtain a fitness value for an agent, the contents in
each used bin of an agent is summed. If the summed total is equal to
the bin’s capacity, then the fitness value is incremented by one. This
process is conducted for all used bins of an agent. Once the fitness
value has been obtained, the fitness value is then divided by the total
number of bins the agent has used, to obtain the final fitness value.
For example, the capacity of each bin is 150 and an agent has used
5 bins to construct its solution, and the sum total of each used bin
is 150, 140, 150, 150 and 120, respectively. Then the initial fitness
value of the agent would be 3, as 3 bins have a sum total of 150. To
obtain the final fitness value for the agent, the value of 3 needs to be
divided by the total number of bins used by the agent, which is 5.
Therefore, the fitness value for the agent is 0.6.
The fitness equations are presented below.
Single bin of an agent:
f(bj) =

1, if
∑n
i=1 wixij = C
0, otherwise
(6)
Overall fitness of an agent:
Sf =
∑m
j=1 f(bj)
m
(7)
In equation 6, bj denotes a single bin (bin j) of an agent and C
denotes the bin’s capacity; f(bj), which is the fitness of bin j, is
equal to 1 only when the sum of items in bj is equal to the capacity
of the bin, otherwise the fitness is 0. In equation 7, Sf denotes an
agent’s solution fitness, which is the sum of the fitness values of all
the bins of an agent that are equal to the bin’s capacity, divided by
the total number of bins used by an agent, which is represented by
m.
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4.2 Initialisation phase
The SDS algorithm has three phases, the Initialisation phase, the test
phase and the diffusion phase. In the Initialisation phase, a population
of agents are initialised; the amount of agents initialised is described
in sub-section 5.1. All agents are initially set to “inactive”. Each “in-
active” agent has a copy of the items to pack and each agent starts
from an arbitrary location within the items. For example, if there are
120 items to pack, an agent could start at the 30th item. Once all
agents have selected their starting item, they then begin to pack the
items into the bins in an iterative manner (pack the 30th item then
the 31st item, etc) using the chosen heuristic to produce their solu-
tions. Constructing solutions in this manner allows for a diverse set
of solutions to be produced. Once all agents have constructed their
individual solutions, they are then evaluated and given a fitness value.
4.3 Test phase
Within the test phase, every agent’s fitness (value) is evaluated
against a fitness threshold (value). The fitness threshold is determ-
ined in advance. If an agent’s fitness value is greater than or equal to
the threshold, the agent becomes “active”. If the agent’s fitness value
does not meet the threshold, then the agent becomes “inactive”. The
fitness threshold determines which solutions produced are capable of
later producing optimal solutions (i.e. best possible solutions). The
value of the threshold is critical to the production of well-packed
solutions, as changing the value of the fitness threshold leads to the
construction of sub-optimal solutions.
if agentFitnessSolution ≥ fitnessThreshold then
agent = “Active”
else
agent = “Inactive”
end if
4.4 Diffusion phase
During the diffusion phase, each “inactive” agent randomly selects
a single agent for potential diffusion of hypothesis. In this example,
the selected agent is referred to as the recruited agent and the former
agent as the recruiter agent. If the selected agent is “inactive”, then
the “inactive” recruiter agent does not proceed to the next stage of the
diffusion phase, and the “inactive” recruiter agent will create a new
solution during the next iteration of SDS. Though, if the selected
(recruited) agent is “active”, both the “inactive” recruiter agent and
the “active” recruited agent transfer to the crossover mechanism.
The SDS algorithm constructs the crossover mechanism by con-
ducting the following steps:
1. The “inactive” recruiter agent discards its current solution.
2. Two crossing sites are randomly selected from the “active” re-
cruited agent’s solution.
3. The bins from within the crossing site are selected.
4. The “inactive” recruiter agent then inherits the selected bins from
the “active” recruited agent.
5. Lastly, all other bins not inherited are “destroyed” (removed) and
the items are re-packed into new bins using the FFD heuristic and
given to the “inactive” recruiter agent’s solution.
This crossover mechanism was inspired by Genetic Algorithms
(GA) [8]. The purpose of implementing crossover is to allow the “in-
active” recruiter agent to inherit a select number of well-filled bins
from the “active” recruited agent. However, given the stochasticity of
the crossover procedure, the process of hill-climbing is also imple-
mented during the diffusion phase. During the diffusion phase, the
crossover operation is repeated n number of times between the “in-
active” recruiter agent and the “active” recruited agent. If the quality
of the newly produced solution for the “inactive” recruiter agent is
better than its current best solution, then th new solution is accep-
ted, though if the new solution provides no new improvements, then
it is ignored and the process continues until the pre-defined iteration
end is satisfied.
4.5 Local search
Local search was implemented to the SDS algorithm due to the bene-
fits it provides, such as exploitation of solutions. The performance of
meta-heuristics are greatly improved when coupled with local search,
as observ d by John Levine and Frederick Ducatelle [12]. The SDS
local search is applied once all agents become “active”.
The local search procedure is described as follows: for a given
“active” agent, sum up the contents of each bin, if the total sum
of the bin is equal to the bin’s capacity, then keep the bin and its
contents (i.e. do not “destroy” the bin). All of the bins that do not
equal the bins capacity are “destroyed” (removed) and the items of
the “destroyed” bins are re-packed into new bins and given to the
agent. Though, the items are not re-packed using the FFD heuristic.
The items are packed by getting the biggest item that can still fit into
the bin. The local search procedure is applied n number of times.
This local search places emphasis on well-filled bins, as al-
gorithms that minimise the leftover space per bin often produce
optimal solutions (best solutions) as proved by the ACO [12] and
HGGA [8] algorithms.
5 Experiments and Results
The following are described in this section: First, in section 5.1, the
parameter values required for the SDS algorithm is described. Then
in 5.2, the benchmark problem instances are introduced. In 5.3, the
SDS algorithm is compared against different population and non-
population based techniques, including the HGGA [8], Hybrid ACO
and pure ACO approaches [12], to name a few. The results obtained
from this comparison are also shown. 5.4 provides a discussion of
the results and 5.5 shows the strengths and weaknesses of SDS.
5.1 SDS parameters
Before commencing with comparing SDS to other algorithms, cer-
tain parameters need to be initialised (i.e. iteration numbers, number
of agents initialised, etc). The first parameter that needs to be set is
the number of agents used for each problem. The number of agents
used will be equal to the number of items in each problem. So if there
are 120 items in a problem, then there will be 120 agents deployed to
tackle the problem. The fitness threshold value is also initialised, and
set to the empirically suggested value of 0.6. The iteration number
for the crossover and local search mechanisms are the final para-
meters that need to be set. A total of 80 iterations are set for these
mechanisms. These values were empirically suggested following the
experiments on different benchmark problems.
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5.2 Benchmark instances
The problem instances used and shown in the results tables were ob-
tained from the OR-library3. There are 4 problem instance sets (u120,
u250, u500 and u1000); each problem instance set contains 20 prob-
lems and there are 80 problems overall. u120, u250, u500 and u1000
require 120, 250, 500 and 1000 items to be packed per problem. The
size of each item is uniformly distributed in the range of (20,100) and
must be packed into bins of capacity 150. Theoretically optimal bins
are also provided. Theoretically optimal bins are the calculated best
number of bins for a problem. This is calculated by summing up the
items values and dividing it by the bins capacity. Theo = (totsize/bin-
size), this was calculated by Emanuel Falkenauer [8].
5.3 Results
To conduct the experiments, the SDS algorithm is compared against
a number of algorithms, ranging from swarm to non-swarm al-
gorithms. The SDS algorithm is compared against algorithms includ-
ing Falkenauer’s HGGA algorithm [8], John Levine and Frederick
Ducatelle’s Hybrid ACO and pure ACO approaches [12], Martello
and Toth’s MTP algorithm [13], as well as the Grammatical Evolu-
tion based algorithms [16].
Two separate tables will be shown. At the last column of each
table, the performance of the SDS algorithm is demonstrated. In the
reported result tables, PSO stands for Particle Swarm Optimisation
and PESO stands for Particle Evolutionary Swarm Optimisation. The
results in Table 1(a) are borrowed from [12] and the results reported
in Table 1(b) are from [16].
As explained in [12], in table 1(a), HACO, ACO, MTP and HGGA
were run once per problem, therefore, SDS was also run once per
problem. The population size for ACO is equal to the number of
items per problem. HACO simply uses a population of 10. HGGA
uses a population size of 100. The population size for SDS is ex-
plained in section 5.1.
The authors of PSO and PESO in table 1(b) had run their al-
gorithms 33 times and the median from their results were used. The
population size for each PSO and PESO algorithms is 50.
Within each table, the “prob” column refers to the type of problem
instance set the algorithms are tackling. The “+ bins” column refers
to how many extra bins were needed for all of the problems in that
particular problem instance set. So the optimal bins for u120 are 981
and if an algorithm has a +2 in their column for the u120 problem set,
this means that the algorithm used 983 bins in total. The “Exec time”
column refers to the execution time of the algorithms and it is in
seconds, and only the algorithms in Table 1(a) had provided the exe-
cution time, the reason for this is that Levine and Ducatelle [12] were
the only ones that provided the execution time for their algorithm and
the algorithms they compared. The optimal bins for u120, u250, u500
and u1000 are 981, 2032, 4024 and 8011, respectively. Optimal bins
refers to how many bins are needed for the best results; these optimal
bins, as described in section 5.2, were calculated by Falkenauer [8].
5.4 Discussion
As observed from the table of results, the SDS algorithm outperforms
many well established algorithms. A reason for the SDS algorithm
performing superior to many algorithms is perhaps attributable to the
diverse solutions produced by the SDS population.
3 http://people.brunel.ac.uk/˜mastjjb/jeb/orlib/
binpackinfo.html
Though, when compared to superior packing algorithms (i.e.
HACO and HGGA), the SDS algorithm is outperformed. These al-
gorithms (HACO and HGGA) use the benefits of Genetic Algorithms
and Ant Colony and they improve these benefits by applying extra
features such as local search, inversion of bins, etc. Acknowledging
the outperformance of these two (out of 10) algorithms, including the
variants, the purpose of the study is to present a proof of principle to
the applicability of a simple algorithm to compete and outperform
several other algorithms (8 out of 10, including the variants).
Also, the fitness function and the threshold used to decide if an
agent is active or not is highly sensitive to the granularity of item
weights. They work well for the problem instance sets used, because
the capacity C=150 for all of problems and it is relatively easy to fill
up a bin completely with item weights between 25 and 100. They
may not work well if the capacity C=100,000 and items weights are
between 20,000 and 35,000. In these instances, very few bins may be
full, and thus all agents may be inactive.
5.5 Strengths and Weaknesses
SDS has many strengths, one of which is the diffusion phase which
allows good solutions to spread throughout the agent population
quickly and efficiently, while the discarding of bad solutions is gen-
erally reliable. Although SDS exhibited an overall outperformance
over the majority of the algorithms reported in this work, it failed
to outperform two of the algorithms, namely HACO and HGGA. A
possible cause for this could be sought in the balance between ex-
ploration and exploitation which is a topic for future research. SDS
does offer two mechanisms to cater for this balance (i.e. context-free
and context-sensitive mechanism) which will be explored in future
research.
The current implementation of SDS 4, in addition to using the in-
herent exploration-exploitation balance which is facilitated through
the test and diffusion phases, the local search allows for further in-
vestigation of solutions.
One of the current weaknesses of the fitness function is that a solu-
tion can have non-zero fitness only if at least one bin is exactly filled,
which despite being feasible in some instances, could be hard or im-
possible in others. Overcoming this weakness in the fitness function
could potentially contribute to a better performance of the algorithm.
6 Conclusion and future work
In the work presented, an SDS algorithm was proposed and applied
to the 1D-BPP. The purpose of the study was to introduce a proof
of principle for the applicability of this simple swarm intelligence
algorithm when compared with other swarm intelligence and evol-
utionary computation algorithms over standard benchmark problem
instances.
The presented algorithm produced encouraging results, as shown
in section 5.3 where SDS is demonstrated to outperform 80% of the
algorithms and their variants: ACO, MTP, as well as the variants of
PESO and PSO algorithms over the benchmarks. Having stating the
above, SDS algorithm falls short when compared to two algorithm,
the Hybrid ACO and HGGA.
In summary, while this work introduces promising results, there
are several open research questions which could contribute to further
enhancement of the algorithm’s performance, such as: introducing
4 The source code for applying SDS to 1D-BPP can be accessed
through the following link: https://www.dropbox.com/sh/
odi2twj9336xic6/AABaWduBqi8vHbvS_6Reb0pLa?dl=0.
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Table 1. Comparing SDS with other techniques.
(a)
Prob HGGA MTP ACO HACO SDS
+Bins +Bins +Binss +Bins +Bins
u120 +2 1 +2 +2 +0 +2
u250 +3 +12 +12 +2 +8
u500 +0 +44 +42 +0 +7
u1000 +0 +78 +70 +0 +12
(b) Grammatical Evolutionary algorithms using Grammars 1-3 (i.e. G1, G2 and G3) + SDS
Prob PSO PESO
G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 SDS
+Bins +Bins +Bins +Bins +Bins +Binss +Bins
u120 +63 +150 +391 +63 +150 +14 +2
u250 +130 +310 +819 +130 +310 +30 +8
u500 +231 +590 +1623 +231 +590 +54 +7
u1000 +419 +1143 +3242 +419 +1143 +97 +12
more lenient fitness function which reflects the fitness of a solution
more proportionately to their quality vs a binary evaluation of bins,
possibly it could be helpful to evaluate a cost function contingent
on the relative fullness of each bin. Improving the balance between
exploration and exploitation using alternative recruitment strategies
in the diffusion phase, exploring the performance of varying local
search mechanisms and applying the algorithm to other more com-
plex benchmarks an comparing with other emerging BPP algorithms.
Furthermore, the performance of SDS in the BPP with higher di-
mensionality (i.e. the 2D and 3D-BPPs) will be evaluated, and po-
tentially SDS could be applied to other NP-Hard class of problems.
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Haploid-Diploid Evolutionary Algorithms:  
The Baldwin Effect and Recombination Nature’s Way
Larry Bull
1
 
Abstract.  This paper uses the recent idea that the fundamental 
haploid-diploid lifecycle of eukaryotic organisms implements a 
rudimentary form of learning within evolution. A general 
approach for evolutionary computation is here derived that 
differs from all previous known work using diploid 
representations. The primary role of recombination is also 
changed from that previously considered in both natural and 
artificial evolution under the new view. Using well-known 
abstract tuneable models it is shown that varying fitness 
landscape ruggedness varies the benefit of the new approach.12 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The vast majority of work within evolutionary computation has 
used a haploid representation scheme; individuals are one 
solution to the given problem. Simple prokaryotic organisms 
similarly contain one set of genes, whereas the more complex 
eukaryotic organisms – such as plants and animals - are 
predominantly diploid and contain two sets of genes. A small 
body of work exists using a diploid representation scheme within 
evolutionary computation; individuals carry two solutions to the 
given problem. In all but one known example, a dominance 
scheme is utilized to reduce the diploid down to a traditional 
haploid solution for evaluation. That is, as individuals carry two 
sets of genes, a heuristic is included to choose which of the 
genes to use (see [1] for a recent review). The only known 
exception is work by Hillis [2] on sorting networks wherein non-
identical solution values at a given gene position are both used to 
form the solution for evaluation, thereby enabling solution 
lengths to vary up to the combined length of the two constituent 
genomes. 
However, in nature, eukaryotes exploit a haploid-diploid 
cycle where haploid cells form a diploid cell/organism. At the 
point of reproduction by the cell/organism, the haploid genomes 
within the diploid each form haploid gamete cells that (may) join 
with a haploid gamete from another cell/organism to form a 
diploid (Figure 1). Specifically, each of the two genomes in an 
organism is replicated, with one copy of each genome being 
crossed over. In this way copies of the original pair of genomes 
may be passed on, mutations aside, along with two versions 
containing a mixture of genes from each. Previous explanations 
for the emergence of the alternation between the haploid and 
diploid states are typically based upon its being driven by 
changes in the environment (after [3]).  Recently, an explanation 
for the haploid-diploid cycle in eukaryotes has been presented 
[4] which also explained other aspects of their sexual 
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reproduction, including the use of recombination, based upon the 
Baldwin effect [5].  
 
 
 
Figure 1. The haploid-diploid phases within the two-stage 
meiosis process seen in most eukaryotic organisms. 
 
The Baldwin effect is the existence of phenotypic plasticity 
which enables an organism to display a different (better) fitness 
than its genome directly represents. Importantly, such learning 
can affect (improve) the evolutionary process by altering the 
shape of the underlying fitness landscape. For example, if a very 
poor combination of genes is able to consistently learn a far 
superior phenotype, their frequency will increase under selection 
more than expected without learning; the effective shape of the 
fitness landscape will be changed for the poor gene combination. 
Becoming diploid can potentially alter gene expression in 
comparison to being haploid and hence affect the expected 
phenotype of each haploid alone since both genomes are active 
in the cell - through changes in gene product concentrations, 
partial or co-dominance, etc. That is, the fitness of the diploid 
cell/organism is a combination of the fitness contributions of the 
composite haploid genomes. If the cell/organism subsequently 
remains diploid and reproduces asexually, there is no scope for a 
rudimentary Baldwin effect. However, if there is a reversion to a 
haploid state for reproduction, there is the potential for a 
significant mismatch between the utility of the haploids passed 
on compared to that of the diploid selected; individual haploid 
gametes do not contain all of the genetic material through which 
their fitness was determined. That is, the effects of haploid 
genome combination into a diploid can be seen as a simple form 
of phenotypic plasticity for the individual haploid genomes 
before they revert to a solitary state during reproduction. 
In the haploid case, variation operators generate a new 
genome at a point in the fitness landscape. Under the haploid-
diploid cycle, two such genomes join and their fitness as a 
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diploid is a function of their individual genomes and any 
interactions. In the simplest case, the fitness of the diploid can be 
taken as the average fitness of the individual haploids. Hence the 
fitness of the diploid is a point between the fitness of the 
individual haploids. Since the constituent haploid genomes are 
each assigned that fitness under selection, the shape of the 
underlying haploid genome fitness landscape can be changed. 
That is, evolution forms a generalization about the typical fitness 
of solutions found between the two haploid genomes. 
 
 
Figure 2. Comparing the fitnesses of haploid genomes under the 
haploid-diploid case (bottom) to the traditional haploid case 
(top). The case where 01-11 are always paired and the others 
pair homogeneously is shown.  
 
 
Figure 2 shows a very simple example of the contrast between 
the standard haploid genome landscape evolution view and how 
the haploid-diploid cycle alters the landscape with fitness 
contribution averaging. Under the haploid-diploid cycle the 
apparent fitness of the valley is potentially increased, increasing 
the likelihood selection will maintain such haploid genomes 
within the population, thereby increasing the likelihood of the 
valley being crossed to the optimum. This suggests an increased 
benefit from the haploid-diploid cycle as landscape ruggedness 
increases. It can also be noted that the shape of the fitness 
landscape varies based upon the haploid genomes which exist 
within a given population at any time. This is also significant 
since, as has been pointed out for coevolutionary fitness 
landscapes [6], such movement potentially enables the 
temporary creation of neutral paths, where the benefits of (static) 
landscape neutrality are well-established (after [7]). 
Moreover, the variation operators can then be seen to change 
the bounds for sampling combined genomes within the diploid 
fitness landscape by altering the distance between the two end 
points in the underlying haploid fitness landscape. That is, the 
degree of possible change in the distance between the two 
haploid genomes controls the amount of learning possible per 
cycle. It has long been known that the most beneficial amount of 
learning under the Baldwin effect increases with the ruggedness 
of the fitness landscape [8]. Numerous explanations exist for the 
benefits of recombination in both natural (eg, [9]) and artificial 
systems (eg, [10]), the latter focusing solely upon haploid 
genomes and neither considering the potential Baldwin effect 
under the haploid-diploid cycle. The effects of recombination in 
the haploid-diploid cycle become clear with the new insight: 
recombination potentially moves the current end points 
significantly, thereby increasing the rate of change in the fitness 
level generalizations in comparison to that possible under 
typical gene value mutation rates alone. This paper presents a 
new class of evolutionary algorithm which exploits the new 
understanding of the haploid-diploid cycle in eukaryotes.  
2 NK AND RBNK MODELS  
The NK model of fitness landscapes to allow the systematic 
study of various aspects of evolution (see [11]). In the model an 
individual is represented by a set of N (binary) genes or traits, 
each of which depends upon its own value and that of K 
randomly chosen others in the individual. Thus increasing K, 
with respect to N, increases the epistatic linkage. This increases 
the ruggedness of the fitness landscapes by increasing the 
number of fitness peaks. The model assumes all epistatic 
interactions are so complex that it is only appropriate to assign 
(uniform) random values to their effects on fitness. Therefore for 
each of the possible K interactions, a table of 2(K+1) fitnesses is 
created, with all entries in the range 0.0 to 1.0, such that there is 
one fitness value for each combination of traits. The fitness 
contribution of each trait is found from its individual table. 
These fitnesses are then summed and normalised by N to give 
the selective fitness of the individual (Figure 3). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. An example NK model. (i) shows how the fitness 
contribution of each gene depends on K random genes. 
Therefore there are 2(K+1) possible allele combinations, each of 
which is assigned a random fitness as shown in (ii). Each gene of 
the genome has such a table created for it. Total fitness of a 
given genome is the normalized sum of these values. 
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In the RBN model of genetic regulatory networks (see [11]) a 
network of R nodes, each with B directed connections from other 
nodes in the network all update synchronously based upon the 
current state of those B nodes. Hence those B nodes are seen to 
have a regulatory effect upon the given node, specified by the 
given Boolean function attributed to it. Nodes can also be self-
connected. Since they have a finite number of possible states and 
they are deterministic, such networks eventually fall into an 
attractor. It is well-established that the value of B affects the 
emergent behaviour of RBN wherein attractors typically contain 
an increasing number of states with increasing B. Three phases 
of behaviour exist: ordered when B=1, with attractors consisting 
of one or a few states; chaotic when B>2, with a very large 
number of states per attractor; and, a critical regime at B=2, 
where similar states lie on trajectories that tend to neither 
diverge nor converge (see [11] for discussions of this critical 
regime, e.g., with respect to perturbations).  
The combination of the RBN and NK models enables the 
exploration of the relationship between phenotypic traits and the 
genetic regulatory network by which they are produced – the 
RBNK model [12]. In this paper, the following simple scheme is 
adopted: N phenotypic traits are attributed to randomly chosen 
nodes within the network of R genes (Figure 4). Thereafter all 
aspects of the two models remain as described, with simulated 
evolution used to evolve the RBN on NK landscapes. Hence the 
NK element creates a tuneable component to the overall RBN 
fitness landscape. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Example RBNK model. Each network consists of R 
nodes, each node containing B integers in the range [1, R] to 
indicate input connections and a binary string of length 2B to 
indicate the Boolean logic function over those connections.  
3 A HAPLOID-DIPLOID ALGORITHM  
In the simple haploid-diploid evolutionary algorithm (HD-EA) 
used here, a population member is diploid and so contains two 
solutions to the given task. The fitness of a population member is 
the average of the fitness of its two genomes/solutions. Two 
parents are selected to form one offspring here, following the 
process shown in Figure 1: one parent is selected and copies 
each of its haploid genomes; one copy of each of the two 
genomes is crossed over to create two new variants; mutation is 
applied to all four genomes; and finally, one of the four resulting 
haploid genomes is picked at random to form half of the new 
offspring individual. The process is repeated with the second 
parent to form the other half of the offspring:  
 
 BEGIN 
 INITIALISE population each with two random solutions 
 EVALUATE each candidate’s pair of solutions 
 REPEAT UNTIL (TERMINATION CONDITION) DO 
FOR each new candidate solution DO 
       REPEAT twice DO 
SELECT parent candidate 
COPY candidate with ERROR 
COPY candidate copy again 
 RECOMBINE two non-sister solutions 
CHOOSE one of the four solutions 
      OD 
      EVALUATE new solution 
      REPLACE IF (UPDATE CONDITION) 
candidate with new solution 
OD 
 OD 
 END 
 
 
The details of the selection process, recombination and mutation 
operators are not specific to the general approach. Specific 
examples are next described for the chosen tasks.  
4  EXPERIMENTATION 
A standard steady-state evolutionary process is used here: 
reproduction selection is via a binary tournament (size 2), 
replacement selection uses the worst individual, the population 
contains 50 diploid individuals, the constituent haploid genomes 
are binary strings of length N=50, mutation is deterministic at 
rate 1/N and single-point crossover is used. Since each diploid 
individual requires two evaluations, the comparative traditional 
haploid scheme is run for twice as many generations, with all 
other details the same. The results presented are the average 
fitness of the best individual after 20,000 generations (40,000 for 
the haploid), for various K. Each experiment consists of running 
ten random populations on each of ten fitness landscapes, ie, 
results are the average of 100 runs. As can be seen in Figure 5, 
for K>4 the HD-EA is better than the traditional haploid 
approach (T-test, p<0.05), otherwise performance is equal (T-
test, p≥0.05). 
     Most details of the experimentation remain unchanged from 
the NK model for the RBNK model. Individual solutions are 
now integer strings of length (R=100) and mutation is applied 
deterministically at a rate 1/R. In contrast to bit-flipping, 
mutation can either alter the Boolean function of the randomly 
chosen node or alter a randomly chosen connection for that node 
(equal probability). Following the known behaviour of B=2 RBN 
discussed above, only B=2 is used here. A fitness evaluation is 
ascertained by first assigning each node to a randomly chosen 
start state and updating each node synchronously for T cycles 
(T=50). Here T is chosen such that the networks have typically 
reached an attractor. At update cycle T, the value of each of the 
N trait nodes is then used to calculate fitness on the given NK 
landscape. This process is repeated ten times on the given NK 
landscape iteration. Each experiment again consists of running 
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ten random populations on each of ten fitness landscapes, ie, 
results are here the average of 1000 runs (after [12]). Figure 6 
shows for K>6 the HD-EA is better than the traditional haploid 
approach (T-test, p<0.05), otherwise performance is equal (T-
test, p≥0.05).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Comparative performance of the best individual 
evolved using the haploid-diploid algorithm (HD-EA) to the 
traditional haploid approach (H-EA), over a range of fitness 
landscapes (N=50). Error bars show max and min values. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Comparative performance of the best RBN individual 
evolved using the haploid-diploid algorithm (HD-EA) to the 
traditional haploid approach (H-EA), over a range of fitness 
landscapes (R=100, B=2, N=50). Error bars show max and min 
values. 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
This paper has presented a new form of evolutionary algorithm 
which exploits the haploid-diploid cycle seen in eukaryotic 
organisms. In contrast to previous work on diploid 
representations, both candidate solutions are evaluated and a 
combined fitness attributed to the individual. Since the diploid is 
reduced to a haploid under reproduction, there is a mismatch 
between the actual utility of the haploid and the fitness attributed 
to it. This is seen as exploiting a rudimentary form of the 
Baldwin effect, with the diploid phase seen as the “learning” step 
[4]. The scheme has been shown beneficial as the ruggedness of 
the fitness landscape increases for both a traditional binary-
encoded optimization task and a dynamical network design task. 
Every generation was assumed sexual here, whereas some 
eukaryotes can also reproduce asexually. Future work should 
consider this fact by introducing a new parameter to introduce 
(traditional) haploid cycles. The effects of varying the number of 
copies of genomes at the point of reproduction should also be 
explored – the typical natural case of pre-meiotic doubling was 
used here. The use of many recombination schemes would also 
seem to hold the potential to improve performance, along with 
other search operators from the literature. Results (not shown) 
find an improvement (K>0) for both the haploid and diploid 
algorithms using one-point crossover on the RBNK but not the 
NK tasks. Note the potential benefits of crossover as 
traditionally understood (eg, [10]) are not lost under the new 
scheme.  
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Experience Evaluations for Human-Computer
Co-Creative Processes - a Proposal
Anna Kantosalo 1
Abstract.
Human-computer co-creative software requires an evaluation per-
spective that better incorporates the experiences of the users. In this
paper we propose an evaluation perspective based on user experience
evaluation to evaluate the human-computer co-creative process. We
apply this perspective into forming an evaluation plan for a human-
computer co-creative poetry writing system called the Poetry Ma-
chine. We feel that the inherently contextualized and subjective user
experience perspective complements the commonly assumed posi-
tions of objectively evaluating the creative outcomes and the creative
algorithmic processes in the domain of computational creativity ap-
plications. We first discuss the need for such an evaluation perspec-
tive and continue to present relevant evaluation metrics. We then
outline an experiment in which we propose to use the said metrics
to investigate differences in a human-computer co-creation process,
a human-human co-creation process, and a human-human-computer
co-creation process with the poetry writing system.
1 INTRODUCTION
As computational creativity generation methods advance, we are
more and more interested in how to put them to good use. Human-
computer co-creativity studies how we can use computational cre-
ativity methods to promote human creativity in a co-operative cre-
ative process with a computer and vice versa. In this process the hu-
man becomes an integral part of the creative process itself instead of
being just part of the audience. This requires adopting a new eval-
uation stance, which goes beyond the traditional computational cre-
ativity evaluation focuses of creative output and internal workings
of the system. Evaluation of human-computer co-creativity systems
must be carried out in real contexts with real users, so that we get
authentic data for developing our systems further.
In this paper we propose evaluation from a human perspective fo-
cusing on the user experience of users participating in the co-creative
process. User Experience is closely related to the domain of In-
teraction Design, which has been proposed as a useful evaluation
paradigm by Bown [1], and successfully utilized in some user evalu-
ations of computational creativity applications (see e.g. [11, 2]). The
term user experience refers to a number of hedonistic aspects of inter-
action design summed up as the quality-in-use of interactive products
or ”the result of enjoyable interactions and/or anticipated interactions
with a product” by Lachner et al. [12]. By including an experience
oriented perspective, we can better promote collection of information
that also involves the complex emotive expectations and reactions to
1 Department of Computer Science and Helsinki Institute for In-
formation Technology HIIT, University of Helsinki, Finland e-mail:
anna.kantosalo@helsinki.fi
computationally creative software that affects the creative use of such
systems.
In computational creativity evaluation, a focus on user experience
has been scarce so far, but Yee-King and d’Inverno [32] suggest
that measuring the experiences of a human interacting with a system
is more important than measuring the systems creativity. Similarly
Bown [2] considers that instead of measuring an interactive systems
creativity, we should focus on describing the complex network of
interactions that surrounds it. We agree with these views and argue
that investigating the human-computer co-creative process from the
human’s subjective, experiential perspective can reveal new insights
useful for both the design and evaluation of such systems.
Our evaluation target is a poetry writing agent designed to collab-
orate with children in schools. Creative writing and poetry are both
part of the national curriculum, which also emphasizes learning by
doing. The Poetry Machine application is intended to help pupils cre-
ate their own poetry in and out of the classroom. We are interested in
what constitutes a good creative experience when working with the
application. We examine this question in a comparative setting, with
children writing both with a friend and/or the Poetry Machine sys-
tem. We feel that the user experience oriented evaluation view will
give us a more nuanced picture of the aspects influencing creative
work with a creative system.
In this paper we outline our approach to investigating user ex-
perience in this comparative setting. We start by looking at what
good user experience in human-computer co-creation might entail.
We mix together three perspectives: user experience evaluation, com-
putational creativity evaluation and creativity support system evalua-
tion. We briefly discuss evaluation metrics presented in these three
domains and then proceed to examining our study context. After
presenting our context, we present our list of metrics, and discuss
how they are based on the three perspectives and what kind of study
questions we have derived from them. Finally we present our study
method.
2 STUDY INSPIRATIONS
Maher [16] has suggested that similar evaluation metrics should be
used for evaluating the creativity of ”humans, computers, and col-
lectively intelligent systems” regardless of their domain. Inspired
by Maher’s consideration, we assume the position that the human-
computer co-creative user experience and human-human co-creative
user experience can be studied with the same metrics. Yet we think
some metrics may be more important for one case than the other.
Therefore we should gather our metrics from a variety of domains:
general user experience evaluation, computational creativity evalua-
tion, and creativity support system evaluation. Finally we included
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three case studies from the computational creativity literature to il-
lustrate possible user experience evaluation in action.
2.1 Study Inspirations from User Experience
Evaluation
User experience evaluation is a part of the long standing usabil-
ity evaluation tradition [14] and its methodology can be viewed as
an augmentation of known usability evaluation methodologies [31].
MacDonald and Atwood [14] conclude that three basic categories
of methods, suited both for pragmatic, usability oriented testing, as
well as hedonic, user experience oriented testing, exist: User Testing
Methods, Inspection Methods, and Field Methods. The main differ-
ence to usability evaluation is that the nature of user experience eval-
uations is inherently subjective, since we are interested in ”how the
user feels about the system”, including user motivations and expec-
tations [31].
Vermeeren et al. [31] consider that there is still a lack of system-
atic research into evaluating and measuring User Experience. This
may be the reason, why general user-experience evaluation literature
and metrics are still scarce. Here Lachner et al. [12] stress the impor-
tance of defining user-experience for a specific context as the basis of
evaluation: ”To create a certain UX [user experience], a systematic
approach and an associated description of user experience are needed
to consider and measure the intended experience”. To this end they
report nine user experience dimensions divided into three categories
based on their extensive literature review and expert interviews. The
categories, named ”Look”, ”Feel”, and ”Usability” include the fol-
lowing categories ”Appealing visual design”, ”Communicated infor-
mation structure”, ”visual branding”, ”mastery”, ”outcome satisfac-
tion”, ”emotional attachment”, ”task effectiveness”, ”task efficiency”
and ”stability and performance”, which have been translated into 27
Likert scale questions.
2.2 Study Inspirations from Computational
Creativity
One of the first attempts for systematical, empirically grounded com-
putational creativity evaluation criteria is Ritchie’s framework, pre-
sented in [25] and elaborated in [22] and [26]. In his framework (as
presented in [26]), Ritchie proposes we investigate the creativity of
a program by focusing on ”what is known”, meaning the attributes
of the creative artefact it produces instead of the internal workings of
the program. In the framework [25], creative artefacts are assessed by
two factors: quality and novelty. (Ritchie later [26] substituted nov-
elty for typicality as a more suitable characteristic for computational
systems.)
Pease and Colton [21] assumed a position of evaluating the im-
pact of the creative artifact on a supposed ideal audience. This au-
dience gives two ratings for each artifact: a well-being rating and a
cognitive-effort rating. With the well-being rating users evaluate the
subjective like or dislike of an artifact, and with the cognitive-effort
rating they evaluate if they are willing to devote time to understand-
ing the artifact.
Colton [4] shifted the viewpoint of evaluation from artifacts to the
internal processes of the system in his Creative Tripod-framework,
which requires that in order to be perceived as creative, we must be
able to say that the behavior of the software is skillful, appreciative
and imaginative.
The most recent efforts for setting evaluative criteria for computa-
tional creativity methods have focused on determining components
of creativity from larger data sets. Such efforts include Jordanous’
[10] corpus based approach on determining words related to creativ-
ity by their lexical co-occurrence as well as van der Velde et al.’s
[30] efforts to determine components of creativity with human asso-
ciation tests. Jordanous identified in her research 14 components of
creativity, including ”Active Involvement and Persistence”, ”Deal-
ing with Uncertanity”, ”Domain Competence”, ”General Intellect”,
”Generation of Results”, ”Independence and Freedom”, ”Intention
and Emotional Involvement”, ”Originality”, ”Progression and De-
velopment”, ”Social Interaction and Communication”, ”Spontane-
ity/Subconscious Processing”, ”Thinking and Evaluation”, ”Value”,
”Variety, Divergence and Experimentation”. Using Jordanous’ work
as a basis van der Velde et al. then again found 42 creativity related
words through their human association studies. These 42 words were
further distilled to five clusters based on human sorting: originality,
emotional value, novelty/innovation, intelligence, and skill.
2.3 Study Inspirations from Creativity Support
Systems
Any tool or combination of tools that can help ”in the open-ended
creation of new artifacts” can be considered as a creativity support
system [3]. Naturally, the role and purpose of creativity support sys-
tems are varied: systems can be derived for managerial roles, com-
munication enabling, enhancing creativity, or even to perform as cre-
ative partners [13], or more specifically for developing creative skills,
creating faster, or enabling entirely new creative methods [19]. In this
short literature review we have focused on general issues related to
the evaluation of creativity support systems.
Evaluation problems faced by the creativity support system do-
main are relatively similar to the computational creativity domain:
As Shneiderman [27] writes, the evaluation and design of creativity
support tools is not simple, as both the requirements and the mea-
sures for success are vague. Cherry and Latulipe [3] attribute this
vagueness to defining what creativity is in the first place. As an added
dimension confusing user evaluations, Shneiderman notes that user
behaviors are ”unorthodox” when compared to traditional ”produc-
tivity support” systems.
Cherry and Latulipe [3] have developed a Creativity Support In-
dex psychometric survey tool to examine quantitatively the support
of creative digital tools. Their index takes into account ”six dimen-
sions of creativity support: Exploration, Expressiveness, Immersion,
Enjoyment, Results Worth Effort, and Collaboration.” The Creativity
Support Index is suggested as an additional evaluation metric to com-
plement other evaluation approaches. The tool itself consists of rating
scales and paired-factor comparison sections. The paired-factor com-
parison section is intended to ground the rating scales for the specific
creative tasks users perform during the testing.
A working paper by Resnick et al. [24] on design principles for
creativity support systems highlights 12 guidelines for designing cre-
ativity support systems that could be summed up as follows: Sup-
port exploration through self-revealing interaction, cater for a vari-
ety of skill levels in a variety of projects, support many paths and
many styles, support collaboration, support open interchange, make
it simple, choose ’black-boxes’ carefully, design tools to be enjoy-
able by yourself as well as others, use a multimethod approach to
balance user requirements, use an iterative design approach, design
for designers, and evaluate your system. In our opinion, the first four
guidelines are most important for creativity, when the the rest are
somewhat general the list ending with suggestions typical for any
interaction design project.
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Compton and Mateas [5] define a more specific, yet domain inde-
pendent type of creativity support system: Casual Creators are simple
tools to help facilitate searching for interesting creative artefacts in
specified creative domains. They argue that the use of casual creators
is firstly motivated by fun and a sense of ownership over the found
artefacts, and designers should ensure the quality of the user expe-
rience by making sure there are no broken artefacts in the allowed
search space and that there is a large enough number of surprising
artefacts in the search space, yet it should be low enough to promote
the sense of ownership and creativity when discovering one by inten-
tionally searching the search space. In addition the system must offer
a meaningful creative experience in the first few minutes to receive an
audience. Fun and a sense of ownership are already intersting expe-
riental factors that can be measured. Compton and Mateas add three
more user experience descriptors intended to amount to a flow state:
playfulness, powerfulness and pleasure.
2.4 Study Inspirations from Case Studies
The casual creator definition of Compton and Mateas has been used
by Davis et al. [6] in their case study investigating the use of a casual
creator system called the ”Drawing Apprentice” designed to simu-
late a human collaborator. Davis et al. tested their system in a com-
parative setting where the computational methods within the system
were temporarily replaced by a professional artist. The focus of their
study was on ”evaluating the quality of the collaboration and how
influential their collaboration was in defining artistic goals” in an
open-ended drawing task. The qualitative study listed the most crit-
ical evaluation metrics users used to determine if an agent’s contri-
butions ’make sense’ as follows: spatial awareness, visual similarity
and perceptual logic. Spatial awareness entails exhibiting a sense of
what has been previously drawn and not ”messing it up”. Visual sim-
ilarity entails contributing the process with visually similar material
to that provided by the user. Perceptual logic means that the agent
must adapt its new input to the existing drawing, especially when
drawing spatially near it.
Jacob and Magerko [9] also conducted a comparative evaluation
of three different degrees of interactivity in a co-creative dancing
agent. In their study, a user was asked to interact with a dancing co-
creative agent in three conditions: an agent mirroring their moves, a
pre-authored version of the agent, and a fully interactive version of
the agent. After each condition the users were asked to evaluate their
experience with a few known usability evaluation instruments, in-
cluding the creativity support index. Unfortunately, the small sample
size of their pilot study does not yet show clear indications of which
of the instruments work best.
Bown [2] investigated musical improvisation with three musicians
and a computationally creative musical system. He used a focus
group in which the musicians took turns in playing with the algo-
rithm, observing others play with it and discussing their experiences.
The intention of the study was to examine how musicians approached
and discussed performing with computational systems focusing on
questions of effectiveness, autonomy, novelty and surprise. In his ex-
periment, Bown found that participants who played with the system
had a stronger engagement than observers and the musicians did not
compare the system with human standards.
3 STUDY CONTEXT
Our case study evaluates an interactive poetry writing system called
the Poetry Machine. The most important contextual factors in our
study are the system itself, including its intended use as well as the re-
lated interactions, our intended user group, and the specific use cases
we are evaluating. The poetry writing application is designed for use
at the Finnish comprehensive school and is developed by a multidis-
ciplinary team of computer scientists and pedagogical researchers.
More thorough evaluations of the educational use of the tool are be-
ing conducted separately from this study as a part of the on-going
development effort.
The main idea behind the Poetry Machine application is to help
pupils overcome creative droughts: When starting a new poem, the
pupil chooses a theme to witch the application then generates a
short poem excerpt. The pupil can modify the excerpt by moving
words, adding words, or removing them entirely. The pupil has also
a few tools for asking more materials from the computer - a magic
wand that can be dragged over a word for replacement suggestions, a
rhyming tool that gives different types of rhymes for a word dropped
on it, and a robot button, which will generate more lines to the poem
being modified.
We intend to study the application with children, who are 9 - 12-
years of age. Children as users are somewhat different from adults:
Firstly their cognitive skills, including concentration [18] and prob-
lem solving are not yet fully developed [7]. Secondly, also their phys-
ical skills, including motor and perception skills are still developing
[7]. Finally the relationship between children participating in the test
and the adult researchers administering the tests affects overall test
success [20] and may cause bias in testing [23]. Therefore testing
with children requires special considerations so that it can be done
in a comfortable, secure atmosphere in which children feel free to
express their feelings about the application to be tested.
Children are usually divided to different groups based on their age
as children of similar age tend to share similar capabilities and abil-
ities with respect to user testing. A review of the cognitive, percep-
tional and motor skills of children in different age brackets can be
found for example in Hourcade’s article [7]. However, it is important
to note that individual differences between children are large and the
ability of specific individuals to participate in testing can be boosted
by task specific factors, such as good domain information, social sup-
port and good instructions [7].
We are interested especially in the experiences of a child creating
a poem together with the Poetry Machine in a co-creative process.
However, we are also interested to see, how this situation differs from
two different scenarios: Two children writing a poem together with-
out computational aid, as well as two children collaborating with one
computer.
4 OUR METRICS
Based on the literature, we selected seven metrics, which we feel are
most suitable for our context whilst giving a good overall picture of
the quality of use. The metrics are: Fun, Enjoyment, Expressiveness,
Outcome Satisfaction, Ease of writing (task efficiency), Collabora-
tion and Ownership. The metrics and relevant background literature
is shown in table 1.
The first metric, Fun, is derived from the Fun-metric suggested
by Compton and Mateas in their casual creator work [5]. It was se-
lected as it is a very clear experiential factor and coincidentally a lot
of research exists on using fun as an experience parameter in chil-
dren’s software: Besides a useful descriptor for user experience [28],
it is considered important for keeping children’s attention in edu-
cational software [15] and their willingness to use a specific prod-
uct altogether [23, 29]. Added to the criticism towards productivity,
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Table 1. Selected metrics and the most influential related concepts in literature
Metric Literature
Fun Fun [5]
Enjoyment Enjoyment [3], Pleasure [5]
Expressiveness Intention and emotional involvement [10], Expressiveness [3]
Outcome Satisfaction Outcome satisfaction [12], Quality [26], Well-Being rating [21], Value [10], Results worth the effort [3]
Ease of writing (task efficiency) Task efficiency [12]
Collaboration Social interaction and communication [10], Collaboration* [3], Support collaboration* [24]
Ownership Sense of Ownership [5]
speed and efficiency oriented views of evaluating software intended
for children [7] and Shneiderman’s [27] considerations on the un-
orthodox use of creativity support systems, we must conclude that
Fun is indeed one of the most important experience factors in this
research.
The next metric, Enjoyment, builds on the Fun metric. It also
draws from the work of Compton and Mateas, this time their pleasure
parameter [5]. This metric however, is more similar to what Cherry
and Latulipe [3] call Enjoyment. In the work of Cherry and Latulipe,
Enjoyment is a metric that clearly spans a larger time frame. As a
measure of enjoyment, they ask their users, if they would like to use
the software in the future on a regular basis. This requires the users to
evaluate how the enjoyment, or fun, they have had with the software
is enough to support future use.
The Expressiveness metric relies mostly on the similarly named
metric from the work of Cherry and Latulipe [3]. Under Expressive-
ness, Cherry and Latulipe ask their users, if they were able to be
creative and express themselves in the use of the software. These
questions are related to Jordanous’ metrics on Intention and emo-
tional involvement, which deal with self expression and emotional
fulfillment in the creative task.
The outcome satisfaction metric is the metric most directly related
to the user experience evaluation literature presented here. But as it
implicitly requires the users to cast an evaluation on the final out-
come of the creative process, it is also clearly related to the Quality,
Well-Being, and Value ratings presented in computational creativity
literature. A similar metric is also present in the work of Cherry and
Latulipe [3].
Ease of writing is a specification of the Task Efficiency dimension
suggested by the study of Lachner et al. [12]. However, we want to
avoid specific efficiency metrics, as efficiency may not be a primary
goal for creative users. Here we focus on the subjective efficiency
experienced by the users, which is likely to reflect on the overall user
experience.
The Collaboration metric is evident in a large part of the creativ-
ity support literature mentioned here. However, Jordanous’ views on
Social interaction and communication [10] fit this descriptor best as
it fits mutual influence, sharing and feedback with different agents.
This is different from the Collaboration [3] and Support collabora-
tion [24] dimensions in creativity support literature, which usually
specifically mention another user with whom the user is collaborat-
ing. Therefore we have noted this difference with a star at the end of
the metrics in table 1.
The Ownership measure is derived from the ideas of Compton and
Mateas [5]. They note that it is important to support a sense of owner-
ship, and tie the user experience tightly into the user feeling control
over finding meaningful artifacts in the search space. We feel that
it is an attribute which may be especially important in investigating
co-creative scenarios.
The list of metrics is quite short, since children are only able to
concentrate for a limited time. This limits the number of questions
and the number of question themes we are able to address in a ques-
tionnaire or an interview. Instead of covering a wide range of topics,
we decid d that we would narrow the list and within that list focus
on some specific aspects, namely Expressiveness, Ease of writing,
Collaboration and Creative Contribution. We have derived ten Likert
scale statements to be used as part of questionnaires from these met-
rics, focusing on the said aspects. The full list of statements can be
seen in table 2.
As we see from the statements, many of them require that users do
some sort of implicit quality evaluation of artifacts or other outcomes
of the process. Therefore it could be argued that quality and novelty
are implicit metrics throughout the study, although we do not men-
tion them specifically as metrics. It will be interesting to see, if our
users base their judgment of the items in these metrics, when they
have a chance to freely elaborate on their thoughts.
Natuarlly, there were other metrics we would have liked to include
in our study: The Exploration metric, evident in many works, includ-
ing Jordanous [10], Cherry and Latulipe [3] and Resnick et al. [24]
was a very strong candidate. However, it became difficult to invent
Likert statements that would fit both writing with the system as well
as writing with a friend. Similarly, the Immersion dimension, present
again in both Jordanous’ list as well as in the work of Cherry and
Latulipe, and related to the flow state mentioned by Compton and
Mateas [5], is also very important, but difficult to fit into our lim-
ited schedule and the limited cognitive effort of our users. Yet, we
will keep these metrics in mind when analyzing our data, as users
may explain their answers and reveal important data related to these
metrics as well.
Notably, we excluded some works altogether - the work of van der
Velde et al. [30] did not reveal any additional dimensions we would
have been interested in evaluating specifically. Also the metrics used
in the case studies proved too specific for our case.
5 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
We are interested in the experiences of pupils working with the Po-
etry Machine system to create new poetry. We are especially inter-
ested in what aspects of the computational partner promote a good
co-creative experience and whether the pupils see the role of the pro-
gram as an active collaborator or just a tool. The Collaboration and
Ownership metrics selected for our study stress this point of view.
We feel that to investigate user experience thoroughly, we will need
to look at co-creative poetry writing in a broader setting, involving
both human-computer, human-human, and human-human-computer
partnerships. Therefore we have planned a comparative evaluation
with the following three conditions:
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Table 2. Likert statements derived from the metrics
Metric Likert statement
Fun Writing the poem was fun
Enjoyment I would like to write poems in this way in the future
Expressiveness
I was able to be creative
I was able to express my own thoughts well
Outcome satisfaction I was happy with the poem I wrote
Ease of writing
It was easy to start writing the poem
It was easy to write the poem
Collaboration
I got good ideas from the other writers
Other writers were helpful for my writing
Ownership I feel the final poem is mine
• A: 1 Pupil and the Poetry Machine
• B: 2 Pupils
• C: 2 Pupils and the Poetry Machine
Our experiment is a same-participant design, meaning, we will
form pairs of pupils and each pair will participate in all three con-
ditions. There is an intrinsic value in paired test setups used with
children: children tend to be more relaxed when communicating with
adults as a peer is present in the test space. This can be achieved ei-
ther by conducting the testing with pairs of pupils (see e.g. [8]) or
just by conducting several tests simultaneously (for example [29],
and [28]). The order of the conditions will be randomized so that we
will have altogether six different treatments in which the order of the
conditions varies. We will perform two tests for each treatment and
run 12 tests in total. The participants will be recruited at schools and
we will conduct the tests at the school in order to offer children a
natural environment.
All test conditions will have a variant of the same task: ”Write a
poem to congratulate a friend who likes cats/dogs/mice.” Having the
same task will ease comparisons between the conditions. In the test
condition A each pair is split up to write a poem with the Poetry Ma-
chine according to the task description. In the task condition B each
pair will be given two permanent pens of different color and a piece
of paper to write their poem on. We chose pen and paper over pos-
sible word processing programs, as in our experience children may
not share an equivalent knowledge of all word processors and they
may get carried away by layout details and other visual aspects of
the program. The different color permanent pens accompanied by a
video of the test situation will produce a log comparable to the log
produced by the Poetry Machine application. In the final test con-
dition C each pair will work together on the same Poetry Machine
application instance writing a poem together.
We will videotape all test conditions and observe the tests in situ
for authentic communication related to the creative task at hand. We
will promote thinking aloud where possible to record the users im-
pressions as they occur. In addition to observations, we will admin-
ister a short questionnaire based on the Likert scale statements pro-
vided, after each condition. After all three conditions, each pupil will
also answer similar questions which ask them to compare the three
conditions. After this each pair will be interviewed on their experi-
ences in a discussion covering the same themes. This will give the
children a chance to elaborate on their views on the questions pro-
vided. We will use befitting discussion aids involving tactile rating
scales and physically interactive objects to enable children to answer
questions related to these abstract themes in a meaningful way.
The main differences between our study and the three case stud-
ies are that instead of investigating open-ended exploration, as Davis
et al. [6] did in their experiment, we provide our users with a clear
task, which stays relatively similar from one condition to another.
The purpose of the task is to provide a more natural context for the
users to work in. Unlike the other studies, we also deliberately com-
pare collaboration with a human with collaboration with a computer.
By investigating both dimensions and their combination, our users
can provide us with more detailed descriptions of their relative expe-
riences.
Our analysis will focus on key differences and similarities in the
creative experiences of the users in conditions A, B, and C. We will
be interested to see, what kind of language users use to describe their
collaborators in the different conditions. We are especially interested
in the role of the computer as a creator in the experiment: Does it take
the same role in the two different conditions it participates in? Are
the collaborative responsibilities of the human collaborator similar
to the computational one, and how? By analyzing the results from
a role based view, we hope to add to the understanding of different
roles taken by creative software in the creative process, as previously
described by Lubart [13], Maher [17] and Nakakoji [19].
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have argued for a more contextual evaluation of human-computer
co-creative systems focusing on the user experiences of the human
participating in the co-creative process. We have presented a set of
factors from previous approaches to evaluating user experience, cre-
ativity of computational creativity systems, and creativity support
systems. We have shown how to select suitable metrics based on the
specific contextual needs of our research. Finally we have suggested
an experimental approach into studying user experiences of children
creating together with a co-creative computational partner.
Much work is still needed to establish the user experience oriented
evaluation of the co-creative process. The on-going work here can be
seen as a starting point, upon which to build a much larger under-
standing of the specific evaluative needs of different contexts and cre-
ativity domains with regard to experience evaluation. We expect that
the experiment we present here, once carried out, can demonstrate
some preliminary benefits of the approach, as well as the usefulness
of the suggested metrics for evaluating the co-creative experience in
the creative writing domain.
Yet further work will need to be carried out to establish the rel-
evance of experience evaluations in the field of computational cre-
ativity at large: We need to see a variety of different domains, exper-
iment with different criteria, and formalize investigative tools, such
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as questionnaires. But most of all, we need to see where and how
the experience evaluation results can be used to design more fluent
human-computer co-creative processes.
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Exploring Creative Freedom
in Real Time Story Generation
Gonzalo Me´ndez and Raquel Herva´s and Pablo Gerva´s1 and Alejandro Martı´n and Frank Julca2
Abstract. Interactive storytelling systems have become very popu-
lar as they engage users in the creation of narrative. In order to ex-
plore a co-creation process where the final result is narrated while
the user is playing, we have designed an interactive storytelling sys-
tem that is able to generate a narration in real time while giving the
user the possibility to decide what to do and where to go. The in-
tended result is a tool that allows the author, the user and the system
to co-create a narration giving the user, as the ultimate author of the
resulting narration, the freedom to decide the course of the events. In
this paper we focus on the structures that have been used to represent
the stories and in the mechanisms designed to generate the narration
so that a coherent and entertaining story can be presented to the user.
1 Introduction
Interactive storytelling systems have become a popular way to en-
gage users in the creation of narrative elements. However, in many
occasions, the narration as a voice or textual product takes second
place to the interactive experience within the game, as a way to let
the user take the role of one of the characters inside the game and
influence the story.
One of the most entertaining aspects in a narration is to read or
listen to a skilled narrator that wraps the listener into the atmosphere
of the story. This is the case of the game The Stanley Parable [24],
an interactive, narrative-driven video game where the player controls
Stanley, the main and only character in the game. The story is pre-
sented to the user via the voice of a narrator, who explains the user
what he is expected to do. The story splits in several possibilities, and
the narrator continues the story according to the player’s choices.
All along the game, the player can interact with the elements that
surround him, such as buttons or doors. In the points where a choice
has to be made, the narrator always suggests the path to follow, but
the player can choose differently, producing different narrations and
endings to the story. The game is envisioned as a thought-provoking
experience about the freedom of choice in video games, since the
options given to the user are always within the intentions of the nar-
rator. The original game has a total of six different endings, and it
takes about an hour to explore all the possibilities.
Inspired by the game The Stanley Parable, our objective has been
to design an interactive storytelling system that is able to generate a
narration in real time while giving the user the possibility to decide
what to do and where to go, in a co-creation process where the final
result is narrated while the user is playing the game.
1 Instituto de Tecnologı´a del Conocimiento, Universidad Complutense de
Madrid, Spain, email: {gmendez,rhervasb,pgervas}@ucm.es
2 Facultad de Informa´tica, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain,
email: {alemar07,fjulca}@ucm.es
The purpose is to tell a story, or a set of interrelated stories, to
the user, trying to make him follow the path of the story told by the
system, while giving him the possibility to change the way and order
in which the story is told.
Therefore, our first objective is to give a human author the possi-
bility to easily create the stories that the system has to tell, adding
and changing the events of the story from outside the application.
Secondly, we need to allow the system to decide how to tell the story
according to the user’s actions, so that the same event can be narrated
in different ways. Third, we want the user to be able to change the
course of the events, driving the story to a different course than that
originally designed by the author, and the system must be able to nar-
rate the new story as the user is playing it. And finally, we intend to
give the user the chance to explore the setting and interlace that into
the story.
The intended result is a tool that allows the author, the user and the
system to co-create a narration giving the user, whose actions drive
the resulting narration, as much freedom as possible to decide the
course of the events.
The system has been implemented using the Unity 3D engine and
the stories are set in the Computer Science School at UCM (see Fig-
ure 3). The game uses a first person perspective where the user takes
the role of the main character, who needs to solve several situations
in his daily life at the university. When the game starts, the voice of
a narrator starts telling the story and tries to direct the user towards
his first objective. The objectives of the stories are located at specific
checkpoints; when the player reaches one of these points and per-
forms a specific action, if necessary, the objective is accomplished,
the narrator tells the part of the story corresponding to that objective
and the next objective of the story is unlocked.
At any point of the game, the user can decide to either follow the
instructions the narrator provides, so that he plays the story the game
intends him to play, or he can choose to disregard these instructions
and follow his own path. The first option represents the case where
no unexpected actions are taken by the user, so the story the narrator
tells can be carefully planned by the author. The second option is the
alternate case where the user decides to ignore the story and explore
other options. In this case, the designed story will not continue until
the user returns to the appropriate location, but the system will have
to narrate what the user is doing (see Section 4).
In order to know whether the user is following the story the narra-
tor is telling or not, every time the player achieves an objective and
unlocks the next one, the path between both objectives is calculated
by the system, represented as a series of physical landmarks the user
is supposed to go across. If he does not cross these points, the system
accounts for the number of landmarks he is missing, so that it can fig-
ure out how much the user is deviating from the intended objective
SYMPOSIUM IV. 4TH COMPUTATIONAL CREATIVITY SYMPOSIUM 102
Co
nfe
re
nc
e
ed
itio
n
and can modify the narration accordingly (see Section 5).
In this paper we focus on the structures that have been used to
represent the stories and in the mechanisms designed to generate the
narration so that a coherent and non-monotonous story can be pre-
sented to the user, irrespective of whether he follows the predefined
stories or not.
2 Related Work
Storytelling systems have been developed for more than forty years.
The first story telling system for which there is a record is the Novel
Writer system developed by Sheldon Klein [10]. Novel Writer cre-
ated murder stories within the context of a weekend party. It relied
on a micro-simulation model where the behaviour of individual char-
acters and events were governed by probabilistic rules that progres-
sively changed the state of the simulated world (represented as a se-
mantic network). The set of rules is highly constraining, and allows
for the construction of only one very specific type of story.
TALESPIN [18], a system which told stories about the lives of
simple woodland creatures, was based on planning: to create a story,
a character is given a goal, and then the plan is developed to solve
the goal. TALESPIN introduces character goals as triggers for action.
The systems allows the possibility of having more than one problem-
solving character in the story (and it introduced separate goal lists
for each of them). The validity of a story is established in terms of:
existence of a problem, degree of difficulty in solving the problem,
and nature or level of problem solved.
Lebowitz’s UNIVERSE [13] modelled the generation of scripts
for a succession of TV soap opera episodes (a large cast of characters
play out multiple, simultaneous, overlapping stories that never end).
UNIVERSE is the first storytelling system to devote special attention
to the creation of characters. Complex data structures are presented
to represent characters, and a simple algorithm is proposed to fill
these partly in an automatic way. But the bulk of characterization
is left for the user to do by hand. It is in a first instance intended
as a writer’s aid, with additional hopes to later develop it into an
autonomous storyteller.
The line of work initiated by TALESPIN, based on modelling the
behaviour of characters, has led to a specific branch of storytellers.
Characters are implemented as intelligent autonomous agents that
can choose their own actions informed by their internal states (in-
cluding goals and emotions) and their perception of the environment.
Narrative is understood to emerge from the interaction of these char-
acters with one another. While this guarantees coherent plots, the
lack of author goals does not necessarily produce very interesting
stories. However, it has been found very useful in the context of vir-
tual environments, where the introduction of such agents injects a
measure of narrative to an interactive setting.
With the use of virtual environments, the field of interactive sto-
rytelling has flourished over the last two decades, shifting the focus
from actually generating a story towards real-time interactivity, en-
gagement and user involvement in the story [1, 2, 4, 7, 15, 22].
The Virtual Storyteller [23] introduces a multi-agent approach to
story creation where a specific director agent is introduced to look af-
ter plot. Each agent has its own knowledge base (representing what it
knows about the world) and rules to govern its behaviour. In particu-
lar, the director agent has basic knowledge about plot structure (that
it must have a beginning, a middle, and a happy end) and exercises
control over agent’s actions in one of three ways: environmental (in-
troduce new characters and object), motivational (giving characters
specific goals), and proscriptive (disallowing a character’s intended
action). The director has no prescriptive control (it cannot force char-
acters to perform specific actions).
Fac¸ade [15] is an interactive drama where the player takes the role
of a friend of Grace and Trip, a married couple who invite the player
to a get-together in their apartment. A conflict arises between the
couple and the player gets involved in solving the situation between
Trip and Grace. The player can talk to Trip and Grace, gesture, move
and use objects, and both Trip and Grace will react to the user’s ac-
tions according to their psychological state. Fac¸ade takes advantage
of a dialog based interaction that recognizes a large number of com-
mands with which the system reacts to the user’s utterances. The
story is therefore based on the dialogs that take place between the
player and the characters.
In [3] the authors describe an immersive interactive storytelling
system where the user can play the role of a character of the novel
Madame Bovary, written by Gustave Flaubert. The authors use a
character-based approach where each character is driven by its own
feelings, supported by a planner that determine the next action to
be taken. However, much of the storytelling output is based on an-
imations, rather than text or speech, which is limited to short utter-
ances of dialogues extracted from the novel. In addition, the role of
the player is limited to responding to Emma Bovary’s actions, which
narrow the capacity of the user to create its own story. This approach
has been furtherly explored in [20], an interactive storytelling sys-
tem based on Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice, where the focus is
set on balancing the character’s autonomy and the global structure of
the plot.
The authors of [16] refer a social simulation game, Prom Week,
where the aim is to explore social physics among characters to make
them achieve their goals. The result is a story that reflects the interac-
tions that have taken place among characters during the simulation.
The game is based on the use of a rich set of sociocultural norms
and an AI engine, Comme il Faut, that determines the results of the
characters interactions based on these norms [17]. Although the au-
thorial involvement of the user is noteworthy, the narrative output of
the game is left for the player to interpret.
3 Description of the System
The work presented in this paper focuses on how the design of the
interface between the user and the system can allow for different de-
grees of creative freedom and/or perception of such behaviour by the
user. To achieve this, a system was designed to explore the interplay
between the actual set of options open to a user, the indications pro-
vided to the user in the interface, the implicit preferences captured in
the way the system communicates with the user, and the paths that
the system would prefer the user to follow.
Although some of the interactive systems reviewed in Section 2 do
allow the dynamic creation of new alternatives in reaction to unex-
pected decisions by the user, we are at present considering a system
in which the set of alternatives paths open to the user is fixed before
hand by the designer. These need not only be paths through a physi-
cal space, but may include sets of possible actions taken at particular
points in the interaction. This set of alternatives is referred to as the
action space. If such a system wants to provide the user with a cer-
tain sensation of creative freedom, it has to rely on different means
for presenting the set of alternatives. The set of ingredients to com-
bine are:
1. the actual set of possible paths through the action space that the
user can follow
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2. the set of possible paths that are marked to the user as alterna-
tives (either signposted on the display, offered as items in system
menus, or somehow marked implicitly in the environment – such
as doors in the walls)
3. the set of possible paths recommended to the user by the system
4. the path chosen by the user
5. the actual path that the user’s avatar is made to follow as a result
of the user’s choice
This set of ingredients can be combined in different ways. In basic
systems for interactive storytelling, all possible paths are explicitly
marked to the user (1 = 2) and the actual path taken by the avatar
matches the path chosen by the user (4 = 5). In more elaborate sys-
tems, some of the possible paths are not explicitly marked to the user
but the user may explore them if he decides not to follow the explic-
itly marked indications (1 > 2). Another variation occurs when the
the path chosen by the user is disregarded by the system in favour
of another one. This usually happens because the path chosen by the
user would have taken the interaction away from the path desired by
the designer. In such cases, a favoured option is to provide the user
with a brief explanation of why the chosen action was not taken. A
final point to consider is that the border between the set of possi-
ble paths that are marked to the user as alternatives (2) and the set
of possible paths recommended to the user by the system (3) may
become blurred in the case of subtle markings of possible paths or
subtle means of recommendation. This opens up an avenue for ex-
ploring ways in which the user can be made to experience a certain
creative freedom by means of crafty design of the marking and rec-
ommendations.
In the following sections we describe how we have structured the
stories, so that the user can have the impression of freedom in the way
he plays all the available stories, and how we generate the narration
of the user’s actions outside the predefined paths, so that we can add
them to the story.
4 Story Structure
One of the first aspects we had to solve was to decide how to rep-
resent the stories the user can play so that, at any given moment,
he has a wide range of possible actions to perform. We considered
three possible structures, with minor variations, inspired by the ones
described in [21]:
• linear story: all the possible actions are intertwined in a single
story
• story tree: a set of stories with a common starting point from which
different branches emerge and with one or more endings
• inverted story tree: a set of stories with one or more starting points
that are divided in different branches and end up in one or more
endings.
In the following subsections we analyze their advantages and dis-
advantages in order to select the most appropriate one for our pur-
pose.
4.1 Linear Story
This is the simplest case and the easiest one to manage, since there
are not relationships among different stories, which are merged into
a single one (see Figure 1). It is the least costly solution in terms
of implementation, and all the possibilities the user is given can be
easily controlled in order to decide what the user can or cannot do.
Figure 1: Linear story structure
In order to avoid monotony in the narration, minor ramifications
can be added to the story, but the user cannot deviate much from the
main branch of the plot. In these cases, in general, the user is led
to alternative endings which are different from the one of the main
story, unless he decides to return to the main course of action and
lead towards the main ending.
This option was discarded due to the lack of flexibility in terms of
available user choices and, subsequently, the monotony of the story
the user can play.
4.2 Story Tree
This is a tree-shaped structure (see Figure 2a) which starts in a single
node that subsequently divides in several branches, a common ap-
proach that is used by different authors [11]. The relationship among
these branches emerges from the initial node. Using this structure we
can make the story evolve and end in many different ways (as shown
in Figure 2b) and we can make all the stories converge into a single
ending (as depicted in Figure 2c).
This structure is more complex than the previous one, and if the
number of stories and their length are big enough, the implementa-
tion requires loading and unloading parts of the stories dynamically
so that all the necessary elements of the stories can be stored in mem-
ory. When a user moves from one story to another one, it is necessary
to generate the narration in such a way that both stories are smoothly
stitched together, so that the narration does not jump abruptly from
one topic to another, but is integrated in a comprehensible way in-
stead.
4.3 Inverted Story Tree
This schema is similar to the previous one. The main difference is the
initial disposition of the tree nodes, which allows the user to choose
the story he would like to start playing (see Figure 2d). The main
advantage of this structure is that the user can start playing any of
the available stories, without having a default one the user has to
start from. For example, using the previous structure, when the game
starts the user is immediately pointed to play the default story, while
using this structure it is not until the user starts doing something that
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(a) Simple Tree (b) Branched Tree (c) Convergent Tree (d) Inverted Story Tree
Figure 2: Variations of the Story Tree and Inverted Story Tree
the systems chooses what story to start narrating depending on the
user actions.
Both in the case of the story tree and the inverted story tree, if the
user follows the narration without deviation the system assumes that
it ends satisfactorily and chooses another one among the available
stories so that the user can play all of them. On the contrary, if the
user decides not to play the story the narrator is telling, a range of
possible options will open, which can be abandoned or resumed at
any time, giving rise to a network of interconnected stories.
In terms of implementation, trying to maintain all this stories ac-
tive a the same time involves a high computational cost, because the
extent of the ramification is unknown, depending on the number of
available stories and on how much the user deviates for the narrator’s
instructions. We tested a first prototype of the system trying to play
three stories in a four storey building that represents our school (see
Figure 3) and the result was a slow system that produced meaningless
stories. This was due, on the one hand, to the fact that a lot of struc-
tures and information had to be loaded in memory at the same time,
slowing the system to a point where it was difficult to play it. On the
other hand, having all the possibilities of all the stories available at
the same time made the generated story be completely meaningless,
since unrelated events where being mixed without further criteria,
having even repeated parts because the user was passing once and
again through the same spot.
In order to solve these two problems, which were quite related to
one another, we decided to restrict the available predefined options
the user had at the same time, keeping the possibility to deviate from
these predefined paths. Each node of the tree is represented as a hid-
den object in Unity with which the user can collide. When this colli-
sion is effective, the system triggers an event that makes the narrator
tell the user the next part of the story. Once he has finished telling it,
the object disappears and is replaced by another object in a different
location that represents the next objective of the story.
At any moment, only the current objectives of all the available sto-
ries are loaded, decreasing considerably the amount of information
that has to be loaded in memory, and increasing notably the execu-
tion speed. In addition, since no other parts of the stories and ready
to be told, we make sure that what the narrator tells is completely
meaningful and that one part of a story is not told repeatedly if the
user moves around the same spot for a while.
The inverted story tree has proved to be the structure that best
suited all of our needs, so this was the chosen one to develop of the
system. These inverted story trees are represented as external files
that contain the information about the stories that the user can play,
so is it fairly easy to add new stories, modify the existing ones or add
new relations among the existing stories in order to enrich the user
experience throughout the game.
5 Narrative Generation
As it has been previously mentioned, the narrative system has been
implemented using the Unity 3D engine, where the user can choose
whether to follow the narrator’s instructions or not. One of our objec-
tives was to study how the narrator can influence the user’s choices
in order to make him follow a predefined story while giving him the
chance to follow his own path. In order to achieve this, we needed
to adapt the messages that were presented to the user to make them
attractive and to redirect the user to the story in case he deviated from
the predefined course of action.
With this objective in mind, there were two aspects that had to
be considered in order to create an attractive narrative that the user
would like to follow:
• The messages the narrator offers have to be varied so that the story
does not turn repetitive.
• Apart from these variations, if the narrator has to persist in its
intent to make the user return to the predefined story, the tone of
the messages must change progressively, which involves adding
even more variability to the narration.
In order to do this, a simple algorithm has been designed to gener-
ate pseudo-random combinations of sentences with the same mean-
ing, changing the way of phrasing them and adding a different tone
depending on the situation. This way, we have managed to almost
eliminate the repetition of messages throughout the story, specially
when the user decides to take alternative paths to the story.
5.1 Adjusting the levels of intensity
As we have mentioned before, when the user decides not to follow
the story, the narrator can use different strategies in order to convince
the user to return to the predefined path. Several approaches were
considered, but only one of them was selected for the first version
of the system, since adding more than one would require the design
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of a selection strategy or even endowing the narrator with emotional
traits in order to change the way in which it talks to the user (which
will be taken into account for future work).
Similarly to what is done in [24] we decided to arrange the mes-
sages in different levels of intensity, progressively making them less
polite and more imperative. Therefore, it is necessary to decide how
to manage these levels in order to make the narrator’s messages in-
creasingly more cutting. The messages the narrator can provide are
read from an .xml file, so that the catalog of messages can be conve-
niently expanded in order to increase the variability of the sentences
that the system offers. The narrator can provide messages using four
levels of intensity.
In the lowest level, the narrator will be more polite and will keep
a certain distance from the user. The narrator will consider that there
has been a slight deviation from the predefined path, but it is not
being completely ignored, so he will just remind the user that the
path he should follow is different.
On the contrary, in the highest level, the narrator is less friendly
and his comments will be more direct. At this point, the user is quite
far from the place he is intended to be, so the narrator will remind
him where he should go and how to get there.
In order to determine the appropriate level of intensity, the system
keeps track of the user’s position, and calculates a number of mile-
stones the user must cross before arriving to the intended objective.
The level of intensity of the messages will be determined accord-
ing to the number of milestones that the user misses when he walks
through the scene. This numbers can be appropriately calibrated in
the corresponding configuration files. If the user goes back to where
the narrator suggests, or if he switches to a different story, the mes-
sages the narrator provides will become friendly again.
5.2 Sentence Structure
After deciding what levels of intensity we would use, the next step
was to decide how to generate the narrator’s messages so that there
would be enough variability that the messages that form the story
would not be repeated.
In order to do this, we decided to use a combinatorial method
where the sentences would be divided in different parts that would
be combined in order to generate a highly enough number of combi-
nations. Each of these parts are subsequently written in a text file at-
tending to the previously defined levels of intensity, so the same sen-
tence can be generated differently according to the narrator’s mood.
Each sentence is currently divided into three parts, according to its
position and purpose in the sentence:
• Opening: it is optional and it mainly consists in a way of referring
to the user; it is used at the beginning of the message. “It seems
that” or ”Insisting on his impulsive attitude” are some possible
openings.
• Body: it contains the main message of the narrator and has mean-
ing by itself, like “Gabe decided to go to the canteen”.
• Closing: it is optional and contains an additional comment to
the narrator’s message; it is used at the end of the message.
“Disregarding my directions” or “without considering the con-
sequences” are some possible closings.
Combining these three parts a considerable amount of messages
can be generated by the narrator: “It seems that Gabe decided to go
to the canteen disregarding my directions”, “Gabe decided to go to
the canteen without considering the consequences”, etc.
5.3 Message Generation
Using the previously described sentence division, we intend to gen-
erate both simple and compound sentences. If the pieces we use to
build the sentences belong to the same intensity level, we will be sure
that the generated sentences will be coherent, as long as we make use
of the following rules.
In the case of simple sentences, we have to specify in the con-
figuration file that they end with a period. As for the openings and
closings, we can use assertions, exclamations and questions, such as
“Hey!” or “You know what?” and we also have to specify it in the
configuration file so that they can be linked appropriately with the
rest of the sentence. In addition, in the closings we need to indicate
whether they can link directly with the body of the sentence or not,
so that they can be correctly written, using a comma or starting them
with capital letters.
Compound sentences involve more restrictions about the way in
which they can be linked to other sentences. We use two different
types of sentence bodies that can be combined with openings and
closings, depending on whether they need a nexus with them or not.
As in the case of the simple sentences, we need to consider whether
the openings and closings are separated by commas or not, so that
they can be correctly written (e.g. “In a show of rebellion,. . . ” or
“. . . , as his father used to say.”). The only difference between open-
ings and closings is the place where they link with the sentence body.
In order to allow the insertion of elements of the story into the sen-
tence, the rules to generate the sentence bodies are a little different.
A sentence body can be used by itself or in conjunction with open-
ings and/or closings, and it can be completed with context dependent
actions (e.g. “In a show of rebellion, Gabe decided to turn left”).
The main variations in this case depend on the user’s location and
the objectives he still has to achieve in the story. If the user prefers to
explore the site instead of following the story, the narrator can pro-
vide him with information regarding where he is, while other times
he can try to lead the user to the next objective. In both cases, the
sentence body must end with a verb, so that the sentence can be
completed correctly adding information about the place or objective
where the system wants the player to go.
The following example summarizes the previous rules to generate
compound sentences. Gabe is in a classroom and has decided to dis-
regard the narrator and explore the upper floor of the building. The
narrator, annoyed, tries to lead Gabe to the canteen, where his friends
are working on an assignment. The sentence body the narrator is go-
ing to use is “I thought I had told you that you had to go to...”.
Before processing the sentence, the narrator retrieves the current
objective in order to integrate it into the sentence. The narrator de-
cides whether to use an opening and/or closing and, in case it does,
checks whether it is necessary to use punctuation marks or not. As
a result, the narrator decides he has to use “You may have not un-
derstood me well, but” as an opening and “Are you sure you want
to continue with this nonsense?” as a closing. The system then se-
lects the appropriate capitalization for the three parts of the sentence
and builds the final message: “Gabe, you may have not understood
me well, but I thought I had told you that you had to go to the can-
teen with your friends. Are you sure you want to continue with this
nonsense?”.
6 Story Generation Example: Exam Season
As a complete example of how the system works, we present a sam-
ple execution containing two different stories. In the first one, our
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main character, Gabe, must go to a specific classroom to take an im-
portant exam that he had forgotten he had to take. In the second story,
which could be played before or after the first one, Gabe must find
a specific professor to ask him to review a previous exam. In both
cases, the player would have to interact with different characters and
fulfill some partial objectives for the stories to advance.
In order to understand the example, we will first describe the data
structures of the stories and the narrative generation, and then we will
show an execution where the user is playing one of the stories and
jumps from that story to the other before finishing the first one.
6.1 Structure of the Stories
As previously explained in Section 4, stories are organized as a series
of objectives that must be fulfilled for the user being able to continue
the story. Therefore, objectives can be seen as milestones that mark
the advancement of the user through the story. In order to understand
the working example, we present here the list of objectives for each
of the stories.
List of objectives in Story 1 (Gabe must go to classroom 3 to take
an exam):
s1o1 Gabe sees a lot of students in front of classroom 3 and decides
to approach them to see what is happening.
s1o2 Gabe realizes that he had an exam today but he had forgotten
about it.
s1o3 Gabe decides to go the expending machine to look for some-
thing to calm his nerves.
s1o4 Already at the machine, Gabe realizes that he has no money on
him.
s1o5 Gabe decides to go to the canteen to see if he finds a friend
who could lend him some money.
s1o6 Gabe sees Michael in the canteen, who owes him a favor.
s1o7 Description of Michael, who is unmistakable because of his
sun glasses and orange shirt.
s1o8 Michael does not have enough money for Gabe. Gabe decides
to come back to classroom 3.
s1o9 Gabe has to hurry because the teacher is already there.
s1o10 Gabe arrives on time and takes the exam.
s1o11 After the exam Gabe feels better and starts to count the days
until holidays.
List of objectives in Story 2 (Gabe wants to find Professor Smith
to ask him to review a previous exam):
s2o1 Gabe remembers that he has to talk with Professor Smith to
ask him to review an exam.
s2o2 Gabe thinks that he can find him in his office, so he goes there.
s2o3 Gabe meets Macarena on his way. He decides to ask her about
the professor.
s2o4 She tells him that Smith was with her in a meeting in a different
office.
s2o5 Gabe goes to this other office to look for him.
s2o6 Professor Smith tells Gabe that he does not have time to help
him. Gabe leaves a bit annoyed.
We will later see how the user can jump from one story to the other
at any time. As the user has complete freedom of movement in the 3D
environment, he can decide to move from the current objective in one
story and find a different one in other story (remember that objectives
are triggered by the user when he goes over certain landmarks in
the environment). The only restriction is that the system “activates”
the next objective of a story only when the previous one has been
fulfilled, so the user can only move from the current objective in a
story to the current objective in the other story. We will later see an
example of this and what are the consequences from the point of view
of the narration.
6.2 Narrative Generation Data
From the point of view of the narrative generation, there are two dif-
ferent kinds of messages used by the narrator: objective messages
and control messages. On the one hand, each objective has an utter-
ance associated that explains what is happening or what is the next
objective (for example “Gabe wondered why there were so many stu-
dents in front of classroom 3. He decided to check what was hap-
pening.”). Those are the objective messages. On the other hand, the
narrator also speaks when the user is not following a path leading to
fulfilling the next objective. In this case, the generated messages are
intended to remind the user of what he should be doing, and they are
expressed in different levels of intensity depending on how far the
next objective is. These are the control messages. As the generation
of control messages is more creative, we will explain them deeper
for the present example.
According to what was explained in Section 5.1, the current exam-
ple includes four different levels of intensity in the narration. Level 1
(lowest level) represents utterances with a slight annoyance from the
narrator (like for example “Gabe felt curious and decided to deviate
from his path”), whereas in level 4 (highest level) the narrator trans-
mits to be very angry with the user (for example “You know what?
I desist. If you don’t want to follow my advice, it’s up to you.”). A
total of 18 body sentence templates, 10 openings and 9 closings were
created for these control messages. Remember that utterances by the
narrator are then formed by a body sentence template completed ac-
cording to the current state of the story, optionally accompanied by
an opening and/or closing.
6.3 Sample Story
Gabe, our main character, appears in the entrance hall of the building.
At the beginning none of the stories is active, and one or the other
would activate when Gabe passes through the landmark of the first
objective of one of them. Until then, the user is allowed to explore the
3D environment as he wishes. The narrator is initially off and would
start the narration when an objective is activated.
In addition, there is not a prefixed order for the two stories to occur.
The user can start and finish any of them before starting the other,
or interweave them as he wishes. In this example the user will start
with the first story, but during it he will decide to explore the second
story, finally coming back to the first one when the second is finished.
Although these two stories are reasonably simple in order to have an
example that is easy to follow, we can imagine an execution of the
system where there are multiple stories and the user “finds” them
while exploring the course of other stories.
While exploring the building, Gabe enters one of the corridors in
the ground floor, triggering the first objective of story 1 (s1o1). He
sees a group of students in front of classroom 3 and decides to take
a look (see Figure 3). When he arrives, he realizes he had forgot-
ten about an important exam (s1o2). The narrator then suggests that
Gabe is very nervous and should go to the vending machine to grab
a drink (s1o3).
Note that in objective s1o2 the player is not told to go anywhere,
and therefore objectives s1o2 and s1o3 occur in the same spatial point
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Figure 3: First objective of story 1
and could be considered as only one objective. However, the narra-
tion is better managed if they are considered as two different objec-
tives occurring in the same place but with different narration utter-
ances. This will happen again in some other points of the stories.
When Gabe arrives to the vending machine, the narrator informs
him that he has no money to pay for the drink (s1o4), and that he
should go to the canteen to see if he finds someone who could lend
him some coins (s1o5).
At this point of the execution, the user decides that he will not
obey the narrator anymore. Instead of going to the canteen, as he
was suggested, the user makes Gabe turn around and go upstairs
to the first floor. The narrator detects this deviation from the ex-
pected path in story 1, and activates the use of control messages
with a low intensity. Therefore, the narrator will suggest Gabe to
go back to the expected path with sentences like “Being aware that
this was not the way to go, Gabe decided to explore other places
without knowing the possible consequences” or “It seems that Gabe
decided to go in the opposite direction”. Openings and closings have
been underlined for easier recognition.
As Gabe explores the first floor the system detects that he is
getting away more and more from his current objective (s1o5 -
going to the canteen). As a consequence, the narrator gets more
serious and the intensity of control messages is increased. If it
reached the maximum level, the narrator would say things like
“You think that being the player gives you the right to ignore me.
For the last time, you are going to the canteen!”.
While exploring the first floor, Gabe enters classroom 5 where the
first objective of story 2 is located (s2o1) and he remembers that he
has to talk with Professor Smith to review a previous exam.
At this point, the system stores the current objective of story 1,
starts the execution of story 2 by setting the current objective to s2o1,
and the narrator “forgets” his anger for previous deviations.
The user then continues story 2 by making Gabe go to Professor
Smith’s office (s2o2), meeting Macarena in his way (s2o3 and s2o4),
going to the office Macarena mentioned (s2o5), and finally finding
him (s2o6).
After Professor Smith tells Gabe that he has no time to attend him
and the narrator explains that Gabe is a bit annoyed, the second story
is considered to have finished.
Then the system checks if there are other unfinished stories (story
1 in this case), sets the current objective as s1o5, and the narrator acti-
vates again the control messages if the user is deviating from the path
to the current objective. The user can then finish story 1, and once he
does the system detects that there are no more available stories and
informs the user accordingly.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper describes a system that has been designed to allow a hu-
man author, the system and a human player to co-create stories in
a given environment, currently a 3D reproduction of the Computer
Science School at UCM. The focus has been set on those aspects of
the system that have allowed us to create the stories: the structure to
represent the stories, which allowed us to give the user the control
over its development, for which an inverted tree structure has been
used; the mechanism to generate different ways to narrate an event
to the user; and the technique devised to influence the user in order
to make him follow the narrator’s instructions.
The objective of the system is twofold: first, as a computer game,
it aims at providing the user with an engaging experience playing the
stories that a human author has created, as well as telling to the user
these stories while he plays; second, as a computational creativity
tool, it intends to allow the user to influence and modify the system
behaviour in order to create stories which are different from the orig-
inal ones.
Although both objectives have been achieved, we have been able
to identify several issues that allow for future lines of work in order
to improve the system behaviour.
Even though the variability of the generated story is notable, it
requires the intervention of the human author to elaborate the open-
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ings, closings and bodies of the sentences. For this reason, a more
generative way to create the stories, based on NLG techniques, are to
be considered, as long as they meet one of the basic requirements of
the system: that it can generate the stories in real time, in order to be
able to narrate the actions of the player while he is playing. This way,
we will be able to include more elements into the story and generate
its content in a more dynamic way.
Another aspect that has to be furtherly explored is the behaviour
of the narrator, giving it the chance to use other ways to persuade the
user to follow its instructions. To achieve a successful behaviour, an
extensive user testing is required in order to study the user’s prefer-
ences and reactions towards the narrator’s messages.
In order to relieve the human author from having to create the con-
tents of the initial stories, we are aiming at using other storytelling
systems for this task. Our research group has already developed sev-
eral systems of this kind (see, for example [8, 12, 14, 19]) and we
are currently working in an intermediate representation [5, 6] that
enables different storytelling systems to exchange information that
allows us to combine them to generate different aspects of a story.
In this same line, we are evaluating the possibility to feed the sys-
tem with the new stories, so that they can be evaluated an incorpo-
rated into the game so that other players can play the new stories that
have been considered acceptable using different quality metrics [9].
Finally, one of the aspects that has not been fully explored in the
current version of the game are the dialogs with other characters, in a
similar way as it is done in Fac¸ade [15] and Prom Week [16], which
will give the user the impression of having more influence over the
resulting story.
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Impact of Interactivity on Information Management
for Suspense in Storytelling
Pablo Delatorre 1 and Carlos Leo´n 2 and Alberto Salguero 3 and Cristina Mateo-Gil 4 and Pablo Gerva´s 5
Abstract. One of the most common purposes of storytelling is to
amuse the audience. Triggering different emotions and feelings is
a common method for entertaining with stories. Among these, sus-
pense is strongly linked to narrative, and delivering a suspenseful
feeling along the story to increase the fun is an effective, well tested
practice when producing stories. Specifically, controlling the amount
of information is a part of how suspense is provoked, but the infor-
mation flow varies across different media. In this paper, we explore
the impact of the amount of given information and the perception
of amusement in suspenseful narrative settings. We provide evidence
that non-interactive audiences prefer less information and more sus-
pense, and interactive audiences find a higher amount of information
more enjoyable. To validate this hypothesis, an experimental escape
story in which a threat approaches the main character is presented to
a number of subjects. Interactive and non-interactive versions have
been tested, and the relation between given information, perceived
suspense and amusement has been analysed, producing results sup-
porting the hypothesis.
1 INTRODUCTION
Amusement is one of the most typical objectives of storytelling. This
has been thoroughly studied in different fields (narratology [64], psy-
chology [62, 17] and learning [8] among others). How to improve
the feeling of amusement is fundamental in mastering valuable sto-
rytelling in humans. As such, good storytellers are generally assumed
to master the skill of adjusting the level of different components
along a story in such a way that the overall perceived fun is high.
Among the aspects influencing the quality and effectiveness of
successful storytelling, suspense plays a crucial role in emotional
gratifications. Reactions to suspense are known to be directly related
to enjoyment [39, p. 315], having a big impact on the audience’s im-
mersion and suspension of disbelief [26, p. 1359]. The impact of sus-
pense is backed up by several studies showing that people enjoy not
only positive, but also negative aspects in stories [3, p. 2]. Readers
tend to be amused by suspenseful, coherent and complex narratives,
accounting for roughly 54% of the variance in situational interest [49,
p. 445] (in that study, suspense made the most relevant contribution
with a 34% of the variation). The same pattern has been evidenced to
appear in videogames, in which suspenseful ones are rated as more
enjoyable than non-suspenseful ones [29, p. 31].
This suggests that creating and properly adjusting suspense is a
fundamental asset in storytelling. Among others, one of the ways
1 Universidad de Ca´diz, Spain, email: pablo.delatorre@uca.es
2 Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain, email: cleon@ucm.es
3 Universidad de Ca´diz, Spain, email: alberto.salguero@uca.es
4 Universidad de Ca´diz, Spain, email: cristina.mateogil@alum.uca.es
5 Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain, email: pgervas@sip.ucm.es
of managing the delivered suspense is by means of controlling the
amount of information that is given to the audience, having them
know about a threat, a resource to handle it or what the main charac-
ter knows.
This influence of information flow is not only applicable to pas-
sive, linear storytelling. Active audiences of an interactive fiction,
effectively performing as actors, need to be able to take decisions
(where to go, what to do. . . ) based on what the spectator knows
about the environment. We hypothesize that if the active subject’s
uncertainty is too high for taking informed decisions, she might feel
unable to enjoy the story. However, a full disclosure of the environ-
ment could decrease the player’s feeling of suspense.
Suspense and information flow are therefore tightly intercon-
nected. Controlling information is a useful resource to control sus-
pense. Interactive storytelling systems, when implemented as com-
puter simulations or games, can make use of this to try to convey
different levels of suspense to the user. In these kind of systems, con-
trolling information does not only impact suspense, but also playabil-
ity and believability (among other), ultimately influencing the levels
of amusement and engagement.
The present paper hypothesizes that the effect of information flow
is different between interactive and non-interactive stories. The un-
derlying involved cognitive processes completely change the whole
experience when the audience is not passive. Modelling the in-
formation flow requires a distinction between interactive and non-
interactive storytelling. In particular, this work is based on the fol-
lowing hypotheses:
1. The impact of suspense in overall amusement is, in general, lower
in interactive fiction than in non-interactive fiction.
2. Interactive storytelling requires more information than equivalent
non-interactive stories for producing and amusing experience.
These hypotheses imply that, to maximize amusement in interac-
tive storytelling, more information is required, even at the cost of
jeopardizing the equilibrium between classical suspense delivery by
hindering facts to the audience.
This arises from the intuition that some classical assumptions in
suspense cannot be applied to interactive fiction. One of the most
relevant is that suspense can be influenced by managing the infor-
mation provided to the audience. For instance, this happens when
the audience knows the location of a murderer but the victim does
not. Any information about the increased vulnerability of the victim
typically increases the suspense.
In case of interactive stories where the audience or player has full
control over a character, giving information to the character is the
same as giving this information to the player and vice versa. For this
kind of interaction, there is one single information channel, instead
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of two (one for the characters and one for the players) which means
that there is a loss of one degree of freedom for directly influencing
the amusement of the audience.
It follows that, if the audience is omniscient, the character repre-
sented would be so as well. This indicates that some classic suspense
strategies are not enough to keep the interactive audience amused.
Instead, we believe that the audience must have a certain feeling of
control over the progression of the scene in order to maintain the
amusement and to get engagement.
Ensuring amusement and engagement is fundamental in all kinds
of narrative discourse. These include game-like scenarios and many
other forms of what is assumed to be interactive storytelling nowa-
days. In these environments, if no progress is possible, a player may
try to continue playing for some time, becoming increasingly frus-
trated before giving up [33, p. 7]. When this happens, engagement
for the narrative may decrease. According to the working hypothe-
ses, guaranteeing engagement through interaction is more influential
than suspense, being the added interactivity a new degree for convey-
ing a different, complementary form of amusement.
With this idea in mind, Delatorre et al. (2016) propose the archi-
tecture of a system whose main objective is the adaptation of the
descriptive elements of a scene, in such a way that the amount of
information of the scene output is adjusted to the required suspense
intensity [18].
The system manages the structural components of the scene based
on a weighted corpus consisting on a set of concepts, each one as-
sociated to a quantitative value that represents its level of suspense:
a) characters’ features related to balance of outcome oriented im-
plicit strengths, empathy and proximity between threat and victim
to the outcome, as a spatial or temporal dimension concerning both
sides; b) objects involved in the scene influencing the scene plot (as
weapons or doors) or just decorative elements without direct partici-
pation in terms of emotional valence and dominance; and c) environ-
ments as spatial context, atmosphere or scenery, which are a verifi-
able generator of suspense and may affect the skills of the characters.
The development of such an architecture requires a careful anal-
ysis of how to adapt the parameters. According to the previously
exposed ideas, it is necessary to quantify the actual differences and
particularities of suspense in interactive storytelling as opposed to
producing suspense in non-interactive settings.
To confirm the previously proposed hypotheses, an experiment has
been designed and run. In this experiment, N = 23 human subjects
experienced interactive or non-interactive versions of a suspenseful
story. The amount of information they were given was different on
each version.
No claims are made about what the underlying cognitive aspects
are. The aim of this experiment is to provide evidence for this phe-
nomenon, as it is considered influential in the design of suspenseful
interactive stories. Other aspects influencing engagement and amuse-
ment (playability, context, plot) are not studied in this experiment.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes
the related previous work on suspense and information used for de-
signing the experiment. Section 3 describes the experiment, whose
results are detailed in Section 4. Section 5 and Section 6, respec-
tively, discuss and summarize these results.
2 BACKGROUND
The experiment described in Section 3 tests the results of watching
and playing non-interactive and interactive versions of short, sus-
penseful stories. In these stories, a murderer chases a victim con-
trollable by a human. The information concerning the position of the
murdered is not provided, or provided by sound, visual footsteps or a
full view of the setting, depending on the version of each story. This
section analyses the psychological ground of this work and other re-
lated systems and results based on suspense, information and auto-
matic storytelling.
Suspense “has been conceived of as pleasant excitement” [63, p.
282]. This evidences the relation between suspense and amusement.
In this way, suspense is defined as “the pleasure experienced immedi-
ately prior to the anticipated resolution of uncertainty, and posit that
it is positively related (up to a point) to the amount that is at stake on
the outcome of an event” [10, p. 73].
For interactive systems, it has been proposed that the amount of
outcome uncertainty produces enjoyment [1, p. 1]. More specifically,
in video-games –taken as a form of interactivity in which narrative
can take place [47, p. 45]– players feel bored when the challenge is
too easy and stressed when it is too hard [41, p. 137]. This leads to be-
lieve that giving full information and easing the challenge produces
boredom and giving no information at all provokes frustration.
Against this background, controlling information seems funda-
mental to provide amusement to the audience and active audiences
in interactive storytelling. This seems to affect the information given
about characters, their situations and their related events, so that sus-
pense happens directing the course of the narrative [27, p. 42].
For instance, in Hitchcock movies (as well as classical thrillers),
suspense is delivered by providing the audience with information the
characters in the story lack. This resource makes it possible for the
spectators to know more than the protagonists and can make the ques-
tion “how can the situation be solved?” more intensely [56, p. 95].
These data are key because enforce active cooperation with the au-
dience for coming up with a meaning [9, p. 154]. Suspense is then
generated as a function of the spectator’s perception on the character
escape options [24, p. 460], which can be inferred from the informa-
tion provided by the story.
From this standpoint, suspense can be defined too as the result of
foreseeing a jeopardizing situation; “the activity that lies in equally
calculating, expecting and evaluating a coming event” [61, p. 1],
foreseeing participates “in the constructive process by which a reader
interprets details in a text and works towards an understanding of a
text as a whole” [35, p. 277]. It is not unusual that the anticipation
of negative outcomes triggers the feeling of suspense in the audi-
ence [14, p. 51]. Even when uncertainty does not exist (as it happens
when a movie is watched more than once), the emotion that foresee-
ing provokes can be experienced [25, 16, 27]. from this perspective,
suspense is an anticipation feeling [36, p. 54].
This anticipation requires: 1) information as the starting point for
future developments; 2) a scenario of what is coming; 3) alternative
possibilities which are more or less probable; 4) finally, the individ-
ual possibilities and possible counteractions by the protagonist con-
ceived [61, p. 1].
In particular, in the case of a suspenseful situation caused by a
chase, “the tension of the chase comes from the proximity of the two
characters”, being “greatest at the moment just before it seems cap-
ture is inevitable” [55, p. 81]. “Suspense situations arise from the
possible close proximity of lethal danger” [7, p. 67], where “proxim-
ity increases the sense of danger” [15, p. 61]. If the threat is too far
away, the emotion is hardly experienced [56, p. 232]. Isolating and
limiting the character also raises the suspenseful feeling [55, p. 84].
For achieving to evoke this suspense, there are several possi-
ble information channels as visual images, text, music, speech and
environmental effects [59, p. 694]. For instance, and according to
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Smith (1999), fear makes us notice dark shadows, mysterious noises
and sudden movements and thus provides more possibly frighten-
ing cues [51]. Van Vught & Gareth (2012) support this view. To
them, it is more common for players to experience a startle suspense
in response to games with fictional worlds because the atmosphere
that triggers the anticipation is more easily created through fictional
clues. This is the case in games with portray dark alleys and scary-
looking monsters that can jump out at us unexpectedly. Atmosphere
effects as dark/foggy and the music/soundscape are continuously sus-
penseful [58, p. 100]. Perron (2012) sustains a similar opinion about
the fog and darkness as used to hide what is not depicted. Players
do not see very far, so they are always scared to run into something
awful [44, p. 27]. Since players with omniscient knowledge will use
it for their own benefit [9, p. 214], controlling what they know is fun-
damental to keep the narrative and the corresponding suspense under
the designer control.
Sound is another useful component of suspenseful environments.
Sounds can contribute to environment and spatial definition. If a
character hears a subtle whisper, she will probably be far from the
speaker. If she understands the words, she is nearer. A clock tower
sound far away will increment the space [5, p. 101], and the sound
can inform the character about the proximity of an enemy [20, p.
104]. Therefore, sound is fundamental in interactive scenarios be-
cause it provides specific information about the environment and
conveys emotional information like surprise or terror [46, p. 192].
Mixing sound and visual information can provide useful redundancy
for the player and enhances vividness [52, p. 12].
Regardless of the strategy to evoke suspense, interactive scenarios
in which the audience takes the role of one of the characters have a
particularity: the player has the same information as the main char-
acter. In this sense, information revealed to the spectator-controlled
character is automatically revealed to the audience. In these cases,
systems focus on the user’s experience of the story as it participates
as the character and, therefore, choices are made by the user influ-
ence the story development [12, p. 1907].
While the treatment of suspense in the main narrative is supported
by several prototypes of automatic storytelling systems (MEXICA
[43], MINSTREL [57], Suspenser [12], Dramatis [40] or IDtension
[53]), interactivity is not addressed by the most. Attempting to un-
dertake this feature, proposals as DEFACTO [50], Character-Based
Interactive Storytelling [11] or Fac¸ade [34] are interesting initiatives,
considering the difficult and limitations of the matter. These limita-
tions are mainly based on the “narrative paradox” or how to reconcile
the needs of the user who is now potentially a participant rather than
a spectator with the idea of narrative coherence [4, p. 35]. Some other
important challenges as the order in which actions must be performed
and the system is often inflexible, it is usually hard to recover from
mistakes, and each system has its own interaction conventions [45,
p. 315] are implied. Similarly, in connection with suspense, interac-
tive narrative techniques do not provided mechanism to ensure that
particular narrative qualities (such mentioned suspense, as well as
surprise or romance) will be produced in resulting plans [54, p. 21].
Along with this, the effect of suspense in experimental prototypes
and practical narrative are often not the same. Stories developed
through research projects generally create much shorter and less in-
tense narrative experience than films, novels or story-centered com-
mercial games do [60, p. 338].
Naturally, video-games have been the discursive narrative space
which have taken more advantage of this strategy from primal inter-
active fiction textual games [37, p. 7] to, recently, filmic interactive
dramas [60, p. 338]. Beyond the narratology versus ludology debate
[38, p. 231], computer games may be considered as “interactive cin-
ema” [23, p. 78]. Actually, current developments of interactive nar-
rative systems borrow the design of video-games [30, p. 189], partic-
ularly of genres as survival horror and RPG [32, 22, 19, 42].
In this new discourse denominated transmedia storytelling [28, p.
21] in which the player takes the role of the character, there is an
emotional impact coming from such transf rence. This is different
from the impact happening in classic discourses [31, p. 139]. For
instance, suspense decreases as the player control increases [44, p.
99]. On the other hand, some suspense-generation techniques based
on how to provide information are not possible, as players need a
different amount of information [9].
Taking this difference into account, quantitative and qualitative
analyses are needed to approximate the impact of information and
suspense between interactive and non-interactive storytelling.
Against this background, an approaching threat comes out as a
useful resource for experimenting with suspense. Given that most ac-
counts of suspense assume foreseeing as a fundamental component,
physical approximation has been used in the prototype system for the
experiment, as described in Section 3.
3 EXPERIMENT
This section describes the experiment and the methodology that was
applied to extract the information about what the differences between
audiences of interactive and non-interactive stories are. Section 4 de-
scribes the results.
3.1 Interactive environment
To test the hypothesis proposed in Section 1, a testing environment
was built. It consisted on an interactive application that displayed a
top-down, tile-based 2D closed environment in which a female char-
acter (the victim) has to find a key to get out of an apartment, as
depicted in Figure 1. During the escape, the victim is chased by a
male murderer (the threat), who will kill her if he reaches her. The
choice of both genders concerning their respective roles have been
taken from classical suspense movies [48].
Figure 1. Screenshot of the 2D environment used for experimenting with
the suspenseful story
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The victim is initially located in the central corridor of an apart-
ment with only one door to the outside, and the threat is initially lo-
cated in a random border of the apartment. The location of the threat
is initially unknown to the audience (whatever experimentation group
they are). Each participant in the group A takes the role of the victim,
and must escape the apartment. To do that, the decision-maker needs
a) to find the key (randomly placed in any wardrobe of the apartment)
and b) to get out through the door. If the murderer reaches the victim,
she is killed and the decision-maker loses the game.
The gameplay is turn based and the victim moves first. On each
turn, the decision-maker subject must move the character with the
keyboard cursor arrows (up-down-left-right) and search for the knife
or the key with the space bar. The victim moves four tiles on each
turn, and the threat can move up to five times. This advantage for the
murderer avoids endless or very long matches and forces the victim
to try not to face him (since otherwise the player will not be able to
escape).
The murderer is controlled by a simple AI (whose behaviour is
unknown to the participants). This AI systematically explores each
one of the rooms of the apartment. The exploration goes on until
the victim is within the sight area of the threat (less than four tiles
away, in the direction the threat is facing) and there are no obstacles
between them.
If the threat detects the victim, he approaches her until he reaches
her, or she is out his sight area. If this happens, the threat gets back
to his initial position and starts over the exploration (unless he finds
the victim again).
The prototype was implemented with RPG Maker VX6 and it is
freely available7.
3.2 Story
The structure and the decoration of the apartment are the same
through the different executions. The interactive experience has five
versions:
0. A sandbox version (not used for data acquisition) in which the
subjects can move freely and get used to the controls, the space
and the basic interactive mechanics. This version has no threat.
This version was used to train the participants in the experiment.
1. An interactive session in which no information about the threat
position is given. The victim has a flashlight that allow to see only
the very nearby area. The rest of the scene remains in complete
dark. No sound or other clues are revealed until victim is reached.
2. An interactive session in which, for each turn of the murderer,
there is an audible feedback of footsteps revealing approximately
how far he is. The visibility is the same as in version 1.
3. An interactive session in which, for each turn of the murderer,
there is an audible feedback of footsteps revealing approximately
how far he is. Additionally, footprints are displayed on the screen
to inform the user the relative part of the apartment the threat is.
The visibility is the same as in versions 1 and 2
4. An interactive session in which the decision-maker can see the
whole scenario including the threat location, the footprints and
the sound feedback.
3.3 Method
A total of twenty-three participants (N = 23; three women, twenty
men), with ages ranging from 20 to 41 years (m = 24.28, sd =
6 http://www.rpgmakerweb.com/products/programs/rpg-maker-vx
7 http://goo.gl/C4YMJ3
4.95) voluntarily took part in this experiment. Participants were di-
vided randomly in two groups. Group A or decision-makers (NA =
12) is formed by participants who will perform the role of decision-
makers during the interactive stories; and group B or viewers (NB =
11), who will be the audience without a chance of influence.
The experiment was run in two sessions in one single laboratory.
Subjects from groups A and B were matched randomly in pairs and
intercalated (subjects from group A would be surrounded by mem-
bers of group B and vice versa). The screen of the decision-makers
(the interactive version) was shared through Adobe Connect so that
the corresponding viewer (group B) could see the interaction in real
time. Viewport, tile size and other rendering aspects were identical
between systems: all of them had the same specifications and config-
uration (Toshiba Satellite Pro S500-10D).
Before the sessions started, each participant was asked about age,
gender and experience in video-games (low, medium or high). After
that, group B was presented with version 0 of the environment (see
Section 3.2) for five minutes, in order for them to familiarize with
the context, characters and controls. After that, each decision-maker
(group A) and, passively, each viewer (group B) played or watched
twice each version (eight plays in total). On each iteration, all the ver-
sions (from 1 to 4) were played in random order. After two iterations
were finished, the experiment concluded.
After each threat turn and before the decision-maker made a deci-
sion for the victim’s next move, the participants had to fill in a line in
a questionnaire consisting of five questions:
• How much suspense does the situation generate?
• What hope do you think the character has to escape?8
• What degree of enjoyment are you experiencing? (the responses to
questions are given in a 4-likert scale with the following values:
none, low, high and very high, corresponding to values ranging
from 1 to 4, respectively)
• Do you think it makes sense to go on with the story? (yes/no)
• How much information do you feel you have about the current
situation? (4-likert scale with the following values: too little, little,
enough and too much).
4 RESULTS
After running the experiment as previously described, demographic
information for all participants and a total of 1811 report lines were
collected. Each one of this report lines included answers for the five
questions made on each step. 48 entries had to be discarded because
they were partially missing or erroneous.
Results show a moderate downhill correlation between suspense
and hope (ρ = −0.470, p < 0.000) and a weak uphill correlation
between suspense and amusement (ρ = 0.179, p < 0.000). The
correlation is slightly stronger in the group B (viewers), both between
suspense and hope (ρ = −0.527, p < 0.000) as, noticeably, between
suspense and amusement (ρ = 0.315, p < 0.000). This evidences
that subjects taking an active role (decision-makers, group A) are also
influenced by other aspects beyond suspense.
Regarding participants’ perception about the information provided
during the scenes, there is a very strong correlation between the
sensed perception and the actual information flow (i.e. actually giv-
ing them more information): disclosing the whole apartment (Z =
32.869, p < 0.000), hear the audible feedback (Z = −25.86,
p < 0.000) and displaying the footsteps indicating the position of
8 Both questions based on Gerrig & Bernardo’s (1994) experiment [24],
aforementioned in Section 2.
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the murderer (Z = −35.543, p < 0.000), which supports the valid-
ity of the reported value by the subjects and is also in line with the
successive versions of the story (χ2 = 75.441, p < 0.000).
As expected, the higher the amount of information, the lower the
reported suspense (χ2 = 15.782, p < 0.005). Consequently, the
amount of information given in the experiment should influence in
hope but the gathered data showed borderline signification (χ2 =
7.323, p < 0.07).
A significant difference in amusement can be found: version 3
yields a high value, low/high in version 2 and low in versions 1 and 4
(χ2 = 18.908, p < 0.000). The amount of information seems to af-
fect the participants’ opinion about going on with the story: the data
evidence that as the amount of information decreases, participants
tend to want to keep on with the experience (Z = 4.099, p < 0.000).
The influence on engagement by suspense (Z = −5.971, p <
0.000) and, more intensely, amusement (Z = −11.144, p < 0.000)
can be equally observed. This effect is not evident in the case of
hope for decision-makers (p < 0.5), but it could be verifiable for
the viewers (Z = 2.021, p < 0.05), for which the loss of hope
influences the desire to go on with the story or not.
As trivially expected, the differences in information also influence
the interaction (F3,88 = 4.967, p < 0.01), making less disclosed
scenarios faster to play (10 turns in average) than fully viewable ones
(14.78 turns on average, version 4). There was no significant differ-
ence between versions 2 (12.21 turns) and 3 (11.35 turns).
Experience in video-games seems to have no relevant effect on the
number of turns (p < 0.2), suspense (p < 0.6), hope (p < 0.5) or
amusement (p < 0.7). However, least experienced decision-makers
reported a higher suspense (χ2 = 12.99, p < 0.002). This difference
in suspense as not reflected in the least experienced viewers in video-
games (p < 1), who moreover reported a slightly higher global hope
(low/high versus low) (χ2 = 6.774, p < 0.04).
Perception of suspense seems to not be affected by the group. Both
group A (decision-makers) and group B (viewers) answered similarly
about reported suspense (p < 0.8). In contrast, decision-makers re-
ported slightly higher hope (low/high) than viewers (low,Z = 2.264,
p < 0.05). Reported amusement, when ignore versions, seems to be
also affected by the group (Z = −2.077, p < 0.04).
By comparing the perceptions reported by groups A and B, it
was also found a significant difference between reported amuse-
ment and the version of the story. The report by decision-makers
(χ2 = 24.606, p < 0.000) rated as high the amusement in sto-
ries 2 and 3 (versions with little and enough information); too much
information (version 4) yields low amusement and too little informa-
tion (version 1) makes the participants report a none/low amusement,
being the second try even lower. However, although with a less in-
tense effect (χ2 = 10.584, p < 0.02), viewers reported more amuse-
ment in versions 1 and 2 in that order (low/high to high) and then 3
and 4 (low/high to low), which is inverse to the amount of given in-
formation. Figure 2 shows graphically this difference between both
groups A and B. Concretely, reported amusement is significantly dif-
ferent in versions 3 (χ2 = −6.686, p < 0.000) and 1 (χ2 = 6.156,
p < 0.000), weaker in version 4 (χ2 = −2.920, p < 0.004) and
not significant in version 2, where both roles refer similar ratings
(χ2 = −0.292, p < 0.8).
Remarkable differences were found between successive tries (each
version was run twice). Participants from both groups report higher
suspense in the first try (high) than in the second one (low, Z =
3.635, p < 0.001). The hope to escape raises in the second try (high
versus low in the first try, Z = −3.611, p < 0.001). Not signifi-
cantly, but still worth mentioning (Z = 1.927, p < 0.06), it was
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Figure 2. Amusement reported by decision-makers and viewers
found that amusement is higher in the first try (high) than in the sec-
ond one (low).
5 DISCUSSION
The results of the experiment suggest differences between the impact
of suspense in interactive versus non-interactive stories. However,
there are some aspects that must be reviewed in order to extract a
working conclusion.
Suspense, hope for escaping, amusement and amount of informa-
tion are all part of a general cognitive process experienced when
playing or watching a story. As such, the influence of several aspects
in the experimenting environment (hard or impossible to control) is
not negligible. First, the platform used in this experiment was intend-
edly modelled as an easy-to-play video-game for the participants to
be able to play the interactive story with a low entry barrier. This may
have influenced the participants since they promptly detect the story
occurs in a fixed-rule scenario, with probably no surprises. The same
applies to the simplicity of the plot, explained to the participants be-
forehand. The validity of the working hypothesis in more elaborated,
real contexts would require more in-depth experimentation.
The suspense in this experiment is not based on providing addi-
tional information to the audience, as proposed by several authors
[27, 56, 9, 7, 2]. This is anyway impossible in interactive stories be-
cause the audience, as decision-maker, takes the role of the main
character, and that implies that any information provided to the char-
acter is automatically provided to the player and vice versa. This fact
is evidenced in version 4 (see Section 3), where, even when the mur-
derer is in another room that would not be visible for the victim as
fictional character, the decision-maker reacts by avoiding that place.
Hence, the suspense in this case is produced even when the fictional
character and the player have the same information. Presumably, the
participant watching the story experiences a limit when feeling sus-
pense since this partial information process cannot take place.
Although information flow as an important constituent of sus-
pense, anticipation seems to be restricted to situations where escap-
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ing or being about to be killed is perceived as certain for the audience
[61, 35, 14, 25]. Nevertheless, taking suspense as an “anticipation
feeling” [36], it can be observed that it happens in versions 1, 2 and
3, being noticeably reduced in version 4, when the participant knows
the location of the murderer.
Moreover, the experiment has only been run with a single pair of
characters (a prototypical female victim and a prototypical male mur-
derer, being both ideas taken from classical suspense movies [48]).
The literature, however, reports on emotional differences when the
gender and the aspect of characters vary [21, 13, 6]. Additionally,
more differences could be expected between decision-makers and
viewers. This limit is aggravated by the fact that the percentage of
female participants is significantly low, which does not yield suffi-
cient data to discard the influence of genre.
All these aspects suggest the need for a more refined experiment,
once promising but not fully conclusive results have been obtained.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
This work is based on the hypothesis that interactive stories need
more information than non-interactive ones to be amusing to the au-
dience, even at the expense of less suspense. Suspense seems not to
be as influential in interactive storytelling, at least not as much as a
correct information flow. While an exact quantification of how much
information is needed depends on the context, it seems clear that too
much information is boring and too little information can be frustrat-
ing in interactive storytelling.
Along with the hypothesis, this paper has described an experi-
ment in which human participants were matched in pairs of decision-
makers (active) and viewers (passive), both experiencing the same
story from two different roles. The analysis of the results indicates
that the hypothesis is plausible in the context of the experiment and
the found correlations indicate that the predicted effect seems to be
true. However, due to the nature of the experiment (a 2D, tile-based,
turn-based game) and its limitations, it is still soon to make a gen-
eral conclusion. Nevertheless, we consider the results to be relevant
since the engine we have used to test the hypotheses is quite similar
to several interactive systems and games.
In all versions of the narrative, suspense is produced even when the
audience has the same information as the main character in the scene.
Against this background, the experiment has evidenced that giving
too little information to the decision-maker reduces the amusement,
just in the same way that too much information is counterproductive.
In this sense, an omniscient audience, in contrast with non-interactive
stories, needs a different amount of information.
We observed that amusement and engagement are influenced by
the perception of escape chances. As the hope of winning decreases,
the passive audience loses interest. It seems that, whereas the passive
spectator desires a quick resolution when the options of the protago-
nist are low, the active audience wants to have an advantage to help
the character to generate opportunities that can make the story longer.
More generally, we also conclude that interactive storytelling re-
quires challenge, but offering enough opportunities. In this way, it
is important to avoid this form of “learned helplessness” in which
the audience experiencing a negative outcome which cannot be con-
trolled loses interest. Besides, simply triggering the feeling of sus-
pense is not enough to consolidate engagement. This does not seem
to be the case for passive audience, which seems to be more affected
by classic suspenseful settings, some of which are replicated in inter-
active drama as discussed in Section 1.
Finally, based on the evidences found, we are currently working on
a broader study that relates these observations with the effect of other
features of suspense (use of tools and resources, distance between the
threat and the victim, and other particular characters’ features).
The overall objective is to provide a model serving not only to pre-
dict suspense, but to be able to do it within interactive storytelling.
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Abstract. Communication is often defined as the ability to trans-
mit information. We can employ creativity in many ways and to
various degrees when communicating information. From a compu-
tational creativity perspective, how can we model such communica-
tive creativity, so that we can make software that can communicate
creatively? To answer this question, we need to tackle a more spe-
cific question: how can we better understand what entails creativ-
ity, enhances creativity and/or contributes to creativity in the con-
text of communication? Then we can use this information to inform
our models and/or evaluate their creativity. This paper tackles this
question by analysing how creativity is perceived to be manifested
in communication by participants with experience in studying com-
munication and information. It uses a recent characterisation of key
components of creativity to identify aspects that are particularly im-
portant for making communication more creative. Overall, the com-
ponents that relate to autonomous and informed involvement in the
communicative process seem to be prioritised most for creativity,
alongside the unsurprising requirement for originality and novelty
in this process. Our findings can help us create better computational
models of creative communication, and guide us to a more informed
evaluation strategy for assessing creative systems that perform com-
munication tasks.
INTRODUCTION
What entails creativity in communication? The central aim of this
paper is to identify how creativity is manifested in communication
scenarios, in a format that can be represented computationally as a
model of creativity.
Communication is typically defined as the ability to exchange or
transmit information.
Definitions of communication:
‘The imparting or exchanging of information by speaking,
writing, or using some other medium’ (Oxford English Dictio-
nary)
‘the act or an instance of communicating; the imparting or
exchange of information, ideas, or feelings’ (Collins English
Dictionary)
We should be able to create expressions representing the informa-
tion we wish to communicate in a clear, understandable way. Creativ-
ity can be useful when we detect and clarify misunderstandings, by
re-expressing this information in different formats. We also use cre-
ativity when we target our communication to be relevant and coher-
ent to our specific audience at any one time. We can adapt creatively
to different communication scenarios and different media for com-
munication. Within society,1 then, the ability to communicate allows
us to demonstrate creativity in multiple ways.
What makes a communicator creative? What can we check or
track, to see if a communicator entity is particularly creative (or
less creative?) Particularly in the context of computational creativ-
ity, what should we prioritise including in computational models or
simulations of communication, to maximise their creativity?
This paper considers what it means to be a creative communica-
tor, identifying key themes and aspects that should be included in
computational creativity systems that are designed to perform com-
munication tasks as creatively as possible.
For this paper, creativity is considered to comprise fourteen com-
ponents of creativity, as derived in [14]. The characterisation of cre-
ativity as these collection of components was the result of an inves-
tigation of the meaning of the word ‘creativity’: analysing the lan-
guage that is used in discussions of the nature of creativity. This
work, originally conducted as part of a study understanding how to
evaluate the creativity of computational software [12], forms the ba-
sis of the current study. As argued elsewhere [12, 13, 18], creativity
often appears to manifest itself differently in different domains of
creativity. The study reported in this paper develops these ideas fur-
ther in the context of communication, analysing how a model based
on the components of creativity should be adapted to best represent
creativity in communication.
Background
Computers are used in many communication tasks. We use comput-
ers to communicate in various ways over the internet, or to pass data
from one location to another via electrical pulses that communicate
that data. We also use computers to communicate information by re-
representing data using pattern detection, information search, data
mining, or various other techniques. These are communication sce-
narios where the human user is driving communication. This paper,
however, focuses on scenarios where a computational agent is able
1 The AISB’17 convention, which includes the Computational Creativity
symposium that this paper is presented at, is co-ordinated under the gen-
eral overarching theme of ‘Society and AI’.
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to communicate in creative ways, with some degree of autonomy as
a creative system.
Creativity manifests itself within the context of communication in
a huge variety of ways. We use language creatively to converse and
exchange information, in everyday communication [4] and in spe-
cialised circumstances such as professional scenarios [3] or trans-
lation [17]. Examples occur in discourse [10], narrative construc-
tion [16], creative writing and in the use of linguistic devices such
as metaphors to communicate concepts [15] - but our creative com-
munication abilities are not limited to spoken language; we also use
other communication methods creatively such as gestures, facial ex-
pressions, sounds, body language, and so on. We can even be creative
in using silence to communicate [9]. The creative act of improvisa-
tion is often a major part of communication, as we exchange and
react to exchange of information [20]. We also use creativity to com-
municate digitally [7] or via other media such as imagery or visual
language.
Figure 1. TheRiddlerBot twitterbot (https :
//twitter.com/TheRiddlerBot) creates and posts riddles, and re-
sponds to Twitter users who try to solve them. Incidentally, the answer to this
riddle is Weird Al Yankovic.
How could a computer program implement any of these tasks
such that it is able to communicate in a creative way? We are all
familiar with interactive software that are low in creativity, rang-
ing from ELIZA [22] to modern-day voice-recognition-enabled tele-
phone help systems, because of their reliance on ‘canned’ phrases
and preprogrammed responses. Quite possibly, incorporation of com-
putational creativity could help these systems be better communi-
cators. Similarly, in other communication scenarios, the ability to
adapt creatively to different communication scenarios has been al-
ready demonstrated in existing computational software. For exam-
ple, on Twitter, as well as creating and tweeting riddles, TheRid-
dlerBot twitterbot [8] can also adapt its tweets in response to other
tweets it has received, see for example Figure 1; the MetaphorMag-
net twitterbot [21] is able to comment on current trends such as
(perhaps provocative) tweets referring to the recent US presidential
elections (see Figure 2). In the domain of one-way communication,
rather than interactive/two-way communication, computational cre-
ativity has seen significant progress in the realm of story-telling and
narrative [6, for a good summary]. There have also been achieve-
ments in other systems that perform communicative tasks such as the
re-representation of news stories as images [5], or systems that can
create and use their own communication language [19].
Figure 2. Metaphor Magnet twitterbot (https :
//twitter.com/MetaphorMagnet) creates and posts metaphor-laden
tweets referring to current news events, such as the recent US presidential
election.
Computational creativity typically has two overarching motiva-
tors, which vary in their relative motivation for different compu-
tational creativity projects but which tend to both be present to at
least some degree in computational creativity research. Firstly, such
projects attempt to see if the creative tasks/behaviours under focus
can be modelled, simulated or replicated using computational means,
such that they can be done by computer. This affords various ad-
vantages such as possible automation to help generate creative out-
puts on a larger scale, or to help enhance our own creativity via co-
creativity and interaction. Or, we can take advantage in a creative
process of what computers can do better than humans, e.g. large-
scale/long-term processing of data in a mechanical and accurate fash-
ion, without becoming bored, tired, unduly biased or occasionally in-
accurate due to lapses in attention. Secondly, the computational study
of creativity allows us to study creativity in new ways afforded by
the computational models, abstractions and algorithms we employ.
Computational creativity gives us new tools with which to analyse,
understand and simulate creativity. Particularly for this second moti-
vation, we are able to test hypotheses of what makes us more creative
in a particular task (or in general) via the computational means we
employ.
When working with computational creativity and communication,
how do we make our software more creative communicators? And
how do we evaluate the degree to which our programs are indeed
creative in their communication? To model, simulate or replicate
creative communication using computational means, it is useful to
have some prior understanding of - or hypotheses for - what entails
creativity in communication. In an evaluation context, the Standard-
ised Procedure for Evaluating Creative Systems (SPECS) evaluation
methodology requires us to judge our creative systems in terms of
what it means to be creative (both generally and in the domain(s) in
which they perform their given creative task(s)) [11, 12]. So if we are
approaching the task of creating software which can communicate
creatively, what characterisation or definition of creativity should we
use to guide and assess our success in this task?
Following [14], we have a characterisation of creativity, via 14
components of creativity: key themes and factors that collectively
represent different aspects of creativity. These components were de-
rived using statistical natural language processing to detect concepts
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that we typically talk about when we discuss what creativity is. This
works on the cognitive linguistics assumption that if a word is often
mentioned when we talk about a concept, then that word is connected
to the meaning of that concept. Figure 3 reproduces these compo-
nents of creativity from [14].
Figure 3. Fourteen components of creativity [14]
With the Figure 3 components as a model or characterisation of
creativity in general, we can ask: are there any particular priorities
(or conversely, less important components) for creativity in commu-
nication? Different types of creativity can manifest themselves in dif-
ferent ways; although some elements of creativity transcend all types
of creativity, other elements are more - or less - important for dif-
ferent types of creativity [2, 18, 1]. For example, in the domain of
mathematical creativity, it is crucial to generate correct results at the
end of the creative process. On the other hand, in musical improvi-
sation, we have found that the music produced as the end result of
improvisation is actually not so important a contributor to the cre-
ative process of improvisation, compared to other factors such as the
ability to show intention and emotional involvement during impro-
visation, or to interact and communicate in the social context within
which improvisation is taking place [13]. So what components are
particularly important for creativity in communication? What should
we prioritise when we build and evaluate computationally creative
communication systems?
Aims of this research
In [13] we consulted various people with an expertise/interest in mu-
sic, to get their opinions on what it means to be creative in the con-
text of musical improvisation. We analysed data from questionnaires
about creativity in musical improvisation, to customise the 14 com-
ponents of creativity from [14] and understand which components
are most important for this type of creativity. In this present work,
the aim is similar: to understand better what entails, enhances and/or
contributes to creativity in the context of communication. This aim
can be achieved by consulting the opinion of people who are experi-
enced in the use and analysis of communication, and using the data
generated from this consultation to weight and order the 14 compo-
nents of creativity for this particular type of creativity.
METHODOLOGY
Attendees of the 11th International Colloquium for Computational
Creativity colloquium acted as participants for the exercise of gath-
ering data. This Colloquium was held at Universidad Autonoma
Metropolitana (UAM)’s Cuajimalpa campus in Mexico City, Mex-
ico. The Colloquium attendees largely came from the interdisci-
plinary Masters programme in Design, Information and Communi-
cation (MADIC). Based in UAM’s Division of Communication and
Design, MADIC students specialise in how to integrate Design, In-
formation and Communication together in interdisciplinary ways,
studying each of these three levels in detail individually and in com-
bination.
Although levels of expertise in communication vary according to
students’ individual background, all these students spend their time
thinking about how to approach communication of information in
an interdisciplinary way, as well as having some training in how to
design technologically based solutions. This is why their opinions
were considered to be a useful source of information for the research
question: when you are a creative communicator, what makes your
communication more creative?
The workshop where data was gathered for this study occurred in
the middle of the colloquium, after a series of talks relating to cre-
ativity and computational approaches. Participants were given a brief
introduction to the 14 components of creativity from [14] during one
of the lectures on the first day of the colloquium. This introduction
to the components was then repeated as part of a workshop the fol-
lowing day. Participants were also given brief written definitions of
the components as appear in [14, 12] and as has been reproduced in
the Appendix to this paper.
We should acknowledge the potential impact of language issues on
this research, as well as the steps taken to deal with these issues. This
set of participants was selected because of 1. their masters-level in-
terdisciplinary study of communication with design and information,
and 2. their exposure to creativity and computational creativity dur-
ing the colloquium. Participants were mainly Mexican, with Spanish
as their native tongue and English as a second language. The collo-
quium lecture and workshops were conducted in English2 with live
Spanish translation for those who felt their English was not sufficient
to understand. Then they were given paper surveys to complete (as
part of the tasks for the aforementioned workshop); their responses
form the data for this paper. Again, these surveys were in English,
however people who felt their English was not sufficient for the task
could work in pairs with another participant with stronger English
language skills. In practice, it was pleasing3 to note that most of the
participants were able to work capably in English.
The students were asked, in the paper survey, to rank the 14 com-
ponents in order of importance for being a creative communicator.
The header of the survey sheet asked “How important do you think
each of these things are, for being a creative communicator?” This
was followed by the list of components, by which they were asked
to fill in the sentence ‘This is the most important out of all the
14 things in this list.” The students were given as much time as they
needed to complete the survey.
2 I have promised to work on my Spanish(!) but unfortunately it is not at a
level where I could conduct research in Spanish.
3 And slightly humbling, to the author.
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Table 1. Mean and standard deviation for the 51 responses to the survey. A
ranking of 1 for a component indicates it is considered ’most important’ by a
participant, and 14 is ‘least important’. Results are sorted first by lowest mean
ranking (to 1dp) and then by lowest standard deviation (to 1 dp).
Mean S.D. Component
5.6 4.5 Originality
6.3 4.1 Intention & emotional involvement
6.6 3.5 Independence & freedom
6.7 4.2 Social interaction & communication
6.8 4.2 Active involvement & persistence
7.4 3.9 General intellect
7.7 3.9 Thinking & evaluation
7.8 3.5 Variety, divergence & experimentation
7.8 3.7 Generating results
7.8 3.6 Progression & development
8.2 3.9 Spontaneity & subconscious processing
8.3 4.5 Domain competence
8.6 4.2 Dealing with uncertainty
9.6 3.3 Value
RESULTS
In total, 51 participants returned the survey with complete data. Oc-
casionally participants had made mistakes (or deliberately not ranked
the components in strict order) by ranking, say, two components as
6th most important and no components as 7th most important. Such
scenarios were rare (6 participants in total out of 51). In these cases,
data was recorded as it was supplied, with no normalisation or forc-
ing into a strict 1-to-14 ordering.
The results in Table 1 and Figure 4 show that overall, participants
considered Originality to be the most important component for cre-
ativity in communication with a mean ranking of 5.6, followed by
Intention & Emotional Involvement (mean ranking of 6.3) then by In-
dependence & Freedom (mean 6.6), Social Interaction & Communi-
cation (6.7) and Active Involvement & Persistence (6.8) respectively.
Figure 4. Graphical representation of the data in Table 1.
The standard deviation showed no particular variance in opinions
to take note of. Typically participants varied in their responses by
around 3.9 standard deviations; responses varied in standard devi-
ation from 3.3 (Value, with the highest agreement at a ranking of
around 9.6 out of 14) through to 4.5 (Originality and Domain Com-
petence, with the highest disagreement over rankings of 5.6 and 8.3
respectively).
The mean values for the raw response data do, however, in fact
rank all components between 5.6th and 9.6th most important for cre-
ativity in communication. We can analyse the data further by group-
ing responses. If we categorise rankings using the bins of 1-5, 6-9,
and 10-14, this gives us an idea of what people considered top 5
(most important) components for creative communication, middling
in importance, and bottom 5 (least important) components. These
grouping data are shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Rankings data categorised using the bins of 1-5, 6-9, and 10-14
(top 5 (most important) components for creative communication, middling in
importance, and bottom 5 (least important) components, respectively). Com-
ponents are ordered in the same order as for Figure 4.
Inspecting Figure 5, more differentiation can be identified in re-
sponses. We see that 27 people considered Originality to be in the
top 5 most important components for creativity in communication
- this is over half the respondents). 26 people considered Intention
& Emotional Involvement to be top 5 most important, the second
highest response (and again just over 50% of respondents). Active
Involvement & Persistence and General Intellect were each chosen
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by 21 participants in their top 5 most important components, and 20
people selected Independence & Freedom in their top 5 most impor-
tant components.
Looking at the components people ranked in the bottom 5 for im-
portance for creativity in communication, 31 respondents out of 50
felt Value was in the bottom 5 (with only 5 people ranking it in their
top 5). 24 people felt Domain Competence was in the bottom 5 in
terms of importance, followed by Dealing With Uncertainty (22 par-
ticipants), Spontaneity & Subconscious Processing (21 participants).
Next came Thinking & Evaluation and Generating Results, tied at 19
respondents each who ranked these components in their bottom 5 in
terms of importance.
DISCUSSION
The following components have emerged as particularly important
for creativity in communication. They are marked with an asterisk *
if they are identified as important via the raw rankings data, and by a
plus sign + if they are identified as important via the treatment of the
data as ordinal:
• Originality *+
• Intention & Emotional Involvement *+
• Active Involvement & Persistence *+
• General Intellect +
• Independence & Freedom *+
• Social interaction & communication *
Overall, the components that relate to autonomous and informed
involvement in the communicative process seem to be prioritised
most for creativity, alongside the unsurprising requirement for origi-
nality and novelty as part of creativity.
One surprise in this data was that the component Social Interac-
tion and Communication did not feature much more highly in impor-
tance, being ranked a mean of 6.7th most important component out
of the 14, with just under half of participants placing it as one of the
top 5 most important components for creativity in communication.
This could be because this component was interpreted in this con-
text as focusing on the social and interactive parts of communication,
and that the participants did not feel that communication necessarily
needed to be social/interactive in order to be creative. In the rank-
ings data it was still seen as relatively important compared to other
components, but in the ordinal treatment of the data just over half the
participants tended to pass over this component in their choice of the
top 5 components for communicative creativity.
It is interesting to see the lack of consensus of opinion on a clear
outlier(s) for the most or least important components of creativity
in communication; no individual components were universally (or
near-universally) agreed upon as most important for creative com-
munication, or least important. Perhaps this is due to the diversity of
different means and modes of communication (as highlighted earlier
in this paper). Alternatively, perhaps we need much larger numbers
of informed participants in order to arrive at a consensus - if there is
a consensus to be arrived at?
On the whole, though, we now have some useful data about factors
of communication that make it more creative.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper aimed to uncover data helping us to understand what
makes communication more creative. In a computational creativity
context, we want to understand creativity more by using computa-
tional means. In this current paper, we wish to identify what is im-
portant to include in computationally creative models and simula-
tions of communication. Our specific aim was to understand better
what entails, enhances and/or contributes to creativity in the context
of communication.
To address this research aim, this paper analyses of data provided
by participants with a particular interdisciplinary focus on study-
ing, analysing and applying communication in the context of design
and information. We found that all of the components were consid-
ered important to some degree for communicative creativity, perhaps
more uniformly than in other creative domains such as music impro-
visation. Some components, though, did emerge as particularly con-
tributory to creative communication. We found that, as is common for
most types of creativity (if not all), originality is considered very im-
portant for creativity in communication. Also important is the ability
to demonstrate the intent to communicate and emotional involvement
in that process, on a level which is active and persistent. General in-
tellect is important for assisting creativity in communication, as are
the abilities to operate independently and without constraint, as well
as the abilities to interact socially during communication.
It should be noted that the data reported in this paper was obtained
via studies conducted in English with participants who were mostly
native Spanish speakers. While participants’ competence in English
was mostly found to be very high, it would be useful to replicate this
study with a group mostly consisting of native English speakers, to
verify whether the same findings are to be found.
Nonetheless, we do now have some useful data on what consti-
tutes creativity in communication. We can use this in computational
models of communication in two ways.
Firstly, we can use the data to better understand/evaluate how cre-
ative these computational models are, and how to increase their cre-
ativity; for example, working on making creative systems more capa-
ble of being original and demonstrating intent would be more fruit-
ful than working on the quality of communicative output and grasp
of domain skills such as language, if we are intending to maximise
the creativity of the system. (Note that maximising the creativity of
the system is not the same aim as maximising the performance of
the system, where quality of output might be more important.) Sec-
ondly, we can use this data as evidence that creativity in different
domains has been shown to differ.4 [13] found a different distribu-
tion of importance for the components, in the context of their impor-
tance for creativity in musical improvisation: Domain Competence
and Social Interaction & Communication were considered two of
the most important components for musical improvisation creativity.
The two different types of creativity considered here (music impro-
visation and communication) do both show an emphasis on Intention
& Emotional Involvement, which is interesting to note given that this
would be considered more tricky to achieve in computational systems
than some of the other components. The data for this current study
and that in [13] shows the value of efforts to make our creative sys-
tems show intent and emotional involvement in their creative tasks,
at least in the context of creativity in communication (this study) and
in musical improvisation [13].
In communicative creativity, this data shows a more even distribu-
tion of the components’ relative importance for this type of creativity.
This study is not conclusive, as it comes from the perspective of one
group of participants, mostly of a similar demographic and possibly
4 As noted by a reviewer of this paper, there is potential for exciting future
work to use comparative analysis to investigate in depth how individual
components are manifested in different creative domains.
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with biases introduced from their study of the MADIC Design, Infor-
mation and Communication masters degree in UAM, Mexico. The
study, however, gives a good indication of what entails creativity in
communication, from the perspective of people who study commu-
nication and related concepts as masters level.
Now that we have this data on what to include in creative com-
munication systems, we can use it to inform the building of soft-
ware that emphasises the aspects which were found to be particu-
larly important for creativity (while not overlooking other aspects of
creativity). One fascinating potential application of this work is in
the annual Loebner Prize competition based around the Turing Test,
which AISB hosts and organises.5 Could computational creativity as-
sist Turing Test software entrants, using creativity in communication
towards a better performance at the Turing test? It would be very
interesting to pursue this angle. There are many other potential ap-
plications; in fact, during the workshop where data was collected, the
students were also asked to consider a piece of software that could do
a communication task that requires creativity. Their suggestions were
extremely broad in range, from chatbot software through to applica-
tions that use creativity in communication with mentally ill patients.
In short, the potential array of possibilities for creative communica-
tion software is vast, and we now have more information on how to
make such systems more creative.
To summarise this paper’s contribution, in conclusion we return
to the question in the title of this paper: how can we write software
that can communicate creatively? From our findings above, we can
conclude that we should focus on equipping our software with the
abilities to be original and independent, to demonstrate intent and
emotional involvement, to actively persist in that involvement in the
communication process, to interact socially and with intelligence.
Perhaps with such information, we may produce software that cre-
atively tackles the Turing test, in a prize winning capacity? Or, and
with more every-day intentions in mind, we can at least have a more
robust understanding of how to make creative software that commu-
nicates.
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Appendix: Definitions of components of creativity
Definitions are reproduced here for the fourteen components of creativity,
as derived in [14]:
1. Active Involvement and Persistence
• Being actively involved; reacting to and having a deliberate effect on a
process.
• The tenacity to persist with a process throughout, even at problematic
points.
2. Generation of Results
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• Working towards some end target, or goal, or result.
• Producing something (tangible or intangible) that previously did not
exist.
3. Dealing with Uncertainty
• Coping with incomplete, missing, inconsistent, uncertain and/or am-
biguous information. Element of risk and chance, with no guarantee
that problems can or will be resolved.
• Not relying on every step of the process to be specified in detail; per-
haps even avoiding routine or pre-existing methods and solutions.
4. Domain Competence
• Domain-specific intelligence, knowledge, talent, skills, experience and
expertise.
• Knowing a domain well enough to be equipped to recognise gaps, needs
or problems that need solving and to generate, validate, develop and
promote new ideas in that domain.
5. General Intellect
• General intelligence and intellectual ability.
• Flexible and adaptable mental capacity.
6. Independence and Freedom
• Working independently with autonomy over actions and decisions.
• Freedom to work without being bound to pre-existing solutions, pro-
cesses or biases; perhaps challenging cultural or domain norms.
7. Intention and Emotional Involvement
• Personal and emotional investment, immersion, self-expression, in-
volvement in a process.
• Intention and desire to perform a task, a positive process giving fulfil-
ment and enjoyment.
8. Originality
• Novelty and originality - a new product, or doing something in a new
way, or seeing new links and relations between previously unassociated
concepts.
• Results that are unpredictable, unexpected, surprising, unusual, out of
the ordinary.
9. Progression and Development
• Movement, advancement, evolution and development during a process.
• Whilst progress may or may not be linear, and an actual end goal may
be only loosely specified (if at all), the entire process should represent
some developmental progression in a particular domain or task.
10. Social Interaction and Communication
• Communicating and promoting work to others in a persuasive, positive
manner.
• Mutual influence, feedback, sharing and collaboration between society
and individual.
11. Spontaneity / Subconscious Processing
• No need to be in control of the whole process - thoughts and activities
may inform a process subconsciously without being fully accessible for
conscious analysis.
• Being able to react quickly and spontaneously during a process when
appropriate, without needing to spend time thinking about options too
much.
12. Thinking and Evaluation
• Consciously evaluating several options to recognise potential value in
each and identify the best option, using reasoning and good judgment.
• Proactively selecting a decided choice from possible options, without
allowing the process to stagnate under indecision.
13. Value
• Making a useful contribution that is valued by others and recognised
as an influential achievement; perceived as special; ‘not just something
anybody would have done’.
• End product is relevant and appropriate to the domain being worked in.
14. Variety, Divergence and Experimentation
• Generating a variety of different ideas to compare and choose from,
with the flexibility to be open to several perspectives and to experiment
with different options without bias.
• Multi-tasking during a process.
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Symposium V
Computational modelling of
emotion: theory and applications
Contemporary emotion modelling includes many projects attempting to understand natural emotions or to
implement simulated emotions in chatbots, avatars or robots, for practical uses of many sorts from
entertainment to caring. The numerous models of affective phenomena in the literature differ in important
respects. They differ in how they describe and explain a range of phenomena, including the nature and order
of perceptual, cognitive and emotional mental processes and behavioural responses in emotional episodes.
They also differ in their target level of granularity: from fine-grained neural to coarse-grained psychological.
Different models simulate emotions (and other mental states) with different ontological status and with a
different focus on whether they model external behaviour or internal states. The papers in this symposium
reflect this range of approaches, coming from computer science and robotics to psychology and philosophy.
Both theoretical approaches and applications are amongst the papers in the Computational Modelling of
Emotion symposium. A number of papers in the symposium take an evolutionary approach to explaining
emotion. The keynote talk by Aaron Sloman theorises about the different sorts of information processing
architecture which can result from varying developmental and epigenetic trajectories over evolution. These
differing information processing architectures then have the potential to experience different sorts of
emotion. Following the ’evolution and emotion’ theme, two further papers discuss results from iterated
prisoner’s dilemma simulations related to the evolution of moral sentiments such as guilt, revenge, apology
and forgiveness. In these papers, implications from the evolutionary emergence of such sentiments for
inter-agent cooperation is discussed (Pereira, Lenaerts, Vaquero and Han; and, Lenaerts, Han, Pereira, and
Vaquero). With an alternative mathematical approach, Donsimoni models psychological fatigue in the
context of a labour supply problem, showing how fatigue interacts with resilience in influencing work output.
A number of papers discuss architectural issues in emotion modelling. Petters and Waters present a
historical review of Bowlby’s attachment control system, showing that what Bowlby conceived between the
1960s and 1980s is in many respects a surprisingly contemporary framework for emotional architectures.
Beaudoin, Hyniewska and Hudlicka consider how emotional perturbance arises in information processes
architectures and consider how the concept of perturbance helps explain emotions such as grief and
limerence (the attraction stage of romantic love) and other emotions with repetitive and intrusive mentation.
Broekens assesses the prospects of emotional architectures based on reinforcement learning. He considers
that emotions may emerge from the operation of reinforcement learning mechanisms. This raises the
question: ’can any agent implementing reinforcement learning mechanisms be considered to possess an
implicit emotion model?’. Caspar and Moore relate emotions to survival processes. They present a neural
circuit architecture for emotion and compare its performance in terms of survivability with a previous model.
In the symposium there are several papers related to theoretical or applied aspects of attachment modelling.
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Petters and Coyne-Umfreville consider that whilst personality-like states might be modelled as control states,
most computational models of personality instead merely attempt to imitate superficial behavioural aspects
of personality. They go on to present as a position paper the proposal that adult attachment patterns seen in
conversational interviews might be modelled using information processing architectures with particular
meta-cognitive and memory encoding and retrieval mechanisms. In contrast with the other architectural
approaches to emotion, Truschzinski and Klein present the advantages of taking a dynamical systems and
enactive approach to emotion modelling.
The symposium papers concerned with emotion modelling applications complement the theoretical and
architectural focus of the papers described above. Many of these ’applications’ papers have a clear
relationship to the theory and architectural papers. For example, Cittern, Edalat and Ghaznavi; and,
Shemmings (presentation without a paper in proceedings) both discuss technologically supported
attachment interventions which complement the theoretical attachment modelling papers by Petters and
Waters; and Petters and Coyne-Umfreville.
Tanevska, Rea, Sandini and Sciutti present results on emotion and human robot interaction which model
emotion in two senses. Firstly, the robots perceive human emotions. So forming emotion models of the
humans they interact with to better direct robot actions. In addition, the robots incorporate an emotion-driven
motivation and learning system. Thus demonstrating another example of the close interaction of theoretical,
architectural and applied aspects of emotion modelling. Both Dente, Kuester, Skora and Krumhuber; and,
Dupre, Booth, Bolster, Morrison and McKeown, describe face recognition emotion models which utilises
machine analysis of a large number of human faces. From faces to language – Seyeditabari, Levens,
Maestas, Walsh, Danis and Zadrozny describe algorithms for large-scale text data analysis of emotions with
the purpose of studying emotion contagion through social media networks.
Taken together the collected papers of the symposium discuss a wide range of computational models and a
wide range of specific emotions, affective states and moral sentiments. These include: motives,
attachments, moods, guilt, revenge, apology, forgiveness, fatigue, resilience, capacity for recuperation, grief,
love, hope, fear, happiness, sadness, avoidance, preoccupation, trust, anger, surprise, disgust, shock,
anxiousness, sympathy, frustration, feeling betrayed, and pride. It is hoped presenting the state of the art in
emotion modelling and bringing such diverse papers together in the Computa ional Modelling of Emotion
symposium at AISB2017 facilitates movement towards a mature integrated field. This should possess a
deeper and richer understanding of biological minds; clearer interrelationships between contemporary
emotion models; and fruitful use of emotion models in real world applications.
Dean Petters, Department of Psychology, Birmingham City University
David Moffat, School of Engineering and Built Environment, Glasgow Caledonian University
Joel Parthemore, Department of Cognitive Neuroscience and Philosophy, University of Sko¨vde, Sweden
Organizers
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Architectures underlying cognition and affect in
natural and artificial systems
Aaron Sloman
School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, UK
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/˜axs
Abstract. This is a summary of some of the ideas
in my invited talk for the Symposium on “Computational
modelling of emotion: theory and applications” at AISB
2017. A deep understanding of human (or animal) minds
requires a broad and deep understanding of the types of
information processing functions and information processing
mechanisms produced by biological evolution, and how those
functions and mechanisms are combined in architectures of
increasing sophistication and complexity over evolutionary
trajectories leading to new species, and how various
kinds of evolved potential are realised by context-sensitive
mechanisms during individual development. Some aspects
of individual development add context-specific detail to
products of the evolutionary history, partly because evolution
cannot produce pre-packaged specifications for complete
information processing architectures, except for the very
simplest organisms. Instead, for more complex organisms,
including humans, different architectural layers develop at
different times during an individual’s life, partly under the
influence of the genome and partly under the influence of what
the individual has so far experienced, learnt, and developed.
This is particularly obvious in language development in
humans, but that is a special case of a general biological pattern
(identified in Joint work with Jackie Chappell, partly inspired
by theories of Annette Karmiloff-Smith, among others). This
paper complements a paper presented in the Symposium on
Computing and Philosophy at AISB 2017, which develops
more general ideas about evolution of information processing
functions and mechanisms, partly inspired by Turing’s
work on morphogenesis: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/
projects/cogaff/sloman-aisb17-CandP.pdf.
1 INTRODUCTION
Biological organisms differ in many ways. Members of
the same species can differ according to their stage of
development, according to the problems and resources
(including information) encountered during their development,
according to details of their genome, and details of previous
development, growth, and learning opportunities and also in
details of their particular environments with different threats,
opportunities, resources, obstacles, competitors, helpers,
current needs, and so on.
Variations across species are even greater. Over billions
of years, biological evolution on this planet has produced a
staggering variety of forms of life, varying in many dimensions,
including physical size, change of size during the life of
individuals, life span, sensory apparatus, types of environment,
modes of interaction with the environment including
conspecifics and other life forms, food, prey, predators, forms
of information storage, modes of reproduction, and many
more. All of these differences can affect mechanisms, internal
states or processes, and externally visible forms of behaviour
or expression, including affective states and processes related
to motivation, goals, plans, preferences, desires, attitudes,
values, hopes, ambitions, decisions, intentions, concerns,
moods, and other affective states and processes.
Is this an area that is susceptible of scientific study
and accurate modelling, or is there merely a hopelessly
unstructured mess/tangle of special cases understood in depth
by novelists, poets and playwrights but unfit to be the subject
of scientific investigation?
A similar question might have been asked about chemistry
centuries ago when alchemists were faced with a tangled
mess of special cases with no means of expanding knowledge
except by doing more experiments. But that situation was
changed by discoveries about the atomic structure of matter,
including the details summarised in the periodic table of
the elements, along with advances in chemical understanding
based on many experiments and applications of new ideas from
quantum mechanics – producing explanations that were not
possible in the framework of Newtonian mechanics: chemical
reactions could not be related to Newton’s laws of motion, but
new explanatory theories emerged from information about the
structure of atoms related to the facts assembled in the periodic
table of physical elements, later elaborated by developments
in quantum physics able to explain chemical structures and
mechanisms including some that are crucial for biological
evolution analysed in 1944 by Schro¨dinger[5].1
Since then, although huge gaps remain in our biological
knowledge, there have been tremendous advances based on
theories in physics and chemistry about possible structures and
their interactions, often forming new structures essential to
processes of biological reproduction, growth and development.
In contrast, much (so-called) scientific study of minds
has relied on correlation-seeking experiments and the use
of independently variable components of vectors to describe
complexity – which would be hopelessly inadequate for the
study of complex molecules. There is also a wide-spread
assumption that all motivation needs to be thought of in
terms of the relative attractions (or repulsions) of various
kinds of rewards (or punishments) with a common (positive
or negative) utility measure. This can be compared with the
ancient assumption that all physical masses seek the centre of
the universe, which is hopelessly inadequate for the explanation
of known physical and chemical phenomena.
1 Some annotated extracts are available here http://www.cs.bham.ac.
uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/schrodinger-life.html
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2 CAN STUDY OF MINDS MIRROR STUDY
OF MATTER?
Across all the variation in forms of life, are there any common
principles? One seems to be the ability to acquire and use
information for purposes of control, such as generating options
for consideration, selecting options, working out consequences
of various options. There is also information-based control of
chemical and physical processes of reproduction, development
and growth.
Information is used during interaction with inert physical
features of the environment and also during interaction with
predators, prey, offspring and other conspecifics – which often
requires information about information, e.g. using information
about what something else wants or can perceive.
In many cases passive individuals are acted on by the
environment, for instance when seeds are dispersed by wind,
or when seasonal or daily changes in temperature or availability
of light, air or water currents, or supply of nutrients or dangers
are out of the control of individuals and they can at most resist,
react to avoid or react to make use of (e.g. consume) contents
of their environment.
In more complex cases information about threats,
opportunities, resources, and obstacles can be acquired
and put to use, either immediately or at a later time when a
need arises. Coping with threats from other organisms, may
involve purely physical avoidance or escape actions. But in
some cases it requires other-directed meta-cognition: inferring
intentions, knowledge, reasoning processes and choosing
means of avoidance or escape accordingly.
So information of many kinds plays many different roles
in living things, unlike non living but interacting physical
objects and processes, such as weather features, geological
features shaped by and shaping one another, including
tectonic motion, earthquakes, volcanoes, floods, tornadoes,
other weather patterns, seasonal changes caused by motion
around the sun and tides caused by rotation of the moon around
the earth.
This notion of information is much older than the
notion developed by Shannon around 1948. Since Shannon,
information is often discussed as if it were primarily the content
of messages, with senders and receivers. But sending and
receiving messages would be pointless if the message contents
had no other use than to be transmitted, received and stored.
The fundamental fact about information that is often ignored
in discussions of the nature of information is that it can be used
in controlling what happens.
This can take many forms: in some cases information
directly triggers a response, e.g. a defensive reflex such as
blinking or rapid withdrawal, or an opportunity taken such as
motion towards water, food, shelter or a mate, or use of a body
part to acquire or consume something edible. In other cases the
information can be stored for future use, e.g. information about
where a resource or a danger is located, or information encoded
in a genome that is used at a particular stage during during
reproductive processes to control aspects of development and
growth of tissues and parts of new individuals. Other forms of
information in a genome can include behaviours of organisms
once they are functional, e.g. controlling breathing, pumping of
blood, digestion, begging for food, following parents, etc.
Such uses of information could be ignored in Shannon’s
famous work on information [7] because he was working for
a company (Bell Telephone Company) providing information
services, for whom the main problems were reliable
transmission and storage, not use of information. The use was
the concern of their customers.
In contrast, the novelist Jane Austen was very much
concerned with ways in which her characters could not
only transmit, acquire and store information, but also
use it, as discussed in http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/
projects/cogaff/misc/austen-info.html. She frequently referred
to information, not in Shannon’s sense, but in the much older
sense in which information is used, not merely transmitted or
stored.
3 TWO MAIN VARIETIES OF
INFORMATION USE
There are two fundamentally different roles that useful
information can have, as Hume noted in distinguishing “is”
(information about what is the case) from “ought” (information
about what to do) in his argument that “ought” can never be
derived from “is”. This distinction was elaborated by Elizabeth
Anscombe [1] as a difference in “direction of fit”.
For an information user there are some information contents
(which we can crudely label “desire-like information”) whose
role in an organism determines what should be done to the
world to make the world match the information content, and
other information contents (which we can crudely label “belief-
like information”) whose role is such that the information
should be altered when there is a mismatch with how the world
is. Both sorts are required for intelligent, or purposeful action,
or deliberate inaction.
Moreover, in both cases there is always the possibility of
an organism not being in a position to determine whether
the information item does or does not match reality – e.g.
whether some belief is true, or whether some desire or goal has
been satisfied. This can generate a new second order desire-
like information state, which specifies that an information gap
needs to be bridged. That new state can trigger action to fill the
information gap – which may either be done relatively simply
(e.g. by looking, sniffing, touching, etc.) or by engaging in
some sort of information-gathering research, e.g. to find out
whether food is available nearby and if so where it is.
As these examples show, there can be many processes by
which combinations of belief-like and desire-like information
states can generate actions to determine whether the belief-like
states actually fit the world or actions to make the world fit the
desire-like states. A rich theory of varieties of cognition and
affect can be based on the implications of this distinction as
pointed out (by Sloman, Chrisley and Scheutz) in [10].
The time scales involved and the scale of action required
to bridge these information gaps (finding out whether X is
true, or making X true) can vary enormously according to the
complexity of the information specification and the amount of
effort involved in checking whether X fits the facts or making
X fit the facts.
Things get more complex if individuals can have a
large and changing collection of desire-like and belief-like
information states, unlike a simple thermostat which has a
target temperature and a sensor providing information about
the gap between the current and target states, along with a
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mechanism for turning on or turning off a heat generator or heat
remover. It is often assumed that all desire-like information
states are concerned with achievement or maximisation of
some measurable reward or utility, but life is far too complex
for that: organisms have many different needs at different stages
of development and at different times and places, often needs
that coexist and conflict, e.g. a need to approach a source of
food when energy stores are low and a need to avoid detection
by a dangerous predator or rival. The assumption that these
needs can be compared on a common scale are as misguided
as the assumption that strength of materials and fuel energy of
materials can be compared on a common scale.
Figure 1. Many discontinuities in physical forms, behavioural
capabilities, environments, types of information acquired, types of use
of information and mechanisms for information-processing are still
waiting to be discovered.
As organisms became more complex with more complex
collections of biological needs and capabilities (crudely
indicated in Figure 1) the information processing requirements,
including both processing of information about what is the case
(belief-like information) and information about what should be
done (desire-like information) became increasingly complex,
involving not only immediate choices between different
possible movements, but comparisons involving various time
scales and various locations in which actions can be performed.
As a result, evolution produced not only huge variations
in physical forms and physical behavioural capabilities, but
also huge variations in types of information acquired and used
and variations in mechanisms for acquiring storing and using
information – leading to further problems of control of those
mechanisms – e.g. whether to think about where to get the next
meal or how to avoid the approaching predator, or where to find
a mate, or what to do to improve one’s information processing
abilities or physical abilities of various kinds.
In the case of humans, this led to a vocabulary that referred
to varieties of information state (mental state) and processes in
which such states change, in addition to a vocabulary referring
to varieties of physical state and physical process.
However, in the case of the physical sciences the “ordinary”
vocabulary was found to be in need of fundamental expansion
to cover states, processes and mechanisms that were previously
unknown but provided vastly superior understanding of the
physical world than our ancestors had, especially during the
last few centuries.
In contrast the sciences of mind are still, to a large extent,
like the ancient alchemist science, in a state that is groping
towards adequate explanatory concepts and mechanisms. I do
not believe that current theories are any more than a pale
shadow of the theories required for deep characterisations and
explanations of mental phenomena, both in humans, in other
animals and in future intelligent machines.
AI has begun to change this, during the last half century
or so, but we still have a long way to go, both in
understanding and in solving the problems. Current proposals
for information processing architectures and mechanisms are
still grossly inadequate in comparison with the complexity of
the phenomena to be explained.
In my presentation I’ll offer some conjectures, and evidence,
relating to required forms of explanation, including required
information processing architectures for explaining minds of
various kinds, how they develop, and how they evolve.
4 VARIATIONS IN EPIGENETIC
TRAJECTORIES
The description given so far is very abstract and allows
significantly different instantiations in different species,
addressing different sorts of functionality and different types of
design, e.g. of physical forms, behaviours, control mechanisms,
reproductive mechanisms, etc. In particular at one extreme the
reproductive process may produce individuals whose genome
exercises a standard pattern of control during development,
leading to “adults” with only minor individual differences.
At another extreme, instead of the process of development
from one stage to another being fixed in the genome, it can
be created during development through the use of two or more
levels of design in the genome, allowing different environments
to cause different choices in going from the initial design
to the adult form so that at intermediate stages not only
are there different developmental trajectories due to different
environmental parameters, there are also selections among the
intermediate level patterns to be instantiated. For example, for
the same species, in one environment development may include
much learning concerned with protection from freezing,
whereas in another environment individuals may vary more
in the ways they seek water during dry seasons, where
the differences in adults come partly from the influence of
the environment in selecting genetically available patterns to
instantiate during development of individuals. E.g. one group
may learn and pass on information about where the main water
holes are, and in another group individuals may learn and pass
on information about which plants are good sources of water
(with nutrients).
All of these things may happen automatically because of
patterns and meta-patterns picked up by earlier generations and
instantiated in cascades during development.
But it seems that evolution has found ways of providing even
richer developmental variation, by allowing the information
gathered by young individuals not merely to select and use
pre-stored design patterns, but to create new patterns by
assembling fragments of information during early development
and using newer, more abstract processes to construct new
abstract patterns, partly shaped by the environment, but with
the power to be used across variations in that environment.
This was called “Representational Re-description” by
Karmiloff-Smith in [4]. The best known example of this is
the way in which children develop (rather than learn) new
languages through cooperation with conspecifics, illustrated
most dramatically by Nicaraguan deaf children who produced a
new sign language because their sign language teachers had had
deprived childhoods because they had not learnt sign languages
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early enough.2 See also [6].
Only such a mechanism with such cascading alternations
between data-collection and abstraction formation (by
instantiating higher level abstractions, not by forming
statistical generalisations) could account for both the diversity
of human languages and the power of each one, all supported
by a common genome.
My suggestion, in agreement with Karmiloff-Smith is that
this process is not restricted to language development, but
occurs throughout childhood (and beyond) in connection with
many aspects of development of information processing. An
early version of this idea, crudely depicted in Figure 2, was
presented in [2], though there are many details still to be
developed.
Figure 2. The varieties of developmental trajectory proposed by
Chappell & Sloman. (Chris Miall helped with the original diagram)
This is very different from a form of learning or
development that uses a uniform method for repeatedly finding
patterns at different levels of abstraction, e.g. using statistical
generalisations.
Instead, on this model, the genome encodes increasingly
abstract and powerful creative mechanisms developed at
different stages of evolution, that are “awakened” (a notion also
used by Kant[3]) in individuals only when their time is ready, so
that they can build on what has already been learned or created
in a manner that is tailored to the current environment.
5 CHANGING DEVELOPMENTAL
TRAJECTORIES
As living things become more complex, increasingly varied
types of information are required for increasingly varied
uses. The processes of reproduction normally produce new
individuals that have seriously under-developed physical
structures and behavioural competences. Self-development
requires physical materials, but it also requires information
about what to do with the materials, including disassembling
and reassembling chemical structures at a microscopic level
and using the products to assemble larger body parts, while
constantly providing new materials, removing waste products
2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pjtioIFuNf8
and consuming energy. Some energy is stored and some is used
in assembly and other processes.
The earliest organisms can acquire and use information
about (i.e. sense) only internal states and processes and the
immediate external environment, e.g. pressure, temperature,
and presence of chemicals in the surrounding soup, with
all uses of information taking the form of immediate local
reactions, e.g. allowing a molecule through a membrane.
Some of the changes in types of information, types of
use of information and types of biological mechanism for
processing information have repeatedly altered the processes
of evolutionary morphogenesis that produce such changes: a
positive feedback process. A familiar example is the influence
of mate selection on evolution in intelligent organisms, since
mate selection is itself dependent on previous evolution of new
cognitive mechanisms. This is a process with multiple feedback
loops between new designs and new requirements (niches), as
suggested in [8]. Compare also the author’s presentation at the
Computing and Philosophy symposium at this conference.
As Figure 1 suggests, evolution constantly produces new
organisms that may or may not be larger than predecessors,
but are more complex both in the types of physical action they
can produce and also the types of information and types of
information-processing required for selection and control of
such actions.
These ideas, and those in [4] suggest that one of the effects of
biological evolution was fairly recent production of extremely,
but not totally, abstract construction kits that come into play at
different stages in development, that produce much more rapid
changes in variety and complexity of information processing
across generations than ever before. This idea is fairly familiar
as regards the role of a common genetic inheritance in enabling
hugely varied languages to be developed by humans in different
cultures. This pattern can be generalised to other aspects of
development, as suggested in Figure 2.
The talk will present some ideas about possible information
processing architectures capable of supporting diverse kinds of
variety among humans and other animals. I suggest that within
a century or two our ideas about how human minds work, and
the requirements for modelling them in intelligent machines,
will have changed at least as much as our ideas about physics
and chemistry have changed since the time of Galileo. Some
suggestions, regarding mechanisms and architectures can be
found in [9] and [11].
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Bowlby’s Attachment Control System Approach: An
Alternative History of Emotion Modelling
Dean Petters 1 and Everett Waters 2
Abstract.
Within the contemporary emotion modelling community historical
reviews look back to an exchange between Ulric Neisser and Her-
bert Simon. Neisser (1963) claimed that the serial computers of the
day could not effectively model emotion. Simon’s (1967) response
was that augmented with a variety of real time interrupt and goal-
management mechanisms they could. This paper presents an alterna-
tive history of an emotional modelling approach developed by John
Bowlby, in which he proposed emotional modelling mechanisms as a
scientifically respectable updating of psychoanalytic theory. This ap-
proach places comparatively less emphasis on emotional interrupts
and goal-management within a single locus of control, and respec-
tively more emphasis on how multiple mixed and often conflicting
goals can arise from conflicting internal working models which are
formed at different stages of development. A key conclusion is the
benefit for emotion modelling of the rich scenarios provided by at-
tachment phenomena.
1 A FAMILIAR HISTORY
In 1963, Ulric Neisser [47] published a critique of psychological
modelling. He recognised that computers provide valuable models
of purposive cognition, such as reasoning. However, he challenged
whether the modelling techniques of the day would provide adequate
explanations of psychological phenomena like: the parallel opera-
tion of multiple motives; bored and distracted thinking; other kinds
of minimally purpose cognition; unconscious processing; and above
all, social decision making. Neisser viewed the cognitive modelling
at this time as ‘indomitably’ single-minded and ‘too purposive’ to
match the richness and diversity of cognition in humans. He pointed
out that human information processing possesses a subtlety and flex-
ibility. Neisser recognised the issue was partly to do with the distinc-
tion between serial and parallel processes. However, whilst he pre-
supposed human cognition is parallel his criticism of the computa-
tional modelling of his day went beyond this assumption. He empha-
sised the depth as well as breadth of human cognition that provides
spontaneity, multiple motives, mixed motives, and even boredom. In
his view, the computers of that time did not possess the kinds of sub-
tle, complex, often conflicted and contradictory motives that would
distinguish them from one dimensional ‘shallow fictional characters’.
Simon [64] responded to Neisser’s challenge by accepting a gen-
eral theory of thinking and problem solving must incorporate motives
and emotions, and that the absence of such states was a major lacuna
of theories at that time. He then went on to illustrate how serial pro-
cessing can account for emotions as interrupts to ongoing serial pro-
1 Birmingham City University, UK, email: dean.petters@bcu.ac.uk
2 SUNY, Stony Brook, USA.
cesses by time-sharing of the processor between main tasks and inter-
rupt mechanisms, allowing a processor to respond to urgent needs in
real time. He also proposed a collection of goal-management mecha-
nisms allowing a processor to manage goals through satisficing, set-
ting aspiration levels, implementing impatience and discouragement
functions, using queues and individual time allocations, and making
choices among alternatives as responses to multiple criteria. These
mechanisms go a long way to adding subtlety and complexity to the
approaches which Neisser criticised. However, a key difference be-
tween Simon’s and Neisser’s approaches is, respectively, between a
serial system that processes multiple objectives in a rationale manner
through a single locus of control (and augmented with mechanisms to
manage real time needs and multiple constraints), and a system with
multiple loci of control and the kind of conflicting motives familiar
to psychoanalytic theory. Neisser makes this point with explicit ref-
erence to the requirement for conflicted multiple motives operating
at different levels:
“In the early days of psychoanalysis it was fashionable to
devalue the obvious motives in favor of the unconscious ones,
and to assume that cognitive activity was “nothing but” a way
to placate instinctual demands. This tendency is happily no
longer common: “rational” activities are unquestionably im-
portant in their own right to the person who engages in them.
But we must be careful not to let the availability of computer
models seduce us into the 19th century view of a man as a trans-
parently single-minded and logical creature”([47], p. 196)
Simon’s approach to modelling emotions as interrupts to pro-
cessing has been an inspiration for generations of AI researchers,
with this approach being expanded and modified in various ways
[69, 66, 37, 60, 63, 45, 44]. The current state of the field of computa-
tional emotion modelling has progressed a long way, but a limitation
of the contemporary ‘state of the art’ is that it has still not developed
a rich ecology of affective states like standards, values, preferences,
attitudes, attachments, motives, moods, ambitions, and other various
moral and aesthetic phenomena which are integrated with different
kinds of emotional interrupts to provide the subtleties and complexi-
ties of humans that were highlighted by Neisser.
This paper is an attempt to provide a historical review of an ap-
proach to computational emotion modelling set out by John Bowlby
in his development of the ‘attachment control system’ concept
that originated as an attempt to explain psychoanalytic complex-
ity. Bowlby’s approach assimilated an armoury of modelling tech-
niques from cybernetics, artificial intelligence and other scientific
approaches to explaining phenomena of interest to psychoanalysis.
This approach to emotion modelling did not originate with the ideas
of Neisser or Simon (it would seem Bowlby was entirely unaware of
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this work), but instead developed directly from psychoanalytic theory
and out of Bowlby’s attempt to update this theory from the emerging
sciences of the mind in a scientifically respectable manner. However,
what Neisser, Simon, Bowlby and psychoanalytic theory all held to
be true is that “Human thinking begins in an intimate association
with emotions and feelings which is never entirely lost.” ([64], p. 29).
2 ATTACHMENT WAS PRODUCED IN STAGES
Bowlby was spurred to develop Attachment Theory from his obser-
vation of the effects on human relationships of: war-time evacuation
[5]; the prohibition of parental hospital visits to their young children
[6]; the effect of early maternal deprivation on later development [7];
and the behavioural phases that are observed in long term separations
and grief and mourning in infancy [12]. For approximately thirty
years after the Second World War Bowlby’s theoretical approach
to explaining what we now term attachment phenomena progressed
from initially explaining these behavioural patterns in psychoanalytic
terms to invoking increasingly sophisticated information processing
structures and mechanisms [19, 2, 23, 42].
During Attachment Theory’s development Bowlby imported ideas
from diverse neighbouring disciplines to explain this range of phe-
nomena. Explanatory concepts which were newly prominent in the
general academic environment had a particularly strong influence as
Bowlby formulated elements of Attachment Theory at those times.
As he elucidated details of Attachment Theory he adopted new con-
cepts to substitute for particular psychoanalytic constructs which he
wanted to transform. Surveying the range of concepts Bowlby intro-
duced over time, we can make several generalizations. Firstly, he was
influenced by the changes in the intellectual milieu between 1950
and 1980. His initial thinking in the late 1940s and early 1950s had
a heavy psychoanalytic influence [10]; his earliest ‘loans’ were from
Ethology [11, 15]; his latest from Cognitive Psychology; and in be-
tween he focused on concepts from Cybernetics and Artificial Intel-
ligence [18, 20, 21, 19].
2.1 Before Attachment Theory: a psychoanalytic
theory of attachment
Bowlby became interested in personality development and the key
role played by an individual’s early caregiving environment before
he trained as a psychoanalyst ([2], p 333). His belief in the signifi-
cance of real life events on the course of child development set him
in conflict with several psychoanalysts with whom he worked at the
Tavistock Clinic in the late 1940s, resulting in his forming his own
research unit in 1948. At an early stage of his research career he
chose to focus on the effects of early separation from the mother
rather than other examples of disturbed family interaction. Bowlby
made this decision due to practical considerations, as he intended to
work within a scientific methodology which focused on analyzing
the effect of environmental conditions. This was in contrast to adopt-
ing the retrospective case study conducted by other psychoanalysts.
From Bowlby’s view, separation events were particularly suitable for
research as they were an event on record, whereas at that time there
was no adequate reporting or documentation for other forms of dis-
turbed family interaction ([2], p 334).
Bowlby’s departure from the mainstream of psychoanalysis was
also due to his awareness of problems with Freud’s motivational the-
ory. For Bowlby, this approach to motivation required revision be-
cause it was rooted in a drive theory which suggested infants were
primarily focused on their inner drives and drive representations, and
little interested in the social or physical environment per se. This
focus inwards was in part driven by the psychoanalystic retrospec-
tive case study method which Bowlby had rejected. Critiques from
psychology and philosophy of science also made clear that the drive
theory of motivation was not tenable. It was not well supported by
their own evidence, which itself was problematic, and seemed inac-
cessible to ordinary standards of empirical analysis and falsification
[22].
In 1951 Bowlby published a landmark report to the World Health
Organization which contained a substantial body of observations on
the mental health of children [9]. Although this report was principally
a survey of empirical work, it also illustrates the manner in which
Bowlby was attempting to reshape psychoanalytic theory. Bretherton
[23] notes that:
“it is interesting to examine the 1951 report from today’s
perspective. At that time Bowlby still used the terminology of
traditional psychoanalysis (love object, libidinal ties, ego, and
superego), but his ideas were little short of heretical.” ( [23], p.
50)
An example of Bowlby’s unorthodoxy which is highlighted by
Bretherton ([23], p. 51) is where Bowlby explains that the creation
of an infant’s ego and superego are formed in a process of interaction
with his mother:
“[The mother] is his ego and his superego. Gradually he
learns these arts himself, and as he does, the skilled parent
transfers the roles to him. This is a slow, subtle and continu-
ous process, beginning when he first learns to walk and feed
himself, and not ending completely until maturity is reached”
([9], p. 53, quoted in [23], p. 51).
According to Bretherton, this description: “sounds more Vygot-
skian than Freudian”, ([23], p. 51). Why did Bowlby attempt a trans-
formation of psychoanalytic terms like ego and superego rather than
just rejecting all of the psychoanalytic framework outright? Psycho-
analysis did possess a number of key insights into early experiences
and relationships which Bowlby valued and wanted to maintain in
his own approach [75]. He therefore wanted to reform psychoana-
lytic theory not replace it wholesale. However Bowlby, keenly aware
of the sociology of science, recognized that critics would likely throw
out the genuine insights along with the untenable motivation theory.
He also recognized that the useful insights about early experience and
relationships were logically independent of the drive theory. Central
then to his work on attachment theory at this stage was to find an
alternative approach to motivation. The key here was to avoid re-
placing one kind of magic (drives) with another (e.g., the infant in-
tends, signals, wants, needs, loves, etc. the mother) thereby incurring
what Dennett [29] calls “intelligence loans”, presumptions of intel-
ligence that are unlikely to be accounted for (“paid back”) [61]. As
we shall see, first in Ethology, and later in Cybernetics and Artificial
Intelligence, Bowlby found approaches that could account for what
he called ‘the apparently purposeful’ organization of observable at-
tachment behaviour without incurring such intelligence debts. The
example above, where Bowlby attempts to provide a causal origin
for the ego and superego is merely an early example of what he later
accomplished in a more radical and explicit manner.
As Ainsworth and Bowlby [2] recount, it was in the early 1950s
that:
“Bowlby[...] had begun a search for adequate explanation
of the empirical findings, having found none in current psycho-
analytic theories to account for young children’s responses to
SYMPOSIUM V. COMPUTATIONAL MODELLING OF EMOTION 132
Co
nfe
re
nc
e
ed
itio
n
separation and reunion, or indeed how the tie to the mother
develops. At this point Konrad Lorenz’s work on imprinting be-
came available in translation. Sensing its possible relevance
to his problem and encouraged by Julian Huxley, Bowlby be-
gan delving into the ethological literature. [...] During the early
1950s Bowlby was also deeply influenced by his membership in
an international and interdisciplinary study group on the psy-
chobiology of the child convened by the World Health Organ-
isation, which met annually. Among the members were Piaget,
Lorenz, and Margaret Mead, and among guest speakers were
Julian Huxley, von Bertalannfy, and Erik Erikson.”([2], p. 337)
Bowlby’s revision of psychoanalytic theory with an ethological
perspective occurred gradually. The transitional nature of Bowlby’s
theoretical perspective at this time is illustrated by Bowlby himself
in 1953, when he stated:
“I want to remark on three or four psychological processes
which may be relevant, and in doing so I shall speak in a hybrid,
bastard language which I have come to use, which derives from
both psychoanalysis and ethology” ([10], p. 183-184).
Bowlby did not experience an overnight conversion from a psy-
choanalytic view to the scientific view provided by the then nascent
disciplines of cybernetics, artificial intelligence and systems theory.
However, we can see from the meetings he attended and the int rac-
tions he engaged in at these meetings that he was inexorably moved
towards viewing attachment relations in scientifically respectable in-
formation processing terms3.
2.2 Attachment Theory proper: an evolutionary
ethological theory
After Robert Hinde (a leading ethologist) joined Bowlby’s seminar
group at the Tavistock clinic in 1954 the incorporation of ethologi-
cal theory in Bowlby’s conceptual development deepened. This col-
laboration helped contribute to Bowlby’s first formal statement of
attachment theory in his 1958 paper: ‘The Nature of the Child’s
Tie to his Mother’[11]. The three main ethological concepts which
Bowlby incorporated in this version of his theory were that: (1) at-
tachment behaviour are a species-specific behaviour patterns which
he termed ‘instinctual responses’; (2) these behaviour patterns are
activated and terminated by various external and internal stimuli and
(3) these simple sequences of behaviour are integrated into more
complex behavioural patterns ([11], p. 366). It is worth emphasis-
ing that although later theories provided more detail on how the at-
tachment system develops, even this early theory presents attachment
responses as not just preformed and waiting to be triggered or ma-
turing without experience but rather constructed through interaction
between infants and their caregiving environment4. The 1958 ver-
sion of Attachment Theory, with ethological instinctive behaviour as
3 For example, the transcript of the second meeting of the ’World Health
Organization Study Group on the Psychobiological Development of the
Child’, in 1954, records Bowlby and Grey Walter discussing the scientific
nature of the psychoanalytic ‘superego’ construct:
BOWLBY: The superego is rather complicated and contains more than one
variable
GREY WALTER: Can you measure the superego?
BOWLBY: You cannot.
GREY WALTER: Then what is the point of discussing it?
BOWLBY: I think it is useful to try and see how things relate in these psy-
chological functions after which we are dimly trying to grope.
([38], p. 205)
4 [73] provides a detailed account of Bowlby’s introduction to, and adoption
of, ethological theory.
a new substitute for the Freudian instinctive behaviour of Bowlby’s
previous approach, was in several respects only part-way towards
Bowlby’s final characterization of Attachment Theory.
2.2.1 Six papers between 1960 and 1963
Between his first presentation of Attachment Theory-proper in 1958,
and the 1969 publication of the first volume of the Attachment and
Loss Trilogy, Bowlby published six key papers that illustrate the
movement of his thinking in this period. He published two papers
concerned with empirical descriptions of separation anxiety [14, 16],
and three papers concerned with mourning, particularly in infancy,
[12, 13, 17]. In his 1960 paper: ‘Ethology and the Development of
Object Relations’[15], Bowlby considered how ethological mecha-
nisms can substitute for psychoanalytic concepts. For example, using
ideas from ethology in understanding the ontogeny of object rela-
tions and anxious, depressed and defensive responses which are trig-
gered by infant-mother separations. He considers the benefit of the
ethology inspired idea that attachment is a primary need which leads
to the emergence of reciprocal social relationships during ontogeny.
This theoretical innovation leads to the expectation that distress and
anxiety are normal expectations when separations occur, and that de-
pression and separation anxiety can be seen as different stages in
one process. Whilst he still refers to many psychoanalytic constructs
like ‘orality’, ‘repression’ and ‘symbolic substitutions’ he does spec-
ulate whether behaviour previously thought to arise from these mech-
anisms might be better described by ethological concepts. He gives
an example, where psychoanalysts would explain one activity taking
the place of another because of symbolic equivalence whereas this
may occur at an intrasymbolic level due to ethological displacement
activities.
2.3 The final ‘full-strength’ control system version
of Attachment Theory
2.3.1 Continuity and Change in theoretical developments
Bowlby reflected on the changing nature in his own theoretical ap-
proach during the 1960s, when he described the difference between
his 1958 version of his theory and the version in the 1969 first volume
of the Attachment and Loss Trilogy:
“The hypothesis proposed represents a development of that
advanced by me in 1958. The principal change is due to bet-
ter understanding of control theory and to recognition of the
very sophisticated forms that behavioural systems controlling
instinctive behaviour may take. In the present version of the hy-
pothesis it is postulated that, at some stage in the development
of the behavioural system responsible for attachment, proxim-
ity to mother becomes a set-goal. In the earlier version of the
theory five patterns of behaviour - sucking, clinging, following,
crying, and smiling - were described as contributing to attach-
ment. In the new version these same five patterns are still held
to be of great importance, but it is postulated that between the
ages of about nine and eighteen months they usually become in-
corporated into far more sophisticated goal-corrected systems.
These systems are so organised and activated that a child tends
to be maintained in proximity to his mother. [...] The earlier
version of the theory was described as a theory of component
instinctual responses. The new version can be described as a
control theory of attachment behaviour ([19], page 180,)
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Bowlby’s newer 1969 version of Attachment Theory shows the
continued importance of secure base behaviour with an increasing
role for mental representation. As a control theory, the newer frame-
work provides a greater focus on the attachment system as directed
towards outcomes as set-goals to be achieved from a flexible be-
havioural repertoire rather than a system that simply involves trigger-
ing preset responses. However, the new theory still includes a strong
ethological influence. Although the control systems formulation was
a major departure from Bowlby’s early instinct theory, he retained
his commitment to behavioural biology. For example, Bowlby still
presents the attachment system as an instinct to form bonds and as
a system that is activated by species specific patterns of care. In ad-
dition, Bowlbys new terminology of behaviour systems only masks
a core theoretical inheritance from his ethological instinct theory. As
Hinde notes:
“The concept of a behavioural system is, in fact related to
one meaning of the term instinct. [...] It has been used in a
rather special sense by ethologists to refer to systems postu-
lated as controlling a group of behaviour patterns that together
serve to achieve a given biological end”([41], p. 57).
The final version of Attachment Theory, which was set-out across
all three volumes of Bowlbys Attachment Trilogy [18, 20, 21, 19], in-
volves a richer and deeper conceptualization for attachment phenom-
ena. Within a control system framework, Bowlby’s three volume tril-
ogy included information processing concepts such as homeostasis,
hierarchical plans, internal working models, selective attention, and
meta-cognition5. These concepts provide a supporting framework for
explanations of a range of attachment phenomena. However, even
whilst Bowlby was providing an alternative to psychoanalytic expla-
nations for attachment behaviour, the range and type of phenomena
of interest to psychoanalysts provided much of his research agenda:
“The resulting conceptual framework is designed to accom-
modate all those phenomena to which Freud called attention
for example, love relations, separation, anxiety, mourning, de-
fense, anger, guilt, depression, trauma, emotional detachment,
sensitive periods in early life and so to offer an alternative of
the traditional metapsychology of psychoanalysis” ([19], page
668).
Although Bowlby claimed that the trilogy sets out an approach
which had already been fully conceived of at its initiation, there were
some limited changes in emphasis between the 1969 and 1980 publi-
cations. For example, the 1969 volume incorporated Cybernetic and
AI concepts and the 1973 and 1980 volumes show a switch in empha-
sis to Cognitive Psychology. This change is not surprising. Bowlby
noted that both his, and Freud’s previous formulations of instinc-
tive behaviour, were both “a reflection of the scientific climate of the
times” ([19], page 18). Clearly, to incorporate up-to-date citations in
the three volumes of his trilogy as he published them would involve
inclusion of some influences from contemporary theoretical sources.
However, how far Bowlby was influenced merely by the nature of the
ideas in current circulation at any given time should not be over em-
phasized. During the 30 years in which he constructed Attachment
Theory he selected particularly suitable concepts which matched his
5 Van der Horst [73] described Bowlbys adoption of an ethological frame-
work as an “Archimedean moment”[73], p. 3). However, the adoption of a
cybernetic and control systems framework in the late 1960s has as much
claim to be a core pivotal moment as the earlier adoption of ethology.
current requirements. So he did incorporate concepts from the cur-
rent literature, but from a wide set of candidate ideas he selected
those which possessed the appropriate properties and fitted within
his existing framework. For example, in both the first and third vol-
umes of the attachment trilogy psychoanalytic defensive processes
are reframed in terms of how sensory inputs are processed. However,
in the first volume this process is framed and referenced in terms of
neurophysiological processes, in particular drawing upon the work
of Magda Arnold ([19], page 103), whereas in the third volume the
same attachment phenomena are described in the newly fashionable
cognitive psychological terms of selective attention ([21], chapter 4).t
2.3.2 Control Systems
In the first volume of his Attachment Trilogy, Bowlby was continu-
ing his search to consolidate the conceptual foundation for Attach-
ment Theory by replacing Freud’s concept of Psychical energy and
its discharge ([19], p. 18). He introduced the control system concept
for this purpose, and set out a range of control systems of increas-
ing sophistication. For a simple example of a control system, which
acted as a regulator by keeping a single variable constant, Bowlby
presented the humble thermostat. He noted that this system was rela-
tively static (with a pre-set goal) and unable to act as a model of even
the simplest form of instinctive behaviour. However, Bowlby ([19],
p. 44) showed how this control system design might be elaborated by
allowing its goal setting to be determined by another control system.
He also sketches out further extensions to this simple design of a
greater sheer scale and complexity. In Bowlby’s thinking the impor-
tance of the intimate integration of different representational forms
we have set out is demonstrated when he noted:
“The mental apparatus can be thought of as made up of a
very large number of complex control systems, organized in a
loosely hierarchical way and with an enormous network of two-
way communications between them. At the top we postulate one
or more principal evaluators and controllers, closely linked to
long term memory and comprising a very large number of eval-
uation (appraisal) scales ranged in some order of precedence.
This system, or possibly federation of systems, I shall call the
Principal System (s), this leaving open the question whether it
is best regarded as singular or plural” ([21], p. 52).
This passage is one of the more explicit descriptions by Bowlby
for what contemporary researchers in cognitive modelling would
term an architectural solution to the problem of understanding attach-
ment phenomena. Though it is not a detailed description it does direct
research on attachment modelling to the exploration of how differ-
ent constituent parts for an attachment control system might be inte-
grated. Newell (1990) defined a cognitive architecture as: “the fixed
(or slowly varying) structure that forms the framework for the im-
mediate processes of cognitive performance and learning.” ([48], p.
12). So Bowlby’s conception of the attachment control system is cer-
tainly a cognitive architecture in this sense. The temporal structure of
attachment styles as long term control states, and related shorter term
states in particular attachment related episodes, can be compared
with other kinds of affective control states within cognitive architec-
tures [67]. Anderson [3] provides an outlook on cognitive architec-
tures that considers them formed of three factors: their function; the
structures and mechanisms they possess; and the computations they
perform. In the first volume of his Attachment Trilogy, Bowlby did
not just match interesting behaviours with potential information pro-
cessing structures and mechanisms. He also spent a great deal of this
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first volume concerned with explicating the evolutionary function of
attachment behaviour. Bowlby set out all the three required ingredi-
ents for an architectural analysis of attachment phenomena, namely:
empirically observed attachment behaviours; information processing
structures and mechanisms; and an evolutionary functional analysis
that matches these structures and mechanisms with the observed be-
havioural patterns. However, since Bell and Newell [4] didn’t coin
the term ‘cognitive architecture’ until 1971 it is understandable that
it was not adopted by Bowlby when he originally formulated Attach-
ment Theory, who instead used the term ‘attachment control system’.
2.3.3 Action Selection
Bowlby did not discuss how particular actions or behaviours were
selected using the contemporary term ‘action selection’. However,
he did present ethological mechanisms operating within the attach-
ment control system architecture as carrying out this role. In both the
1958 and later versions of Attachment Theory, the behaviours related
to attachment were organized according to four behaviour systems,
the attachment, fear, sociability and exploration systems. According
to Bowlby, what defines the attachment control system is not a set
behaviour repertoire but the outcomes that predictably follow from
these behaviours. Similar behaviours may be produced by different
behaviour systems. In addition, each behaviour system has its own
ontogenetic development, initially producing reflex actions and later
in infancy producing fixed action patterns which increase in the com-
plexity of their organisation in sequences and chains. Where in the
1958 theory attachment instincts were linked to the activation of par-
ticular behaviours (which can be viewed as having an implicit goal
in the sense of having a predictable outcome in environments sim-
ilar to the species environment of evolutionary adaptedness), in the
later theory they were linked to the achievement of particular goals
which are explicitly held as representations which can be achieved
by a variety of actions.
2.3.4 Hierarchical Planning
In the first volume of his trilogy, Bowlby also set out differences be-
tween control systems in terms of how the behaviours within them
are organized. He presented behavioural chaining as an example of
a simple organizing principle for control systems, and hierarchical
planning as much more complex and flexible ([18], p. 76). In this
approach, plans are composed of sub-plans, and each plan and sub-
plan is a set of instructions for action. So a high level plan can give a
main objective and general strategy, where subplans deal more with
the details of how to implement actions. However, Bowlby presents
a very broad range of planning types. He includes planning exam-
ples of both explicit human plans and planning carried out by rats
and other animals [18], p. 79-80). Although Bowlby presented con-
texts in which different kinds of plans would be formed, he did not
distinguish these planning examples in terms of the sorts of represen-
tational or computational details needed to implement running simu-
lations.
2.3.5 Internal Working Models
The concept of ‘Internal Working Models’ (IWMs) as important rep-
resentations within the attachment control system was also intro-
duced in the first volume of the attachment trilogy [18]. These are
described by Bowlby as higher level representational forms which
integrate and exert control over lower level control systems. Their
principal information processing function is to allow predictions to
be made about the likely outcomes of taking actions within a given
environment, and Bowlby notes: “the two working models each in-
dividual must have are referred to respectively as his environmental
model and his organismic model ( [18], p. 82). These two models
transmit, store and manipulate information and allow the individual
to “conduct small scale experiments within the head” ( [18], p. 81).
Their function, in terms of Bowlby’s agenda of reforming psychoana-
lytic theory, was to take the place of the internal worlds of traditional
psychoanalytic theory. In this first volume of the trilogy Bowlby em-
phasizes the requirements for IWMs to be updated. He also briefly
observes that pathological sequelae of separation and bereavement
can be understood in terms of out of date models or half revised mod-
els which may contain consistencies and confusions ([18], p. 82).
Bowlby invokes IWMs at early stages in development and later on,
when linguistic skills and conscious reflection can enable models to
become more adequate ([18], p. 84). As with his presentation of plan-
ning, he does not emphasize the representational details for IWMs.
Bowlby linked the construction of plans with the operation of In-
ternal Working Models:
“Not infrequently, many alternative plans are concocted,
their potential consequences imagined (on the basis of models
of environment and organism) and the consequences of each
plan appraised. Only after that is any particular plan put into
operation”([18], p. 114)
Petters [55] presents a historical review of the development of the
IWM concept in Bowlby’s writing and shows the change over time
from an analog to symbolic conception of IWMs. More recently, ar-
tificial neural networks, have been used to simulate how attachment
representations may change or remain stable over development. A
number of researchers have used Hopfield Artificial Neural Networks
to simulate prototype formation [70, 32]). Edalat and Mancinelli [32]
present a model that explains early attachment stability as arising
from strong patterns with large basins of attraction in Hopfield neu-
ral networks. Fraley [36] uses a synchronous auto-associator network
to investigate how early relationship prototypes respond to differing
schedules of subsequent experience. A key conclusion from these
artificial neural network simulations is that early prototypes are not
over-written, and so show greater continuity, when new relationship
experiences are inconsistent. But consistent presentation of new pro-
totypes does result in gradual change.
2.3.6 Stability and lability over ontogenetic development
Bowlby didn’t use the terms ‘precocial’ and ‘altricial’ to describe
stable or labile control systems, but the developmental trade-offs
he sketched for these contrasting systems match current concep-
tions in research on altricial and precocial patterns of development
in contemporary computational cognitive modelling [26]. For exam-
ple, Bowlby [18], p. 46) presents a developmental trade-off whereby
ontogenetic lability in a control system might result in a longer devel-
opmental duration, but may also result in this control system becom-
ing better adapted and more flexible than a stable fixed alternative.
Recent work has framed similar ideas in terms of altricial and pre-
cocial forms of development, within artificial systems which might
be used in computational modelling [26]. However, it is notable that
this recent work has additionally linked altricial development (which
corresponds to Bowlbys labile developmental pattern for control sys-
tems) with the development of higher level more explicit representa-
tional forms.
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2.3.7 Representational change through ontogenetic
development
Bowlby compared changes in the kinds of representations which in-
fants and children would possess in their attachment control systems
with representational forms such as sensorimotor, pre-conceptual and
symbolic representations which were theorized to occur in different
Piagetian stages ([18], p. 153). He also speculated that actions which
are automatically triggered early in development, such as feeding re-
flexes, might then be organized into causal hierarchies which can
then form part of plans with set-goals. ([18], p.160; [57], p. 54-55).
This appreciation of how representational forms can change early in
infancy was matched by an acknowledgement of the important role
played by language and symbolic forms of representation in later
stages of development:
“Thus whereas during infancy and childhood humans are
incapable of structuring their behaviour in any way more com-
plex than the simplest of plans, in adolescence and adulthood
behaviour is habitually structured on the basis of elaborate
plan hierarchies. This tremendous development on the sophisti-
cation of the behavioural organizations employed is made pos-
sible, of course, by the increasing capacity of the growing hu-
man child to use symbols, especially language.”([18], p. 155)
Bowlby recognized that natural language is the ultimate and most
sophisticated way in which an individual can represent themself
within their social environment. This form of representation has
the benefit that “instead of each one of us having to build his
environmental and organismic models entirely for himself, he can
draw on models built by others”([18], p. 82)6. A benefit of non-
communicative aspect of language is that the possession of language
allows more flexible and imaginative plans and sub-plans to be cre-
ated, and shared with others, constituting a possible form of therapy.
Significantly, Bowlby also recognized that the nature of early rep-
resentations are intimately linked with later patterns of behaviour, for
example:
“Man’s capacity to use language and other symbols, his
capacities to plan and build models, his capacities for long-
lasting collaboration with others and for interminable strife,
these make man what he is. All these processes have their origin
during the first three years of life, and all, moreover, are from
their earliest days enlisted in the organisation of the attachment
behaviour.”([18], p. 358)
2.3.8 Homeostatic control, purpose and teleology
In the second volume of the Attachment Trilogy, Bowlby adopted
the biological concept of homeostasis and applied it to behavioural
as well as physiological control systems. In this view, physiologi-
cal homeostasis which regulates food and sleep are an inner ring
6 This is a 1969 description which presages Dennett’s 1995 description of
Gregorian Minds. The similarity may not be coincidental. Dennett termed
‘Gregorian Minds’ after Richard Gregory. The first author of this paper met
Richard Gregory and in a subsequent email exchange, in February 2010,
Richard Gregory wrote: “ I spent exactly one whole day with John Bowlby
when he came to Bristol to visit me and we had a really great day. For most
of the time we talked about what we were doing in the Brain and Perception
laboratory in the Medical School but we did also talk about his work and
I have spent quite a lot of time reading his papers and commenting on
them. He did indeed have very wide interests and did think in terms of
cybernetics and especially interacting machines. I must say I liked him very
much indeed, and he certainly had a sharp and imaginative mind.”
of control. The attachment system constitutes an outer ‘behavioural’
ring which is a complement of this inner ‘physiological’ control sys-
tem (Bowlby 1973, chapter 9). Bowlby discussed how Sommerhoff’s
ideas in ‘Analytic Biology [71] provided an explanatory framework
which showed how apparently goal-directed behaviour can result
from physical systems without the presence of rational agents, con-
scious mental processes, or explicitly held goals ( [71], p. 66). Petters
[55] compares the approach taken by Bowlby to homeostatical con-
trol by the attachment control system to the autopoetic approach in
contemporary enactivism.
2.3.9 Defensive processes, consciousness and model
construction
Bowlby explained defensive processes in terms of multiple working
models. Some working models are open to conscious access. Some
are unconscious but still highly influential, and so act as “a version
in different terms, of Freud’s hypothesis of a dynamic unconscious”
([20] p. 238). Bowlby also suggests IWMs can be formed with in-
compatible information, some of which becomes dominant and ex-
erts influence either consciously or unconsciously:
“In a person suffering from emotional disturbance it is
common to find that the model that has the greatest influence
is one that developed during his early years and is constructed
on fairly primitive lines, but that the person himself may be rel-
atively, or completely, unaware of; while simultaneously there
is operating in him a second, and perhaps radically incompat-
ible, model, that developed later, that is much more sophisti-
cated, that the person is more nearly aware of and that he may
mistakenly suppose to be dominant.” ([20] p. 238).
In this passage Bowlby is setting out forms of interaction and dif-
ferences in representation which provide another strong requirement
for contemporary models of attachment. Bowlby also linked the op-
eration of information processing with conscious awareness:
“Reflection suggests that many of the mental processes of
which we are most keenly conscious are processes concerned
with the building of models, with revising or extending them,
checking them for internal consistency, or drawing on them for
making a novel plan to reach a set-goal. Although it is certainly
not necessary for all such processes always to be conscious, it
is probably necessary that some should be so sometimes. In
particular, it seems likely that revising, extending and check-
ing of models are ill done or done not at all unless a model is
subjected from time to time to whatever special benefits accrue
from becoming conscious”([18], p. 82).
The expectation that IWMs are sometimes open to conscious re-
flection provides a further strong constraint for computational mod-
els.
2.3.10 Therapy as meta-management
In the third volume of the Attachment Trilogy [21], Bowlby drew for
new inspiration upon material from the emerging field of Cognitive
Psychology. He explained Freudian defensive processes in terms of
selective attention ([21], chapter 4), and explained recall, reflection
and potential internal conflict in self image in terms of the distinction
between episodic and semantic memory ([21], pages 61-64). Lastly,
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but of particular pertinence to computational modelling, Bowlby de-
scribes how much of our habitual processing is automatic and por-
trays the kinds of reflective meta-processing on mental life which
occurs in therapy (at least when therapy is successful) in explicitly
computational terms:
“The psychological state may then be likened to that of a
computer that, once programmed, produces its results auto-
matically when activated. Provided the programme is the one
required, all is well. [When] representational models and pro-
grammes are well adapted, the fact that they are drawn on au-
tomatically and without awareness is a great advantage. When
however, they are not well adapted, for whatever reason, the
disadvantages of the arrangement become serious.
For the task is of changing an over-learned programme of
action and/or of appraisal is enormously exacerbated when
rules long implemented by the evaluative system forbid its be-
ing reviewed. [...] A psychological state of this kind in which a
ban on reviewing models and action systems is effected outside
awareness is one encountered frequently during psychother-
apy. It indicates the existence of another stage of processing at
which defensive exclusion can also take place, different to the
stage at which perceptual defence takes place. ([21], p. 55-56)
What Bowlby is referring to when he discusses therapy are meta-
processes such as self-reflection and meta-management [68]. Self-
reflection is a less precise term and is involves an organisms or
software agent reasoning about itself [54]. The lack of precision
is in part because contemporary cognitive science does not have
a clear theory of phenomena posited at the ‘personal’ (as opposed
to ‘sub-personal’) level of description [27]. Beaudoin defines meta-
management more precisely as managing management processes
(some of which might be meta-management processes”. For exam-
ple meta-management processes control management processes by
deciding when to make decisions (such as adopting a goal), and to
decide which management processes to activate (such as managing
by ruminating or managing by reacting with a well practiced and
automatised routine (such as count to ten before responding). [68]
provides a recent review of meta-management in the context of meta-
cognition. However, this remains an under-explored area of artificial
intelligence and cognitive systems research ([74], p. 12).
3 CONCLUSION
Attachment Theory originated from theories set out by Freud, Klein
and other psychoanalysts. However, Bowlby ultimately formed a
clear distinction between Attachment Theory and Psychoanalytic
Theory by explaining the richness, broad scope and complexity of
behavioural phenomena which interest psychoanalysts in informa-
tion processing terms which are congruent with contemporary cog-
nitive science constructs. Bowlby’s last publication was a historical
review of Attachment Theory, co-authored with Mary Ainsworth [2],
and published posthumously in 1991 (a year after Bowlby’s death
in 1990). This historical review concentrates more on the early and
medium term history of Attachment Theory rather than develop-
ments occurring around the time of its publication. However, in 1990
Emde [43] published a short review of developments in attachment
research in that period, which he characterised as ’The Third Phase
Of Attachment Research’. In his view, Bowlby’s departure from the
British Object Relations School of psychoanalysis was a first phase
of attachment research. Mary Ainsworth and co-workers move to
study individual differences in infant attachment constitutes a sec-
ond phase which revitalised attachment research because it helped
link theory to individual experience and clinical concepts. Emde pro-
posed a third phase of attachment research was occurring at the time
he wrote. It involved attachment research moving beyond infancy to
observe and measure individual differences in the pre-school years.
To do this new assessment approaches wer created to move away
from concentration on the Strange Situation Procedure [1] and ad-
dress more complex behaviours of toddlers and pre-schoolers.
Since the 1990s the variety and scope of approaches has greatly
broadened [25]. Contemporary directions in Attachment Theory in-
clude a deepening of areas which were already of interest to Bowlby,
including: the caregiving system [33]; evolutionary [65]; and psy-
chopathological [28] perspectives. New directions for Attachment
Theory with regard to the behavioural phenomena of interest to
Attachment Theory researchers include: romantic relationship [34];
comparative [72]; and cross-cultural [46] perspectives. The scope of
Attachment Theory has broadened so that some contemporary re-
search can be viewed as of a type with contemporary social psychol-
ogy [40] and other research fits within the area of cognitive psychol-
ogy [31].
Of particular interest to computational emotion modellers is re-
search relevant to understanding how the attachment control system
is implemented neurally and physiologically. This includes biolog-
ical [39] and imaging research on the neuroscience of attachment
[24]. A question for computational modellers is whether these con-
temporary perspectives replace or complement the particular attach-
ment control system approach that Bowlby set out. In addition, whilst
this review has demonstrated that Bowlby’s attachment control sys-
tem construct was a clear departure from psychoanalytic structures
and mechanisms, researchers of a psychoanalytic persuasion still
make a contribution to attachment research. For example, Fonagy
suggests that from a psychoanalytic perspective, Attachment Theory
and Psychoanalysis are heading towards the same end point, with
regard to the phenomena they are trying to explain [35]. Fonagy sug-
gests that from this psychoanalytic perspective Attachment Theory
can seem ‘method-bound’ because of the strong focus on a set of
validated measures:
[Attachment Theory’s] “scope was determined less by what
fell within the domain defined by relationship phenomena in-
volving a caretaking-dependent dyad and more by the range
of groups and behaviors to which the preferred mode of ob-
servation, the strange situation, the adult attachment inter-
view, and so forth, could be productively applied. This shel-
tered the theory from a range of ideas that clinical psychoana-
lysts evolved, particularly in the context of analytic work with
increasingly severely disturbed chronic personality-disordered
individuals.”([35], pp 472-473).
Therefore, Fonagy suggests that Attachment Theory might bene-
fit from engaging with clinical discoveries of psychoanalysts. Psy-
choanalysts have also taken issue with the explanatory power of
Bowlby’s attachment control system constructs [35]. For example,
the psychoanalyst Jeremy Holmes suggests that Attachment Theory
lacks complexity because it provides less focus on emotional phan-
tasy about loss ([42] pp 6-7). To sum up Attachment Theory research
since Bowlby, whilst contemporary Attachment Theory is diverse
and multifaceted with many varied perspectives, most of these per-
spectives involve collecting new kinds of empirical data not new un-
derlying information processing explanations for Attachment The-
ory. The jury is still out whether new biological and imaging results
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will replace or complement Bowlby’s psychological level formula-
tion of the attachment control system.
Petters and Waters [58] provide a review of recent attempts in
computational attachment modelling. These include autonomous
software agent models, robotic models, multi-generational evolution-
ary models and artificial neural network models. However, when this
range of studies is compared to the breadth and depth of phenomena
that Bowlby discussed it is apparent that taken together the collec-
tion of all existing attachment models is rather incomplete in two
senses. Firstly, this collection provides just a few examples of possi-
ble models of the attachment control system. So the relatively small
number of extant attachment models gives a sparse coverage of pos-
sible models. Secondly, the simulations that have been created are
relatively simple compared to Bowlby’s idea of a complex hierarchy
of control systems ([21], p. 52).
A key direction for future work in a computational modelling ap-
proach to attachment is to systematically explore the architectural
design space of possible attachment control systems. What are the
options a modeller might choose from in designing cognitive archi-
tectures? One way to classify different architectures is by the nature
of the subsystems they possess. For very simple architectures, with
few subsystems in uncomplicated arrangements, this might be a rea-
sonable approach. For example how infants respond in separation
and reunion episodes might be simulated using predictive processing
[55]; or the verbal interchange between adults discussing attachment
issues might be simulated using general cognitive principles such
as frequency and decay memory functions rather than specific lan-
guage processing mechanisms [56]. However, for complex architec-
tures it may be that defining architectures by their component parts
may make no sense. For architectures which are sufficiently rich,
with numerous independent components, functional differentiation
of components and a variety of causal linkages, how the components
are arranged will be highly influential in determining the architec-
ture’s capabilities [67, 76]. It may even be that when architectural
components have some minimal sufficient structural variability and
speed of operation, then the arrangement of the components becomes
crucial. This idea phrased more succinctly is that “architecture dom-
inates mechanism - global design normally determines global capa-
bilities to a greater extent than implementation details” ([76], p.104).
In the context of attachment modelling: how the attachment control
system’s components are arranged may matter more than the perfor-
mance details of each component.
Dennett portrays two contrasting approaches to pursuing a deeper
understanding of the information processing architectures: “At one
pole, are AI visionaries who don’t write actual programs but settle
instead for facts about specs for any successful program for one task
or another, and at the other pole, hard bitten engineering types who
aren’t impressed until they see code that actually runs and does the
job. The rest, they sneer, is not software, it is vapourware” ([30],
p. 139). Bowlby’s approach was clearly of the ‘visionary’ variety.
Much contemporary emotion modelling is ‘hard bitten’ engineer-
ing in the sense that it is strongly constrained by the requirement
to produce working simulations, even if these are relatively narrow
in scope or application. The challenge for the field of attachment
modelling is whilst producing running simulations to not lose site
of Bowlby’s complex vision of the overall attachment control sys-
tem and the richness of phenomena it explains. A key conclusion
for this historical review is the value of the rich, deep, broad and
complex modelling scenarios that the attachment domain provides.
Empirical attachment data cover the lifespan of social and emotional
development, in caregiving and romantic relationships. Attachment
is also researched from evolutionary, comparative, biological, cross-
cultural, clinical, emotion-regulation, and educational perspectives
[25], providing a storehouse of constraints for computational attach-
ment models.
4 CODA - A COUNTERFACTUAL
ALTERNATIVE HISTORY
After concluding a historical account of the development of the at-
tachment control system in the section above, this final section of the
paper will do something different by speculating about how Attach-
ment Theory might have developed if history had gone differently.
The systemic family therapy practitioner Robin Routledge [62] de-
scribes Bowlby’s (1949) paper: ‘The Study and Reduction of Group
Tensions in the Family’ [8] as possessing a clear systemic perspec-
tive and approach. It therefore predates other examples of systemic
analysis and systemic family therapy- being written in the 1940s at a
time of scientific origin for many branches of modern psychotherapy.
Routledge notes that whilst the Attachment Theory that was devel-
oped subsequently to this paper was an extension away from Object
Relations Psychodynamic Theory, it was actually an even bigger step
away from the more systemic view found in the 1949 paper. Rout-
ledge quotes John Byng-Hall’s recollection that Bowlby took this
decision because he believed the infant-mother dyad “was complex
enough itself” (Bing-Hall quoted in [62], p 17) and needed to be
explained before the broader family system was investigated. This
leaves Routledge pondering ‘what might have been’ in attachment
research if Bowlby had made a different decision at this time. There-
fore a final thought in this alternative history is to imagine a counter
factual alternative history for Attachment Theory, more strongly fo-
cused on dyads embedded in broader systems. Computational tech-
niques for modelling emotion with multi-agent systems might spear-
head this sort of integrated research today - using existing attachment
models to simulate wider family systems.
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An Immersive Virtual Reality Mobile Platform for
Self-Attachment
David Cittern and Abbas Edalat and Ibrahim Ghaznavi 1
Abstract. Psychotherapy is among the most effective techniques for
combating mental health issues, and virtual reality is beginning to be
explored as a way to enhance the efficacy of various psychotherapeu-
tic treatments. In this paper we propose an immersive virtual reality
mobile platform for Self-Attachment psychotherapy. Under the Self-
Attachment therapeutic framework, the causes of disorders such as
chronic anxiety and depression are traced back to the quality of the
individual’s attachment with their primary caregiver during child-
hood. Our proposed platform aims to assist the user in enhancing
their capacities for self-regulation of emotion, by means of earning
secure attachment through the experience of positive attachment in-
teractions, missed in their childhood. In the virtual environment pro-
vided by the platform, the adult-self of the user learns to create and
strengthen an affectional and supportive bond with the inner-child.
It is hypothesised that by long term potentiation and neuroplasticity,
the user gradually develops new neural pathways and matures into
an effective secure attachment object for the inner-child, thereby en-
abling the self-regulation of emotions.
1 INTRODUCTION
Globally, Dysthymia (chronic depression) occurs in about 105 mil-
lion people per year (or approximately 1.5% of the population) [31],
and about 4% of people worldwide are affected by Generalised Anx-
iety Disorder (chronic anxiety) at some point during their life [7].
Self-Attachment is a new, self-administrable, attachment-based psy-
chotherapy which starts from the premise that at the root of many
affect dysregulation, mood and anxiety disorders is a suboptimal at-
tachment experience during early childhood [21, 10, 11]. Showing
success in initial preclinical trials, the therapy aims to naturally stim-
ulate the release of oxytocin and dopamine in order to promote neu-
ral plasticity in key attachment related areas of the brain, in order
to enhance the individual’s capacities to self-regulate their emotion.
This is achieved by the application of a number of attachment-based
protocols involving, for example, the mental simulation of interac-
tions with a good-enough caregiver. Application of these protocols
supplies the individual with the unconditional affection and love that
characterises secure forms of attachment, which provides scaffold-
ing for the development of mental resilience and overall emotional
well-being.
The purpose of this paper is to overview Self-Attachment ther-
apy, and outline how recent advances in mobile Virtual Reality (VR)
technology can be leveraged to assist in its undertaking (an idea first
proposed in [9]). In particular, we will overview the features of an
1 Algorithmic Human Development, Department of Com-
puting, Imperial College London, SW7 2AZ, UK, email:
{david.cittern10,a.edalat,s.ghaznavi16}@imperial.ac.uk. Authors listed in
alphabetical order.
initial prototype mobile app and VR environment that has been de-
veloped to this end, before outlining our plans for the development
of a new and immersive (sensorily-rich) VR platform to aid the user
in effectively undertaking the simulatory aspects of the therapy.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section
2 we discuss related work on VR for mental health, and in Section
3 we detail Self-Attachment therapy along with neurobiological hy-
potheses with regards to its effects on brain regions involved in emo-
tion regulation. An overview of the functionality of our VR mobile
platform for Self-Attachment is given in Section 4. We conclude the
paper in Section 5.
2 RELATEDWORK
Technological and web-based platforms have, for a number of years,
been used to assist in the administration of various psychotherapeutic
treatments (e.g. [25]). Recent advances in the field of VR have shown
promise in the pursuit of devising new techniques for the treatment of
a variety of psychological and medical conditions involving phobias,
pain, anxiety and depression, and meta-analyses have shown that in-
dividuals perform better than controls on post-treatment behavioural
and self-report assessments, and similarly to those undergoing (often
more costly and less customisable) in-vivo treatments, in response to
VR-based exposure therapies for specific phobias [22] and anxiety
disorders [23]. Here we overview some key relevant platforms.
Rizzo et al. [26] developed Bravemind: an interactive VR-based
exposure therapy tool which allows psychotherapists to immerse
post-traumatic stress disorder patients into virtual environments in
a controlled, stepwise fashion. This immersive VR platform enables
the clinician to control multi-sensory emotional stimuli and monitor
the intensity of the patient’s stress via brain imaging and psychophys-
iological assessment. Rizzo et al. [27] also developed the STRIVE
immersive VR platform for stress treatment. Veterans are first ex-
posed to a virtual war-like environment in order to provoke physi-
cal, social and emotional stress, and after each war episode a virtual
mentor explains the underlying causes and physiology of stress. Then
in the second stage physical, social and cognitive exercises utilising
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) are undertaken.
Fernando et al. [14] uses VR to treat anxiety and phobias, with
customised virtual environments designed according to the specific
type of phobia. The platform, dubbed ‘Phobos’, also has support for
standard CBT treatments. Freeman at al. [16] uses immersive VR
technology to treat patients experiencing persecutory delusions by
enabling them to test the threat predictions in virtual social environ-
ments. Results of a randomised controlled trail study of the proposed
therapy revealed reductions in delusional conviction and real-world
distress.
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Hoffman at al. [18] makes use of VR to create a virtual environ-
ment containing snow and water, with the aim of relieving burn pa-
tients from their pain. The main idea is to immerse the patient in
this virtual environment in order to drain their attention resources
(which would otherwise be used to process pain signals). The team
conducted fMRI brain scans which revealed a significant reduction
in pain-related brain activity in response to using the application.
Garrett et al. [17] propose Virtual Mediatative Walk (VMW), an im-
mersive VR environment incorporating sensors and sound, which is
intended to help chronic pain patients practice mindfulness-based
stress reduction. Patients experiencing pain can see their mirrored
version and using VMW they learn to control inner emotional states
to reduce pain.
A concept closely related to Self-Attachment is security priming,
which involves temporarily activating mental representations relat-
ing to the availability of a secure attachment figure (using sublim-
inal, visual or imagery techniques) in order to reduce distress and
restore positive mood [21, 3]. Also closely related are recent studies
that have experimented with virtual embodiment-switching within
the context of mental health, which (as we will see in the next sec-
tion) is a process undertaken during Self-Attachment therapy. Osimo
et al. [24] uses virtual embodiment as a method for improving pa-
tient mood. In their experiments the individual was first embodied
in a virtual body that closely resembled themselves, from which they
described a personal problem to another virtual body representing Dr
Sigmund Freud. Then, in the second part of the experiment, the in-
dividual was embodied in the virtual Freud, from which they offered
their virtual self counselling. This virtual embodiment technique is
proposed to result in sufficient detachment from conventional and ha-
bitual ways of thinking about problems, and can ultimately be used to
create and retain positive cognitive changes. Falconer et al.[13] uses
immersive VR to enable patients to practice self-compassion. First
the individual is embodied in a virtual representation of themselves
in order to deliver compassion towards a (generic) distressed virtual
child. Then, the individual is embodied in the virtual child and ex-
periences receiving compassion from their virtual self. Participants
undertaking this procedure were found to decrease self-criticism and
depressive symptoms, and increase self-compassion.
3 SELF-ATTACHMENT THERAPY
Self-Attachment is a new attachment-based psychotherapy that has
recently been proposed as a method for re-training an individual’s
sub-optimal attachment schema [9, 10, 11]. Showing success in pre-
clinical trials, the therapy is rooted in the idea that many affect dys-
regulation disorders have their basis in early insecure attachment ex-
periences [11], and consists of a number of self-administrable pro-
tocols which aim to recreate the effects of positive infant-parent in-
teractions using instead interactions that are fully internalised within
the individual.
Under the Self-Attachment paradigm, the individual undergoing
therapy is conceptualised as comprising both an inner-child and
adult-self. The inner-child corresponds to the emotional self that be-
comes dominant under stress, whereas the adult-self relates to the
more rational part of the self, dominant under times of calm and low
perceived threat. The aim of the therapy is to create a secure attach-
ment and affectional bond between the adult-self and inner-child in
order to enhance the capacity for emotion regulation within the indi-
vidual and this is achieved using techniques such as mental imagery,
which has the capacity to evoke emotional responses at neurophysi-
ological and subjective levels and has been utilised in a wide variety
of psychotherapeutic contexts [19], and VR, detailed in forthcoming
Section 4.
3.1 Stages
The four stages of Self-Attachment are outlined below [10, 11, 12]:
1. Introduction to Self-Attachment. In this preliminary stage the in-
dividual becomes familiar with the scientific basis and underly-
ing hypotheses of the therapy. This includes a basic introduction
to attachment theory; the basics of the (developmental) neurobi-
ology of attachment, love, bond making and emotion regulation;
and the mechanisms of neuroplasticity and long term potentiation.
The aim of this phase is to provide the initial motivation for under-
taking the therapy, which requires dedication and self-discipline in
terms of time and commitment.
2. Connecting with the inner-child. In this second stage of the ther-
apy, the individual begins to create a relationship with the inner-
child with a view to establishing empathy and ultimately compas-
sion with them. The individual selects both a positive photograph
or their childhood (which elicits emotions and memories such as
happiness or contentment) and a sad photograph (associated with
negative affect). Several highly-structured exercises (termed pro-
tocols), focused towards these images, are then conducted in order
to conceptualise the inner-child as concretely as possible. These
protocols include (for example), with closed eyes, trying to visu-
alise the two chosen childhood photos, and attempting to imagine
that the child that they were is present and close to them and that
they can touch and hold this child.
3. Building an affectional bond with the inner-child. During this
stage of the therapy an imaginative but passionate affectional bond
is created with the inner-child, which is subjectively experienced
as falling in love with them. The adult-self adopts the inner-child
and vows to consistently support and love them, in order to re-
process previously traumatic experiences and re-parent them to-
war s a state in which they are able to self-regulate their emotion.
From the perspective of the adult-self, the individual focuses on
the images of the inner-child and attempts to bond with them, in
order to create an attachment relationship. This bonding process
is enhanced with the use of activities such as self-massage, to sim-
ulate the act of cuddling the inner-child, and (overt and/or imag-
ined) song and dance directed towards the inner-child which (as
we briefly outline below) are hypothesised to induce neural plas-
ticity in key attachment-related neural circuitry.
4. Developmental re-training and re-parenting of the inner-child. The
next stage of the therapy involves a number of protocols describ-
ing patterns of interaction between the adult-self and inner-child
that emulate the function of a good enough parent interacting with
a securely attached child, in order to minimise negative emotions
and maximise positive affect. One example is a protocol that in-
volves the reprocessing of painful and traumatic past events: first,
the individual closes their eyes and recalls a traumatic childhood
episode, remembering and re-experiencing in as much detail as
possible the associated negative emotions (such as fear or help-
lessness). Once this state has been recalled, the individual imag-
ines that their adult-self quickly and competently intervenes in or-
der to reduce distress in the inner-child, for example by embracing
or vocally reassuring them. As for the bonding protocols, this can
be enhanced with various activities: for example the individual can
assist in imagining an embrace with the use of self massage. Other
examples of protocols are those which use imagery techniques in
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order to minimise negative and maximise positive affects. The aim
is for these protocols to become habituated with repetition, and so
the individual is encouraged to integrate them into their everyday
activities.
Notice that the therapy makes much use of visualisation and im-
agery techniques: this is because the early attachment type of a child
is formed in the pre-verbal years, during which the visual senses are
relatively influential. Accordingly, the individual is additionally en-
couraged to gradually construct a visually potent picture of the cre-
ation of their secure attachment object as they progress through each
stage of the therapy. This might be, for example, in the form of a new
and solid house which is incrementally constructed to replace a dark
and derelict shelter (depicting the previous insecure attachment).
3.2 Hypotheses on Neurobiological Effects
Much of our work to date has focused on formulating and computa-
tionally simulating neurobiological hypotheses with respect to the
underlying effects on the individual’s brain of practising the pro-
tocols concerned with the creation of a bond between the adult-
self and inner-child. The attachment schema has been theorised to
be based in unconscious and implicit memories, rooted mainly in
right-hemispheric brain regions centred on the Orbitofrontal Cortex
(OFC), amygdala and hypothalamus [6]; areas known to be central
to a range of social cognition and emotional processing functions. In
the framework outlined by Rolls [28] (which we broadly follow in
our work) the OFC is involved in emotion, (reinforcement) learning
and decision making as a result of two primary functions. The first of
these functions is its representation of the reward (anything that an
individual will work to acquire) and punishment (anything that they
will work to avoid) value of primarily reinforcing stimuli (e.g. food
or pain, that are positively or negatively reinforcing, i.e. will increase
or decrease the probability of repeating behaviours paired with them
innately and without learning), with OFC activity representing many
different types of primary reinforcer (including taste, pleasant and
painful touch, and visual and auditory stimuli). The second func-
tion is the OFC’s involvement in the learning and reversal of asso-
ciations between previously neutral stimuli and primary reinforcers,
such that these previously neutral stimuli become rewarding or pun-
ishing themselves. Rolls argues that emotions are states elicited by
reinforcers, defined in terms of the withholding or administration of
rewards and punishments (for example, non-delivery of an expected
reward might lead to anger, while delivery of a punishment might
elicit a state of fear).
Based on existing neurobiological data, we have previously hy-
pothesised [5] that a main effect of the Self-Attachment bonding pro-
tocols (stage 3) is to associate broad classes of social stimuli that have
previously been conditioned as being fearful or threatening in nature
with representations of additional, naturally-induced reward (which
result from the various interactions associated with the protocols, e.g.
directed singing with inner-child imagery, that induce dopamine re-
lease). We proposed that these new associations in the OFC should
increasingly facilitate endogenous oxytocin release (associated with
a range of bonding and attachment-related behaviours) and restrain
the release of corticotropin-releasing hormone (the precursor to cor-
tisol, the stress hormone) via strengthening of an inhibitory pathway
to the amygdala.
In [4] we considered how the formation of an empathic state with
the inner-child (stage 2) might stimulate neural circuitry otherwise
implicated in the onset of caregiving behaviour, in order to generate
motivation for the application of these bonding protocols. Based on
data concerning the strength of the empathic response with respect
to the perceived innocence and closeness/relatedness of the other, we
proposed that the particular representation used in Self-Attachment
therapy for the target of this bonding (the inner-child) would assist in
stimulating this motivational pathway.
4 VR FOR SELF-ATTACHMENT
VR, the state of the art human-computer interface, uses computer
graphics to create a realistic-looking virtual world that the user can
interact with in real-time. In recent years, tech giants including Face-
book (Oculus), Google (Daydream, Cardboard and Jump), Sony
Playstation (PlaystationVR) and HTC (Vive) have begun to provide
powerful mass market VR solutions, and immersive VR platforms,
tools and technologies are now commonly used in a wide variety of
sectors including military, healthcare, education, entertainment and
construction, as well as for scientific visualisation purposes.
Our group has recently developed an initial prototype app and VR
platform to assist the user in undertaking aspects of Self-Attachment
therapy [30]. Since mobile phones are the most widely used technol-
ogy worldwide (with, according to the United Nations, an estimated
6 billion global subscriptions), for reasons of accessibility we have
chosen the use the Google Android mobile platform (with Cardboard
VR). Here we overview the key features of this initial prototype app.
Firstly, the app includes informational videos relating to appropri-
ate and affectionate attachment behaviour between a child and pri-
mary caregiver, along with textual information relating to the theo-
retical aspects of the therapy. The mobile app includes functionality
for managing the digital content (e.g. the happy/sad childhood pho-
tos, and designated favourite songs) utilised throughout the therapy,
and after each exercise the user is prompted to write a diary entry
to help them consolidate what they have experienced and learned
(which includes speech-to-text functionality for dictation of entries).
This digital content is stored in a ‘memory bank’, which the user can
view in a style similar to flash cards (serving to induce active mem-
ory recall). The app allows the user to complete well-established self-
report questionnaires on anxiety [29], depression [20] and attachment
[15], with scores presented visually in order to communicate their
progress. Launched from within this mobile app, our prototype VR
platform allows the user to focus on their happy and sad childhood
images within a virtual environment resembling a small garden, to
assist with undertaking the protocols in stages 2 and 3.
A number of additional features are planned for the final app.
Firstly, in order to assist in the first stage of the therapy, the app
will include additional informational videos which introduce and
overview the therapy, and provide motivational testimonials from
participants who have experienced improvement after undergoing
Self-Attachment. We will additionally offer tutorial videos for the
head, shoulder and neck massages involved in other stages in case
participants are not familiar with these techniques. The user will also
have the ability to print their happy childhood photos from within the
app, since the third stage of the therapy requires that copies be placed
in different areas of the living space. Playback of the self-designated
happy songs will now include the option to display lyric subtitles in
order to encourage engagement, and the app will automatically and
periodically ask the user to complete the self-report questionnaires
(rather than this being reliant on user initiative). Finally, pop-up no-
tifications will be used to gently remind the individual to undertake
the required exercises should they be neglecting their obligations.
We plan to expand on the functionality of the prototype VR en-
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vironment to incorporate embodiment in adult-self and inner-child
avatars so that the user can carry out the protocols relating to bond-
ing and parenting, and we anticipate that relatively inexpensive add-
on hardware (e.g. [1]) can be used to optionally enhance the sense of
immersion by means of tracking (and virtually replicating) the move-
ments of the individual’s own body. While the implementation of
the Self-Attachment protocols will involve the adult-self interacting
with an inner-child avatar that is customised in order to have as close
a resemblance to the user’s own previous (childhood) self as possi-
ble, our underlying VR platform will also accommodate implemen-
tation of the experiment undertaken by [13] (described previously)
involving a generic child, as well as techniques from security priming
(e.g. the presentation of subliminal pictures or names of participant-
designated security-enhancing attachment figures, if available), such
that we can compare the relative efficacy of these procedures.
Another potential feature that we are exploring is that of an in-
ternal dialogue: when the inner-child’s attachment system is active,
we envisage them opening a conversational dialogue with the adult-
self. This would involve the inner-child first describing their current
concerns and/or emotional state to the adult-self, followed by an ap-
propriate (soothing) response from the adult-self, with a series of
exchanges ensuing until the inner-child’s regains emotional balance.
This functionality might be implemented in the form of a conversa-
tional agent which has the ability to recognise the emotional and/or
verbal content of the inner-child’s dialogue at each stage, and to sub-
sequently present an appropriate response aimed at soothing or calm-
ing them (see e.g. [2] for real-time speech emotion and sentiment
recognition in an interactive dialogue system). Automated speech
analysis techniques might additionally aid in determining the sever-
ity of depressive symptoms [8] to assist in tracking therapy progress.
5 CONCLUSION
Self-Attachment is a new psychotherapeutic technique for re-training
an individual’s sub-optimal attachment schema, involving the regu-
lar practice of self-administrable protocols which aim to recreate the
positive effects of affectionate infant-parent interactions. In this pa-
per we briefly overviewed Self-Attachment along with our hypothe-
ses regarding its effects on parts of the individual’s brain involved
in emotion regulation, and reviewed recent works that have success-
fully used VR for the treatment of various medical (including men-
tal health) conditions. Based on this, we proposed a new immersive
VR mobile platform to assist with administration of the protocols in-
volved in Self-Attachment therapy and outlined its key functionality.
Development of this platform is now underway, and our aim moving
forwards is to conduct a randomised controlled trial in order to fully
assess its efficacy in treating chronic anxiety and depression.
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Perturbance: Unifying Research on Emotion, Intrusive 
Mentation and Other Psychological Phenomena with AI
Luc P. Beaudoin1, Sylwia Hyniewska2 and Eva Hudlicka3  
Abstract.  Intrusive mentation, rumination, obsession, and 
worry, referred to by Watkins [1] as "repetitive thought" (RT), 
are of great interest to psychology. This is partly because every 
typical adult is subject to "RT". A critical feature of "RT" is of  
transdiagnostic significance—for example obsessive compulsive 
disorder, insomnia and addictions involve unconstructive “RT”. 
We argue that “RT” cannot be understood in isolation but must 
rather be considered within models of whole minds. Researchers 
must adopt the designer stance in the tradition of Artificial 
Intelligence augmented by systematic conceptual analysis [2]. 
This means developing, exploring and implementing cognitive-
affective architectures. Empirical research on "RT" needs to be 
driven by such theories, and theorizing about “RT” needs to 
consider such data. We draw attention to H-CogAff theory of 
mind (motive processing, emotion, etc.) and a class of emotions 
it posits called perturbance (or tertiary emotions) [3,4], as a 
foundation for the research programme we advocate. Briefly, a 
perturbance is a mental state in which motivators tend to disrupt 
executive processes. We argue that grief,  limerence (the 
attraction phase of romantic love) and a host of other 
psychological phenomena involving "RT" should be 
conceptualized in terms of perturbance and related design-based 
constructs. We call for new taxonomies of "RT" in terms of 
information processing architectures such as  H-CogAff. We 
claim general theories of emotion also need to recognize 
perturbance and other architecture-based aspects of emotion. 
Meanwhile “cognitive” architectures need to consider 
requirements of autonomous agency, leading to cognitive-
affective architectures. 
12 
In the evenings she peeped out at him from the bookcase, from 
the fireplace, from the corner — he heard her breathing, the 
caressing rustle of her dress. In the street he watched the 
women, looking for someone like her. (“The Lady with the Dog”, 
Anton Chekhov.) 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Over 35 years ago, Aaron Sloman and Monica Croucher 
launched a research programme based on an important , subtle 
insight that had first been suggested by Herbert Simon [61]: 
Humans have emotions for the same reason that future robots 
will, as a consequence of interacting information processing 
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mechanisms that address the requirements of autonomous 
agency [5,6]. This theory was grounded in Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) and conceptual analysis. From 1990 to 2005 the ensuing 
Cognition and Affect (CogAff) project (mainly at the University 
of Birmingham, England) actively pursued this insight, by 
exploring, implementing, assessing and refining requirements, 
and software tools, and developing cognitive-affective 
architectures capable of modelling the hypothesized affective 
processes[7]. 
Sloman ultimately proposed three major types of emotion: 
primary, secondary and tertiary [3]. Tertiary emotion, the focus 
of [5,6] where it is simply called ‘emotion’, is also the focus of 
this paper; for reasons explained below, we refer to it as 
perturbance [4]. In a nutshell, in order for a motive to disturb 
deliberative processes, such as problem solving, it must 
implicitly or explicitly be assigned a sufficiently high insistence 
level. A perturbance is a state in which an insistent motivator 
tends to distract or alter deliberative processes in a manner that 
is difficult for reflective processes to suppress or control. These 
terms are briefly described below, and more extensively in 
various CogAff project publications we cite. In short, the 
concept of perturbance provides a parsimonious, design-based 
way of understanding the obsessive aspects of emotion-like 
states, wherein the agent experiences a certain loss of control of 
attention and hence of management processes.  
In this paper, we argue that perturbance is a major feature of 
the human mind that has been ignored by psychologists but 
deserves considerable attention. This concept has the potential to 
unify several areas of study, including fundamental processes 
such as attention, emotion and emotion regulation, cognitive 
phenomena such as intrusive thought, and psychopathological 
conditions such as rumination, obsessive worrying and 
addictions. Like any theoretical concept, the concept of 
perturbance does not stand alone. It is meaningful, promising 
and useful because of the theoretical framework within which it 
is embedded: a) the CogAff architecture schema, and b) H-
CogAff, a particular architecture based on CogAff which is 
aimed specifically at understanding humans [3].  
Whereas Sloman made significant attempts to disseminate the 
design-based approach and H-CogAff to emotion and AI 
researchers, the impact on the psychology literature so far has 
been minimal, due to various factors some of which we will 
allude to here. Meanwhile, affective computing (AC), a 
discipline of computer science that focuses on emotion, 
including emotion modelling, is gaining momentum. However, 
AC currently tends to pursue narrow problems relevant to 
practical applications focusing on primary emotions (e.g., 
machine perception of primary emotions). In AC, there is almost 
no research on automatically detecting perturbance, let alone 
attempts to produce systems that can experience and monitor 
perturbance. This is the case despite the fact that Sloman’s work, 
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including the concept of perturbance, was described in Rosalind 
Picard influential Affective Computing [65]. Sloman, who was 
one of the first AI researchers to systematically emphasize 
computational architectures, did foresee that AC would be a 
long road [66]. Still, AI’s highly visible progress, and its work 
on architectures, bode well for AC. We believe that history will 
prove Sloman’s theory of perturbance is a “sleeping beauty”. 
According to [8] these “beauties” tend to ‘awaken’ when they 
are discovered by a new community of researchers.  
This paper is meant to promote consideration of H-CogAff by 
indicating its relevance to many phenomena and research 
communities, while focusing on one of its original concepts, 
perturbance. However, we only have space for a cursory 
overview of the theory itself.  For more information about it, see 
[2-7,9-10] and other papers cited below. 
2 WHY HUMANS HAVE PERTURBANT 
EMOTIONS AND HIGHLY AUTONOMOUS 
ROBOTS WILL TOO  
Sloman & Croucher [5,6] claimed emotions will emerge as side-
effects in minds designed to meet the requirements of 
autonomous agency. These challenges include dealing with 
multiple endogenous sources of motivation with limited physical 
and processing resources in a rapidly changing, unpredictable, 
and only partially controllable environment. Autonomous agents 
require relatively simple mechanisms to generate and activate 
goals. For various a priori reasons their deliberative mechanisms 
have limited parallelism (see [4] ch. 4 and [61]) . 
Not every activated goal can be considered simultaneously by 
deliberative processes. There must be comparatively simple 
mechanisms to decide whether the deliberative layer of the 
architecture may be interrupted (or otherwise influenced) by a 
given goal. These include insistence assignment, which 
heuristically reflects the importance and urgency of a goal, and 
interrupt filtering. For example, if a hungry autonomous agent 
detects a rare opportunity to consume a source of energy, a new 
goal to approach the source may be triggered. However, in order 
for this goal to even be considered, it needs to be sufficiently 
insistent to penetrate the attention filter and interrupt current 
executive processing and behaviour. If the agent is under attack, 
its executive processes might not even notice its goal to 
approach the source because the filter threshold will have been 
raised higher than the insistence level of the goal to approach. As 
any good software designer knows, designing software involves 
trade-offs. It’s impossible to design perfect insistence and 
filtering rules. Sometimes, the robot will tend to be distracted by 
its own insistent goals that it keeps rejecting (e.g., to approach an 
appealing agent the pursuit of whom would violate its norms or 
other goals—conflicted robot love.) Thus, not all emotion-like 
states need be built into a robot; perturbant emotions will 
emerge.  
Sloman, Beaudoin and their colleagues on H-CogAff project 
continued to be challenged by psychologists who insisted that 
the states they were describing were not really emotions. 
Meanwhile, psychologists still do not agree on the meaning of 
the word “emotion” [11-13], a highly polymorphous concept in 
ordinary language. In order to avoid pointless turf wars over a 
label and to stimulate progressive research, Beaudoin [4] coined 
the term “perturbance” for Sloman’s original technical concept 
of emotion [5]. Since then, one has been able to say there are 
perturbant emotions (or perturbant states), while allowing 
researchers to stipulate other types of emotion. We prefer the 
term ‘perturbance’ to ‘tertiary emotion’ (introduced later by 
Sloman [3]) because the former denotes a more general 
concept—e.g., it can be interpreted in terms of  architectures 
with more than three layers. 
Perturbance is of considerable adaptive significance because 
it is an affection of the human brain’s executive processes, which 
govern the agent.   
Alas, internal attentional disturbance still does not figure 
prominently in general theories of human emotion (e.g., [13,14]). 
Ironically, it is in a biological theory of emotion that such 
disturbance is highlighted, in what Panksepp & Biven [15] also 
call tertiary emotions. Unfortunately, the architecture-based 
concept of perturbance is still not used widely outside H-
CogAff. Yet the loss of control of attention of many emotional 
episodes needs to be accounted for in such terms. We believe 
that the concept of perturbance and its label still need to be 
disseminated. It is our hope that this paper will help the idea gain 
acceptance and treat this alexithymia in the literature on affect. 
 3 H-CogAff: AN AUTONOMOUS AGENT 
ARCHITECTURE 
The concept of perturbance is part of a design-based research 
programme that proposes a class of mental architectures 
(CogAff) whose particular instance, H-CogAff, is the backdrop 
of this paper [7]. H-CogAff is a response to human autonomous 
agency requirements emanating from that programme. They 
were alluded to above, and elaborated in [4]. A sketch of H-
CogAff is presented next to the more generic CogAff schema in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. CogAff schema and H-CogAff architecture diagrams 
from [3] 
This highly interconnected architecture assumes mechanisms 
for perceiving and affecting the environment, generating alarms, 
and creating and activating goals (and other types of motivators) 
in real-time, synchronously and asynchronously from executive 
processes. There are two broad types of executive processes: 
deliberative processes (manifold base level reasoning, 
evaluating, planning, scheduling, deciding, and control, also 
known as management processes) and meta-management 
processes (reflection and high-level control), localized in the 
upper two levels of the H-CogAff architecture. The meta-
management layer could, for instance, postpone the 
consideration of a newly activated goal till some juncture — 
deliberation scheduling. The “reactive” layer is more closely 
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coupled to the environment than the other two. H-CogAff 
supposes variable-threshold qualitative and quantitative interrupt 
filters, which protect limited-capacity executive processes. A 
detailed specification of the structure of goals and the H-CogAff 
processes operating on them is provided in [4]. 
On the basis of this architecture, Sloman was able to 
distinguish three types of emotion [3,16]. Primary emotion 
involves alarms triggered by perceptual information, such as an 
angry glare or the unexpected appearance of the object of one’s 
infatuation. Secondary emotion involves alarms triggered by 
noticing an executive layer’s content (e.g., suddenly realizing a 
plan of action will or would have a disastrous side-effect). 
Alarms have global effects in the architecture, physiological or 
exclusively mental. Tertiary emotion—more generally, 
perturbance—involves an interaction, between motive 
activators, filters, deliberative and meta-management processes, 
etc. In perturbance, even if the deliberative layer were to 
postpone consideration of an insistent motivator, the motivator 
would still tend to penetrate the filter and divert deliberative 
processes; or the motivator might maintain control of executive 
processes. Perturbance is an emergent phenomenon; special 
cases aside, it is not necessarily adaptive or maladaptive. 
Adaptiveness and function are attributes of the architecture and 
its constituent mechanisms.    
The potential of this theory for psychology derives partly 
from the research methods, the designer stance [67], that gave 
rise to it. This stance can address a deep issue that surrounds but 
has not previously been explicitly linked to psychology’s 
“replication crisis” [17]. Psychology often lacks sufficient theory 
for the  phenomena it empirically investigates.  We call for (1) a 
better explicit characterization of human capabilities, an 
exploration of mental architectures (designs), and 
implementations [2]; and (2) empirical research driven by 
unified theories of mind [18,19]. Cognitive architectures, still 
largely ignored in psychology, are not enough; affective 
processes deserve equal consideration. H-CogAff is still 
incomplete; but it is a starting point worth considering.  
4 TWO PERTURBANT EMOTIONS 
Let us consider two emotions that can last for months, are 
eminently perturbant, but are insufficiently explained by general 
theories of emotion: grief and limerence. Perhaps this oversight 
is because these emotions cannot ethically be manipulated in the 
laboratory. Empirical psychology needs to be more concerned 
with explaining observed individual possibilities in detail 
(Newell, 1973), including detailed case studies, diary studies, 
correspondence studies (e.g., [20]) and fiction ([21-23]). 
Researchers could do worse than to try to design minds that 
support the perturbant emotions depicted in humanity’s greatest 
works of romantic poetry and fiction —such as of the main 
characters in Shakespeare’s Romeo & Juliet and Chekhov’s The 
Lady with the Dog. 
Grief. When grieving, one tends to be assailed by memories 
and motives about the deceased. Wright, Sloman & Beaudoin 
[24,25] offered a design-based explanation of emotion, 
illustrated by a case study of grief, in which they claimed grief is 
(often) “an extended process of cognitive reorganization 
characterized by the occurrence of negatively valenced 
perturbant states caused by an attachment structure reacting to 
news of the death.” That theory addresses important questions 
such as: Why does grief consume the mourner? Because 
executive processes have limited capacity and become swamped 
by highly insistent motivators generated by a structure of 
attachment to a highly valued individual; in addition, re-learning 
and detachment require extensive rumination, which can 
maintain perturbance.  
Limerence. The prototypical perturbant state is limerence: 
The nearly universal attraction phase of romantic love [26,27]. 
Notably, limerence researchers agree that limerence is 
characterized by focused attention on and intrusive mentation 
(IM) about the limerent object (LO) with manifold intense and 
insistent motives for union with the LO ([26]). Limerence is of 
great evolutionary and human significance, because it enhances 
the likelihood of mating—and, in most cultures, attaching to the 
LO, which helps offspring survive [28]. Yet affective scientists 
have hardly considered the phenomenon as a generally 
representative and illuminating emotion, let alone from the 
designer stance.  
A defining feature of perturbance is diminishment of the 
already limited human capacity to control one’s own attention. 
Consider a limerent’s diary entry ““This obsession has infected 
my brain. I cannot shake those constantly intruding thoughts of 
you. Every thought winds back to you no matter how hard I try 
to direct its course in other directions.”” [26]).  Many, perhaps 
most, limerent minds are aware of this intrusiveness. This is only 
possible because (unlike most species) humans can, to a limited 
extent, monitor and voluntarily control their attention (i.e., 
execute meta-management functions). 
The H-CogAff framework seems to be at least as promising 
for limerence as it is for grief—two emotions that normally 
operate in opposite ways on attachment structures. Limerence, 
the attraction phase, involves establishing attachment structures: 
motivators, motive generators, insistence assignment rules, other 
reactive processes, filters, plans, etc. Grief is an extended 
process of dismantling such attachment structures. Limerence 
and grief overlap in heartbreak and lovelornness. Also like grief, 
limerence can loosen prior attachment (facilitating the 
abandonment of one’s current partner for a new one, or 
forgetting a prior love). Accounting for attachment processes is 
important given that emotions seem to have evolved in large part 
to enable individuals to indirectly manage each other via 
commitments and attachments [29]. Several H-CogAff projects 
have already examined perturbance in relation to attachment 
(e.g., [30]). 
While it may be tempting to cast limerence as a pathological 
form of romantic love [31,32], this would distort the original and 
common academic conception of limerence [33]. This would 
also overlook the near universality and evolutionary significance 
of limerence. Like other obsessions and other emotional states, 
limerence lies on continua [34] and may or may not be 
pathological. We believe the distorted casting should be resisted 
by scholars; instead other terms should be used to describe 
pathological limerence. We also recommend that scientific 
literature on this phase converge on the term ‘limerence’ and 
help shape folk psychology.  
There is more to limerence than perturbance, just as there is 
more to motive processing and emotions than perturbance.  
Perturbance is a particularly promising concept partly because 
it encourages questions to be raised progressively about mental 
states in terms of whole-mind design (motive generators, 
attachment structures, etc.), leading to further requirement and 
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design specification. Perturbance cannot be understood in 
isolation. It transcends folk psychology and the intentional 
stance. 
5 REPETITIVE AND INTRUSIVE 
MENTATION INVOLVE PERTURBANCE 
Watkins [1] suggested that an important attentional 
phenomenon should be conceptualized as “repetitive thought” 
(RT). He echoed a definition of RT as a “process of thinking 
attentively, repetitively or frequently about one’s self and one’s 
world [forming] the core of a number of different models of 
adjustment and maladjustment.” (p. 163) Under the banner of 
RT, Watkins included such varied phenomena as cognitive and 
emotional processing of persistent intrusions, depressive 
rumination, perseverative cognition, rumination, worry, 
planning, problem solving, and mental simulation, mind 
wandering, counterfactual thinking, post-event rumination, 
defensive pessimism, positive rumination, reflection, habitual 
negative self-thinking. To this list we would add obsessive and 
compulsive mentation and cravings. Watkins notes that worry, 
for instance, was defined in [35] as “a chain of thoughts and 
images, negatively affect-laden and relatively uncontrollable” 
and as “an attempt to engage in mental problem-solving on an 
issue whose outcome is uncertain but contains the possibility of 
one or more negative outcomes” (p. 9). 
Watkins’s reasons for favouring RT as the overarching 
concept were that it is more inclusive than the alternatives, 
atheoretical, clearer, highly correlated with measures of worry 
and rumination, and non-evaluative (constructive or 
unconstructive). 
We agree that RT phenomena are scientifically significant. 
For many of them are typical of normal self-regulation—
everyone experiences IM, for instance. Furthermore, extreme 
forms of RT are transdiagnostic [36]. RT plays a critical role in 
insomnia and depression, for instance [37]. Insomnia also is of 
transdiagnostic significance [37]—a cause and consequence of 
RT.  
However, Watkins’ RT conceptualization is limited. Firstly, 
the expression “RT” misleadingly suggests that the repetitive 
content is cognitive in the traditional sense (“thought”), whereas 
it is often affectively-laden. Moreover, the processes that 
manage the ‘repetitive’ mental content serve these motivators, 
such as assessing and deciding. Repetitive mentation (RM) is 
more inclusive and germane. Further, the atheoretical criterion is 
unrealistic and counterproductive; it also runs against Watkins’s 
other criterion of being conceptually clear. One needs a general 
theory, beyond folk psychology, in relation to which intrusions 
and the executive processes that respond to them are specified. 
(Compare progress in evolutionary classification based on 
molecular genetics rather than phenotypic features.) Whether 
authors are explicit and clear or not about their theory, the 
concepts at play in RT involve, or at least require, a functional 
architecture. For something must be generating motivators; 
something must be interrupting in intrusions; something must be 
considering goals; something must be prioritizing them; etc. 
These mechanisms need to be named and specified in relation to 
an architecture. The theory ought to “cut nature at its joints” and 
be amenable to a progressive research programme of simulation, 
further theoretical development and cumulative empirical 
research [38]. Furthermore, the all inclusive RT 
conceptualization comes at the cost of papering over significant 
differences, for instance between reflection and rumination. The 
farrago of “RT” concepts requires conceptual analysis and 
functional specification, which will lead to much pruning and 
reclassification.  
The phenomena of RM are too global, involving too many 
diverse wide-ranging mechanisms of mind, to be understood 
without reference to a broad and explicit theory of mind. 
Moreover, one must understand the how of normal information 
processing (IP) to assess mentation as constructive or 
unconstructive. Alas, the RT literature has failed to adopt or 
develop architectural models of mind. For instance, in describing 
a highly studied phenomenon of RM, affective biases, Mathews, 
Mackintosh & Fulcher [39] invoke interrupt signals, attentional 
vigilance, effortful suppression and intrusions. The concepts of 
cognitive and attentional ‘biases’ [68], are currently cast mainly 
in terms of ‘external and internal stimuli’ rather than in terms of 
goal or motive processing (contrast [4-5,61]), i.e., the 
mechanisms that are being affected. The attentional bias and RM 
literatures fail to invoke an overall model of mind which, for 
instance generates motives, prioritizes, them and acts upon them, 
i.e., that addresses the types of capabilities with which H-CogAff 
is concerned. 
Wells & Mathews published a book length theory, the Self-
Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) model [40], that 
valiantly attempts to address many phenomena at the intersection 
of cognition and affect, including RT. The model is explicitly 
inspired by architecture-based AI. However, the empirical RT 
literature seems at most to pay lip service to it. For instance, in 
their extensive book on transdiagnostic processes, Harvey et al. 
[36] summarily reject S-REF. It is not noted that and how S-REF 
would need to be improved to address more of the requirements 
of autonomous agency — normal multi-purpose (multi-motive) 
competence. The main issue, that this promising underdeveloped 
theory needed AI attention was not mentioned. 
Watkins (2008) and others point to control theory as an 
explanatory framework for “RT” and self-regulation. While 
some of these models are promising (e.g., [41]), they too need to 
be integrated with a broader architecture.  They need to deal with 
rich qualitative control states and mechanisms that follow from 
the requirements of autonomous agency (see [42]). 
H-CogAff provides a theoretical framework in relation to 
which classification and modelling may proceed. This 
framework has the advantage of being constructed to explore 
how human minds might solve real world problems of 
autonomous agency. It is by no means a complete or detailed 
specification; but it has proven to be useful for generating and 
exploring models, many of which have already been 
implemented [7,9]. 
H-CogAff offers a path towards a deeper conceptualization of 
“RT”. In [1], intrusive thought (IT) is not a category of RT, 
likely because it is an essential aspect of RT. IT is better, and 
more generally, conceived as intrusive mentation (IM), and more 
deeply as perturbance. The concept of perturbance is based on 
the dispositional concept of insistence of mental content: a 
motivator may be insistent and yet not disrupt processing. To 
understand IM as perturbance we must specify in terms of an 
architecture (like H-CogAff) the ways in which insistence 
assignment, interrupt filtering and attention switching are 
effected. 
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This may also help address the need in the RT literature for a 
design-based taxonomy of patterns of executive processes. [4] 
and [25] put forth several categories, such as oscillation between 
decisions, manifest perturbance, digressions and maundering. 
Several other patterns have been identified in the CogAffect 
project (e.g., [25,43]). These, and several types of phenomena 
labelled by Watkins as RT (such as worry and rumination) need 
to be systematically characterized in terms of patterns of 
interaction between management, reflective and reactive 
processes in H-CogAff. 
6 OTHER PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURES 
IN NEED OF PERTURBANCE AND RELATED 
ARCHITECTURAL CONCEPTS 
Several other research problems need to be reinterpreted 
specifically in terms of perturbance and, more generally, from 
the designer stance. Motivation in psychology tends to be 
conceived as the directing and energizing of behaviour [44] 
(what goals do people choose; when, why, and how intensely do 
they pursue them), rather than in terms of motive processing 
(how can motives be processed to evince autonomous agency). 
For instance, none of the Behavior & Brain Sciences peer 
responses to the Selfish Goal theory [45] noted its lack of 
explicit architecture nor that its goal specification and processes 
are bare (e.g., where is insistence? Contrast [4]). Pleasure and 
avoidance of pain are still normally assumed to be the final ends, 
while the deeper, more subtle and generative possibility of 
architecture-based motivation [46] is ignored  even in rare 
discussions of effectance ([41]; contrast [47]). Stanovich  
developed a promising theory [48] to explain and improve 
rationality with a three-level architecture which, although 
referring to H-CogAff, fails to use motive processing constructs. 
Yet the perturbance theory was meant to account for breakdowns 
in rationality [5]. Meanwhile, the recent theory of cognitive 
energetics [49], which is meant to explain all instances of  goal-
directed thinking, also lacks an architecture (contrast the related 
concept of economy of mind in Wright [25]). 
Given that perturbance is an underlying construct to explain 
RT, and RT is transdiagnostic, it stands to reason that the 
concept of perturbance is relevant to transdiagnostic approaches. 
For instance, addictions involve motivators that are both insistent 
(attention grabbing) and intense (control behaviour). Obsessions 
and compulsions also involve perturbance. More generally, a 
design-based approach is required for transdiagnostic 
understanding [50]. Even more generally, to understand 
abnormal psychology we must understand normal psychology in 
design-based terms. 
Pain in its various forms involves aversive perturbance and 
should be modelled with H-CogAff or related designs.  
Beaudoin [47] argued that mindfulness-based therapies, 
which are either explicitly behaviourist [51]  or use architectures 
detached from AI, could benefit from H-CogAff. Mindfulness 
therapies assume direct experience [51]. But no one has ever 
built a machine that can directly perceive anything, nor 
demonstrated the possibility of such a machine—perception is in 
fact always highly indirect. Mindfulness therapies prescribe 
awareness of emotion, but by this term their authors mainly refer 
to affective feelings. Shouldn’t therapists and clients be trained 
with a rich design-based theory of mind to improve clients’ 
awareness, i.e., models of themselves? Similarly, the acceptance 
and commitment therapy (ACT) technique of “cognitive 
defusion” [51] requires an IP ontology of mental states that ACT 
fails to invoke. 
Perturbance is also quite relevant to human memory. 
Following Anderson’s adaptive explanation of memory [62], 
Beaudoin [47] proposed the heuristic relevance-signaling 
hypothesis (“HRS”) from the designer stance. On a daily basis, 
humans process enormous amounts of information. The brain 
cannot deeply interpret it all, nor store all of its interpretations. 
Nor can the cortex directly signal relevance top down (The direct 
command “I shall remember this phone number” does not work.) 
What information should be given precedence? Testing effects 
are amongst the most well documented findings in empirical 
psychology: repeatedly recalling information potentiates it. The 
HRS hypothesis states that deliberative layer recall attempts are 
implicit cues to the brain’s heuristic memory indexing 
mechanisms to prioritize access to information (‘memories’) 
related to the perturbance—information (interpretations, 
narratives, etc.) that the deliberative layer has at least attempted 
to recall (reconstruct). Perturbances are hijackings of these 
mechanisms by insistent motivators, potentiating memories 
related to the perturbant objects (e.g., the limerent object). 
Psychology has struggled with the question: in what respect 
can the experience of music in particular and art more generally 
be emotional? From the designer stance we might similarly ask 
how can great art rivet us and reverberate within us, from catchy 
ear worms to more? We suggest a new answer based on H-
CogAff theory, namely that music and fiction may trigger an 
illusion of perturbance: the reflective-layer impression that the 
agent is experiencing a genuine perturbance (as if self-generated 
motives were  insistently being activated, captivating 
management processes). More obviously, art likely often 
operates by increasing the insistence of one’s own latent 
motivators (triggering limerence and grief, for instance).  To 
explore and specify these vague hypotheses, we suggest 
modeling responses to high-calibre, multi-modal art depicting 
limerence and grief that uses repetition in provocative ways, 
such as Veda Hill & Amiel Gladstone’s musical theatre 
adaptation of Tchaikovsky opera, Onegin [64], itself based on 
Pushkin’s poem, Eugene Onegin.  
It should be noted that perturbance is not the only type of loss 
of control in minds. Dean Petters described several other types in 
relation to H-CogAff  [43].   
We also believe a theory of perturbance can be used for 
positive psychology and self-help. For example, Beaudoin 
(2013) developed the cognitive shuffle a technique to combat 
insomnia which is meant to work partly by interfering with 
bedtime perturbance [52]. Focusing and flow are essential to 
cognitive productivity and hence to knowledge economies. 
Distraction is largely affective yet theories of attention —and 
knowledge translation on the subject e.g. [53-54] Levitin (2014), 
Gallagher (2006) — do not deal with motive processing and fail 
to invoke perturbance. Theories of learning, expertise and 
productive practice need to explain how humans can deliberately 
develop their mental architectures, e.g., creating new goal 
generators [47,55-56].  
 
In short, previous research phenomena and problems can 
systematically be revisited from the designer stance as involving 
perturbance. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
We have called attention to perturbance as a way to understand a 
broad variety of normal and pathological mental phenomena in 
IP terms. This concept has the advantage of being firmly rooted 
in AI and of involving a flexible, extensible architectural 
framework. This enables research problems to be considered in 
terms of models of entire minds. 
Perturbance and other aspects of H-CogAff are not final 
explanations. They are part of the beginning of what we believe 
can be a progressive research programme. 
The designer stance also is directly relevant to education and 
training. Psychology students need to be able to think about 
themselves, other humans and possible minds in terms of 
multiple cognitive-affective IP architectures. Psychology and AI 
students should  also graduate well-trained in conceptual 
analysis [57,58] as they are in empirical research methods. 
(These would be fitting topics in [59], for example.) 
We are not suggesting a one-way flow of influence. Instead, 
we advocate a progressive theory-driven research programme to 
improve H-CogAff and related proposals. There is a need for 
more AI researchers to consider broad, integrative, multi-
layered, affective autonomous agency. We believe psychology 
and AI researchers need to work more closely together, not only 
on purely cognitive problems but affective ones as well. AI and 
psychology must blend more. For the opening quotation of 
Beaudoin’s (1994) Ph.D. thesis [4] is still true: “The problem is 
not that we do not know which theory is correct, but rather that 
we cannot construct any theory at all which explains the basic 
facts” [60] (p. 109.) 
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Cross Corpus Emotion Classification Using Survey Data 
Armin Seyeditabari1, Sara Levens3, Cherie Maestas2, Samira Shaikh1, James Igoe Walsh2 , Wlodek 
Zadrozny1, Christine Danis2 and Onah P. Thompson2 
Abstract.  Although semantic analysis and machine learning are 
becoming well established parts of Natural Language Processing 
(NLP), extraction of discrete emotions from text remains an 
under-developed area. Even less frequently do we see 
application of these technologies to open-ended survey questions 
in fields such as political science, psychology, public policy and 
sociology. In these domains, the need for more fined-grained 
emotion analysis of text responses has become apparent, 
particularly for assessing nuanced responses of the population to 
unexpected high impact events or incidents. Doing such 
assessments in real time is even more difficult. We report 
preliminary results on an ambitious attempt to perform a cross-
corpus emotion classification that applies data gathered in one 
survey to text collected at a different time from different sources. 
This research is one step in a broader agenda to create new NLP 
methods to code large-scale text data from surveys and social 
media to improve studies of emotion contagion through social 
media networks. Our report is based on a medium-scale 
experiment from a survey conducted in the Fall of 2016 during a 
crisis event. Preliminary evidence suggests that with careful 
calibration of survey instruments, and proper understanding of 
natural language expressions (encoded as machine learning 
features), a transfer of classification code should be possible for 
some strongly expressed and potentially actionable emotions, 
like anger.12 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Emotions are central to interpersonal communication, fostering 
rapid spread of ideas in social situations. As routes of 
interpersonal communication have rapidly expanded with 
increased social media options in the last few decades, it is 
critical to understand the role of emotions in communication and 
perhaps even more critically, how emotions can spread from one 
person to another to give rise to social action.  Furthermore, 
social dynamics associated with communication and trust are 
likely to amplify emotion through the rapid spread of messages 
via social media channels (e.g. Facebook, Reddit, and newspaper 
comments). To examine these dynamics, we need to develop a 
method of analyzing event-specific social media text that can be 
deployed quickly during high impact crises. One key challenge 
in doing so, however, is to accurately identify discrete emotions 
in text, when the text uses context-specific language. Contextual 
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expressions of emotions often contain metaphors, symbols, 
irony, or implicit language, making it difficult to classify with 
dictionaries. Further, using general sentiment dictionaries to 
identify text as positive or negative is insufficient for identifying 
the potential for social actions. Instead, it is essential to code for 
discrete emotion such as anger, an emotion linked to willingness 
to take risks and act to punish those deemed responsible (see 
Druckman and McDermott [1]). Anger is notably distinct from 
other negative emotions like fear which promote watchfulness 
and risk aversion (ibid.). 
1.1 Goals of our research program 
The goals of our research program are to create a methodology 
and a set of tools for real time or close to real time analysis of 
emotions expressed in social media in response to an event. We 
propose doing this based on the idea of cross-corpus 
classification of social media texts, that is, using tools developed 
in the context of prior events to analyze new events.  
This requires an automated pipeline that is capable of 
recognizing specific emotions, and a method for fine tuning the 
parameters of such a pipeline in the context of a new event. In 
this scheme, we would begin with the text from a flash survey in 
response to the event, which would be used to fine tune the 
parameters of the previously built text analyzer, e.g. vocabulary 
and distribution of emotions in this new case. Since the flash 
survey contains only a few hundred to a couple of thousands 
short texts, it can be annotated by humans very fast (e.g. using 
Amazon Mechanical Turk).  
 
 
 
Figure 1. The pipeline for emotion classification using survey text: Flash 
surveys update parameters of the model, allowing real time 
understanding of emotions triggered by emerging events. 
 
SYMPOSIUM V. COMPUTATIONAL MODELLING OF EMOTION 152
Co
nfe
re
nc
e
ed
itio
n
In this scheme, in the simplest case, we would begin with the 
text from a survey, and train a classifier using the preprocessed 
labeled text. This classifier would then use to identify emotional 
content in social media text (e.g. anger). The survey itself could 
then be kept in the field to collect small amounts of data as 
reactions to the incident changes pace or direction. Our 
classification model could then be updated reflecting these 
changes, and continuously used in analysis of the unfolding 
event. 
1.2 Results in this paper 
The goal of this paper is to describe our first experiments, and 
discuss the results from the perspective of cross-corpus 
classification, as presented above.  
After a discussion of prior work on the use of natural 
language processing in analysis of emotions in text (Section 2) 
we describe in detail our approach.  
The first step of it to conduct “flash” surveys dispersed via 
social media during and after a high-impact event; the surveys 
are asking respondents to describe their thoughts and feelings 
about the event in open-ended survey responses.  The context-
specific data is then extracted using human annotators, to be 
used in training of a machine learning classifier.  (Section 3.1). 
We pair the open-ended survey questions with closed-ended 
survey questions to explore whether using participants’ self-
reported emotions creates a more efficient means of training the 
model compared to human coding of the same text.  (Section 
3.2).  
To achieve the objectives of our program, an important 
requirement is use a machine learning classifier. We analyze the 
performance of such classifiers based on the trained model 
generated from the human annotated flash survey text. This 
gives us the advantage of training our model with the language 
that is specific to the event. In this case, we analyzed the police 
shooting of Keith Lamont Scott in Charlotte, NC, which gained 
US-wide attention of all major media channels and social media. 
We show that the classifier is capable of capturing the 
nuances in symbolic/metaphoric language that emerges as the 
meaning of the event is socially constructed (Section 3.3).  We 
also describe multiple ways to build such models. Through this 
process, we demonstrate the advantages of this method, as well 
as some shortcomings and strategies to overcome them.  
Finally, in Section 3.4 we describe our first experiments with 
cross-corpus classification, namely an application of the trained 
model to classify responses to the same event but in a different 
population and media outlets. These results are mixed; on the 
one hand we obtain high accuracy of 90.12% in finding 
expressions of anger; on the other hand, the classification of 
comments in news articles seems to be less reliable. We only 
have an anecdotal evidence for latter as in the over 450 
comments we gathered, we have recognized automatically only a 
handful of 137 angry comments, probably due to the fact that 
most of them expressed anger only implicitly (Section 3.5). 
2 OVERVIEW OF PRIOR WORK 
The effect of emotion on human behavior has been the focus of 
many studies in a variety of social science and psychological 
disciplines. Recent research emphasizes the importance of 
studying the effects of distinct emotions rather than valence or 
sentiment (Lerner and Keltner [2]). Discrete emotions like anger 
and fear shape information search, cognition, motivation, and 
behavior in distinct ways (see [2,3,4]). The paper by 
Vasilopoulos [5] shows that “fear stemming from a terrorist 
attack will increase motivation to seek out political information, 
yet will have a negative effect on actual participation. In 
contrast, anger mobilizes participation in political action, even 
when such action entails an increased physical risk for the 
participant.” Further, those who are angry tend to seek 
information related to blame and retribution, while those who are 
anxious seek information about protective measures [4].  Thus, 
emotion contagion in society is likely to produce different 
cascades of information depending upon whether the emotion 
that spreads is one of anxiety or anger. Studies such as these 
show the relevance of understanding emotions in political 
discourse and prediction of political events. 
With the abundance of expressive text on the internet, 
especially in social media, natural language processing has been 
shown to be one of the most important tools in analyzing human 
behavior. In natural language processing, extraction of specific 
discrete emotions from text is still developing, and it benefits 
from prior work on sentiment analysis, (see [6] for discussion on 
how the two are related), sentiment and emotion extraction are 
distinct. 
Dimensionality reduction methods to identify emotions are 
often used; e.g. Kim et al. [7] evaluate LSA, Probabilistic LSA 
and non-negative matrix factorization in identifying four 
emotions: Anger, Fear, Joy, and Sadness. Word embeddings are 
a newer promising methods of dimensionality reduction that 
build on distributional semantic models (see e.g. [8] for an 
overview of the distributional semantics promises and open 
problems). Although there has been some efforts in using word 
embeddings in semantic analysis (see [9,10,11]), Bellegarda’s 
paper [8] is one of the few to consider word vector spaces for 
emotion analysis. 
However, despite the growing presence of new methods of 
dimensionality reduction, so far most efforts in emotion 
extraction have been focused on classification using lexicon 
based techniques. In their paper, Staiano and Guerini [12] used 
crowd-sourcing to annotate around 37,000 terms with emotion 
scores to be used in emotion analysis tasks; Bobicev et al. [13] 
created a domain specific lexicon, HealthAffect, to analyze 
comments on an online health forum. 
The use of statistical analysis methods also proved to be 
effective in many use cases. In [14], Vu et al. used a small 
sample of surveys about emotion provoking events to extract 
events with similar pattern from social media by seed expansion 
and clustering; and Kozareva et al. [15] used mutual information 
score to classify emotions in headlines. The most used method in 
literature for emotion extraction and analysis is the application of 
different classification techniques. For example, Yang et al. [16] 
showed that conditional random field classifiers outperform 
support vector machines in classifying emotions in web blog 
corpora; and Lin at al. [17] used classifiers with different feature 
settings to analyze emotions of readers of online news articles. 
3 EXPERIMENT 
Software As we described above, the broader goal of our 
research program is to create an automated pipeline, capable of 
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recognizing specific emotions in text and to apply it to coding 
social media text in near real time. In this section, we report 
preliminary experiments to test the efficacy of this approach. We 
focus on classifying one emotion in survey texts, namely anger. 
We focus anger because it serves as a catalyst for behavior (cf. 
[2] [3] [4]); thus, we wish to distinguish it from other emotions 
such as fear or frustration that are less likely to produce action. 
3.1 Data and preparation 
We compare two different ways in which event specific text 
could be manually coded to use in training a machine learning 
model for coding event-related social media text: (i) self-coding 
of emotion by survey respondents, and (ii) human coding by a 
researcher based on specific instructions. 
We compare them in the context of a specific event, namely, 
the fatal police shooting of Keith Scott in Charlotte, North 
Carolina on 20 September 2016. This event occurred in the 
context of a national debate about the use of lethal force by 
police. The event attracted considerable attention from 
traditional and social media, because of Scott’s race, ambiguity 
regarding important details, and the public release of police 
officer “body cam” video. For these reasons, the shooting 
generated a range of emotional responses.  
Subjects in the Charlotte area were recruited to participate in 
the online survey via social media postings, postings of 
comments on local media websites, and from emails to the 
student population at a nearby public university. Participants 
were asked open-ended questions followed with close ended 
questions about the Keith Scott shooting. The main questions 
were focused on feelings and emotions about the incident and 
who or what were to blame. 
After removing the empty answers from the survey, we had 
1192 records, of which 839 were classified as angry. All texts 
were lowercased, and we used NLTK library in Python to 
remove punctuations and stop-words from the answers, and 
Porter stemmer in NLTK for stemming the words. 
As we were primarily interested in the emotion classification, 
we mainly focused on the answers to the following open-ended, 
emotion question: “Please tell us about the emotions you felt the 
most strongly in response to the news about the police shooting 
of Keith Scott and the protests that followed. Please tell us why 
you felt that way.” Next participants were asked to select all 
emotions they felt from the following options: angry, anxious, 
sad, disgusted, shocked, sympathetic, proud, frustrated, betrayed, 
and afraid and indicate to the strength or intensity of each 
selected emotion using a slider that ranged from 1 to 100. Anger 
was the focus of the present classification experiment, although 
the same process described here could be applied to any 
emotion-laden text. 
3.2 Initial analysis 
The results of using the close ended slider responses to label the 
open-ended emotion question, mentioned above, is presented 
below in Table 1. Two different classifiers, logistic regression 
and random forest, have been used with 10-fold cross validation. 
To assess the quality of the close-ended answers, we decided to 
use the slider responses (values between 1 to 100 selected by the 
participants) as the labels for our data (We chose 40% as the 
threshold as it showed to yield the best accuracy). The result of 
10-fold cross validation on the balanced subset of our data did 
not show any improvement compared to the baseline ZeroR 
(majority class) classifier. 
 
Baseline		 Classifier	 Accuracy		 Recall		
0.53	 Logistic	
Regression	
0.55	 0.55	
Random	Forest	 0.61	 0.61	
Table 1. Using intensity slider as data label.  Classifying answers to 
the emotion question using the emotion intensity slider (for anger) as 
label for the data. The low accuracy of the classifiers shows the 
inadequacy of using the emotion intensity sliders as label for the data. 
 
This problem likely occurred because after answering the 
open-ended question in which the participants expressed emotion 
(e.g. disgust) they were presented with slider for a range of 
emotions and were asked to indicate how much they felt each 
emotion in response to the incident. Accordingly, even if they 
only wrote about one emotion in their written response, they 
could haven selected other emotions that they felt in response to 
the incident but did not write about. For example, one participant 
answered the emotion question like this: 
 
“I'm disgusted and saddened at the killing of Keith Scott and 
frustrated that there is nothing that I can do about it. The police 
were apparently serving a warrant, not intervening in the 
commission of a violent crime. I can't help thinking that they lost 
sight of what they were doing and severely discounted the value 
of Mr. Scott's life as they forgot their duty to protect.  Nothing in 
any account I've seen or heard suggests that the police were in a 
situation where they had no choice. As simple and corny as it 
sounds, Andy Griffith would not have killed Keith Scott.” 
 
This participant’s selected values for the emotion sliders was: 
100 for angry, 40 for anxious, 81 for sad, 100 for disgusted, 50 
for shocked, 49 for sympathetic, 69 for frustrated, and, 0 for 
betrayed, afraid and proud.  
The failure of the direct attempt at using self-coded text for 
machine learning prompted us to try to use expert human 
labelling of the data, and to rethink the design of the survey for 
future research. In particular, future surveys deployed with this 
goal should better align close-ended responses and open-ended 
prompts so that the answers from close-ended questions could be 
used to label open ended responses, thereby creating an 
automated pipeline. To create the data to use in the human-coded 
experiments, we trained coders to recognize expressions of 
context-specific anger in survey text and hand code each survey 
response for the presence or absence of anger.  
3.3 Building the model 
After pre-processing the data as described in the previous 
section, we use Weka 3.8 [18] for our classifications. The 
StringtoWordVector filter in Weka was used to convert the 
document to feature vectors and all classifications was done with 
10-fold cross validation. The baseline ZeroR classifier for this 
data was 70.38 percent accuracy. 
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For the first experiment, we ran the data through a logistic 
regression classifier, resulting in 83.7 percent accuracy in 
predictions with 0.72 recall. We also tried random forest with 83 
percent accuracy and lower recall of 0.47. The resulting 
coefficients from logistic regression were used as measure for 
feature selection. After trying multiple values, we found that the 
margin of 2 for the coefficients results the best outcome for our 
classifier. We thus discarded the words with coefficients 
between -2 and 2, and with the resulting dataset we used a 
random forest classifier resulting in 91.23 percent accuracy with 
the recall of 0.79. The results are shown in Table 2. 
 
Baseline		 Classifier	 Accuracy		 Recall	
0.70	 Logistic	 regression	
(LR)	
0.84	 0.72	
Random	forest	(RF)	 0.83	 0.47	
LR	 (with	 feature	
selection)	
0.81	 0.70	
RF	 (with	 feature	
selection)	
0.91	 0.79	
Table 2. Classifying answers to the emotion question using expert labels 
for anger. Feature selection has been done using coefficients from 
logistic regression. After feature selection using logistic regression, and 
using random forest as the classifier we reached a high accuracy of 
91.23%. 
 
We also tried using answers to two other survey questions as 
training data. The questions assessed feeling towards the protest: 
 
 “We would like to know what you have felt or thought about 
the protests and riots that followed in the days after the shooting. 
Share the first things that come to mind.”, as well as who or what 
the participant blamed for the incident: “Who do you think is 
most to blame for the protests and riots that occurred in 
Charlotte after the shooting”. 
 
Of the survey’s questions, we chose these two because the 
first one was one of the first open-ended questions on the survey 
which might have resulted in more expressive responses, and a 
natural association between anger and blame might support 
detection of anger text. Unfortunately, the outcomes of 10-fold 
cross validations (Table 3) revealed that the responses to these 
questions were poor training data. One potential reason for this is 
that due to the small size of the dataset is, more explicit and 
intense emotionally expressive language is needed to train the 
model. 
For example, one participant whose answer to emotion 
question was labeled as angry: 
 
“Mad ! This makes Charlotte look like a circus. The protests 
SHOULD NOT be allowed . BLM should not be allowed to 
march the streets and preach hate! They are a awful group of 
angered individuals that act like the world is against them. They 
do not respect anyone but themselves. I'm just glad that I stayed 
away from it. I will NOT sit at a intersection and let someone 
disrespect me or tear up something I've worked hard for. They 
are heathens!” 
 
This person’s answer to the feeling, and blame questions was 
respectively: 
  
 “I think he was justified in his actions and should not be 
charged. They do not get paid enough for the job they are doing 
and I take it personally when they are disrespected.” 
 
, and 
 
“Honestly the media. News channels and Facebook live.  I 
watched protesters tell where they were and where they were 
going next. I watched thugs invite other thugs to join them!” 
 
One can see that although the anger is evident in the answer to 
the emotion question, no specific sign of anger is apparent in the 
language of the responses to the two other questions. 
 
Baseline	 Classifier	 Accuracy	 Recall	
0.70	 LR	 (question	
about	blame)	
0.56	 0.37	
LR	 (question	
about	feeling)		
0.52	 0.52	
RF	 (question	
about	feeling)	
0.68	 0.68	
Table 3. Classifying responses for anger based on questions about blame 
and feelings (using expert labelled data). The low accuracy of the 
classifiers shows that the answers to such questions are not a good source 
of training data. 
3.4 Using new data 
As our primary goal is to use the trained model from our survey 
to identify emotions from different sources of expressive text 
(e.g. social media, comments on news articles, etc.), we 
expanded the model to a naturalistic social media data set. This 
dataset was created by the same survey structure for a different 
population. This dataset contains 385 answers labeled by human 
experts. We used the previous dataset (the one with 1192 survey 
entries) as training data and used it to classify the new dataset. 
The dataset was preprocessed in the same way as the first 
dataset, by lowercasing, removing punctuations and stop-words. 
Again, Weka was used to classify the data by using the first 
dataset as the training set, and the new dataset as the test set. The 
baseline accuracy for the test set was 71.73. After running the 
data through logistic regression for feature selection, and using 
random forest as our main classifier the resulting model had the 
accuracy of 90.12 percent with 0.90 recall. The summary of 
results can be seen in Table 4.  
Our model was able to correctly classify the responses that 
was clearly angry, responses such as: 
 
“My strongest emotion was anger. Anger because the cops were 
being so poorly mistreated. I was also angry to see all the 
looting and assaulting of one another.” 
 
Also, it was able distinguish answers that clearly was showing 
other emotions like disappointment: 
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“Disappointed that this is a problem. More than disappointed 
that some people fail to acknowledge that there is a disparity 
between how the black community is still treated and the white 
community” 
 
But in some cases, where the expressed emotions were a little 
ambiguous or misleading we could see misclassifications like the 
following response where many emotions were expressed: 
 
“First fear knowing people would go crazy. / Then a little 
hopeful that maybe since the officer was black  people would 
wait until the facts were available. Of course then the family 
whips up emotions and withheld important facts. / Anger and 
fear as the events unfolded. / Disgust at people's behaviors 
towards the CMPD. / Great anger at random white people being 
targeted and attacked. Seems like no one wants to label that ad 
what it is: A Racist Hate Crime.” 
 
Although anger was present in this answer, our model 
classified it as non-anger. Responses like the following which 
did not express anger, but include words that are mostly 
correlated with anger (e.g. fuels, anger, controversy) were 
misclassified as an angry comment: 
 
“The media fuels hate and controversy. They were showing all 
the anger the first 3 nights but not the majority that was 
peaceful. Everyone wants their 10minutes of fame and right now 
all you gotta do is be able to get ratings to have it.” 
 
Baseline		 Classifier	 Accuracy		 Recall	
0.72	 LR	 0.88	 0.87	
RF	 0.83	 0.83	
LR	 (w/	 feature	
selection)	
0.77	 0.77	
RF	 (w/	 feature	
selection)	
0.901	 0.90	
Table 4. Simplest case of cross-corpus classification. We are 
successfully classifying a new survey data using a machine 
learning model developed on another survey. High accuracy of 
90.12% on test data shows the potential of this method for 
building a machine learning classifiers of expressed emotions, 
and using them to analyze new events. 
3.5 Using online data 
In order to see how this process would work on a totally new 
source of data, we attempted to classify news comments on an 
article about the same incident. We used 450 comments posted 
under the article “Amid Pressure, Charlotte Police Release 
Videos in Shooting of Keith Lamont Scott”, taken from The 
Washington Post website. We used the same annotator who 
labeled 137 of those comments as angry. Using the same process 
of cleaning up the text, selecting features based on the results of 
logistic regression, and random forest as the classifier, the model 
classified most of the comments as non-anger. This showed that 
this model did not perform any better than a majority class 
classifier. 
This experiment showed us the challenges in building the 
model based on the responses to the survey, and made us rethink 
the design of the survey so that the responses could better 
represent how people post comments on social media. To solve 
the issues that this experiment revealed we decided to make 
changes to future surveys and test the approach again. For 
example, in a recent survey we released, we tried to address 
these issues by changing the design of the survey to provide 
more focused questions asking about emotions expressed in the 
open-ended responses rather than asking a more general question 
about emotions felt in response to the event. 
Solving this intermediate challenge is a necessary step 
towards empirically testing the implications of agent-based 
models of how emotional messages spread during crisis and 
spawn widespread social action. 
4 CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
In this study, we showed the potentials and challenges in 
extracting emotions in social media posts about a specific 
incident. By conducting a flash survey about the event and 
collecting the emotional responses, we tried to classify emotions 
(e.g. anger) in online comments. Although we were able to 
create a model that could classify anger in a different survey 
population with high accuracy, the language difference in survey 
responses and social media posts, made it harder to use the 
model in real world situation. These results exposed the 
shortcomings of the current survey approach and showed us the 
ways we can change our design to overcome these shortcomings.  
Creating a model that can classify emotions in social media 
posts based on a small sample of labelled text from a survey 
poses problems that need substantial effort to overcome.  In this 
paper, our most successful classifiers were logistic regression 
and random forest; in another paper ([19]) we illustrate some of 
the challenges in using word embeddings to automatically reason 
about emotions in text. However, we haven’t yet explored other 
successful classification techniques, e.g. ensemble methods 
([20]). 
Another problem we encountered was that the language and 
style between survey responses and social media posts differed 
considerably which may have hampered classification. The 
implicit nature of expressed emotion in an online comment 
versus explicit answers to a direct question about emotion in a 
survey was a significant obstacle and one of the main issues that 
caused this language difference, and made it hard for the 
classifier to distinguish the emotional text.  
These experiments led us to change the design of our surveys 
in way that better aligns the test responses and the labelling of 
the data to be as close as possible to online posts. The many 
methods that we considered to achieve this goal are currently 
being implement in new surveys pertaining to high profile events 
such as the recent presidential inauguration and other 
emotionally charged political events.  
We are now experimenting with new variants of survey 
questions that focus the self-coding on the emotions expressed in 
the text response and designing the open-ended survey questions 
to prompt for text they would post on a social media website.  
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Our overall findings are mixed. Trained expert coders can 
identify from survey responses the type of context specific anger 
expressions that can be used to classify text in a high profile 
event. However, the current attempts at cross-corpus 
classification using self-coded survey data was not successful. 
Trained human coding is effective, but does not meet our goal of 
developing a fully automated approach to machine learning for 
broader scale coding of survey and social media text during 
crisis events.  
Although we see great potential to advance cross corpus 
emotion classification without the use of a human expert for 
labelling the survey answers, our initial tests direct attention to 
key considerations in the design of surveys to extract better 
quality text to use as training data.  Extraction of discrete 
emotion from text is challenging because emotion expression is 
often context dependent, full of metaphors, symbols, and other 
implicit expressions. However, extant theory in social and 
psychological sciences point to the critical importance of 
identifying individual emotions because of their unique 
influences on information seeking, learning, attitudes, and 
behavior. Disentangling event specific emotion language in text 
is an essential step in understanding how social movements, 
unrest, protest, and crisis emerge and spread in response to 
critical events.  
Our experiments showed us the challenging task of cross 
corpus classification, especially with a small training dataset. 
The small size of the dataset makes it hard to capture the 
intricacy of language and find features that can be used to 
classify new sources of text.  
We have shown it is possible to successfully perform cross-
corpus classification of free-text answers to a survey, and extract 
some (i.e. one, anger) of the emotions expressed in texts. We 
created a better method for constructing surveys that could be 
used in conjunction with automated classification tools. In our 
next steps, we will be simultaneously addressing the challenges 
of producing better automated analysis tools, extracting other 
emotions, and creating better survey designs. 
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Abstract. The increasing ease of access to large participant 
populations via online recruitment platforms offers considerable 
promise to study aspects of emotion and participants’ 
relationship to brands, artistic media and advertising content. 
Large participant samples can be quickly and easily gathered, 
and their facial expressions can be assessed using video captured 
by webcams that are ubiquitous in modern computing 
environments. However, a long-standing issue is the degree of 
reliability of the data provided by automatic facial expression 
recognition systems. We evaluated the facial expressions of 836 
participants triggered by an online sad video. Thanks to the use 
of this sizeable sample, this experiment has a high statistical 
power and showed, as expected, that Sadness expressions are 
significantly more frequently recognized compared to other 
facial expressions (i.e. Happiness, Surprise and Disgust). 
However, by using Generalized Additive Mixed Models 
(GAMM) to analyse the time-series we show that dynamic 
statistical analyses can avoid biased interpretations. Technical 
sensitivity, posture interpretation, emotion idiosyncrasy, 
intensity of spontaneous expressions and social context of the 
emotion elicitation are open questions that must be answered to 
perform reliable online facial expression recognition.12 
 
Keywords. Emotion, Facial Expression, Automatic Recognition, 
Time-series analysis. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the enduring debates within the psychology of human 
emotion concerns the extent to which facial expressions 
represent an automatic readout of felt emotions or social and 
communicative motivations [1], [2]. This debate has continued 
to dominate discourse in the field of emotion to a large extent 
over the past two decades. However, within the world of 
Affective Computing it is largely the former view that emotions 
are reflections or indices of felt emotions that has prevailed. The 
theoretical importance of these two viewpoints becomes of 
crucial importance when moving from the theoretical world into 
the practical uses and applications of facial expressions in 
technologies that are oriented towards gathering information 
concerning one’s emotional state. 
There are many commercial applications where an 
understanding of the emotional impact on individuals is 
important. These range from an understanding of the emotions of 
interlocutors when they interact with embodied conversational 
agents to the desire to be aware of the emotional impact that a 
given piece of artistic content or advertising may have upon 
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individuals in the worlds of film-making and marketing. The 
former of these examples actively seeks to be social and 
communicative in nature, whereas the latter is much more 
passive. It is not the case that viewing artistic or marketing 
content is entirely non-social – typically the content contains a 
narrative that is highly social in nature, which is what typically 
grabs our attention and engages us. However, the passive nature 
of this content means it may be better described as implicitly [1], 
rather than explicitly, social. Importantly, any person watching 
this type of content on a screen is not actively involved in the 
social interaction, and at best can be considered a distant 
observer. They are also conscious of the real disconnect of their 
current situation from the social events occurring in the on-
screen drama and narrative; the most compelling of artistic 
productions of this kind may go some way to allowing an 
observer to suspend their disbelief and become immersively 
engaged in the content, particularly in an emotional manner. 
Indeed, this is probably the primary goal of many creative artists 
and content creators. 
An opportunity for the fast and efficient emotion assessment 
for these kinds of commercial materials exists through the 
utilisation of crowdsourced recruitment of participants and 
testing them from a distance. Several crowdsourcing services are 
currently available such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, Cint, 
Crowdflower or Prolific Academic [3], [4]. These platforms will 
recruit large panels of participants quickly and efficiently. 
However, whilst the benefits of such panels are considerable for 
the fast and efficient conduct of research, they raise an important 
question: do participants express strong facial expressions when 
they are alone in front of their computer? This question is 
particularly important in terms of emotion studies. Indeed, the 
recording of facial expressions from modern computers is 
relatively easy, while the implementation of automatic emotion 
recognition systems on web-based application is becoming 
increasingly common. However, aside from the improvements in 
these systems, it is important to critically examine the meaning 
of the data provided. 
This paper addresses the question of how to interpret 
automatic emotion recognition results. It presents an online 
crowdsourced experiment in which a primarily sad piece of 
emotional content is presented to a large participant sample. 
Facial expression analysis is conducted to evaluate the emotional 
response using both an overall and a time-series perspective.  
2 EMOTIONS TRIGGERED BY MEDIA  
There remains considerable contention concerning theoretical 
conceptions of emotions [5], as well as the functions of facial 
expressions and their relation to felt emotion [1], [2]. Despite 
this, however, a consistent model of emotions exists that 
considers them as being the result of internal and external 
spontaneous reactions initiated by an event [6], [7]. These 
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appraisal models are well-suited as a theoretical basis for the 
current study, as they place an emphasis on emotions as they 
relate to a specific event and context. The event refers here to the 
media and the narrative content within that media which lead to 
the triggering of specific emotional episodes.  
An extensive literature review was conducted to investigate 
the influence of media such as movies or TV commercial on 
emotions. In that perspective, several video databases were 
created and validated for use in an emotion elicitation task. The 
most well-known one is composed of 16 videos able to elicit 
Amusement, Anger, Disgust, Fear and Sadness [8], [9] or [10], 
for an extensive review. The videos have been shown to have an 
impact on viewers’ self-reported emotions, physiological 
changes and facial expressions. 
 
2.1 Crowdsourced systems for automated facial 
expressions recognition 
With the introduction of software development kit (or SDK) for 
automatic facial expressions recognition, it is possible to embed 
these libraries online for use on crowdsourcing platforms by 
using an application programming interface. Major companies 
have their own SDKs such as Apple (using Emotient SDK), 
Facebook (using FacioMetrics SDK), Microsoft (Project 
Oxford), Qualtrics (using Affectiva SDK) or RealEyes. 
Moreover, some companies directly provide their SDK. This is 
the case for Face++, Kairos, CrowdEmotion and Visage 
Technologies to name a few. 
Even if some systems focus on the dimensional aspect of 
emotions [11], most of these automatic facial expression 
recognition systems are based on the Facial Action Coding 
System (FACS [12], [13]), in which facial movements are 
categorised according to sets of muscle actions termed Action 
Units (AU). The FACS method is agnostic to any relationship 
with felt emotions and only seeks to provide an objective 
classification of the observed facial muscle movement  
(Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of automated FACS coding analysis using 
facial landmark detection with Histograms of Oriented Gradients 
(HOG) features (using OpenFace v0.1 [14]). 
Related systems, such as EmFACS [15], exist which seek to 
associate these muscle movements with the underlying 
emotional states typically associated with a given expression. 
Therefore, most studies taking an affective computing 
perspective, as well as many within scientific psychology 
settings, have used facial expression analysis to detect happiness, 
surprise, sadness, anger, disgust or fear, with the assumption that 
expressions provide facial readouts of felt emotions derived from 
the basic emotions approach. Based on EmFACS recognition, 
significant efforts have been conducted to create accurate facial 
expression analyses of natural emotions [16]. For example, 
challenges such as Facial Expression Recognition and Analysis 
challenge (FERA) [17], [18] or Audio/Visual Emotion Challenge 
(AVEC) [19] aim to develop the most efficient algorithms to 
recognise emotions both in laboratory settings and “in the wild”. 
 
2.2 Sensum Insights: A web based platform for 
media content analysis 
Sensum Insights is a multi-modal research tool that allows the 
collection of responses to events, media and situations by 
measuring, aggregating and integrating a variety of data streams 
collected from participants in either remote or laboratory 
conditions. The platform therefore offers utility in media testing, 
the monitoring of audience reaction to live events, and the 
analysis of large data sets related to performances and content. It 
is particularly well suited to the gathering of affective and 
emotion related information. The multi-modal nature of the 
platform means it can avail of and integrate social signal 
measurements such as: facial expressions and acoustic and 
prosodic cues of emotions; biometric signals such as heart rate, 
breath rate, eye-tracking and galvanic skin response; and more 
classical psychological measurement techniques such as implicit 
association tests and survey responses.  
In the current study, the FacioMetrics system [20] was 
incorporated into Sensum Insights to provide real-time facial 
coding. The FacioMetrics system detects and automatically 
tracks 64 face landmarks for each frame recorded. Then, the 
movement of each landmark is analysed by Scale-Invariant 
Feature Transform (SIFT) descriptors in localized regions [21]. 
Using support vector machine (SVM) classifiers to associate 
landmark movements with AUs, the FacioMetrics system can 
extract facial expression information and categorise 4 emotion 
labels: Disgust, Happy, Sadness, and Surprise. It can also 
categorise more functional labels such as Focus and Attention. 
The FacioMetrics system uses person-specific classifiers for 
FACS recognition and was trained on posed and on spontaneous 
facial expressions (CK+, GEMEP-FERA, RU-FACS and GFT 
databases) [22]. 
3 METHOD 
To test the hypotheses, the Sensum Insights platform was used to 
create an experimental design which allowed the evaluation of 
the influence of brand logo, definition quality and event video 
streaming quality. The dependent measure was provided by the 
classification of the participants’ facial expression of emotions.  
The web-based experiment presented either a high or low 
quality viewing experience whilst using Facial Coding to assess 
the experience.  
Face Tracking 
Facial Landmark 
Detection 
HOG features 
Classification of Action Units 
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Online participants viewed the content on their PC or 
Laptop. They were instructed to watch the content in a room 
with correct lighting and viewing conditions.  
 
3.1 Participants  
To test their facial expressions, 836 participants (442 males and 
394 females, age M = 36.4, SD = 11.5) were recruited to take 
part online around the UK. Those who participated under 
insufficient lighting conditions were removed from the final data 
pool, leaving a final total of 774. 
 
3.2 Material 
An evocative short film that had been shown in previous pilot 
studies to produce feelings of sadness was used. Each participant 
was exposed to a short sci-fi commons piece which lasted for 1 
minute and 30 seconds, called “Tears of Steel”3. It comprised of 
some action and drama elements. It typically creates a sad but 
bittersweet emotional connection with the viewer. 
 
3.3 Protocol 
Respondents were required to set up their viewing space with 
correct lighting before passing a calibration test. This was to 
ensure a good quality data set. 
4 RESULTS 
The analysis of the data obtained was performed in two steps. 
Firstly, we examined the overall automatic recognition of facial 
expression in order to identify which emotion was triggered. 
Secondly, we looked at the evolution of the automatic 
recognition during the video. By using Generalized Additive 
Mixed Models (GAMMs), we were then able to describe the 
events present in the time-series [23]. The GAMMs analysis 
appeared to be particularly relevant for emotion time-series [24]. 
GAMMs allow a researcher to spline multi data streams on a 
reference index, in order to identify the curve with the maximum 
likelihood estimation, whilst taking into account the 
autocorrelation of these data streams.  
General facial expression recognition. Firstly, it was necessary 
to evaluate the overall recognition of the different facial 
expressions recognised by the FacioMetrics system. 
 
Figure 2. Means of the overall facial expression recognition for 
each emotion label for the whole sample studied. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. The FacioMetrics 
recognition score goes from 0 (no recognition at all) to 1 (full 
prototypical expression displayed all along the video). 
                                                 
3
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bjYbA1bWjeE 
As shown in Figure 2, the participants displayed mostly neutral 
expressions. However, we also observed a homogeneous 
dispersion of the mean which indicated no specific trends among 
the participants (M = 0.44, SD = 0.34). We also observed similar 
representation of Disgust (M = 0.08, SD = 0.15), Happy  
(M = 0.03, SD = 0.09) and Surprise (M = 0.02, SD = 0.07). 
Overall, they were weakly recognised, which suggested that their 
natural expression was brief and subtle. It was therefore 
expected that we would observe low levels of the appearance of 
Action Units and facial muscle movements associated with these 
emotions when watching the “Tears of Steel” film. The results 
were somewhat different, however, when observing the level of 
facial muscle movement and expressions associated with 
sadness. We saw a broader distribution of the participants 
compared to the other emotions. However, there were still 
relatively low absolute levels of the sadness facial expression  
(M = 0.24, SD = 0.30). Given the broad distribution of the scores 
in this m asure, it was also prudent to pay attention to the 
median as a measure of central tendency. Sadness labelled facial 
expressions had a median score of 0.08, which was much 
weaker. Finally, it is interesting to note that means and 
distribution of Attention and Focus are very different. Due to 
their involvement in the task, the FacioMetrics system recorded 
mostly participants’ faces displaying Attention (M = 0.79,  
SD = 0.31). Contrary to Attention, the FacioMetrics system did 
not record high levels of faces displaying Focus (M = 0.07,  
SD = 0.06). 
 
 
Figure 3. Temporal evolution of the facial expression according 
the time (frame) for each label. The grey lines represent each 
participant, the red lines are the mean and the black lines are the 
standard deviation. 
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When we assessed the ability to distinguish between emotions 
using a repeated measures ANOVA (with Greenhouse-Giesser 
correction), we found that it was possible to distinguish 
emotional classifications, F(1.89, 1461.8) = 445.8, p < 0.001, η
2 = 
0.37. Then, given the overall analysis of the facial expression, 
we concluded that there was evidence of efficient triggering of 
emotion by the video. Whilst the Neutral recognition was very 
high, this was not particularly surprising, as it was expected that 
Sadness would not be triggered all along the video, but rather 
only at certain key moments. Therefore, it was considered 
particularly important to examine the time-series evolution in 
order to draw conclusions on the identity of the emotion 
triggered and at what specific points in the video. 
Time-series analysis of facial expression recognition. In 
addition to the general analysis of facial expression recognition, 
a first step was to observe the descriptive statistics of the results. 
Therefore, we plotted the temporal evolution of the facial 
expression recognition according to the time for each label 
recognised (Figure 3). 
Surprisingly, all of the label recognitions displayed flat 
evolution according to the time for both mean and standard 
deviation, whereas the dispersion of individual time-series was 
highly heterogeneous. In order to evaluate the influence of the 
label recognition over the time, we performed a Generalized 
Additive Mixed Model analysis of the time series using 
restricted maximum likelihood estimation (REML) [25]. The 
following model was tested: 
y = Xβ + Zu + ε 
u ~ N(0,Ψθ) 
ε ~ N(0,Λσ²) 
where y is the emotion recognition vector, X is the model 
design matrix according to the time (or Frames in our case), β is 
the β coefficient vector. Moreover, u contains a random effects 
vector, and Z is a model matrix for these random effects (for 
each participant), Ψ is the covariance matrix, and θ the unknown 
parameters within that covariance matrix. Λ is a matrix that is 
part of the error term and which can be used to model the 
residual autocorrelation. Finally, ε is the error term. 
When examined the residual distribution for the overall 
model, we observed that the residuals were not normally 
distributed (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Residual distribution of the GAMM analysis using a 
Q-Q plot. 
 
This distribution showed the limit of using parametric overall 
statistical analyses based on the normality distribution of the 
residual such as the t-test or F-test. Then, by looking at the 
trends of the differents emotion labels, we observed that the 
maximum likelihood estimation of the GAMMs revealed 
evolutions in the facial expression recognition (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5. Evolution of the fitted values identified by the GAMM 
analysis for each emotion label over the video. 
 
Even if the effect size of the trends was small, using such a 
sizeable participant sample provided enough statistical power for 
the GAMMs to be significant. Consequently, given the results 
provided by the GAMM analysis over the video, we concluded 
that the result provided by the overall descriptive analysis was 
not too limited to describe the automatic facial expression 
recognition signal. Therefore, the GAMM analysis appears to 
provide a highly promising methodological framework to 
investigate temporal evolutions of emotional facial expressions. 
5 DISCUSSION & PERSPECTIVES 
In this paper we analysed the emotions triggered by an online 
media with an automatic facial expression recognition system. 
The objective of the study was to accurately evaluate the 
emotion expressed by a substantial participant sample, which 
was recruited online. Even if the general analysis showed a 
significant expression of sadness according to the participants, 
the analysis of the time-series revealed a more complex pattern 
of facial expression evolution, indicating the necessity to take 
into account the temporal evolution of facial expressions. 
 
5.1 Weaknesses of emotion recognition systems 
There is a current notable boom in the opportunities provided by 
emotion recognition systems. Emotional expressions become a 
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gold-standard approach in terms of analysing the ways in which 
humans are interacting with computers (HCI) or with robots 
(HRI). However, emotion recognition systems are still dealing 
with recognition problems in the wild. Firstly, face-tracking 
techniques still suffer from poor recognition performance for 
non-frontal faces. There also exist problems accompanying some 
face characteristics such as wrinkles, beards or glasses, for 
example. Secondly, emotion recognition systems can be biased 
by face orientation. If the face is oriented down, this can be 
mistaken as a sadness expression. This probably represents a 
bias towards sadness recognition becomes so important when 
people are recorded by laptop webcams. In terms of signal 
treatment, the results show a false positive recognition of 
sadness, which may also explain why happiness and disgust 
levels appear to increase during a sad video. 
 
5.2 The intensity of facial expression in implicitly 
social settings  
We obtained evidence that the strongest facial expression 
configurations throughout the video clip were those with the 
label Neutral, which is in line with our prediction that this would 
be the most prevalent expression. We also found that there were 
greater levels of expressions with the label Sadness reported 
compared to any other facial expression. This would suggest that 
the emotion elicited during the video clip was recognised as 
sadness, and was discernible from the other emotion labels. 
However, given the dispersion of the scores, a median measure 
presented a much lower level of emotion label. This would 
suggest that only some of the participants were producing 
expressions that were related to sadness, or that the system may 
recognize sadness in the participant’s expression due to their 
position in front of the webcam. Indeed, most of the participants 
were using laptops with an embedded webcam. Therefore, the 
overall position of the face was not effectively placed directly in 
front of the camera, but rather at a slight incline in order to see 
the screen. A future line of enquiry may therefore include the 
examination of individual differences in response to implicitly 
social stimuli. 
 
5.3 Idiosyncrasy of facial expressions 
The variability in the time-series recorded is an important 
problem for further online media evaluations, as it can lead to 
misleading analysis of triggered emotions. A first explanation 
comes from the technical characteristic of automatic recognition 
systems. Indeed, because they have a frame-to-frame analysis, 
their sensibility to micro-change in the face is particularly high 
[26], [27]. Thus, the automatic system can give a meaning to 
movement which may have no meaning. 
Moreover, human emotions are idiosyncratic. There exists 
high variability in terms of how people react to a particular 
stimulus. The dispersion of the individual time-series 
demonstrates that it is very difficult to predict which expression 
people will spontaneously produce in a very large sample. Some 
people can be more expressive of certain emotions at baseline. 
Expressiveness can also vary according to personality and 
culture [28]. However, by using GAMM analysis it is possible to 
take into account the idiosyncrasy of how people express 
emotions at the individual level [29]. 
These sources of variability in the recognition signal are 
particularly important to consider, because they can lead to 
misunderstanding of the emotion triggered by a media source. 
Therefore, new statistical tools, such as the Generalized Additive 
Mixed Model, should be utilised in order to reduce the levels of 
false emotion detection resulting from the use of less sensitive 
and more general statistical analyses.  
 
5.4 The type of facial expressions 
Most of the emotional expressions that occur in realistic 
interpersonal interactions or in HCI settings are not basic 
emotions [30]. Studies on everyday facial expressions have 
begun to increasingly examine mental states [31] such as 
interest, boredom, anxiety, and thoughtfulness, which are the 
kinds of expressions most often observed in face-to-face 
interactions and HCI. Often these natural affective states are 
very difficult to elicit in a laboratory setting, and it is difficult to 
know when they have occurred through traditional techniques of 
self-report [32]. However, the majority of affective computing 
works which examine facial expressions are based on a basic 
emotion paradigm, perhaps for historical reasons or due to the 
likelihood of acceptance [33]. Given the issues highlighted in 
this paper, including the problem that low levels of sociality may 
lead to low levels of expressive behaviour, it may be worthwhile 
taking a more nuanced approach in the understanding of facial 
expressions, and to target systems at a broader range of 
expressive behaviour labels such as amused, persuaded, 
informed, sentimental or inspired for example [34]. 
 
5.5 Using additional information as evidence to 
disambiguate facial expression meaning 
Human communication, of course, involves more than the 
simple signalling of facial expressions. Other social signals, 
including vocal tone, gesture and the entirety of the body itself 
seems to operate as a vector of emotion. Often these can suffer 
similar issues of low levels of expression in situations of low 
sociality. The results of this experiment suggest that caution is 
required in relying too heavily on any given evidence stream 
with regard to the interpretation of the social signals. However, 
combining a variety of these social signals may provide 
opportunities for researchers to increase the weight of evidence 
available on which to judge. Combining multi-modal streams of 
data appears to be a worthwhile endeavour in disambiguating the 
emotional state of individuals. The study of the relationship 
between posture and emotion was explored through gestures 
emitted during conversation between two individuals [35]. 
Whereas the participants did not display obvious facial 
expressions, studying the influence of body posture can be a way 
to increase the interpretation of emotion and communicative 
motives [36]. Therefore, whilst posture seems to play a 
particularly important role in social interactions, its analysis is 
also complicated by issues of context of sociality. Therefore, 
there may be value in the use of other modalities and sources of 
evidence. Notably, biometric physiological signals do not suffer 
from issues of low sociality and should therefore respond in 
accordance with subjective experience whether there are others 
present or not [37]. Adding this source of evidence to multi-
modal streams should be considered, in order to obtain a more 
well-rounded picture of the response to material presented to 
participants. This is becoming an increasingly more viable 
option with the availability of smartphones, smartwatches and 
wearable technologies. Whilst we are currently not at the levels 
of availability that make the online recruitment of large numbers 
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of people with similar sets of technology a feasible option, the 
time is nearing. 
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Measures and metrics for automatic emotion 
classification via FACET 
Pasquale Dente1, Dennis Küster1, Lina Skora2, Eva G. Krumhuber2 
Abstract. For dynamic emotions to be modelled in a natural and 
convincing way, systems must rely on accurate affective analysis 
of facial expressions in the first place. The present work 
introduces two measures for evaluating automatic emotion 
classification performance. It further provides a systematic 
comparison between 14 databases of dynamic expressions. 
Machine analysis was conducted using the FACET system, with 
an algorithm calculating recognition sensitivity and confidence. 
Results revealed the proportion of facial stimuli that could be 
recognised by the machine algorithm above threshold evidence, 
showing significant differences in recognition performance 
between the databases.12 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The computational modelling of dynamic facial expressions is a 
difficult challenge [1] that must be met to understand, and 
ultimately to simulate natural emotions convincingly. While 
single images can, in principle, be coded manually on the basis 
of the Facial Action Coding System [2], large stimulus sets that 
span a range of facial behaviour require a robust automated 
approach. This particularly applies to naturally occurring 
dynamic facial expressions which are often elicited “in the 
wild”. Rather than depicting clean exemplars of an emotion, they 
occur spontaneously, at varying intensities, with Action Units 
(AUs) that are not part of prototypical configurations [3, 4]. 
Automatic analysis of spontaneous as well as posed expressions 
therefore acts as an essential criterion from which to identify and 
synthesise complex emotional behaviour. 
The last two decades have seen great advances in the 
development of stimuli for facial expression and emotion 
research, taking them from static to dynamic portrayals [5, 6]. In 
[7] we have provided a conceptual review of existing dynamic 
facial expression databases. The present paper describes an 
empirical test of 14 of the available datasets in terms of machine 
recognition, with a focus on the six basic emotions (happiness, 
sadness, fear, anger, sadness, and surprise) [8]. In doing so, we 
discuss different measures and metrics for automatic emotion 
classification and their respective role in determining detection 
rates. 
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2 CLASSIFICATION APPROACHES 
14 datasets were chosen, each containing videos classified by the 
dataset author as portraying one of the six basic emotions 
(happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust, surprise). With the 
exception of DynEmo (only four emotions) and DISFA (only 
five emotions), we selected two portrayals of each emotion for 
each database, yielding 12 portrayals per dataset. Facial activity 
was measured through video-based analysis using the iMotions 
Attention Tool and its FACET module (version 5.7) [9]. FACET 
is a commercial facial expression recognition software based on 
the Computer Expression Recognition Toolbox (CERT) [10]. 
Recently, FACET has been used in an increasingly broad range 
of psychological and applied research, such as the attribution of 
emotions to faces of own and other races [11], the relative 
saliency of individual AUs [12], as well as attempts toward an 
automatic recognition of persuasiveness with the aid of features 
from facial expressions [13].  
FACET outputs per-frame “evidence values” that are defined 
as describing how likely an “expert human coder” would be to 
categorise an expression in a given frame as reflecting the 
intended emotion [14]. FACET evidence values are 
recommended for any in-depth analysis as per the manual, and 
are described as “very similar” to a Z-score centred around zero, 
i.e., the set value is assumed to reflect an even chance that an 
expression is to be categorized as neutral [14]. FACET outputs 
these per-frame values in a range from -4 to +4. Unfortunately, 
no recommendations are made by FACET concerning the 
aggregation of evidence values for interpretation beyond the 
level of individual frames. In the present research, we therefore 
decided to further aggregate the output evidence values, and to 
test the results empirically against the database emotion labels 
used as the ground truth. We specified the threshold to indicate a 
positive per-frame recognition for a given expression as 
evidence > 0. In order to evaluate machine recognition 
performance at the per-video level across the databases, we 
computed two additional metrics: recognition sensitivity and 
recognition confidence. 
 
Recognition sensitivity 
 
The sensitivity metric is a simple measure of the percent of 
frames containing the target evidence > 0. It can be used to 
assess which databases show the largest percentage of frames 
with the target expression (e.g., happiness) above the detection 
threshold. As such, it provides guidance for the evaluation of 
databases that show target expressions for a substantial amount 
of time. In the present context, the databases vary substantially 
in average stimulus (i.e. expression) duration, as well as the 
proportion of emotional frames as opposed to neutral or low-
intensity frames. To account for this variability, recognition 
sensitivity was computed for each expression as the percentage 
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of frames with target evidence > 0, divided by the sum of all 
frames, multiplied with 100. The result was then aggregated 
across the whole database to yield an average percentage score 
indicating the overall proportion of frames that were correctly 
identified as containing evidence for the target expression. This 
approach is thus broadly in agreement with the statistical 
definition of “sensitivity” in so far as it reflects the extent to 
which a positive item was correctly classified. However, we use 
this term only loosely due to the lack of precision in the 
definition of evidence values generated by FACET. 
 
 
 
Based on the guidelines provided by FACET [14], evidence 
> 0 can be interpreted as the least conservative threshold for 
positive classification. As such, there is more evidence for the 
presence of a given expression than evidence for its absence. 
However, evidence values can be substantially higher than 0, up 
to the point where a near perfect certainty (> 2) can be assumed 
that an expression is present. More stringent thresholds place 
higher demands on classification rates, which results in lower 
expression recognition as the evidence threshold increases.  
From inspection of Figure 1, above-threshold recognition 
across all 14 databases did not decay equally for all emotional 
expressions. While 54.71% (SD = 27.67) of frames in happiness 
were classified with near-perfect evidence (a decrease of 17.4%), 
only 3.84% (SD = 7.79) of frames in sadness were classified 
with the same evidence threshold > 2 (a decrease of 36.46%). 
This suggests that for sadness only a small number of stimuli 
could be classified with high certainty. 
 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of Target-Expression Frames as a Function 
of Evidence Threshold. 
 
Recognition confidence 
 
Recognition confidence reflects the proportion of above-
threshold target evidence (x) relative to the total above-threshold 
evidence, consisting of the target evidence (x), plus non-target 
evidence (y). Both (x) and (y) were computed as a sum of all 
frames (i) of a given clip, for FACET evidence values above the 
rejection threshold > 0. We excluded any evidence below this 
threshold because evidence < 0 reflects an assessment of the 
system that a given expression was not present. The ground truth 
to distinguish “target” vs. “non-target” evidence was provided by 
the expert labels provided for the validated databases. By 
multiplication with 100, the score yields a “percentage” value 
that is comparable to human confidence measures. For example, 
if a clip was labelled as “happy” in the validated database, and 
FACET only reported above rejection threshold evidence for 
happiness but no above-threshold evidence for any other 
expression, recognition confidence would be 100%. Recognition 
confidence thus provides a more robust metric that takes into 
account false-positive classifications, as well as the summative 
confidence reflected by the per-frame FACET evidence values. 
 
 
 
While a more conservative threshold implies stringent 
sensitivity in the classification of a target expression, non-target 
expressions may tend to be detected more frequently even at 
lower thresholds. As a result, recognition confidence should be 
more robust (compared to plain sensitivity scores) because 
conservative thresholds allow for more cases of non-target 
evidence to be filtered out. Furthermore, recognition confidence 
is weighted by the respective evidence values. 
As can be seen in Figure 2, recognition confidence scores 
were more robust, with slight increases for happiness and disgust 
up to thresholds of 0.75 to 1.00. For these two emotions, 
recognition confidence remained stable even at very 
conservative thresholds, suggesting that target expressions could 
be easily identified. The other four emotions showed some 
decline in recognition confidence with higher thresholds. Yet, 
variation in confidence scores as a function of the evidence 
threshold was still modest compared to the results obtained for 
recognition sensitivity.   
 
Figure 2. Evidence Scores as a Function of Evidence Threshold. 
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3 DETECTION RESULTS  
Based on the sensitivity and confidence scores, it was possible to 
evaluate the extent to which each of the 14 databases yielded > 0 
threshold evidence for emotion detection. For this, scores for the 
two portrayals per emotion were averaged for each database. 
Non-parametric bootstrap ANOVAs (N boots = 5000) were 
performed on the machine classification data. Significant 
differences occurred for the type of emotion, F(5, 124) = 5.86, p 
< .001, as well as the type of database (i.e. spontaneous vs. 
posed; F(1, 124) = 12.00, p < .01, with target expressions being 
detected with higher confidence in posed than spontaneous 
databases. Happiness was overall recognised with the highest 
confidence (90.86, SD = 23.24), followed by disgust (76.45, SD 
= 32.32), while fear was recognised with the lowest degree of 
confidence (47.70, SD = 39.39), and sadness performing slightly 
better (51.62, SD = 44.39).  
As can be seen in Table 1, there was a spread of machine 
recognition performance between databases, ranging from 
complete failures to detect any evidence (STOIC) to near perfect 
performance (ADFES). Additionally, a few databases (e.g., BU-
4DFE) appeared to perform substantially better when recognition 
confidence as opposed to sensitivity was assessed. Such 
databases may provide relatively clear expression data for 
machine analysis, albeit likely with a somewhat larger 
proportion of below-threshold frames. Overall, sensitivity and 
recognition confidence scores for individual clips were highly 
correlated (Pearson’s r = 0.81), suggesting a clear linear 
relationship between both metrics. This was the case in 
particular for the subset of stimuli drawn from spontaneous 
databases (r = 0.91).  
 
 
Database Sensitivity Confidence 
  Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
ADFES 80.04 (3.15) 95.70 (9.52) 
BINED (spon) 33.73 (47.15) 39.01 (47.44) 
BU-4DFE 62.99 (28.74) 90.46 (27.00) 
CK 63.78 (24.30) 86.01 (28.55) 
D3DFACS 61.33 (34.36) 56.05 (36.40) 
DaFEx 36.32 (31.75) 47.91 (42.96) 
DISFA (spon) 46.05 (40.44) 56.82 (47.15) 
DynEmo (spon) 19.81 (28.47) 21.14 (26.84) 
FG-NET (spon) 22.29 (23.21) 37.67 (44.86) 
GEMEP 29.55 (30.71) 29.80 (31.96) 
MMI 46.48 (30.17) 74.86 (38.22) 
MPI 52.31 (22.98) 68.97 (36.92) 
STOIC failed failed 
UT Dallas 42.62 (41.23) 61.54 (47.71) 
Mean 47.95 (33.86) 62.73 (41.38) 
 
Table 1. Machine Sensitivity and Confidence Mean Scores for 
14 Databases. Spon = Databases with Spontaneous Portrayals 
 
By ranking the databases on both metrics, Figure 3 
demonstrates the relative advantage of taking non-target 
evidence into account in the assessment of a dataset’s 
recognition confidence. For example, D3DFACS is the only 
database showing lower confidence than sensitivity. This is 
likely to be due to low per-frame evidence found by the system 
for semi-profile views of the 2D video clips in this database. 
While there was an overall significant effect of database type, 
performance of FACET at the level of each individual database 
suggests that factors related to the construction of a database 
may be more important than their posed/spontaneous nature per 
se. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Correlation between Sensitivity and Confidence 
Scores across the Databases. 
 
 
4 CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
The present research introduced and assessed two measures for 
machine recognition using FACET. Both sensitivity and 
confidence scores provided a robust method for evaluating 
emotion classification performance. They also allowed for a 
systematic comparison between 14 databases with dynamic 
facial expressions. This is the first empirical challenge of 
dynamic datasets in terms of automatic emotion detection. 
Detection rates were above 50% for the majority of the 
databases. Nonetheless, there was also a substantial number of 
sets with relatively weak performance (DynEmo, FG-Net, 
BINED), especially when portrayals were spontaneous rather 
than posed. In view of the limitations of machine analysis to deal 
with changes in viewing angle and overall visibility of the face 
[9, 10], the relatively uncontrolled nature of natural/spontaneous 
expressions, e.g., in online interaction [16], appears to pose 
additional challenges for automatic classification. Future work 
could aim for more high-quality data samples [11] on par with 
the technical recording setup used for some of the best 
performing posed databases such as ADFES or BU-4DFE. We 
suggest that an approach that combines confidence and 
sensitivity metrics can shed light on potential issues and 
limitations of dynamic facial expression databases. Full results 
including a larger set of stimuli will indicate how machine 
classification performs across a number of mediating factors 
such as the number and type of emotions, gender, and age [12]. 
The measures and metrics presented in this paper are comparable 
to human recognition performance for comprehensive database 
examination in the future. 
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Reinforcement Learning Models of Emotion:
Computational Challenges
Joost Broekens1
Abstract. In this paper we address the field that computationally
studies the relation between adaptive behavior and emotion. This
field studies how affective phenomena emerge from simulated adap-
tive agents and how these agents and their human interaction partners
can benefit from this. In particular, we focus on four major challenges
when adaptive behavior is operationalized as an agent that learns to
solve a task using reinforcement learning (RL) and affect is a signal
that is derived from RL primitives and emerges during the interaction
of the agent with its environment. For example, learned state utility,
V (s), is a signal that resembles fear (negative) and hope (positive),
because these emotions signal the anticipation of loss or gain. The
four challenges resolve around the following questions: why would a
particular signal be labeled as an emotion; is there a generic structure
in humans to how mood, emotion and appraisal influence reinforce-
ment learning and action selection; what should benchmark tests look
like if we want to investigate the plausibility and effectiveness of an
emotional instrumentation of RL; are there other benefits to emo-
tion instrumentation than increased adaptive potential for artificial
agents?
1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper we address four major challenges in the field that stud-
ies the relation between emotion and Reinforcement Learning (RL).
However, we first motivate why it is useful in the first place to study
how emotions emerge from a mechanism for adapting behavior. Of
course there is a theoretical benefit for psychology and behavioral
science to gaining insight into the relation between emotion and
adaptive behavior through computational modelling, but there are
certainly also applied benefits. First, affective signals can enhance
the adaptive potential of an artificial agent by influencing the learn-
ing process and action selection [56, 57, 38, 8, 10, 30, 55]. Second,
if emotions emerge from RL during interaction with an environment,
then any RL-based adaptive agent automatically possesses a compu-
tational model of emotion, which reduces the need to design a spe-
cific emotion model for that particular agent. Third, a solid grounding
of emotion in adaptive behavior makes the expression of that emotion
by a Virtual Agent or Robot intrinsically meaningful to humans, be-
cause we can relate to why the emotional signal arises. Having emo-
tions emerge from RL variables would solve the grounding problem
of emotion in RL-based artificial agents [17, 33], i.e., what does an
emotion mean in terms of the functioning of the agent. Solving this
problem might seem an abstract and theoretical goal, but this is far
from the truth. For example, an adaptive robot that shows fear that is
1 Delft University of Technology, Netherlands, email:
joost.broekens@gmail.com
grounded in its learning mechanisms will be much easier to under-
stand for humans, simply because we humans know what it means
to have fear when learning to adapt to an environment. So, solving
the grounding problem directly helps human-robot and human-agent
interaction. This means that for an emotional instrumentation to be
useful, adaptive benefit per se is not a requirement. Even if the emo-
tion is purely an epiphenomenon, it is still useful for human-agent
interaction and for understanding the fundamentals of how emotion
emerges from adaptive behavior.
The underlying hypothesis in this field is that if (a) emotion and
feedback-based adaptation of behavior is intimately connected in nat-
ural agents, and, (b) RL is a model for feedback-based adaptation of
behavior in animals, then (c) this connection should be apparent in
computational models of emotion for artificial agents that use RL to
adapt their behavior. In this introduction we provide evidence for (a)
and (b), which leads us to conclude that indeed it makes sense to
computationally study the relation between emotion and reinforce-
ment learning. Then we discuss computational attempts at modeling
this relation and present the four major challenges.
We first investigate the premise that emotion and feedback-based
adaptation of behavior is intimately connected in natural agents. A
broadly agreed-upon function of emotion in humans and other ani-
mals is to provide a complex feedback signal for a(n) (synthetic) or-
ganism to adapt its behavior [25, 34, 44, 49, 51, 52, 13]. Important for
the current discussion is that emotion provides feedback and that this
feedback ultimately influences behavior, otherwise we can not talk
about the adaptation of behavior. Behavior can be conceptualized as
a sequence of actions. So, the generation of behavior eventually boils
down to selecting appropriate next actions, a process called action
selection [14, 47]. Brain mechanisms have been identified to be re-
sponsible for, or at the very least involved in, this process [6, 31]. An
important signal that influences action selection in humans is how
alternative actions feel. In neuroscience and psychology this signal
is often referred to as somatic marker [18], affective value [53] or
preference [65]. Another way in which emotion influences action se-
lection is through emotion-specific action tendencies [25], such as
the tendency to flee or startle when afraid. Emotion and feedback-
based adaption seem to be intimately connected in natural agents via
the process called action selection.
We now investigate our second premise; is there any support for
RL being a plausible model of natural feedback-based learning? In
RL an (artificial) organism learns, through experience, estimated util-
ity of situated actions. It does so by solving the credit assignment
problem, i.e., how to assign a value to an action in a particular state
so that this value is predictive of the total expected reward (and
punishment) that follows this action. After learning, the action se-
lection process of the organism uses these learned situated action
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values to select actions that optimize reward (and minimize punish-
ment) over time. Here we refer to situated action value as utility. In
RL, reward, utility, and utility updates are the basic elements based
on which action selection is influenced. These basic elements have
been identified in the animal brain including the encoding of util-
ity [62], changes in utility [29], and reward and motivational action
value [3, 4, 5, 62]. In these studies it is argued that these processes re-
late to instrumental conditioning, in particular to the more elaborate
computational model for instrumental conditioning called, indeed,
Reinforcement Learning [19, 43]. It seems RL is a plausible model
for feedback-based adaptation of behavior in animals.
So, the hypothesis that emotion and RL are intimately connected
in animals is supported by the converging evidence that both RL and
emotion seem to influence action selection using a utility-like sig-
nal. In neuroscience the connection between emotion, or affective
signals in general, and reinforcement learning is confirmed by the
large amount of work showing a relation between the orbitofrontal
cortex, reward representation, and (subjective) affective value (for
review see [53]). This connection can be studied computationally us-
ing RL-based adaptive agents. For example, different groups have
shown that in some cases a mood-like signal emerging from the in-
teraction between the agent and its environment can be used to op-
timize search behavior of an adaptive agent [8, 10, 30, 55] by ma-
nipulating the amount of randomness in the action selection process.
Other groups have shown that explicit relations exist between emo-
tion and the (prediction of) utility according to human subjects [28].
It has also been shown that adaptive agents that use their emotion as
a feedback signal for learning, where that emotion itself is emergent
from RL variables (such as reward, utility, and utility change) are in
some tasks more adaptive then standard RL agents [56, 57] or learn
faster [38]. Furthermore, already in 1999 an exhaustive attempt has
been made to investigate different ways in which both emotion and
RL can jointly influence action selection [27]. However, such studies
face 4 major challenges that will be introduced in the next section.
2 CHALLENGES
First, it is a point of debate which and why particular signals coming
from the RL variables or the agent’s interaction with the environ-
ment should be labeled as ”emotion”, ”mood”, or ”appraisal”, which
are the three affect-related situation dependent phenomena, let alone
why a particular signal should be labeled as, e.g., ”fear”. For exam-
ple, why is the amount of control (an appraisal as per [22]) equal
to the difference between the utility of an agent’s current situation
minus the utility of the next situation, which represents the com-
pleteness of a learned interaction model [56] but not equal to the
difference between the highest and lowest utility of the next situa-
tion, which represents the freedom of choice one has. Both instru-
mentations of control are equally plausible. Another example is the
modeling of joy. Relations between specific emotions and RL-related
signals seem to exist, e.g., the relation between joy and the temporal
difference signal in RL. The temporal difference error is correlated
with dopamine signaling in the brain [61] on the one hand, and a
correlation between dopamine signaling and euphoria exists on the
other [21]. Joy reactions habituate upon repeated exposure to jokes
[16] and computationally the temporal difference signal for a particu-
lar situation habituates upon repeated exposure [63], and both joy and
the temporal difference signal are modulated by expectation of the re-
ward. Does that mean that joy equals the temporal difference signal?
The challenge is thus to come up with testable hypotheses about how
emotion, mood and appraisal emerge from or are even equal to RL-
based adaption-related signals. These hypotheses should be based on
cognitive and behavioral theories describing eliciting conditions for
emotions such as OCC [44] and [52].
Second, in order to test the validity of these hypotheses, we need
benchmark scenarios that specify the emergence of affective phe-
nomena during adaptation of behavior. Such benchmark scenarios
do not exist. This is a serious issue because (a) researchers re-invent
similar scenarios with different names [8, 27, 56] without replicat-
ing results of others first, and, (b) small differences in scenarios can
have major influences [30, 8, 55]. The underlying issue is that we
do not know how individual elements of the scenario such as the ex-
trinsic reward function (stochastic or not), the problem to be learned
(Markovian or not, stochastic or not), the learning mechanism (e.g.,
Q-learning versus TD(1)), and policy dependency (on-policy versus
off-policy) influence the emergence of emotion for a particular RL
instrumentation. This means that it is unclear if emergence of an
emotional phenomenon may be generalized. To give an example, fear
extinction is a phenomenon any fear instrumentation should be able
to show. However, what kind of learning task (e.g., foraging task,
partially observable, stochastic reward function) is needed to test for
fear extinction after an initial negative encounter? The challenge is
therefore to device benchmark scenarios that can be used to test for
the replication of affective phenomena in computo, such as habitu-
ation and fear extinction. The goal for these scenarios is to test the
plausibility of hypotheses about emergence of emotion, mood and
appraisal, e.g., to test the validity of a claim such as ”the utility of the
current state equals hope/fear”.
Third, it is unclear how emotion, mood and appraisal influence
action selection in the RL architecture. Action selection can be influ-
enced in roughly three ways [56]: directly by changing action values,
indirectly by changing action-selection parameters, or indirectly by
influencing what is called the intrinsic reward function (the intrin-
sic reward is the signal used for learning, while the extrinsic reward
is the feedback signal from the environment). Mood, appraisal and
emotion can therefore influence action selection each in three dif-
ferent ways. The question is why one way of influencing is more
plausible or useful than another. For example, why would mood in-
fluence action selection meta parameters [8] but not action values? Is
this computationally easier? Is this more effective in terms of adap-
tion benefit? Is it biologically more plausible? The challenge is to
formulate testable hypotheses about how affective phenomena influ-
ence action selection. These hypotheses should, again, be based on
existing research on affective influences on cognition and behavior.
Fourth, it is unclear what kind of adaptive benefits and human-
agent interaction benefits can be expected and in what tasks these
benefits should be observed. Usually research that investigates the
role of emotion in RL-based adaptive agents focuses on increasing
adaptive potential. In the majority of the cases the average (or fi-
nal) fitness is the outcome measure to optimize. However, this is a
one-dimensional approach to the role of emotion in adaptation. For
example, fear can be used to influence intrinsic reward or random-
ness in action selection, and then it might serve the agent on average
over the course of its lifetime. This instrumentation of fear forgoes
the biological function of the fear response, which is to influence ac-
tion selection immediately: fear makes an organism flee or wait (star-
tle), and, for example, waiting simply stalls action selection to gain
more time to absorb information. In scenarios where waiting makes
sense, the effect of the latter fear instrumentation will thus be differ-
ent compared to scenarios where waiting has no function (e.g., when
the agent is the only actor that triggers state changes). In addition to
adaptive benefits there are human-agent interaction benefits, as men-
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tioned in the introduction. The challenge is thus to define benchmark
scenarios in which particular adaptive or interaction benefits can ap-
pear. These scenarios can be different from the ones aimed for in
challenge two, and need not be psychologically or biologically in-
spired per se.
3 APPROACH
We propose to tackle these challenges as follows. First, as a commu-
nity we need an overview of specific adaptive and interaction benefits
that can be expected from emotion, mood and appraisal in an RL set-
ting. Examples include increased overall fitness (higher average re-
ward), faster learning convergence, quicker recovery from changes in
the environment, and increased human understanding of the robot’s
current state in the learning process. For more information on this
topic see the review [40]. Second, we need a publicly available set
of benchmark scenarios to test these benefits, as explained above.
Third, to test individual hypotheses about how (or if) emotion, mood
and appraisal emerge from RL, benchmark scenarios need to be de-
veloped by behavioral scientists, emotion psychologists and RL re-
searchers interested in the role of emotion in adaptive behavior. Each
scenario should involve a RL task, a prediction of which affective
phenomenon emerges when over the course of learning to adapt to
the task, and finally a set of experimental variables of which varia-
tion has a, in psychology and behavioral science, well-known effect
on the affective phenomena. The last step to address involves the
development of a shared simulation environment, analogous to the
agent negotiation community, which successfully launched a shared
test bed for agent-agent negotiation [36]. One important benefit of
this is that differences in results between groups of researchers can-
not be attributed to implementation differences. This is the last step,
as the requirements for this simulation environment should be de-
rived from the benchmark scenarios and expected adaptive and in-
teraction benefit. These steps require collaboration, coordination and
the building of a community, and funding is necessary for this to
happen effectively and efficiently.
The final step involves goodwill and patience. If we accept the va-
lidity of our benchmark scenarios and simulation environment, then
we should accept results that (do not) support a hypothesis that a par-
ticular RL signal should indeed be labeled as a particular emotion.
Only then can we, in a structured way, investigate these hypotheses
and build support for them, or reject them after careful consideration.
If others do not agree with the affective label we gave to a particular
RL-based signal, then our first reaction should be to investigate why
this research passed the benchmark tests. As argued in [40] a more
solid approach is essential for better shared definitions of affective
signals in RL agents.
4 FIRST STEPS
Preliminary investigation [9, 32] suggests three computational (or
cognitive) requirements to model emotions in terms of adaptation-
related signals. The first concerns the element of novelty. Novelty
covers concepts such as predictability, familiarity and suddenness,
which are important factors in many emotions [2, 45, 37, 48, 54],
in particular fear and surprise. Adaptive systems can only represent
novelty if some form of prediction is present in the system. For ex-
ample, if a model contains likelihoods of next states then this al-
lows the derivation of novelty where less likely states are assumed
novel. The second requirement concerns situated adaptation inten-
sity. By this we mean that the intensity of an adaptation-related sig-
nal varies based on the desirability of the situation that causes the
adaptation-related signal [26]. For example, humans differentiate be-
tween important and less important events, resulting in strong and
weak emotions respectively. The third requirement is the existence
of some order of development of signals. In early childhood, humans
develop their emotions in order, from simple to complex, where the
more complex emotions seem to depend on the existence of simple
emotions [35, 34]. An adaptive system inherently lacking such an or-
der of development in its adaptation-related signals cannot have these
mapped correctly (time-wise) onto complex emotions. For example,
fear (the worrying form, not the startle form) in humans occurs later
in development than distress, and for an RL algorithm to model this
there must be some adaption-related signal that only becomes rele-
vant after some initial learning has occurred. This set of requirements
strongly limits the number of available RL algorithms, but there are
still many that meet them all (e.g., all model-based RL).
There are are also emotion-theoretical requirements for RL-based
models of emotion. With regards to the order of development of emo-
tions in infants, humans start with a small number of distinguishable
emotions that increases during development. In the first months of
infancy, children exhibit a narrow range of emotions consisting of
distress and pleasure [59]. Joy and sadness emerge by 3 months,
anger around 4 to 6 months with fear usually reported first at 7 or
8 months [59]. We propose to start by modeling the elicitation of
the emotions of joy, distress, hope, fear, relief, disappointment and
boredom. This set of emotions is meaningful with respect to learning
[46], represents actual feedback, anticipated feedback and reflective
feedback, and is realistically modeled with RL because these emo-
tions depend mainly on novelty detection and goal congruence [50]
(note that agent-directed emotions pride, shame and anger, are more
difficult because this needs the concept of agency, something not in-
herently present in RL-agents). In line with this effort we have re-
cently proposed that joy and distress can be modeled by the temporal
difference signal [9] and that RL agents that learn to walk a slip-
pery cliff best simulate the emotions of hope and fear by taking their
model-based predictions of future temporal difference signals [41].
These findings are in congruence with the cognitive emotion theory
by Reisenzein [49].
Important characteristics of emotions that should be present in
benchmark scenarios include emotion intensity, habituation and ex-
tinction. Habituation is the decrease in intensity of the response to a
reinforced stimulus resulting from that stimulus-reinforcer pair being
repeatedly received, while extinction is the decrease in intensity of a
response when a previously conditioned stimulus is no longer rein-
forced [42, 7, 23, 64]. A model of emotion based on adaption-related
signals should be consistent with habituation and extinction, and in
particular fear extinction as this is a well-studied phenomenon [42].
For example, learning to walk a slippery slope should always involve
some fear, though the intensity should gradually decrease after each
successful passage.
Affect and cognition are also related on a deeper more implicit
level. Mood influences cognition. For example, a positive versus a
slightly negative mood is known to make humans focus on the big
picture or on detail respectively [24]. By artificially biasing the up-
date signal (TD error) toward the positive or negative side, we can
investigate if this effect can be replicated, e.g., by showing that the
agent tends to perform respectively big-picture behavior in the form
of exploration in the first case (and feel more joy) versus detail behav-
ior in the form of exploitation in the second (and feel less joy). Cog-
nition also influences mood. For example, humans employ a system
that determines the balance between evaluating immediate versus
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delayed rewards, which is usually attributed to particular dopamine
neurons [39]. That is, long term thinking involves a larger influence
of future rewards, meaning the intensity of emotions linked to ex-
pectation (such as hope) can be expected to be higher for long-term
thinkers. This could be modeled with the lambda in Reinforcement
Learning. Lambda is a learning parameter that influences the effect
of future rewards on the current state. Thus, by varying learning
parameters, we should be able to replicate effects on behavior and
emotion resulting from deeper relations between cognition and af-
fect. Such simulations have been performed by us [11, 12] and others
[15, 20, 55], but never in relation to the occurring emotions.
5 OUTLOOK
We have argued for the need to systematically study emotions in re-
lation to reinforcement learning. We have listed 4 main challenges
and taken first steps at how to attack these. However, we feel these
challenges should be dealt with by the affective computing, adap-
tive behavior, psychology and neuroscience communities together.
We also feel that the fields of reinforcement learning and emotion re-
search can benefit from each other. Both fields essentially study ani-
mal adaptation mechanisms, but from a complementary perspective.
We think that after 17 years of sporadic research in this field, some-
times explicitly referred to as investigating the link between emotion
and adaptation, sometimes implicitly, the field needs a shared ex-
perimental practice and agenda. Without this, debates will be about
the details, not about the big questions, and this will (and has) hin-
der(ed) progress. It is strange that two areas of study that deal so
explicitly with adaptation and action selection in natural and arti-
ficial agents, that are both grounded in what can easily be called
the fundamentals of animal adaption (feedback, reward, condition-
ing, anticipation, motivation, curiosity, stress, policy learning), and
that are both mature areas in and of itself, would not come up with a
program to merge insights. We feel, given recent publication activity
in the area of affect, reinforcement learning, intrinsic motivation and
neuroscience [1, 56, 58, 60, 53, 34, 9, 41], that the time to do this is
now.
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PrimEmo: A Neural Implementation of Survival Circuits
Supporting Primitive Emotions
Luc Caspar1 and Roger K. Moore2
Abstract. Affective and cognitive sciences are both fields interested
in the inner workings of the brain. While affective science focuses
on the concept of emotions and how they are produced, cognitive
science considers the brain as a whole, treating it as a system made
of a multitude of independent subsystems. Since its inception, af-
fective science has produced a plethora of theories and models each
trying to solve the mysteries surrounding the definition and origin
of emotions in the brain. Cognitive science on the other hand has
had a rather chaotic history shifting its focus every decade, before fi-
nally being influenced by computer science and adopting the point of
view of the brain as the most elaborate computational device. In this
point of view, the gray matter residing within our skull is reduced
to a system that takes sensory information on its inputs, processes
it and outputs more data or actions. Each field has, more or less,
evolved independently from one another so far, but both are now fac-
ing fundamental problems. On the one hand, the concept of emotions
has yet to be completely defined and modeled. On the other, cogni-
tive science is still trying to produce architectures imbuing artificial
agents with human-level intelligence. This paper introduces a neu-
ral architecture based on the “survival circuits” framework (LeDoux,
2012) supporting primitive emotions and providing survival skills
to artificial agents. Side-stepping the problem of defining the con-
cept of emotions, the suggested neural structure focuses on identi-
fying and modeling parts of the brain involved in survival functions
(defense, thermo-regulation, maintenance of energy, nutritional sup-
plies, reproduction and fluid balance). The neural implementation
of this system provides a proto-brain for groups of artificial agents
trying to survive in a dynamic virtual environment. By comparison
with a hard-coded control logic (Scheutz, 2004), our architecture al-
lows for a more equitable sharing of the resources and a longer life
expectancy. It is our belief that, in the long term, the system sug-
gested in this paper could become a robust basis upon which more
elaborate cognitive architectures, such as ACT-R or SOAR, could be
built, hence moving one step closer to endowing artificial agents with
human-level intelligence.
1 INTRODUCTION
Ever since humans have walked the earth it seems they have been
fascinated by emotions, how they shape our everyday life, our inner
thoughts and our relationship with each other. Due to their subjec-
tive, nature everyone has his own thoughts and theory on the matter.
However, even though so many minds are at work trying to solve this
puzzle, we are nowhere near a complete understanding of “What is
an emotion?” [15].
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Since the time of Aristotle [2] in ancient Greece, emotions (called
“passions” at the time) have been separated from reason, if not op-
posed to one another, in the human mind. Passion, according to Aris-
totle, was the fire that burns from the inside and makes people act ir-
rationally or on impulse. While reason was seen as the cold blooded,
carefully calculating and logical part of the mind, that one uses to
solve problems and manage one’s own life. This seemingly natural
separation of the mind in two halves, passion against reason, would
endure and lead to the creation of the affective and cognitive sci-
ences, but that would not happen until the birth of Rene´ Descartes
and William James, respectively.
In 1637, Descartes opened the gate of cognitive science with his
now famous “Cogito, Ergo sum” in “Discourse on the Method” [7],
sparking the interest of many a scientist on the subject of the hu-
man brain and its functioning. Ironically, 12 years later he would
also write what is now considered to be the first theory on emotions
in his “Passions of the Soul” [8]. While the behaviorists took over the
field of cognitive science [5, 21], it would not be before James’ paper
titled “What is an Emotion?” [15] that the field of affective science
would really see the light of day. Each field went its separate way, the
behaviorists dismissing the concept of emotions since it was thought
to be part of the conscious mind, impossible to quantify or measure
and thus of no concern to them [21, 5]. Affective science meanwhile
began its age-old debate over the definition of emotions [4].
Many cognitive architectures have since been developed, such as
ACT-R [35], SOAR [18] and EPIC [16]. Although, the ACT-R and
EPIC theories are devoid of any emotions and SOAR, even if pos-
sessing an emotion module, makes only limited use of the informa-
tion output. Similarly, a plethora of theories and models of emotions
are now available, but as Grandjean, Sander and Scherer [29] noticed
there are maybe too many of them with no connections in-between
and no ways to compare them. The problem has grown since the ap-
pearance of service robots, focusing the attention on emotions recog-
nition and expression to ease human-robot interaction, distancing the
whole field from the fundamental emotion riddle. There is clearly a
need for a different approach if the field is to move forward again,
but where should one begin to look for a solution?
Sloman [34] and LeDoux [22], both suggested a similar solution:
acknowledging the fact that the concept of emotions is still blurry at
the moment and rather concentrate on the functions fulfilled by emo-
tions. In what LeDoux calls a theory of “Survival Circuits” (detailed
in section 2), emotions are seen as a system that evolved in every liv-
ing creatures as a better survival strategy. Animals that had emotions
were better at detecting dangers in their surroundings and so more
efficient in avoiding them. The same is true of happiness that would
usually drive animals to repeat actions that made them happy in the
first place.
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It is our opinion that most cognitive architectures, be it SOAR,
ACT-R or EPIC, are lacking a robust emotion basis upon which to
build a truly intelligent system (see DAC [38] and LIDA [12] for dif-
ferent attempts at solving this problem). This paper then introduces
a new neural architecture in section 2, which focuses on the innate
circuits and the survival functions of emotions. The goal, discussed
in section 4, is to show that artificial agents based on this architec-
ture are better at adapting to and surviving in dynamic environments
than other cognitive agents. Finally, section 5 highlights the steps
that remain to build a complete cognitive architecture endowed with
emotions.
2 METHOD
2.1 Survival circuits
The idea of hard wired structures residing in the older part of the
brain and related to emotions is not entirely new. Its origin could be
traced back to Darwin [6], who first suggested the existence of in-
nate circuits common to all humankind and even part of the animal
kingdom, enabling us to feel and express a certain set of emotions in
similar fashions. According to this theory of basic emotions, it is the
reason why even if one was to travel to the most remote regions of
the world, a simple smile would suffice for everybody to understand
that you are in fact happy. The term “Basic emotions” was coined
for those universally understood emotions, while the rest are usually
referred to as “Complex emotions”, since one’s culture is embedded
into and required for their expression. Scientists at the time were
quick to adopt the concept and each set out to define the set of basic
emotions shared by all and more importantly to describe at the same
time, which were the related circuits in the brain. Two of the most no-
table researchers engaged in this furious race are Paul Ekman, whose
work is still the basis for many a project to this day and who de-
veloped a standard set of six basic emotions: fear, anger, happiness,
sadness, disgust and surprise [9]. And Robert Plutchik, most famous
for the graphical representation of his theory, the aptly named “Wheel
of emotions” (see Figure 1), which described basic emotions as be-
ing similar to primary colors and complex emotions were obtained
by combining those primary colors together in particular ways [27].
However appealing the theory of basic emotions might be, it has
been heavily challenged in the recent years. Most prominent among
all the criticisms, was the fact that sets of different sizes and contain-
ing different labels were put forth by each research project working
on the subject [4, 5, 21, 20]. Furthermore, scientists came to realize
that some of the labels used in the nomenclature could describe two
similar, but still different states of arousal [22]. Another important
issue, pointed out by the opponents of the basic emotion concept,
was the fact that there is a discrepancy between the set of basic emo-
tions listed by the main theory, based on brain research in animals,
and the sets obtained by research projects using human subjects, in-
cluding Ekman’s work. The advent of imaging technologies, such as
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and Positron Emis-
sion Tomography (PET) scans, that allowed to directly observe the
brain’s activation patterns while patients were feeling and expressing
emotions, brought the debate over the veracity of the basic emotions
theory to an end. Even though, the spatial resolution of this type of
technology is still lacking, the evidence pointed toward the fact that
patterns of activations did not have dedicated circuits, as previously
believed. Nowadays, the theory of Basic emotions has lost most of
its supporters, but some parts of its core concepts can still be found
in the work of Orthony [10], Alexandrov [10] and others.
Figure 1. The wheel of emotions as a visual representation of Plutchik’s
theory on basic emotions and their interactions. Source: Wikimedia
commons, under public domain licensing.
The survival circuits framework introduced by LeDoux in 2012
[22] relies on the same fundamental idea of innate circuits nested at
the base of the brain. However, the key difference here is that those
circuits are not ded cated to the production of any emotion or feeling.
Survival circuits have their origin in the single cell organisms that
populated the earth billions of years ago. Those early life forms, even
though very simple, were able to detect and avoid noxious chemical
components and steer themselves toward the more nutritious ones.
Since then, evolution has run its course, but LeDoux argues that the
blueprint for the basis of the vertebrate brain is pretty similar across
species; parts of the human brain can also be found in a rat brain and
vice versa. Obviously, there are some differences in size and shape,
but the same primitive mechanisms that help us survive are present
in the rat’s, as well as, the human’s brain. Thus, the primary function
of survival circuits is to ensure the survival of the individual by mon-
itoring the state of the internal state and detecting relevant changes in
the environment. Each circuit can be conceived as a control system
tasked to maintain one of the individual’s basic needs within a com-
fortable range and initiate a reaction if any stimulus were to unsettle
the established balance.
The similarity that Darwin observed in the expression of emotions
across culture and species are reduced to the fact that the set of in-
nate triggers and reactions defining each survival circuit has been
inherited from a common ancestor. Similarly, the existence of com-
plex emotions influenced by culture can be explained by the ability
of survival circuits to create new associations between insignificant
stimuli and innate reactions through the process called conditioning
[26].
However, if survival circuits are not dedicated to producing emo-
tions, how can they constitute a basis for a model of emotions? Ac-
cording to LeDoux, the triggering of an innate circuit will simultane-
ously send signals for the release of hormones, in both the brain and
body, and to sub-cortical and motor areas to react accordingly. The
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sensory feedback from the reaction coupled with the knowledge that
an innate detector has been triggered, the formation of new memories
and the heightened state of activity in the brain, are all gathered into a
global organismic state that can be processed further by higher-level
cognitive functions. The job of these functions will be to categorize
and finally assign an emotion label to the global organismic state
[22].
2.2 PrimEmo: A neural implementation of the
survival circuits
Relying on LeDouxs framework of survival circuits, this section in-
vestigates a plausible model for such mechanisms, before imple-
menting it in populations of artificial neurons as the main control
process for primitive robots.
2.2.1 The hypothalamus
The hypothalamus in the mammalian brain is part of a larger complex
called the diencephalon along with the thalamus and the pituitary
gland. It is symmetrically distributed around the third ventricle and
its anterior boundary, laying over the optic chiasm, is defined by the
lamina terminalis and the anterior commissure, while its posterior
border is occupied by the mammillary bodies [30, 11, 37, 17, 3].
In the vertebrate brain the hypothalamus is in control of the Auto-
nomic Nervous System (ANS) [30, 11, 37, 17, 3] responsible for the
well-being of the body’s internal state. For a long time it was believed
that the hypothalamus contained different command centers, for ag-
gression, energy, thermoregulation, fluid balance and reproduction,
that could realize fully fledged behaviors. However, recent discover-
ies suggest that, on the contrary, the hypothalamus only influences
the likelihood for a behavior to be executed by sending signals to
widespread areas of the forebrain, cortex and toward the pituitary
gland for the release of hormones. Its functioning is therefore simi-
lar to a control system, processing sensory information and adjusting
the release of hormones in the brain and blood to maintain the body’s
homeostasis [30].
Given its role as a control system and its innate propensity to detect
stimuli relevant to the self-preservation of the body, we consider the
hypothalamus as being one such survival circuit.
2.2.2 The amygdala
In the vertebrates brain, the amygdala refers to a small almond
shaped collection of nuclei that lies in the temporal lobes pole be-
low and medial to the cortex on each side [11, 37, 17, 3, 40].
In the field of affective science, the amygdala has always been the
center of attention, for it was believed to be the main constituent of
the limbic system introduced by Paul MacLean [23]. As the concept
of the limbic system survived throughout the years, so did the idea
of the amygdala being the production center for emotions [5, 22, 3].
Results from studies on the expression of fear in animals concluded
that the amygdala was not the only part involved in the process as
many already suspected, but that it was essential to the elicitation of
negative emotions, such as fear, anger and disgust [28, 21, 19, 5].
However, with the advent of new technologies, especially the fMRI,
researchers discovered that the amygdala was involved in processing
positive emotions as well [39].
As of recently, some scientists have begun to suspect that the
amygdala might only play an indirect role in the production of emo-
tions and that it would be better to think of it as an innate detector
processing external sensory information[22]. Akin to the hypotha-
lamus the amygdala can be seen as a control system (see Figure
2) responsible for monitoring the external environment and reacting
to stimuli relevant to the individual’s survival. As a complement to
the hypothalamus, the amygdala is the second survival circuit in this
model.
Figure 2. Diagram outlining the inner workings of the amygdala. The
lateral and basal nuclei act as the main inputs, propagating information to
both the intercalated neurons and the central nucleus. The central nucleus,
the main ouput, combines information from the hypothalamus with data
processed inside the amygdala. The intercalated neurons are probably the
most important part of the amygdala-thalamus feedback loop, as they
prevent the central nucleus from over-activating by gradually inhibiting its
activity, hence implementing a simple “habituation” mechanism.
2.2.3 The thalamus
The thalamus is the second part of the diencephalon. Roughly egg-
shaped, it sits in the gap between the posterior wall of the interven-
tricular foramen and the subarachnoid space below the fornix and
the splenium of the corpus callosum and above the pineal gland and
tectum [32, 33, 11, 37, 17, 3]. The thalamus is usually referred to as
the gateway to the brain, as it is believed that any external sensory
data must first go through the thalamus on its way to the cortex or
other parts of the brain [32, 33]. For a long time, the role of the thala-
mus was reduced to a mere proxy that redirects any incoming infor-
mation toward its corresponding processing center in the neocortex
[33, 36]. However, recent studies have revised this view and found
that, through bidirectional connections with wide spread areas of the
brain, feedback loops could be defined, where the thalamus would
first send sensory data to a sub-system of the brain. The sub-system
would then process the information further to try and make sense of
it. Finally, a signal would be fed back to the thalamus, modulating
the flow of sensory information entering the sub-system.
As the thalamus’ core function is not directly related to the sur-
vival of the individual, but rather to the restriction on the amount of
information entering the brain, its inclusion might seem pointless.
Nevertheless, the thalamus is a necessary constituent for the amyg-
dala to correctly perform its role as a control system.
2.3 Experimental setup
To assess the performance of our architecture in terms of survival ca-
pabilities, we replicated a “resource foraging task” experiment sug-
gested by Scheutz [31] and compared the subsequents results to those
originally obtained by Scheutz.
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Figure 3. A complete view of the brain areas included in the PrimEmo
model and their interactions.
The main simulation environment is quite simple and consists in a
virtual unlimited two-dimensional floor, on which energy resources,
obstacles and robots are placed. Obstacles are static columns placed
randomly inside a predetermined area of 8 × 8 meters at the be-
ginning of the game and will remain in place until the end. On the
contrary energy resources, which are also randomly scattered inside
the area, will be depleted by the foraging robots and disappear. How-
ever, no agents should ever lack energy, for resources are continually
replaced. Each source contains a maximum of 400 units of energy. In
the initialization phase 25 units of both obstacles and energy sources
will be placed randomly in the area. Furthermore, even though re-
sources are allowed to appear randomly for each turn, the number of
resources that can be on the map at one time has been limited to 50
units for reasons of computational power.
The robot used in this simulation to represent an agent is the E-
puck [25]. It comes equipped with 8 infra-red distance sensors, al-
lowing it to detect objects in every directions, and an rgb camera. It
has been selected for its small size and its availability, since this ex-
periment, if implemented with real agents, involves groups of up to
50 robots. In the frame of the simulation, an agent can perform one
out of five possible actions:
• Move: selected by default if nothing appears in the robot’s im-
mediate surroundings. Moving around expands energy at a rate
proportional to the robot’s linear speed. More over, if a robot is
below the critical level of energy (set to 400 units) its maximum
speed will be limited to 1
7
th of its original value.
• Forage: when the agent is on top of an energy source it will con-
sume energy at a rate of 100 units per turn. There is no limit to
how much energy an agent can consume.
• Fight & Flee: when two or more agents meet, they enter a battle
mode, each agent has to choose whether it will fight or run away.
Knowing that if an agent decides to stay and fight it will consume
50 units of energy, while running away depletes its energy level
by an amount equivalent to moving around at full speed for 10-20
turns. Each agent will make the decision following an algorithm
based on its “action tendency”, a coefficient between 0 and 1 in-
dicative of the probability the agent will fight.
• Procreate: If an agent manages to survive for more than 250 turns
and has more than 2200 units of energy left, it will then auto-
matically procreate. This means that a new agent will appear at a
random location on inside the 8 × 8 meters area. The act of pro-
creation costs 2000 units to the agent.
In the initialization phase, a group of 25 robots are scattered inside
the area, each with an initial energy level of 2000 units. For the same
reason as the sources, there cannot be more than 50 robots at one
time on the map. If an agent fulfills the procreation criteria, but the
robot population has already reached its maximum, the agent will be
allowed to choose another action to perform and no energy is con-
sumed for the procreation.
When moving both the speed and direction of the robot are com-
puted according to the following equation:
D =
∑
n
gr × resource(n) +
∑
m
ga × agent(m)+∑
k
gt × obstacle(k) (1)
Where gr is a coefficient indicative of the agent’s need in energy, ga
represents how much a robot wants to enter a battle (if positive the
robot will be moving toward others, while a negative value means
that the robot will actively avoid others), and gt correspond to obsta-
cle avoidance (similarly, a positive value means the robot will try as
much as possible to run into obstacle, while a negative value forces it
to avoid obstacles). resource(n), agent(m) and obstacle(k) are
the scaled vector from the agent’s current position to the nth re-
source,mth nearby agent (excluding itself) and kth obstacle, respec-
tively.
Finally, at the end of a turn each agent loses 1 unit of energy to
processing power, urging them to move around and forage for energy
as much as possible, since an energy level of 0 means death.
2.4 Hard coded control scheme
In Scheutz’s experiment four types of agent were defined: asocial
non-adaptive, social non-adaptive, asocial adaptive and emotional
(social and adaptive). When a social agent finds itself in a conflict,
it fights only if its action tendency is the highest, otherwise it runs
away. Thus, battle between social agents are resolved after one turn
only. Asocial agents, in the same situation, do not take the action ten-
dency of others into consideration, but use their own action tendency
as a fighting probability. Therefore, a conflict between asocial robots
can last until one of them decides to run away or dies.
The capacity of an agent to adjust its action tendency makes the
difference between adaptive and non-adaptive individuals. On the
one hand, if a robot is non-adaptive then its action tendency is fixed
and chosen at random upon initialization, following a Gaussian dis-
tribution of mean 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.125. Adaptive
agents, on the other hand, adjust their action tendency depending on
whether they lost or won the last fight. A losing agent increases its
action tendency, thus increasing its probability of winning the next
battle, while a winning agent decreases its action tendency.
The adaptation rule (AR), as described by Scheutz [31], defines the
amount by which action tendency should be increased or decreased.
If r is the basic action tendency (randomly initialized at the beginning
of the simulation) and m is the current action tendency, then:
• After a loss:
AR+(m) =

m+ (1−m)
2
if m ≥ r
2×m if m ≤ r
2
r + (2×m− r)× (1−r)
2×r2 otherwise.
(2)
• After winning:
AR−(m) =

2×m− 1 if m ≥ r + 1−r
2
m
2
if m ≤ r
r
2
+ r×(m−r)
(1−r)3 otherwise.
(3)
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Emotional agents will have the added possibility of setting a non-zero
value for their fighting tendency ga, by following the equation:
ga = 100× actiontendency − 50 (4)
Regardless of the agents type, the value for the other gains are fixed
to gr = 20 and gt = −20.
2.5 Control based on PrimEmo
This second control scheme used to investigate the performances of
the PrimEmo architecture is split into two main components. On
the one hand, the model of survival circuits detailed in the previous
sub-section (see Figure 3) has been implemented with the LEABRA
framework in the Emergent software [1]. Each part of the brain being
realized by a different set of layers of artificial neurons. To drive its
activation and act as a sort of proto-brain for each artificial agent, the
network takes as input:
• the sensory data coming from all eight of the proximity sensors;
• the maximum value of the action tendency sampled over all nearby
robots, if any;
• the agent’s energy level;
• and a “fear” value that is proportional to the distance between the
agent and the closest obstacle on the map.
Due to the algorithm behind both the activation and learning pro-
cesses in the LEABRA framework, an additional set of inputs is
fed back to the network for learning purposes. Since the architec-
ture is still in its primitive form and not imbued with the concept of
“good” and “bad”, the learning signal is made of four numbers, in
the range [0, 1] representing a correct value for each of the gr , ga, gt
and action tendency for the present situation. Once all inputs and
learning signals have been sent to the network, it alternates between
activation phases and learning phases, until it reaches an equilibrium.
At the end of the cycle, the activation values on the network’s out-
put layer represent the updated coefficients that influences the robot’s
behavior for the next turn.
A python script acts as both an interface between the proto-brain
and simulated robot, and as a pre-motor area sending commands for
the next action to perform, to the actuators. In its role as an interface,
the script keeps track of the agent’s state, that is:
• the level of energy;
• the agent’s position in a 2D plane;
• the agent’s velocity along the same axes;
• the maximum value for the action tendency, sampled over all
nearby robots;
• and the distances between the agent and the closest obstacle and
energy source.
With this information, the script is capable of computing the “fear”
value, as well as the correct values for the four coefficients. All re-
quired inputs are then formatted in an appropriate structure and sent
to the brain.
Once the network has reached equilibrium, the script retrieves the
activations of the output layer and uses them to determine the next
action to perform, following the process described in sub-section 2.3.
At the end of each turn it sends commands to the simulated environ-
ment, to either move the agent, fight, flee, forage or procreate. In
case an agent finds itself in a battle situation, similarly to Scheutz’s
emotional agents, it only fights when its action tendency is higher
than the action tendencies of all other agents involved in the battle.
Otherwise it flees for a random number of turns chosen in the range
[10, 20].
In contrast to Scheutz’s control scheme, where some coefficients
were static and some bound by equations, agents in this group are
free to set all their coefficients. Moreover, since they are learning over
time, it is possible for them to optimize their strategy for survival.
3 RESULTS
The results presented in this section were obtained after running two
series of 40 simulations, each simulation lasting 150,000 cycles and
initialized with 25 robots, 25 obstacles and 25 energy sources. The
first set of simulations were run using the “emotional” agents defined
by Scheutz, since those were the most efficient of all the different
types present in the experiment [31]. While agents for the second
set of simulations were controlled by our neural implementation of
the survival circuits. In both cases the simulation was executed in a
Webots [24] virtual environment.
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Figure 4. Diagram comparing the average number of robots still alive at
the end of the simulation.
Figures 4 and 5 are concerned with the average number of remain-
ing robots and life expectancy (expressed in number of simulation
cycles) of a virtual agent for both control schemes. These results are
the most important ones since they provide a way to quantify the
performance of each scheme in regard to the general survival goal.
Seeing that the results obtained during the simulation are not as
clear cut as one would have expected (see section 4 for more details),
the diagrams and plot of figures 6, 7 and 8 will help in analyzing
the difference in strategies adopted by the groups of robots for each
control scheme.
The figures 6 and 7 represent the number of cycles during which a
robot executes the “move” and “fight” actions respectively. Knowing
that before the “fight” action becomes available to a robot, it will
have to meet with at least one of its peers.
Finally, the level of energy for each agent was extracted for each
simulation cycle and the average difference between the robot with
the lowest and the highest levels of energy has been plotted in Fig-
ure 8. This difference can be seen as a measure of how equitable
the repartition of energy resources is within a group of robots. Ad-
ditionally, it will help shed light onto the reason why fewer agents
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Figure 5. Diagram comparing the average life span, in cycles, of a virtual
agent.
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Figure 6. Diagram comparing the average number of cycles a robot spends
moving in the environment.
controlled by the PrimEmo architecture remain at the end of a simu-
lation, when compared to Scheutz’s control scheme.
4 DISCUSSION
The results presented in the previous section might, at first glance,
appear odd since neither control schemes seems to have the upper
hand in the race for better survival (see Figures 4 and 5). The virtual
agents using the PrimEmo architecture as brains were indeed unable
to increase or even maintain the original population number until the
end of the simulation, but they did live almost twice as long as their
counterparts controlled by Scheutz’s algorithm. While the contrary is
true for Scheutz’s group of robots. However, by putting the first two
diagrams into a broader perspective encompassing data on the num-
ber of cycles dedicated to moving and fighting, and the differences
in energy within a group, an interesting picture can be drawn and it
becomes possible to explain parts of those seemingly odd results.
The overall question could be rephrased as follows: if robots are
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Figure 7. Diagram comparing the average number of cycles a robot
executes the “fight” action.
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Figure 8. Diagram comparing the average difference between the robot
with the highest and the robot with the lowest energy levels.
able to live longer, why is it that so few of them remain in the end?
The answer comes in two parts, the first has to do with the strategy
for sharing energy resources amongst a population. By analyzing the
average differences in energy between the robot with the highest and
the one with the lowest levels (see Figure 8), it is possible to infer
that, on the one hand, the group using the PrimEmo brains imple-
ment a more equitable strategy, since the difference in energy always
remain inferior to that of Scheutz’s group. As a consequence, robots
at the low end of the energy spectrum have an easy access to energy
resources and are allowed to live longer, hence the extended average
life span (Figure 5). At the other end of the spectrum, robots with
high energy levels have to move to avoid their peers (Figures 6 and
7) and find sources to forage, thus expanding a lot of their precious
energy into movement rather than saving it for procreation. This re-
sults in a better quality of life for the overall population. However,
and here is where the second part of the answer intervenes, because
of the high energy requirements for procreation, it also means that
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dying agents are not necessarily replaced and the population slowly
decreases.
On the other hand, the strategy implemented in Scheutz’s al-
gorithms tends to share energy resources more equally. Therefore,
robots with low energy will often have to fight for their right to forage
a source (see Figure 7), and robots with high levels spend less time
avoiding others (see Figure 6). This results in a bigger gap between
high and low energy robots, with low energy robots dying quickly
(see Figure 5) and being replaced as quickly by the offspring of high
level robots, which are easily able to meet the procreation require-
ments. Moreover, since Scheutz’s algorithm has been optimized for
this experiment, the rate at which procreation happens is higher than
the death rate resulting in an overall population increase (see Figure
4).
5 FUTUREWORK
At the moment the PrimEmo architecture is still a work in progress,
as evidenced by the fact that the structure cannot even differentiate
“good” from “bad”. This means that primitive emotions supported
by the network are really only states of arousal triggered by stimuli
endangering the agent’s homeostasis.
To complete the PrimEmo architecture and support full-fledged
primitive emotions, two more models would have to be incorporated.
First, would be the Primary Value Learned Value (PVLV) model, in-
troduced by Hazy, Frank and O’Reilly [14], describing the process
by which the dopaminergic system, along with the ventral striatum,
amygdala and hypothalamus, is able to predict the reward associated
with an action not yet performed and how this same system is ca-
pable of learning from its own mistakes. The PVLV would endow
the PrimEmo architecture with a sense of “right” and “wrong”, and
with a robust learning mechanism based on reinforcement. The sec-
ond model of interest for this project, is the Pre-frontal cortex Basal
ganglia Working Memory (PBWM) structure, suggested by Hazy,
Frank and O’Reilly [13] to explain the gating mechanism imple-
mented by the basal ganglia in the brain.The PrimEmo architecture,
would greatly benefit from the PBWM model, since it is capable not
only to manage working memory, to a certain degree, but also to
make concrete decisions about what action to perform, rather than
simply influencing the decision process from afar.
On the long term, and once the PrimEmo architecture has been
completed and thoroughly tested, it is our belief that it could be used
as a replacement for the core module of the famous ACT-R system.
In ACT-R the role of the main module, is to consider all stored pro-
duction rules and choose the one best suited, given the situation. This
role could easily be filled in by both the PBWM and PVLV models.
Although, the PrimEmo architecture could offer more than a simple
replacement for the production module, since it is able to keep track
of the state of both the agent’s internal and external environments,
manage its own working memory and maintain its homeostasis, the
data produced by the PrimEmo module could also be used to in-
fluence the functioning of all the other modules in the system. The
modified PBWM and PVLV part of the structure could be used as
part of the update mechanism for both the intentional and declara-
tive modules, along with their associated buffers. The more primitive
part of the architecture, presented in this paper, can also imbue the
commands sent to the manual module with a sense of urgency. How-
ever, our belief that the PrimEmo architecture could replace, if not
enhance, the core module of the ACT-R system, do not stem from
only its capabilities. The constraint, imposed by the ACT-R theory,
that modules can only communicate with the central hub (and even
then only through buffers), but not with each others, would ultimately
force PrimEmo into the central position, since it needs to be able to
monitor the global state of the system and to talk to every part of it.
Be that as it may, the integration of the PrimEmo structure into
the ACT-R system still remains theoretical for the moment. As men-
tioned in the previous section, the first part of the PrimEmo archi-
tecture did not clearly out perform Scheutz’s emotional robots[31].
Thus, the network presented in this paper still needs to be further
refined, before the project can move on to the next stage and make
use of the PVLV and PBWM models. For this reason, in the imme-
diate future more experimentation will be done to fully understand
the agents’ behavioral patterns and pinpoint the parts that need to be
improved upon.
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Towards Modelling Adult Attachment
Patterns as Control States
Dean Petters 1 and Emily Coyne-Umfreville 2
Abstract.
Much contemporary research on personality synthesis in compu-
tational models and robots is superficial, in the sense that it involves
simulating the surface appearance of personality. A deeper concep-
tion of personality is that it is a long-term affective control state
within a complex control system that is relatively hard to change,
slow to learning, and whose causes and effects are more diffuse and
indirect than short-term control states like episodes of anger, fear,
happiness or relief. This paper will extend this control state con-
ception of personality by broadening it to consider personality as
a holistic and multi-level construct. McAdams and Pals’ five prin-
ciples for personality are proposed as an integrating framework for
computational modelling of personality as a control state. The pa-
per then argues that extended verbal discourse is a promising mod-
elling scenario to drive the design of integrated multi-level models
because it involves multi-level cognitive control and is very demand-
ing in terms of self-reflective meta-cognitive governance. Narrative
transcripts from the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) are then pre-
sented as a valuable source of detailed empirical data to be used in
creating modelling scenarios across lifespan development. Lastly, the
paper presents some initial mini-scenario elements and a sketch of an
architecture to be developed to simulate these mini-scenarios.
1 PERSONALITY, ATTACHMENT AND
CONTROL SYSTEMS
In 1995, in the paper “What sort of control system is able to have
a personality”, [28], Sloman suggested that personality should be
viewed as a long-term intelligent control state. In this control systems
view, high-level and long-term personality states are comprised of a
collection of component lower level and shorter term sub-states that
act together in a coherent manner. They act as control states by initi-
ating, maintaining, modifying and terminating information processes
related to desires, beliefs, deliberations about the consequences of
actions, intentions, plans and other substates in mind-like control
systems ([27], p. 10). Shorter-term affective control states such as
anger have functions such as communication and action readiness.
For example, if an organism perceives a threat, a global alarm may
be triggered that momentarily ‘hijacks’ the entire architecture before
returning to the initial state. Behaviour characteristic of a particular
personality is produced in hierarchical control systems because the
system’s high level control states are causal control states. Higher-
level control states manage lower control states, including emotional
states, and through these manage the system’s interaction with the
world. High level causal states can be functional in the sense of being
1 Birmingham City University, UK, email: dean.petters@bcu.ac.uk
2 Birmingham City University
adaptive, effectively managing overall behaviour in a coherent man-
ner. Alternatively, some high-level personality control states may be
dysfunctional or even pathological in terms of how effectively they
direct behaviour.
The issue of how to model personality control states is relevant to
attachment modelling because both personality and attachment states
can both be viewed as long-term control states composed of shorter
term control states. Figure 1 presents both personality types and at-
tachment states as long-term control states which are related to other
types of semantic control state. However, the fact that both person-
ality and attachment are long-term control states does not mean that
personality and attachment states are similar in all respects. Impor-
tantly, personality is highly inheritable [7]. In contrast, in attachment
research, inherited temperamental traits have been found to be or-
thogonal to attachment classifications. For example, attachment state
is relationship specific - individuals may have different attachment
classification with different caregivers [30]. So to summarise the
comparison of attachment status with personality - whilst attachment
status is learnt, it still comprises a long-term control state within a
complex control system.
LONGER TERM INTERMEDIATE SHORTER TERM
Personality, Moods, Neural and
Temperament, Beliefs, physical events,
Attitudes, Preferences,
Skills, Emotions such
Emotions such as joy, fear,
as love, grief, Intentions,
Attachment Plans,
states Desires
Figure 1. Classes of semantic control state, which are compared with
respect to the approximate duration that each class of control state may exist
as a disposition within an architecture (adapted from [28] and [17]).
1.1 Computational models of Personality
Research papers based on viewing personality as a long-term con-
trol state are not readily evident in the contemporary literature on
computational modelling of personality. In their 2014 survey of this
field, Vinciarelli and Mohammadi organise the review of personality
computing research in three categories:
• Automatic Personality Recognition, which involves making infer-
ences of the true personality of an individual from automatically
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processed behavioural evidence. The evidence can include distal
cues such as written texts and logged information from electronic
devices;
• Automatic Personality Perception, which involves making in-
ferences of personality based on automatically observable be-
haviours, such as speech, other aspects of paralanguage, non-
verbal behaviour, and communication from social media;
• Automatic Personality Synthesis, which involves generation of
artificial personalities through software and embodied agents in-
cluding robots
Whereas automatic personality recognition and perception are di-
rected towards creating systems for classifying human personality,
automatic personality synthesis involves creating artificial systems
like software agents or robots whose behaviour can itself be recog-
nised and perceived as having personality. However, of the nine-
teen papers which Vinciarelli and Mohammadi cite as examples of
automatic personality synthesis, none involve simulating personal-
ity as a long-term control state in the manner described by Sloman
[28]. There are some examples of less superficial implementations.
Surendran and Long do provide an example implementation of a sys-
tem from which temperament-like states emerge [29]. However, this
highly abstract simulation is not intended to closely match human
temperament. So overall, what contemporary work in this field fails
to provide is richer theories and models which explain the causal and
functional interactions between a variety of long-term and shorter
term motives, and related control states.
2 PERSONALITY AND PERSONAL
NARRATIVE
McAdams and Pals [14] put forward a comprehensive personality
psychology framework for understanding the whole person as an in-
dividual. To do this they draw together five principles. for an inte-
grative conception of an individual. We will review these five dimen-
sions from the perspective of the design based approach [31]. That
is, considering how the five principles might be simulated together in
integrated systems. In McAdams and Pals’ view a holistic approach
includes:
• considering human behaviour as more or less constrained by
evolutionary design. Much of the nature humans possess in com-
mon in personality terms results from our shared possession of
species specific designs adapted to a cognitive niche [26]. Human
needs from nutrition and sleep to attachment, autonomy, compe-
tence, relatedeness should all be explained, at least in part, by this
approach. For the computational modeller, this approach requires
architectural designs to be based on some fixed core architecture
which is provided by evolution as a starting point for lifespan
adaptation and customisation to the environment an individual ex-
periences.
• the five-factor psychometric model of personality. This or-
ganises personality traits into categories labelled: extraver-
sion/introversion, neuroticism, conscientiousness, agreeableness,
and openness [8]. The approach of McAdams and Pals described
here subsumes this five factor psychometric model as just one
principle of a broader view of personality. Traits are reasonably
good predictors for life outcomes like work and relationship suc-
cess [2]. Researchers have speculated that the kinds of questions
that would be expected to arise in social groups in the environ-
ment of evolutionary adaptedness are addressed in a particularly
apt manner by the five-factor traits [7]. For example, extrover-
sion/introversion can be associated with social dominance; neu-
roticism with stability; agreeableness and conscientiousness with
different aspects of potential for cooperation; and openness with
capacity for change and learning ( [14], p. 208). However, disposi-
tional trait dimensions are decontextualised and general - speaking
to an overall style of engagement with lif . We can see from Vin-
ciarelli and Mohammadi’s recent survey that this principle forms
the framework for most personality computing. A design based
approach would simulate the emergence of these behaviour pat-
terns by complex internal functional processes.
• characteristic adaptations which are more contextualised than
traits. McAdams and Pals suggest that this level of description for
personality is of interest to psychotherapists, counsellors, men-
tors, life-coaches and parents because it focuses on questions
like: “What do people want? What do they value? How do peo-
ple seek out what they want and avoid what they fear? How do
people develop plans, goals, and programs for their lives? How
do people think about and cope with the challenges they face?
What psychological and social tasks await people at particular
stages or times in their lives?” ([14], p. 208). The characteris-
tic adaptations which McAdams and Pals mention as underly-
ing behaviour related to these kinds of questions is similar to
the kinds of intermediate-term control states that Sloman and co-
workers [28, 31, 17] present. A combined list from these sources
includes: motives, goals, plans, strivings, strategies, standards,
values, virtues, attachments, preferences, attitudes, moods, ambi-
tions, obsessions, grief, desires, intentions, schemas, self-images,
emotions like fear, anger, happiness and relief, and mental repre-
sentations of significant others.
• life narratives that are the integrative life stories that are con-
structed by individuals in a process of meaning making and
personal and social identity formation. Life narratives can in-
corporate the reconstructed past, imagined future and allow an in-
dividual to “keep going”( [14], p. 209) through biasing the percep-
tion of events so that they become assimilated into a “more or less
coherent whole”( [14], p. 209). Self narrative can augment the pre-
dictive power of personality measures beyond those of parametric
trait measures. For example, hopeful endings in self-narrative pre-
dict future well-being. Whilst each life story is unique, emotional
tones in narratives cluster in life narrative themes. For example, a
life narrative labelled ‘the redemptive self’ is a kind of life story
about being delivered from suffering which is linked to individu-
als who become productive, caring and prosocial ( [14], p. 210).
Narrative interpretation of experiences can prime future growth.
Positive examples include: “I found out how to make our relation-
ship better” and “I hope that never happens again” ( [14], p. 210).
Narrative accounts that include exploration and accommodation
moderate the dispositional traits of openness. Computational mod-
elling of life-narratives is clearly a major challenge. However, an
important contribution of this paper is to argue that behavioural
scenarios can facilitate modelling this sort of phenomena when
they include particularly rich behaviour patterns that arise in sys-
tematically structured contexts (see section 2.2).
• considering how culture affects different levels of personality
in different ways. It can do this by providing a palette of scripts,
plots, role-models, warnings, tokens, and images for an individual
when they are constructing their narrative. As with life-narratives,
modelling an individual’s embedding in a culture is a major chal-
lenge. However, the benefit of attempting this sort of modelling
would be the ability to computationally model phenomena like so-
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cial marginalisation and radicalisation as deep internal processes
with latent variables rather than through statistical analysis solely
focused on externally observable behavioural variables.
2.1 PERSONALITY AND CONVERSATION
If computational modellers accept the grand challenge of creating
simulations which integrate across McAdams and Pals’ five prin-
ciples they need a source of rich and detailed scenarios to drive
model design and allow model evaluation. Donald illustrates the re-
quirements for multi-level cognitive control using the example of a
group of people deeply involved in a lengthy conversation [9]. The
challenges of ‘keeping up one’s end of conversation’ illustrates the
demands of processing the interchange of ideas and opinions and
making appropriate contributions in an ongoing conversation. Social
events can be demanding to ‘hold in mind’ as they can take time
to unfold. People in conversation generate novel, rich, and mean-
ingful material, highly changeable as the conversation shifts - and
this ability to respond appropriately to novel material, and produce
novel but relevant material in return, can extend over an extended
period of time. Donald argues that this requires continuous self- and
other-monitoring over multiple time scales which is very demanding
in terms of self-reflective metacognitive governance and the require-
ment to store large amounts of knowledge [9].
Conversations can extend from minutes to hours. During these
episodes what is said and thought is converted to long-term memo-
ries, which continue to causally influence ongoing interaction. What
is said or thought at one moment in time can gain momentum and
change the overall direction of conversation. Any conversational
episode has a broader physical and social context into which it is
situated and bracketed. When participants stop taking this into ac-
count they are in a sense, removing themselves from the reality of the
situation. In this view, effective meta-cognitive processes keep par-
ticipants tied to reality, and lapses in these processes can leave partic-
ipants ‘in a world of their own’ ([9], p. 50). To keep up, each person
involved must track what is said and self-monitor thought nearly con-
tinuously. Many of the behaviours that enable participants to behave
in line with the context will be directed by unconscious scripts or
schema. This all means that conversation requires prodigious skills
in dynamic memory organisation, in accessing memories appropri-
ately, and in storing new facts for subsequent use in that conversation
or later. In this view, personality states are partly constituted of biases
and predispositions in cognitive control [9].
To explain this feat of multi-level awareness and governance, Don-
ald proposes a tripartite model, with: (1) momentary binding; (2)
short-term control; and (3) intermediate and longer term mechanisms
of awareness and governance. Perceptual binding explains the raw
feeling awareness. Donald terms this level 1 awareness and gover-
nance. Short-term awareness is what is measured in laboratory ex-
periments in consciousness research in experiments that typically
only last a number of seconds. Donald terms this level 2 awareness
and governance. At this short-term level of awareness and gover-
nance, controlled processing arises from the operation of short-term
working memory which extends perception to capture simple events
which can possess multiple active foci3. Working memory affords
3 During these episodes what is said and thought is transferred into long-term
memories, which continue to casually influence ongoing interaction. Tra-
ditional models of memory propose working memory is simply a transient
mode through which the information was encoded into long-term memories
[3]. Ericsson and Kintsch [10] propose that in order to carry out skilled ac-
tivities an addition of a long-term working memory (LTWM) in modelling
the capacity to hold an image or memory in awareness and so can
allow responses to be delayed. Working memory in its simplest form
is a kind of storage that sustains a perceptual trace in the absence
of the stimulus that produced it. Attention acts as a ’gate-keeper’
to working memory, which is also involved in controlled process-
ing of evaluations, selection, problem solving and response choice
([9], p. 186). Donald’s level 3 intermediate and longer-term aware-
ness and governance is extended by the operation of working mem-
ory through ‘fast switching’ of information in processing buffers in
and out of long-term memory. Lewis and Vashishth’s [12] simulation
of sentence comprehension is an example of intermediate control as
parsing of garden path sentences is carried out with a small capacity
for working memory and mechanisms for ‘fast switching’ between
production buffers and declarative memory. Intermediate awareness
and governance extends further into minutes, hours and days through
deeper integration with long-term memory which includes the kinds
of characteristic adaptations listed in section 2. The kinds of ‘events’
in level 2 and level 3 governance can be distinguished not just tempo-
rally but also by the breadth of level 3 governance to include broader
social, cultural and self-concerns [9]. This means at the third level of
awareness and governance control states like goals and plans direct
ongoing behaviour, and these are influenced by other control states
like standards, values, and preferences.
The level 3 system includes voluntary movement and self-initiated
actions, as well as supervisory evaluative processes. Particularly hu-
man self consciousness emerges from level 3 governance. According
to Donald [9], level 3 awareness and governance supports complex
states of integration with the social and historical environment which
Donald terms ‘deep enculturation’:
“When broken down into their components, the skills we
acquire from deep enculturation can be reduced to chains of al-
gorithms that can control attention and emotional valences. At-
tention determines the sequential flow of memory fixations and
perceptual comparisons, and these determine the precise qual-
ity and sequencing of subjective experience, producing unique
juxtapositions in the mind’s eye and influencing what habits
we form and interpretations we place on events. The emotional
valences attached to various objects, events, and people are
an important part of the same process of conditioning the con-
scious mind. Such algorithms establish the continuity of experi-
ence. There is a coherence, an interconnnectedness, about con-
scious experiences that makes them very different from uncon-
scious ones, where ideas and images can coexist in a pell-mell
disorganised manner” ([9], pp. 212-213)
According to Donald, deep enculturation arises from humans de-
veloping from infancy submerged with symbolic cultures in a radi-
cally different process from any other species. Taken together, levels,
1, 2 and 3 afford episodic awareness of elaborate event representa-
tions. Each episode comprises multiply bound percepts which are
chunked into coherent representations. Deep enculturation refers to
processes beyond individual episodes to cite and fundamental struc-
turing of the mind. Humans acquire symbolic skills and concepts
supported through symbolic skills from the outside in [9]. Some of
the these concepts are standards and values which organise behaviour
in a general sense. From the perspective of modelling long-term con-
trol states like personality we can see it is perceptual, affective and
would explain the ability to leave a task and return to it without impaired
performance. This LTWM could explain the ability to have continued fluent
conversations with the ability to recall post event.
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other processing biases that influence the ‘fast switching’ of informa-
tion into and out of working memory that is important. Different per-
sonalities will be constituted of different patterns of perceptual and
memory retrieval biases and action predispositions. Petters covers
similar ground when he discusses how control states ‘move’ around
an information processing architecture:
“there is constant relocating and transforming of motiva-
tors which is termed circulation. [...] useful control states be-
come more influential and ‘percolate’ up a hierarchy of dis-
positional control states. Ineffective motivators wither away in
influence. One important process is ‘diffusion’, in which the
impact of a major motivator leads it to become gradually dis-
tributed in myriad control states which can include new motive
generators, plans, preferences, predictive models, reflexes and
automatic responses [...] Meta-management attempts to influ-
ence these numerous processes but some are more controllable
than others.” ([20], p, 39)
To model personality-like states we need to implement processes
such as these. Information processes that bridge the moment to mo-
ment operation of working memory with much longer term reloca-
tion and transformation of longer term motivators are what lead to the
emergence of personality control states [4]. The next section presents
results from attachment research, a more helpfully circumscribed do-
main than personality. Whilst attachment phenomena range across
the lifespan they are focused on issues of responsiveness, sensitivity,
predictability and trust in close relationships.
2.2 USING VERBAL BEHAVIOUR TO
CLASSIFY ATTACHMENT STATUS
Whilst open ended unconstrained interviews or conversations may
tell us a lot of details about an individual, we cannot then readily
compare those details with other people in a systematic fashion. If
we look at individuals in different contexts, it is difficult to disen-
tangle the influences arising from within the person and the shaping
influences of the particular situation they are in. Whereas using stan-
dardised psychological procedures designed to assess an individual’s
state of mind allow easier and more meaningful comparison between
individuals.
The Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) [11, 22] is not a kind of
free-wheeling conversation that might be taken in any direction what-
soever, such as the kind of conversation which Donald describes as a
challenge for multi-level awareness and governance (see section 2.1).
It is an interaction between an interviewer and interviewee which
has the objective of classifying an adult’s emotional and social at-
tachment status through interpretation of their verbal behaviour. The
AAI is designed to elucidate structural variations in how life his-
tory is presented that allow reliable inferences about the participant’s
internal state with regard to attachment [11]. The AAI possesses a
pre-specified interview format of 20 questions in a fixed order, but
with additional specific follow up probes to these main set questions.
The questioning and following arrangement must only highlight but
not alter the participant’s natural response tendencies. It opens with
a question asking for a general description of family relationships
in the speaker’s childhood. Further questions are asked about sep-
arations and experiences of rejection; and the effects of these ex-
periences on adult personality. A key section probes experiences of
bereavement. Experience of abuse is also asked about. The AAI ends
with the speaker being invited to express wishes for his or her real or
imagined child in the future [11]. The relatively fast pace of the AAI
means it acts somewhat like a mild ‘stress test’, bringing forward an
individuals state of mind with regard to attachment:
“The central task the interview presents to participant is
that of (1) producing and reflecting on memories related to at-
tachment, while simultaneously (2) maintaining coherent, col-
laborative discourse with the interviewer (Hesse 1996). This
is not a easy as it might appear, and George and colleagues
(1985, 1996) have remarked upon the potential of the protocol
to “surprise the unconscious”. As indicated above, the inter-
view requires the speaker to reflect on and answer a multitude
of complex questions regarding his or her life history, the great
majority of which the speaker will never have been asked be-
fore. In contrast to ordinary conversations, where the intervie-
wee has time for planning, the AAI moves at a relatively rapid
pace, and usually all questions and probes have been presented
within an hour’s time. Ample opportunities are thereby pro-
vided for speakers to contradict themselves, to find themselves
unable to answer clearly, and/or to be drawn into excessively
lengthy or digressive discussions of particular topics” ([11], p.
555)
The AAI uses adherence to (or violation of) maxims for discourse
coherence as a proxy for how an individual thinks and feels about
their attachment experience. Transcripts with a lack of overall coher-
ence end up being categorised as such due to major contradictions
or inconsistencies, passages that are exceptionally short, long, irrel-
evant or difficult to understand and follow. The coding for the AAI
considers the use of language rather than making retrospective infer-
ences about the person’s actual attachment history [11]. It is not what
actually happened to an individual in their past that is important for
predicting an adult’s attachment approach, but the coherence of the
attachment narrative that the adult produces in the constrained AAI.
So adults of all AAI classifications may publically state the same
kinds of values.
In the AAI, interviewees can be classified into four categories. The
secure, dismissing and preoccupied enmeshed patterns are the most
popular adult classifications and considered ‘organised’ responses:
• secure autonomous adults express value for attachment relation-
ships and experiences, and give apparently objective responses
when asked about any particular relationship experience. When
reporting specific experiences they provide confirming detailed
memories and demonstrate ability to reflect on those experiences
with an understanding of why they, and others, behaved the way
they did - and this is the case for happy and troubled experiences.
So a secure autonomous adult might describe episodes of rejection
but recognise the limitations of attachment figures in a balanced
way, as well as include positive aspects of inadequate attachment
figures. So compared with other classifications, only secure au-
tonomous individuals are able to access all memories and respond
to queries about those memories in a controlled and appropriate
manner.
• dismissing adults devalue, or are emotionally cut off from at-
tachment relationships and experiences. These individuals provide
very short transcripts, with little to say about specific incidents
and attachment experiences from their childhood in general. Re-
sponses are not only short but minimise the importance of rela-
tionships in general. They may idealize relationships as ‘loving’
but not provide detailed examples to justify such positive sum-
mary statements. Compared with other classifications, dismissing
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show attenuated access to memories, bias in the memories that
are provided, and an avoidance of the conversational subject of
attachment.
• preoccupied/enmeshed adults are preoccupied with (enmeshed
by) early attachments or attachment related experiences. When
reporting experiences these adults give plenty of detail and long
transcripts but fail to provide a good overview because they be-
come so entangled in the details. They may seem to be still en-
gaged in emotional struggles related to attachment relationships
Compared with other classifications, preoccupied/enmeshed indi-
viduals have access to past memories, but show bias in the mem-
ories that are reported, and show a lack of control in how these
memories are reported.
The unresolved/disorganised classification is less frequent than the
organised categories in non-clinical populations:
• unresolved/disorganised adults speak in unusual ways about loss
experiences, and exhibit: interruptions to cognitive processes, par-
ticularly in contexts associated with the lost person; disbelief that
loss has occurred or is permanent; unfounded fear of death; in-
complete mental and behavioural search processes, disorientation
in contexts linked to the lost person; and major lapses in metacog-
nitive monitoring of reasoning and discourse processes.
Longitudinal studies have looked at the relationship between cur-
rent AAI classification for adults and previous categorisation of their
behaviour as infants many years previously. Waters and co-workers
showed that 72% of participants had the same secure or insecure clas-
sification in infancy and adulthood [30]. They found that high levels
of life trauma had an impact on the AAI data and when those par-
ticipants were removed the AAI could predict 78% of attachment
security. Main and co-workers have presented similar results [13].
The adult’s internal ‘state of mind’ as indicated by coherence with
respect to past attachment relationships is the best predictor of how
they will conduct future attachment interactions, not the actual nature
of their previous attachment interactions or their explicitly professed
values. In addition, there is evidence that the state of mind of an
infant’s parent has a critical impact on the state of mind for that infant
as he or she develops on through childhood, adolescence and into
adulthood. As Bretherton and Munholland note:
“Overall, AAI findings suggest that parents induct their in-
fants into a way of relating that is consistent with their own
secure or conflicted/defensive models of self in relationships.
Developmental continuity from nonverbal behavioral and emo-
tional attachment patterns have been established in several lon-
gitudinal studies of middle-class families, but is great for secu-
rity than for specific subtypes of insecurity”([5], p. 118)
Longitudinal studies also provide valuable detailed evidence of
what aspects of early environment bring about later attachment clas-
sification. Broussard and Cassidy found that “adult participants
whose mothers had held negative perceptions of them as newborns
would be more likely to be classified as insecure on the AAI than par-
ticipants whose mothers had held positive perceptions of them” ([6],
p. 159). This association was gained for participants whose own AAI
was measured between 27-43 years after their parent’s perception of
them as a newborn infant with a projective measure that involved
their mother comparing them with “an average baby”. So it demon-
strates a significant association with a parent’s state of mind and at-
titude towards their newborn and the AAI classification many years
later of the grown-up infant. For the computational modeller, these
associations between individual difference categories, early care-
giving environment, expectations and values provide valuable con-
straints to evaluate and validate attachment models. The modelling
effort can start by re-producing response patterns from the AAI, and
designing architectures to produce these linguistically mediated in-
terview responses. Modelling can then go on to show how the same
architectures can produce different caregiving response patterns, and
hence demonstrate empirically observed patterns of intergenerational
transfer [22].
3 A PRELIMINARY ARCHITECTURAL
DESIGN
Simulating patterns of verbal interaction in the AAI will require
a complex architecture. This section presents a simple architecture
which falls short of this challenge but which can show the direction
of travel for the modelling effort. The hybrid architecture illustrated
in figure 2 situates reactive subsystems alongside a deliberative plan-
ning subsystem (that allows ‘look-ahead’ reasoning) and a simple
meta-management subsystem (where cognitive meta-processes op-
erate on other cognitive processes) [17, p. 103-151]. In this hybrid
architecture, the attentive processes that occur are those not stopped
by a resource limited variable attention filter. These resource bound
serial deliberative processes take input from non-attentive reactive
or perceptual processes which operate in parallel. Reactive motive
generactivators are triggered and activated by any possibly relevant
internal and external events. In the attachment domain there will be
possible threats but also possible exploratory and social opportuni-
ties. When these conditions are met a motivator is constructed which
may ‘surface’ through the attentional filter and be operated upon by
processes in the deliberative or meta-management levels. Amongst
the deliberative attachment processes generated by motivators are the
creation, selection, and execution of action plans. Deliberative pro-
cesses that evaluate other processes occur in the meta-management
layer. So an agent operating with this architecture can perceive the
world, record events, retrieve memories of events and plan future
action plans. What the architecture cannot do at all is communi-
cate through language with other agents. So this architecture might
be augmented with mechanisms such as those presented in Lewis
and Vashishth’s [12] simulation of sentence comprehension along-
side mechanisms of language production.
4 DEVELOPING SIMULATION SCENARIOS IS
AN ITERATIVE PROCESS TO GET THE
ABSTRACTION LEVEL RIGHT
Modelling the AAI to simulate attachment behaviours is more chal-
lenging than modelling infant attachment behaviours due to the com-
plex involvement of language in these interactions. Infant attachment
behaviours can be simulated in terms of proximity to location of
carer, orientation and non-linguistic communication [15, 16, 17, 18,
22]. The fact that linguistic interaction is central to the AAI means
that cognitive processing such as memory recall, speech planning,
considering the likely responses of others, and self-reflection, needs
to all be included and integrated. This means that how social stan-
dards interact with other motivational or affective states is also go-
ing to have a more significant impact in AAI modelling. In terms of
training, the agent is going to require a lexicon including attachment
related words as well as grammar that can simulate and capture typi-
cal AAI responses, but simulating the complexity of full natural lan-
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Transcript fragment from real AAI Abstract description Description framed in scenario
ontology terms
My mom would stick up for me to the teacher, Specific evidence used to Infant ‘training’ phase
or to a kid’s parent, or anybody, really. support the statement Carer agent defends infant
I could put it another way, too. I just knew where relying on distinct memories. agent from other agents;
I stood with her, and that she’d be comforting if I No violations of relevance, comforts and supports during
was upset or crying or something. Oh, maybe you stays on topic. Flowing anxiety or distress; responds
wanted a specific example. Um, that time I set fire discourse, particularly sensitively when there are
absolutely positively wasn’t supposed to use... when engaging in memory cues to danger. Infant agent seeks
came running when the neighbours phoned the fire recall proximity in balance with exploration.
department about the smoke. I expected to get the Adult ‘test’ phase
life lectured out of me, but she just ran straight for [In the process of scenario Clear distinct memories that are
me and picked me up and hugged me real hard. formation entities such as verbalised fluently. Agent is able
Guess she was so scared and glad to see me, she chemistry sets, smoke and to give clear examples from infant
just forgot the lecture fire department are training phase. Responses have high
abstracted away] level of relevance to question.
I don’t remember ... (5 second pause). Well, because Not convincing support for Infant ‘training’ phase
she was caring and supportive. [interviewer prompt] adjective chosen. Attempt to Carer agent provides basic protection
Well ... (5 second pause), I guess like, well you know, create a positive picture. but is predictably (reliably) less
she drove me to school, and I was always really proud Response brief and broken responsive and less sensitive.
of her, I mean, she was really pretty, and she always in nature. Close proximity is a less high quality
took care of her appearance close coupling and cues unease.
[In the process of scenario Adult ‘test’ phase
formation entities such as Memories from training phase are not
cars are abstracted away] recalled in detail. Responses are short
and conform to externally provided
social standards
Uh, yeah, sort of very loving at times, like people Agent unable to stay with the Infant ‘training’ phase
were in the old days- uh, my youth, lot of changes question. Agent moves to Carer agent provides basic protection
since then. I remember home, and home was good irrelevant topics and memory but is unpredictably (unreliable) in
and that. And uh, loving, my wife is loving with [child] for events is an issue. how it responds and how sensitive
- taking him out to the movies tonight, special thing Speech is vague and it is. Close proximity does result in a
he’s been wanting to see all week, dadadada. comprehension is poor. high quality interaction.
Actually, it’s been more like a month, that turtle Adult ‘test’ phase
movie, don’t like it too much myself. Too many [In the process of scenario Incomplete marginally relevant
turtles- where are they from, outer space? Saw formation entities such as responses. Longer responses,
it, though, now, when was it, um, maybe 6 months movies are abstracted away] both in number of utterances
ago. Yeah she’s very loving with [child]. and also in terms of number of
really special, really grateful to her for that. not recalled.
my childhood, I remember just sitting on the
porch, rocking, rocking back and forth,
watching my parents, or maybe having some
lemonade- or, you know, this, that, and the
other. special sorts of things, just me and her.
I wasn’t easy, my temperament was hard on her,
kind of hard. Me and my cousins from [Town] going
down soon - really big birthday, she gonna be 80,
gives my age away (continues)
Figure 3. Example mini-scenarios using quotes by Hesse [11]. Question 3 in the AAI asks the participant to “Think of five adjectives, words, or phrases that
would best describe your relationship with your mother during childhood- say, between ages of 5 and 12, but even earlier if you can remember. Take a minute
to think, and then I am going to ask you why you chose them.” This question involves two levels of processing, the linguistic semantic description as well as
memory to recall the events associated with this. Column one of the table shows three example quotes from interviewees who all used the descriptor ’loving’ but
who were classified differently because of the discourse properties of their full responses. Column two is an abstraction of the response pattern in column one.
Column three describes a mini-scenario element which captures the abstraction pattern in column two but presents it in the context of the scenario ontology.
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Figure 2. A hybrid attachment architecture with reactive, deliberative and
meta-management subsystems. The resource-constrained deliberative
subsystem takes input from the reactive-subsystem, carries out ‘look ahead’
reasoning, and can inhibit the reactive subsystem and execute alternative
actions. The green dashed line represents the fact that in the human
attachment system deliberative and meta-management processes require
attention and so are resource bound, which limits the number that can be
concurrently active. Currently, only a simple form of communication is
implemented in this architecture, with the agent able to receive and send
communications signalling affective tone. However, since the architecture
does allow internal processing of plan representations an extension for the
architecture will include adding the ability to broadcast and perceive these
representations.
guage processing will be avoided. Part of the rationale for modelling
attachment is that close inter-personal interactions can be described
in a more circumscribed manner than less close social interactions
within large groups. So the language level of interaction in the sim-
ulation will only be complex enough to capture abstract attachment
interactions and not the richness of real AAI transcripts [22].
In the first instance, to model AAI responses the three main clas-
sifications must be abstracted; secure autonomous; dismissing; and
preoccupied/enmeshed. Scenarios will include the discourse and at-
tentional flexibility that is typical for each of these classifications.
However, whilst capturing patterns of discourse, the simulations will
abstract away many concrete aspects of the real world that human
participants refer to. For example, secure autonomous agents will
be able to retrieve memories and reflect on them in an organised
way but the actual objects or episodes referred to will be abstrac-
tions. Similarly, whilst dismissing agents will express memory bi-
ases and an avoidance of attachment related discussions the biases
and avoided topics will be in terms of the abstract simulation on-
tology. The same process of abstraction will occur in scenarios for
preoccupied/enmeshed attachment. However, dismissing scenarios
will required an opposite kind of memory bias to dismissing scenar-
ios, with a lack of control over the reporting of memories that leads
to more emotionally charged memories being recounted [22]. Fur-
thermore, physiological responses to infant cries have been linked to
AAI. Ablow and co-workers [1] looked at the response in expectant
first time mothers. Those classified as secure on AAI showed phys-
iologically calmer reactions to the crying than those categorised as
insecure. When infant sensitivity was tested at 9 months postpartum
the secure group had higher levels of infant sensitivity.
Figure 3 shows a scenario fragment contrasting actual AAI tran-
script fragment, a highly abstract description, and then a more con-
crete description couched in terms of the scenario ontology (which is
significantly more abstract than the actual transcripts but allows for
some concrete operational descriptions of phenomena at this abstract
level). Producing scenarios that capture these behavioural patterns
will be an iterative process that find the right level of abstraction for
the scenario ontology [17]. This ontology must possess enough de-
tails to allow the AAI behavioural patterns to be simulated but also
abstract enough for the simulation to be tractable and not get bogged
down in detail which his not relevant to the phenomena of inter-
est. Future work will involve taking fragments of scenario such as
those presented in 3 and combining them with other mini-scenarios
to gain an overall specification of requirements which is represen-
tative of AAI responses generally. Producing scenarios which gain
a comprehensive (if highly abstract) coverage of the behavioral do-
main is important for model evaluation and validation. Whilst cogni-
tive models based on simulating timings or response accuracies can
be quantitatively evaluated, this is not possible for models which are
not attempting to simulate this kind of data. So evaluation and vali-
dation can be carried out by seeing how particular architectures from
an architectural design space manage in simulating a broad range of
competencies.
A general pattern for scenario elements is to describe events which
occur in the ‘infancy’ stage of the agent simulation, where agents
memories are recorded. Then in the ‘adult’ stage of the simulation
that agent is asked questions, accesses memories (in a more or less
effective manner) and a response pattern in verbal behaviour is pro-
duced. Another way of saying this is that agents that represent care-
givers and infants in a early experience ‘training’ stage for the sim-
ulation, the infant agent becomes an adult agent in the AAI compo-
nent of the simulation, and it is asked questions which require it to
draw upon its recorded memories of its infant experiences. In these
simulations the contribution to knowledge is not intended to be the
sophistication of the memory representations or linguistic utterances
but the way that particular agent architectures model processes such
as memory recall being effective or ineffective because of the manner
in which either memories become inaccessible or the opposite occurs
and disturbing memories are recalled even when this is not relevant.
So model evaluation and validation will be in terms of how well the
simulations reproduce defined qualitative patterns of behaviour.
5 CONCLUSION
This paper presents the case for using rich empirical data from AAI
studies to drive model formation of long-term personality-like con-
trol states. In this view, attachment styles which are observed in psy-
chological observations such as the AAI arise from the operation of
internal control states which are formed from the past experience of
low level events and activation of particular short-term control states.
In addition, possession of a certain attachment style predisposes an
architecture to particular short-term activation patterns for states such
as plans or emotions in the future. The function of long-term affective
states like attachment style is to organise past and future behaviour at
a higher level. In Donald’s terms, longer term awareness and gover-
nance by an attachment control states oversees processes of moment
to moment behaviour from a ‘larger landscape’ well beyond the im-
mediate perceptual context into the deep past and imagined future
[9]. Attachment control states do this by bringing together isolated
events into a stream of awareness and providing biases which in-
fluence all perceptions, memory retrievals and actions. Future work
will involve implementing agent-based simulations to produce ab-
stract and simplified versions of the narrative discourse patterns for
each AAI classification by augmenting existing attachment models
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[24].
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Evolutionary Game Theory Modelling of Guilt
Luı´s Moniz Pereira 1 and Tom Lenaerts 2 and Luis A. Martinez-Vaquero 3 and The Anh Han 4
Abstract. Inspired by psychological and evolutionary studies, we
present two theoretical models wherein agents have the potential to
express guilt, with the ambition to study the role of this emotion in
the promotion of pro-social behaviour. We show that the inclusion of
the emotion of guilt, in the sense arising from actual harm done to
others from inappropriate action or inaction, is worthwhile to incor-
porate in evolutionary game theory models of cooperation, for it can
increase cooperation by correcting and inhibiting defection. The ab-
stract study thereof profitably transpires to concrete considerations
in the design of artificial multi-agent populations. To achieve this
goal, analytical and numerical methods from evolutionary game the-
ory have been employed, but not shown in too fine detail here, to
identify that reasonable conditions exist for which enhanced cooper-
ation emerges within the context of the iterated prisoners dilemma.
Guilt is modelled explicitly as two features, i.e. a counter that keeps
track of the number of transgressions and a threshold that dictates
when alleviation (through for instance apology and self-punishment)
is required for an emotional agent. Such alleviation introduces an
effect on the payoff of the agent experiencing guilt. We show that
when the system consists of agents that resolve their own guilt with-
out considering the co-player’s attitude towards guilt alleviation then
cooperation does not emerge. In that case, agents expressing no guilt
or having no incentive to alleviate the guilt they experience easily
dominate the guilt prone ones. On the other hand, when the guilt
prone focal agent requires that guilt only needs to be alleviated when
guilt alleviation is also manifested by a defecting co-player, then co-
operation may thrive. This observation proves consistent in a gener-
alised model discussed in this article. In summary, our analysis pro-
vides important insights into the design of multi-agent and cognitive
agent systems, wherein the inclusion of guilt modelling can improve
agents’ cooperative behaviour and overall benefit.
1 Introduction
“...what do you think, if a person does something very bad, do
they have to be punished?”...”You know the reason I think they
should be punished?”...”It’s because of how bad they are going
to feel, in themselves. Even if nobody did see them and nobody
ever knew. If you do something very bad and you are not pun-
ished you feel worse, and feel far worse, than if you are.” [Page
55 of “The love of a Good Woman” by Alice Munro (Nobel
Prize in Literature 2013) in ”Family Furnishings-Selected Sto-
ries 1995-2014”, Vintage Intl. Edition, 2015]
1 Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal, email: lmp@fct.unl.pt
2 MLG, Universite´ Libre de Bruxelles and AI lab,Vrije Universiteit Brussel,
Belgium, email: tom.lenaerts@ulb.ac.be
3 Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Rome, Italy, email:
fnxabraxas@gmail.com
4 Teesside University, UK, email: T.Han@tees.ac.uk
Presently there is a general mounting interest on machine ethics
[22] and recent research monographs have been addressing its is-
sues [17]. One concerns the computational modelling of human emo-
tions, amongst which we find guilt and its role in minimising so-
cial conflicts [14]. Guilt is defined in the online Merriam-Webster
dictionary as “The feeling of culpability especially for imagined of-
fences or a sense of inadequacy”, which implies that guilt follows
from introspection: An individual experiencing guilt will detect this
emotional state, and can act upon it. Guilt is an evolved pervasive
feature in human cultures, which can lead to enhanced cooperation
via changes in behaviour or upon apology (cf. background references
below). Frank argued that guilt may provide a useful mechanism, if
operationalised properly, to miminise social conflict and promote co-
operation [3]. Notwithstanding the importance of this emotion for the
evolution of cooperation, no in-depth numerical or analytical models
have been provided to confirm or refute the hypothesis that this emo-
tion has evolved to ensure stable social relationships. Hence, it is nat-
ural to enquire how it might enhance cooperation in evolving artifi-
cial multi-agent systems, by means of machine implemented models
of guilt. With that in mind, we avail ourselves of Evolutionary Game
Theory (EGT) [12, 21] to conclude that under certain conditions co-
operation can be enhanced by a modicum of guilt in a population of
autonomous agents.
A distinct evolutionary and population sensitive EGT model of
guilt has been explored in [20]. They focus on behaviours associated
with guilt, such as apology, but do not however explicitly represent
any self fitness changes from the experience of the guilt emotion, like
we do in our models. Moreover, their guilt prone agents (GP) do not
initiate defection like ours do, but defect only in reaction to another’s
defection, though they will then feel guilty for having done so. In-
stead, we crucially associate guilt with self-punishment, and show
how this affecting of fitness can be conducive to a population benefi-
cial Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) state [21], one towards which
the population evolves to play the strategy, and which state cannot be
invaded by a small number of agents using a different strategy. This
is the case in our improved (second) model, where self-punishment is
only enacted if the other party is not recognised to be guilty too. In [4]
(non-evolutionary) utilitarian game theory is employed to model the
behaviour resulting from guilt, not by introducing self-punishment
but by introducing a guilt aversion level term into a player’s utility
function, which takes into account the agent’s history of previous
pairwise interactions and individually learning from it. In contrast,
our moral stance to guilt is not utilitarian, in the sense that no in-
dividual measure of greater good is being explicitly optimised. We
rely instead on social learning in a population’s emergent evolution,
without recourse to individual histories. Hence our approach and re-
sults are thus distinct from previous ones in important ways. Next we
frame our hypotheses on guilt within EGT and define our models and
methods. Thence we proceed to the presentation of results, and wrap
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up with some justified conclusions and future work.
2 Evolutionary Game Theory Model for Guilt
Considering the foregoing, an attempt to introduce guilt in EGT mod-
els of cooperation seems unavoidable. The issue concerning guilt
within such models is whether its presence is more worthwhile than
its absence, with respect to a possibly advantageous emergence of
cooperation. One can introduce guilt explicitly in models to show
that it is worthwhile, in further support of its appearance on the evo-
lutionary scene. Indeed, one may focus on emotions, like guilt, as
being strategies in abstract evolutionary population games, sans spe-
cific embodiment nor subjective quale [18].
We can test this hypothesis via one model spelled out below,
whose details can be found in [16]. In it guilt is tied to intention
recognition, since it will have evolved as a fear about the detection of
harm done (see above). The prediction is that guilt will facilitate and
speed-up the emergence of cooperation. In spite of its initial heav-
ier cost, in time that cost will be recuperated within the guilt-ridden
population, via inhibition of defection as a result of guilt avoidance.
Furthermore, one’s timely recognition of another’s prior give away
guilt signs, on account of her actual intent to harm, can prevent one’s
self-punishing guilt in cases it would be uncalled for. The base hy-
pothesis is thus that when there exists guilt in the starting population
then the most frequent stationary distribution includes the incorpora-
tion of guilt and enhances overall cooperation. For which parameters
of guilt this happens can be analytically determined experimentally.
2.1 Models and Methods
A behavioural quantification of guilt provides us with a basis to de-
fine our evolving agents: Guilt is part of an agent’s representation
or genotype, i.e. they will all be equipped with a guilt threshold G,
with G ∈ [0,+∞], and a transient guilt level, g (g ≥ 0). Initially
g is set to 0 for every agent. If an agent feels guilty after an action
that she considers as wrong, then the agent’s g is increased (by 1).
When g reaches the agent’s guilt threshold, i.e. g ≥ G, the agent
can (or not) act to alleviate her current guilt level. We assume here
that guilt alleviation can be achieved through a sincere apology to
the co-player or, otherwise, through self-punishment if it is not pos-
sible to apologise [1, 6]. Different from prior work [8, 15], we do
not assume here that apology leads to a benefit for the co-player,
considering it only as an honest signal of the experiencing of guilt.
In general, the cost of guilt alleviation is modelled by a so-called
guilt cost γ (γ ≥ 0). Whenever the agent punishes herself, by pay-
ing γ, g is decreased (by 1). Using this genotype definition, one can
imagine different types of agents with differentG thresholds, such as
those who never feel guilty (the unemotional ones, with G = +∞)
or those who are very emotional, feeling guilty immediately after a
wrongdoing (with G = 0).
The objective of this work is to show that agents expressing this
emotion, despite the disadvantage of the costly guilt-alleviation acts,
are evolutionary viable, can dominate agents not expressing the emo-
tion and that they induce sustained social interactions, all of which
will be shown in the context of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
(IPD). To set the stage for future work we first focus on two ex-
treme behaviours, i.e. G = 0 and G = +∞, as will be explained in
more detail later. These results are generalisable to situations where
G > 0 yet less than the number of rounds in the IPD, since when
G is larger this would correspond to G = +∞. We use a stochas-
tic evolutionary model incorporating frequency-dependent selection
and mutation to identify when agents with guilt are evolutionary sta-
ble [21]. More importantly, we will show that for guilt to be evolu-
tionary viable, it should be reactive to the guilt-driven behaviour of
the co-player: If the other party is not behaving properly and/or does
not show guilt-alleviating behaviour then the focal agent’s guilt is
alleviated automatically or even non-existing. Pure self-punishment
without social considerations will not allow for guilt to evolve at
the individual level. In this sense, our work contrasts with for in-
stance that of Gadou et al. [4] which takes an utilitarian perspec-
tive to model the behaviour resulting from guilt, not by introducing
self-punishment but by introducing a guilt aversion level term into
a player’s utility function, which ignores the social role of guilt [3].
From a multi-agent perspective, considering socio-technical systems
including autonomous agents, our results confirm that decision mak-
ing conflicts can be reduced when including emotions to guide par-
ticipants to socially acceptable behaviours.
2.2 It rated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD)
Social interactions are modelled in this article as symmetric two-
player games defined by the payoff matrix
( C D
C R,R S, T
D T, S P, P
)
A player who chooses to cooperate (C) with someone who defects
(D) receives the sucker’s payoff S, whereas the defecting player
gains the temptation to defect, T . Mutual cooperation (resp., defec-
tion) yields the reward R (resp., punishment P) for both players. De-
pending on the ordering of these four payoffs, different social dilem-
mas arise [12, 21]. Namely, in this work we are concerned with the
PD, where T > R > P > S. In a single round, it is always best
to defect, because less risky, but cooperation may be rewarding if the
game is repeated. In IPD, it is also required that mutual cooperation
is preferred over an equal probability of unilateral cooperation and
defection (2R > T +S); otherwise alternating between cooperation
and defection would lead to a higher payoff than mutual coopera-
tion. The PD is repeated for a number of rounds, where the number
of rounds is modelled by Ω.
2.3 Guilt modelling in IPD
Starting from the definition of the agent-based guilt feature in the
Introduction, we will focus in the current work only on two basic
types of (extreme) guilt thresholds:
• G = +∞: In this type of agents the guilt level g will never reach
the threshold no mater how many times they defect; hence, they
never need to reduce g, and consequently never pay the guilt cost
γ. Experiencing no guilt feeling, these agents are dubbed (guilt-)
unemotional.
• G = 0: whenever this type of agents defects, it becomes true that
g > G; hence, the agents need to act immediately to reduce g, thus
paying γ. These agents always feel guilty after a wrongdoing, viz.
defection, and are dubbed (guilt-) emotional agents.
Besides the guilt threshold, an agent’s strategy is described by what
she plays in a PD (C or D) and, when the agent’s ongoing guilt level g
reaches the thresholdG, by whether the agent changes her behaviour
from D to C. Hence, there are five possible strategies, thus labeled:
1. Unemotional cooperator (C): always cooperates, unemotional (i.e.
G = +∞)
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2. Unemotional defector (D): always defects, unemotional (i.e. G =
+∞)
3. Emotional cooperator (CGC): always cooperates, emotional (i.e.
G = 0)
4. Emotional non-adaptive defector (DGD): always defects, feels
guilty after a wrongdoing (i.e. G = 0), but does not change be-
haviour.
5. Emotional adaptive defector (DGC): defects initially, feels guilty
after a wrongdoing (i.e. G = 0), and changes behaviour from D
to C.
In order to understand when guilt can emerge and promote coop-
eration, our EGT modelling study below analyses whether and when
emotional strategies, i.e. those with G = 0, can actually overcome
the disadvantage of the incurred costs or fitness reduction associ-
ated with the guilt feeling and its alleviation, and in consequence
disseminate throughout the population. Namely, in the following we
aim to show that, in order to evolve, guilt alleviation through self-
punishment can only be evolutionarily viable when only the focal
agent misbehaves. In other words, an emotional guilt-based response
only makes sense when the other is not attempting to harm you too.
To that aim, we analyse two different models, which differ in the way
guilt influences the preferences of the focal agents, where the prefer-
ences are determined by the payoffs in the matrices (1) and (2).
In the first model, an agent’s ongoing guilt level g increases when-
ever the agent defects, regardless of what the co-player does. The
payoff matrix for the five strategies C, D, CGC, DGD, and DGC, can
be written as follows

C D CGC DGD DGC
C R S R S S+RΘ
Ω
D T P T P P+TΘ
Ω
CGC R S R S S+RΘ
Ω
DGD T − γ P − γ T − γ P − γ P+TΘ
Ω
− γ
DGC
T−γ+RΘ
Ω
P−γ+SΘ
Ω
T−γ+RΘ
Ω
P−γ+S(Θ)
Ω
P−γ+RΘ
Ω

, (1)
where we use Θ = Ω − 1 just for the purpose of a neater represen-
tation. Note that the actions C and CGC are essentially equivalent;
both considered for the sake of completeness of the strategies set.
The entries in the matrix are derived as follows. For instance, when
a C player interacts with another C (resp. D) player, it always obtains
payoff R (resp. S), in all the rounds of the IPD, so it obtains the
same payoff on average, as indicated in the payoff matrix. When C
interacts with DGC, it obtains S in the first round and then R in the
remaining Ω − 1 rounds (thus it obtains S+R(Ω−1)
Ω
on average), as
the DGC player feels guilty after defecting in the first round, thereby
switching to C. Respectively, DGC obtains T in the first round and
then R in the remaining Ω − 1 rounds, i.e. T+R(Ω−1)
Ω
on average.
As in this model DGC does not take into account the co-player’s
attitude towards guilt alleviation, when interacting with D it defects
in the first round then changes to C, even when the co-players shows
no sign of guilt feeling.
In the second model, an agent feels guilty when defecting if the co-
player acted pro-socially or was observed to feel guilty after defec-
tion, viz. through exercising self-punishment or apologising. Thus in
this second model, guilt has a particular social aspect that is missing
from the first model. In particular, DGC does not change behaviour
to C if the co-player played D and did not try to alleviate her guilt as
a result of her bad behaviour. Now, the payoff matrix is rewritten:

C D CGC DGD DGC
C R S R S S+RΘ
Ω
D T P T P P
CGC R S R S S+RΘ
Ω
DGD T − γ P T − γ P − γ P+TΘ
Ω
− γ
DGC
T−γ+RΘ
Ω
P
T−γ+RΘ
Ω
P−γ+SΘ
Ω
P−γ+RΘ
Ω

. (2)
The difference can be seen in the new payoff obtained by DGC when
playing with D. It no longer changes from D to C after defecting in
the first round, thus obtaining P in all the rounds. Notice the differ-
ences in the payoff matrices for the interactions between the emo-
tional strategies that defect, i.e. DGD and DGC, and the unemotional
defector D.
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Guilt cost, Ɣ
C D DGDCGC DGC
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 1. Frequency of each strategy as a function of the guilt cost, γ, for
the two models, and for different PD game configurations (see below). In the
first model (panels a and b), D always dominates the population. In the
second model (panels c and d), for an intermediate value of γ, DGC is the
most frequent strategy; but when it is too small or too large, DGD is
dominant. Parameters: β = 1; N = 100; Ω = 10; In panels (a) and (c):
T = 2, R = 1, P = 0, S = −1; In panels (b) and (d):
T = 4, 3 = 1, P = 0, S = −1.
2.4 Results
We have elsewhere [16] derived analytical conditions (not proffered
here) for when DGC can be a viable strategy, which is risk-dominant
when playing against defection strategies (i.e. D and DGD). We have
shown that though the DGC strategy is always dominated by defec-
tive strategies in the first model, there is a wide range of parame-
ters in which DGC dominates both defection strategies in the second
model, thereby resulting in high levels of cooperation. Namely, we
have shown that, as long as the guilt cost γ satisfies the following
condition
T + P −R− S
2
< γ < (Ω− 1)(R− P ), (3)
then DGC strategy can dominate all the defective strategies. This
condition indicates that, on the one hand, the guilt cost should not
be too small in order to ensure guilt has a sufficiently strong effect
on emotional players, encouraging guilt alleviation and behavioural
change. On the other hand, this cost should not be too large, allowing
DGC to compete against unemotional D players who never pay the
guilt cost after defecting.
To support the analytical results, we have also provided numerical
simulation results, see Figure 1 5. Furthermore, those results have
5 This figure was reproduced from Ref. [16].
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been generalised to consider non-extreme or radical guilt modelling
(i.e. when 0 < G <∞), showing that the obtained results are robust
beyond the context of radical guilt strategies (for details see [16]).
Guilt, depending on an agent’s strategy, may result in self-
punishment, with effect on fitness, and on a change in behaviour. In
the first model of guilt, a guilt prone agent is insensitive to whether
the co-player also feels guilt on defection. This model does not af-
ford cooperation enhancement because guilt prone agents are then
free-ridden by non-guilt prone ones. In our second model, guilt is
not triggered in an agent sensitive to the defecting co-player not ex-
periencing guilt too, for instance through telltale signs of eye con-
tact avoidance or frowning (see [19] page 60). It is this latter model
that shows the improvement on cooperation brought about by the
existence of guilt in the population, and how it becomes pervasive
through the usual EGT phenomenon of social imitation. Another suc-
cessful variation of this model allows to stipulate guilt accumulation
coupled with a triggering threshold.
3 Conclusions and Future Work
For sure, we conclude, evolutionary biology and anthropology, like
the cognitive sciences too [2, 5, 7, 11, 23], have much to offer in
view of rethinking machine ethics, namely for the guilt emotion,
evolutionary game theory simulations of computational morality, and
functionalism to the rescue [18].
On the basis of psychological and evolutionary understandings of
guilt, and inspired by these, this paper proffers and studies two an-
alytical models of guilt, within a system of multi-agents adopting a
combination of diverse guilty and non-guilty strategies. To do so, it
employs the methods and techniques of EGT, in order to identify the
conditions under which there does emerge an enhanced cooperation,
improving on the case where there is absence of guilt.
Players evaluate others by their actions of cooperation or defec-
tion, whether in the IPD or other models of cooperation. Notwith-
standing, they care not simply whether game partners cooperate but
pay attention to their decision-making process too. More trust is as-
cribed to cooperators who have not even considered defecting at all.
To quote Kant, “In law a man is guilty when he violates the rights
of others. In ethics he is guilty if he only thinks of doing so.” [13].
Hence, detecting another’s proclivity to cheat, albeit checked by
guilt, allots intention recognition an important role to play even when
the intention is not carried out [9, 10].
Our results provide important insights for the design of self-
organised and distributed MAS: if agents are equipped with the ca-
pacity for guilt feeling even if it might appear to lead to disad-
vantage, that drives the system to an overall more cooperative out-
come wherein agents become willing to take reparative actions after
wrongdoings.
In future research, the model shall be complicated via our exist-
ing EGT models comprising apology, revenge, and forgiveness, by
piggybacking guilt onto them [8, 15, 18], namely associating experi-
encing guilt with joint commitment defection ( [24], pp. 108-111).
Last but not least: Currently we only consider one type of emo-
tional strategy playing against unemotional strategy. It is possible
that strategies with multiple guilt threshold are co-present in the pop-
ulation. We envisage that different types might dominate in different
game configurations, which we will analyse in future work.
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When apology is sincere, cooperation evolves, even when
mistakes occur frequently.
Tom Lenaerts1 and The Anh Han 2 and Luis Moniz Pereira 3 and Luis A. Martinez-Vaquero 4
Abstract. Evolutionary psychologists have argued that revenge,
apology and forgiveness are moral sentiments that humans acquired
to establish and maintain long-term mutually beneficial relationships,
especially since misapprehensions, intentional or not, can always oc-
cur that could lead to worse outcomes. Their argument assumes an
evolutionary advantage to such emotional thinking, for which no ex-
plicit model was available. Using the iterated prisoners dilemma as
context, we provided analytical and numerical results that show that
these three behaviours emerge spontaneously, ensuring lasting co-
operation [16]. Concretely our work revealed that apology and for-
giveness are efficient even in a very noisy environment. Yet in order
for apology to work, it needs to be sufficiently costly as otherwise
exploiting the system by defecting and apologising is the most prof-
itable behaviour.
1 Introduction
Commitments by individuals in social interactions are established to
ensure favourable outcomes over long time periods [19]. Essentially,
interaction partners are coerced to comply to certain behavioural re-
strictions like cooperation instead of defection within the context of a
social dilemma. To ensure compliance a credible repercussion needs
to be in place. Emotions are one way to ensure compliance [5]. A nice
anthropological example associated with commitments is the sharing
on demand among foragers [26, 21].
In our prior work we formalised commitment behaviour in the
context of one-shot pairwise and n-player social dilemmas [9, 7, 8],
i.e. the prisoners dilemma and the public goods game: Prior to play-
ing the game, an individual can try to get the other to commit to
cooperate. This effort is costly () but if accepted leads to mutual
cooperation, unless the opponent cheats and defects anyway. Within
our formalisation we assume that when the latter happens the defec-
tor suffers a cost (δ) that benefits the one that honoured the com-
mitment (which we call compensation). This compensation could be
the result of executing a threat as well as the legal prosecution of
the defecting individual. Our analytical and numerical work showed
that commitment behaviour evolves and dominates in a population
when the cost  is smaller than the benefit of cooperation and the
compensation δ is bigger than the cost of cooperation and the cost
of setting up the commitment. Interestingly, the model also showed
that commitments, which are established prior to the social interac-
tion, are more effective than costly punishment [10], which acts only
posteriorly.
1 MLG, Universite´ Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium and AI lab, Vrije
Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium. email: tlenaert@ulb.ac.be
2 School of Computing, Teesside University, Middlesbrough, UK
3 NOVA-LINCS,Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Caparica, Portugal
4 Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, CNR, Rome, Italy
Although commitments have shown their use in one-shot interac-
tions, they seem to be even more relevant for long-term relationships
[14], which required the expansion of our research to repeated games
like the Iterated Prisoners Dilemma (IPD) [2]. Within the context of
the IPD a parameter ω specifies the probability that the interaction
is repeated. A second parameter α determines the likelihood that the
player takes an action opposed to her decision, i.e to play D when
intending to play C and vice versa. Such errors are the source of
misunderstandings and might trigger the end of the commitment. In
[16], we provided detailed analytical and numerical results within
that context using again Evolutionary Game Theory [22] as a tool.
These results are also reported in this abstract.
As commitment decisions occur over multiple rounds with the
same partner in the IPD, the individual strategies are required to take
into account additional issues next to the decision when to coop-
erate or defect: How to deal with mistakes made by the opponent
or by themselves before that the interaction is terminated? To de-
mand the compensation immediately as in the one-shot scenario or
wait? When the interaction is mutually beneficial enough to continue,
which mechanism should be put in place so that trust is reestablished
and the interaction can continue?
As asserted by evolutionary psychologists, humans have acquired
sophisticated strategies to ensure that mistakes are not repeated and
that profitable relationships may continue. McCullough [17, 18] has
eloquently argued that revenge for instance may have evolved exactly
to cope with those situations:
”The threat of revenge, through some punishment or withhold-
ing of a benefit, may discourage interpersonal harm.”
A world wherein social interactions are ruled by the fear for re-
venge is ruled by those that can make credible threats. Such world
appears to be unkind as honest mistakes would be severely punished,
destroying any reason to set up mutually beneficial relationships in
the first place. It is often not straightforward to identify whether or
not the other’s behaviour is accidental [4]. Looking again in society,
we can see that we have acquired the capacity to apologise when a
mistake is made and to forgive the person that makes the mistake.
Forgiveness provides a restorative mechanism that, notwithstanding
the initial harm, ensures that mutually beneficial relationships can
continue. An essential ingredient for forgiveness to work appears to
be (costly) apology [17], a point emphasised also in [23].
As we explained in [16], apology and forgiveness remove the ne-
cessity to get costly external parties (e.g. judicial institutions) in-
volved in order to ensure cooperation. For instance, it was shown
that customers prefer to continue their interaction with a company
that apologises [1]. Also in case of situations of medical error, apol-
ogy has been shown to lead to fewer lawsuits with lower settlements
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[15]. Apology even enters the law as an effective mechanism of re-
solving conflicts [24]. It therefore makes sense to ask under which
conditions revenge, apology and forgiveness evolve to ensure sus-
tainable pro-social interactions.
2 Analysis
We here present some of the technical aspects of the model. For the
details see [16]. Our extension of the repeated games with commit-
ments, revenge, apology and forgiveness required the definition of
new strategies that require to address three questions:
1. Whether the player proposes (P ), accepts (A) or ignores (NC)
commitments, with the latter meaning that they play by refusing
commitment proposals.
2. Whether she cooperates (C) or defects (D) once the commitment
is established.
3. How to behave once the commitment is terminated. As there may
be remaining rounds of the IPD the player needs to decide how to
act. In [16], 4 options were provided, always cooperating (AllC),
always defecting (AllD), playing tit-for-tat (TFT ) and the in-
verse of tit-for-tat (ATFT ).
4. Whether to apologise (q = 1) when a defection occurs and con-
tinue to behave as in 2 (within a commitment).
We consider a well-mixed population formed by N individuals. In
each generation, individuals are randomly matched. They first decide
if they are proposing a commitment. If one or both individuals do it
and the other accepts it, the proposers pay an amount  (/2 if both
are proposing it) and the commitment is set up. In a second stage,
individuals play an Iterated Prisonner’s Dilemma with payoff matrix
( C D
C b− c −c
D b 0
)
(1)
A new round is repeated with probabilty ω. If the commitment was
set up and one of the individuals defects and do not apologise, the
defector pays an amounf δ to the other player and the commitment
is broken. The payoffs that individuals obtain are then the sum of
those obtained during the commitment, outside of the commitment,
and the amounts exchanged in setting up the commitment, apolo-
gising and/or compensating (see all the details in [16]). Payoffs are
a measure of the success of individuals and therefore the higher
the payoff the higher the probability of being imitated by others
[11, 22]. New generations are evolving following a discrete imitation
dynamic[20, 12], where a randomly chosen individual is copying the
strategy of another one according with the Fermi imitation proba-
bility function [3, 25]. Then we calculate the probability that each
strategy invades the others through fixation probabilities [13, 22].
These probabilities determine a transition matrix of a Markov chain
among strategies. The stationary distribution of strategies [12, 6] rep-
resents the relative time that the population spends adopting each of
the strategies.
3 Results and discussion
When apology is not possible, the most successful individuals are
those that propose commitments (and are willing to pay the cost )
and, following the agreement, cooperate until an error occurs. Once
this mistake occurs the commitment is broken and then these indi-
viduals take revenge by defecting in all the remaining rounds. This
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Figure 1. Stationary distribution of the main strategies with respect to the
stationary distribution of the pure defectors as a function of the apology cost
γ for α = 0.01 and α = 0.1. Vertical dashed lines mark the values of c and
δ. We assumed ω = 0.9, b/c = 2,  = 0.25, and δ = 4. Figure reproduced
from [16].
result is relatively important as it confirms analytically that it ap-
pears that individual players prefer to take revenge when apology
and forgiveness are not possible [17, 18]: Withholding benefits from
the wrongdoer appears to induce cooperation even better than to the
well-known TFT-like strategies in the IPD extended with commit-
ments.
Once the model allowed for individuals to apology and forgive,
revenge-taking no longer was the dominating strategy, even in situa-
tions when there was a 10% chance of making mistakes (α = 0.1).
In the simulations, apology was defined as a costly behaviour: when
a player apologises she pays a fine γ to the player that was harmed,
which was always accepted by the co-player. As we show in Figure 1,
our analytical results revealed that apology an forgiveness, and hence
long-term cooperation, evolves when the apology cost is sufficiently
high, i.e. slightly higher than the cooperation cost but much less than
the compensation that can be acquired by ending the commitment.
When the apology cost is too high, revenge dominates apologising.
When the apology cost is too low (lower than the cost of coopera-
tion), apology becomes exploited by cheaters who use it to get more
out of defecting, thus dishonest apologisers evolve. In a follow up ex-
periment we also examined the evolutionary dynamics of an agent-
based model wherein players have a personal apology value and a
forgiveness threshold. This model confirmed our results.
The research we discussed here showed for the first time in an ana-
lytical and numerical manner how emotional responses like revenge,
apology and forgeiveness are relevant for the evolution of coopera-
tion. Extension of this work to the repeated public goods game con-
firm the conclusions (work in progress) we were able to draw, urging
us to further explore the role of emotions in social interactions.
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Labour Supply Dynamics
and Psychological Fatigue
Jean Roch Donsimoni1
Abstract. This paper models psychological fatigue in the context
of a labour supply problem with state-dependent utility, where in-
dividuals accumulate psychological fatigue as a direct consequence
of hours worked. The process is driven by two core processes: (i) the
trade-off between job demands and job resources, which dictates how
important hours worked are for the dynamics of fatigue, and how re-
sponsive those dynamics are to a change in hours worked; and (ii)
the recovery from fatigue after supplying hours worked. The model
shows that individuals who are more resilient with regards to fatigue
will work more and become more mentally exhausted. Furthermore,
greater sensitivity to fatigue, independently of recuperation, will lead
workers to supply less labour and accumulate less fatigue over time.
finally, individuals will begin by working longer hours when psycho-
logical fatigue is low, before decreasing their hours worked as they
become more mentally exhausted over time.
1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, reports from international organisations have started
to look at the mental well-being of individuals and have been report-
ing that workers face significant psychological stress coming from
the workplace, reporting that up to 50% of the working population
of the OECD will experience some degree of mental ill-health at
some point during their career ([19], [20]). This is also confirmed
in the psychology literature, where the negative effects of work on
the mental health of individuals has been investigated for decades
now, with models such as the Job-Demands Resources (JDR) frame-
work, which weighs job demands against job resources and finds that
an imbalance in favour of the former leads to job burnout [5]. In re-
cent decades, the share of workers experiencing psychological dis-
tress coming from their work environment has been increasing, and
yet no effort has been made in economic theory to account for this
phenomenon.
From the standpoint of economics, the main effect of mental is
that it leads to variations in labour supply, and is positively corre-
lated with employee turnover (see [12], [27] and [6]). Understanding
the determinants of labour supply is important for designing taxes, or
formulating labour market policies such as welfare programmes and
social insurances. This paper argues that formalising an economic
framework for mental fatigue is therefore important, as the determi-
nants of hours worked are crucial for understanding the effects of
economic policies, and the prevalence of work-related emotional ex-
haustion in rich countries is substantial, reaching up to 38% in the
UK and around 25% in Norway, the Netherlands and Australia (see
[21], [10], [13], and [3]).
1 University of Mainz, Germany, Jakob-Welder-Weg 4, 55131 Mainz, Ger-
many, phone: + 49-6131-39-25442, email: jdonsimo@uni-mainz.de
The objective of this paper is therefore to establish a mathemati-
cally tractable and intuitive framework for studying the dynamics of
psychological exhaustion and their impact on labour supply. The ex-
isting theories and approaches in the psychology literature offer only
limited insight into questions pertinent to economics, such as the ef-
fects over time of accumulated fatigue on behaviour and the relative
importance of the individual’s decision-making process. Thus, the
aim of this paper is to formalise these views into a coherent and con-
sistent structure, which can then be used to determine how fatigue
accumulates exactly, and what the effects of perceived workload, in-
dividuals’ sensitivity to fatigue and their natural ability to recover
are on individual behaviour. Additionally, the paper contributes to
the growing literature in behavioural macroeconomics, by setting the
stage for further economic analysis around the concept of fatigue.
The consumer in the model maximises lifetime utility, where
labour income is the only source of earnings. There is no savings
decision nor any accumulation of human capital. The only source
of dynamics comes from the accumulation of fatigue through hours
worked. The choice of hours worked therefore creates a trade-off be-
tween increasing consumption by increasing labour income receipts,
while also increasing psychological exhaustion. The reasoning be-
hind this is that the individual accumulates fatigue, which in turn
reduces the individual’s well-being by lowering utility. The individ-
ual has a given sensitivity to fatigue, which will determine to what
extent the latter affects well-being. Fatigue accumulates determinis-
tically over time in hours worked and perceived workload, while the
recovery process is exogenous but specific to the individual.
Modelling workload exogenously will capture features of the JDR
model. A higher level of perceived workload will be consistent with
increasing job demands (or decreasing job resources). This measure
of the effect of hours worked on fatigue can also capture the trade-off
observed in the Efforts-Rewards Imbalance (ERI) model [23], which
predicts that when efforts at work exceed rewards, psychological fa-
tigue will increase faster in hours worked. On the other hand, the
recuperation component of fatigue, also modelled exogenously, will
follow the logic of the Effort-Recovery (ER) model [17]. In the ER
model, efforts required to perform tasks at work lead to the individual
feeling progressively more exhausted as a direct reaction to ad hoc
work-related demands, while the individual will recover smoothly
from this expense of efforts automatically when they are not work-
ing, or when demands are sufficiently low. Thus, in keeping with the
psychological theory, both workload and recuperation are modelled
exogenously.
The model predicts that individuals will begin by supplying a high
level of labour supply, before progressively adjusting their hours
worked downwards over time as psychological fatigue increases.
Growth in labour supply in the model will only be observed if hours
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worked are above a certain threshold value, which will be depen-
dent on the underlying wage dynamics. Optimal behaviour predicts
a compensatory motive for workers whereby the impact of a wel-
fare loss due to fatigue will be compensated by an increase in hours
worked. Concentrating on the new features introduced in the model,
individuals who are more fatigue-resistant will work longer hours
and accumulate more fatigue in the long-run, while more fatigue-
sensitive individuals will also work fewer hours and accumulate less
mental fatigue in the long-run. Greater sensitivity of the accumula-
tion of fatigue to hours worked will lead individuals to work longer
hours but accumulate less fatigue in the long-run. More resilient in-
dividuals, who recover faster, will increase hours worked but also fa-
tigue in the long run, due to the increased capacity to cope with emo-
tional exhaustion. A higher workload will lead individuals to lower
labour supply, but the effect on fatigue will depend on the elastic-
ity of utility in consumption, if the individual’s utility does not react
strongly to changes in consumption then fatigue will be lower in the
long run, while if the individual’s utility reacts strongly to changes in
consumption then fatigue will be higher in the long run. Finally, in-
dividuals will begin by working longer hours when they are psycho-
logically healthy, before reducing their labour supply as their mental
state progressively suffers from the accumulated psychological ex-
haustion.
2 THE MODEL
2.1 Mental fatigue and well-being
Time is continuous and indexed by τ ∈ T := [t,∞), consumers
derive utility from consuming goods at time τ , denoted c (τ) ∈ R+,
while experiencing disutility from psychological fatigue at time τ ,
measured by g (τ) ∈ R+. Fatigue is defined on the set of non-
negative reals, the reasoning behind this being that ’negative’ fatigue
has no definition. Individuals can either be psychologically and men-
tally exhausted or not, and if so, the question then is to what de-
gree they are exhausted. Emotional exhaustion is positively corre-
lated with higher levels of anxiety , sleep disturbance and cognitive
impairments [22], but also with lower life satisfaction and depression
[9]. These negative effects on individual well-being are captured be-
low in (1). The individual chooses consumption in period τ , while
psychological fatigue is a stock variable that affects her well-being
directly. The instantaneous utility function is of the form
u (c (τ) , g (τ)) , (1)
and has the following restrictions. The function u : R2+ −→ R is C2
in both of its arguments, and is strictly increasing concave in c
ucc < 0 < uc, (2)
and decreasing concave in g
ugg, ug ≤ 0. (3)
Concavity of u in g captures the fact that as psychological fatigue
increases, its effects on individual well-being become increasingly
more severe. Furthermore, u is additively separable in c and g, mean-
ing that the cross-partial derivatives are equal to zero,
ucg = ugc = 0. (4)
We can find further support for this modelling choice by looking at
the concept of allostatic load in biology and cognitive sciences. The
notion of allostasis describes a process through which an organism
corrects imbalances through physiological or behavioural changes in
order to reach homeostasis [25], which we can relate to individuals
following a dynamic path to equilibrium in economics. Relatedly, al-
lostatic load refers to the accumulated cost of allostasis [16]. We can
here see that the accumulation of fatigue acts as a signal to the in-
dividual to correct their behaviour. The accumulated allostatic load
corresponds to the stock or level of psychological fatigue felt by the
individual, and affects her negatively by reducing her overall well-
being. A similar model has been advanced for stress, called the al-
lostatic model of stress by McEwen [15], where he describes stress
as arising from a prolonged exposure of the body to allostatic over-
load. In the model presented here, emotional exhaustion accumulates
over time as a reaction to work-related tasks, and as it accumulates
its strain on individual welfare increases at an increasing rate. Thus I
model only the direct effect of fatigue on the individual, and abstract
from indirect effects such as cognitive impairments, which may af-
fect productivity.
Intertemporal preferences are given by the following objective
function giving lifetime utility as the discounted sum of instanta-
neous utility in (1), where ρ ∈ R++ is the time preference rate,
U (t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ[τ−t]u (c (τ) , g (τ)) dτ. (5)
Maximising over an infinite time horizon allows us to prevent the in-
dividual from solving the model backwards and to obtain solutions
that are independent of any terminal condition. I assume that the indi-
vidual cannot save or borrow, and consumption is therefore limited to
equal her labour income, with wage w (τ) ∈ R++ and productivity
θ ∈ R+,
c (τ) = θh (τ)w (τ) . (6)
The individual chooses consumption c (τ) in every period τ , which
determines how much labour h (τ) ∈ [0, 1] to supply, taken to rep-
resent the total share of time endowment the individual can choose
from in any period. The time endowment is normalised to the closed
unit interval, representing the share of total time available spent
working. However, we can see directly from (6) that the problem is
equivalent to selecting how much of her time endowment to work, i.e.
choosing h (τ), which will automatically determine the consumption
level, given the productivity-adjusted wage, θw (τ).
2.2 Dynamics of exhaustion
This section describes the accumulation of mental fatigue via a first-
order autonomous differential equation, where fatigue accumulates
deterministically as a function of hours worked and the current stock
of fatigue in period τ . This approach follows the tradition of the JDR
and ER models, which state that hours worked increase emotional
exhaustion through job demands and job resources, and that the ac-
cumulation of fatigue will be slower if the individual can recover,
respectively. High job demands and low job resources lead to an in-
crease in emotional exhaustion as the individual is psychologically
overtaxed in order to cope with the demanding aspects of work and
the potential lack of necessary resources. If the individual has suffi-
cient resources to deal with her job demands, then the accumulation
of fatigue in hours worked is reduced, that is the slope of the function
becomes less steep. I use the following expression to model fatigue
accumulation,
g˙ (τ) = f (h (τ) , g (τ)) , (7)
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where I impose the following restrictions on g˙ (τ). The function f :
[0, 1] × R+ −→ R is C2 in both of its arguments, and is strictly
increasing convex in h
0 < fhh, fh, (8)
and strictly non-increasing in g
fg ≤ 0. (9)
Furthermore, f is additively separable in h and g, meaning that the
cross-partial derivatives are also equal to zero
fhg = fgh = 0. (10)
Thus, I only make the following assumptions regarding the par-
tial derivatives of the fatigue accumulation function. Firstly, hours
worked have a strictly non-negative marginal effect on the growth
rate of fatigue. This allows us to rule out situations where working
somehow reduces the negative effect of psychological fatigue, which
could include situations such as individuals alleviating their stress
or even recuperating through working, an unlikely but not impossi-
ble scenario. Furthermore, hours worked are assumed to have an in-
creasingly negative impact on the growth rate of fatigue, by convex-
ity. This implies that, ceteris paribus, the more hours an individual
works, the faster her mental fatigue will accumulate, meaning that
for example working one more hour from 12h/day to 13h/day will
have a greater effect on fatigue accumulation than working one more
hour from 2h/day to 3h/day. Secondly, fatigue is assumed to have a
strictly non-positive effect on f (h, g), meaning that it can either have
no marginal effect at all or it can affect the growth rate of fatigue as
some form of depreciation, whereby from one moment to the next,
the individual naturally recuperates and recovers from fatigue. This
follows the logic of the ER model, whereby the individual naturally
recovers from fatigue. The recuperation process is modelled exoge-
nously to represent the fact that individuals cannot choose their own
degree of resistance to psychological fatigue.
This assumption simplifies the analysis by making the steady-state
level g∗ stable and unique, the latter holds true, if and only if f (h, g)
is strictly monotone in g, while the former holds by the assumptions
made on f (h, g), regarding the sign of its derivative with respect to
fatigue. Having a unique g∗ may appear to be a strong assumption
economically, however it would be more surprising psychologically
if the individual had multiple optimal levels of fatigue for a given
set of parameters. While it would present interesting features of the
model, it would be unrealistic to model such a situation. Also, I as-
sume the cross-partial derivatives to be zero, meaning that fg is not
dependent on the level of h, while fh is not dependent on the level of
g. In other words, the marginal effect of hours worked on fatigue does
not depend on the level of fatigue, while the marginal effect of fatigue
on the accumulation process does not depend on the level of hours
worked. That is, I separate the recovery process from the effects of
on-the-job demands and resources, where the former describes an
individual-level phenomenon and the latter describes the effect of the
work environment on the dynamics of emotional exhaustion. Allow-
ing for non-zero cross partial derivatives would imply that the ability
of the individual to recover from fatigue would somehow be depen-
dent on her work environment and the amount of hours worked, but
also that the effect of job demands and resources would depend on
the level of fatigue of the individual as well as on their recovery ca-
pabilities. While the latter argument may be defensible, the former
seems to be more of a stretch both psychologically and rationally. I
thus choose to restrict the function to have zero cross-partial deriva-
tives, in order to be as consistent with established psychological facts
as possible.
2.3 Optimal rule for hours worked
The individual maximises discounted lifetime utility using (1), sub-
ject to (6), and (7), yielding the equation in (11) (see Appendix for
steps), which when combined with the fatigue accumulation function
and the budget constraint, yields the reduced form of our system in
general form
h˙ (τ) =
fg (τ)− ρ− ug(τ)uc(τ)
fh(τ)
θw(τ)
+
[
1 + ucc(τ)
uc(τ)
c (τ)
]
w˙(τ)
w(τ)
fhh(τ)
fh(τ)
− ucc(τ)
uc(τ)
w (τ)
.
(11)
Focusing on (11) we can see that the only force driving the growth
rate of hours worked upward is a compensatory motive determined
by the ratio of the marginal utilities, the ug(τ)
uc(τ)
term. This term shows
a trade-off between the marginal cost of hours worked and their
marginal benefit on the instantaneous utility function, weighed by
the ratio of the productivity-adjusted wage θw (τ) to the marginal
effect of hours worked on the growth rate of fatigue, fh (τ), this is
summarised in Lemma 1 below.
Lemma 1 (Compensatory motive) Individuals will increase their
hours worked over time when marginal disutility of fatigue increases
in order to compensate for the marginal utility loss, relative to the
marginal utility from consumption.
This term shows that if the marginal disutility of fatigue relative to
the marginal utility of consumption increases, the individual will in-
crease her hours worked faster, in order to compensate for the in-
creasing relative marginal disutility. The marginal effect of ug (τ)
on the growth rate of hours worked is measured by the inverse of the
marginal utility of consumption, as well as the relative cost of hours
worked on the accumulation of fatigue over the wage, functioning
as a real measure of an increase in hours worked on fatigue. We can
further see that, in the numerator of (11), the wage rate will have
an ambiguous effect on the growth rate of hours worked, as it will
have a negative effect in levels, but its growth rate will have either a
positive or negative effect depending on the sign of the term in the
square brackets. While in the denominator, the wage rate in levels
will have a negative effect overall as it increases. Finally, we can see
from (11) that ρ and fg (τ) will both have a strictly non-positive ef-
fect on the growth rate of hours worked. As the individual values the
present more, i.e. as ρ increases, they will choose a lower labour sup-
ply path, while an increase in the marginal effect of fatigue on its on
growth rate, i.e. a greater rate of depreciation of the stock of fatigue
or greater recuperation rate, will also put the individual on a lower
labour supply path. The remaining equations described by (6) and
(7) are as in Section 2 above, and describe the process of accumula-
tion of psychological fatigue and the budget constraint, respectively.
Together, these three equations pin down the endogenous variables
of the model, namely labour supply h, fatigue g and consumption
c. This system of equations completely characterises the model in
equilibrium.
We can now establish the condition under which we can observe
growth in labour supply over time. This condition is summarised be-
low in Lemma 2.
It is worth nothing that h∗ (τ) in Lemma 2 is not a steady-state
because of the growth rate of wages, that does not need to be equal
to zero. Thus, if wages change over time, so will the threshold be-
yond which individuals increase their labour supply. If individuals
face an increasing wage profile over time, this threshold will there-
fore move upward for a high income growth rate, before the absolute
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wage level starts eclipsing this effect altogether, reducing the labour
supply threshold determining growth in hours worked.
Lemma 2 (Labour supply growth) Individuals will increase their
labour supply over time, if and only if labour supply is above a
threshold level h∗ (τ) defined by
ρ− fg(h∗ (τ) , g∗ (τ)) =
[
1 +
ucc (c
∗ (τ) , g∗ (τ))
uc (c∗ (τ) , g∗ (τ))
c∗ (τ)
]
w˙ (τ)
w (τ)
−ug (c
∗ (τ) , g∗ (τ))
uc (c∗ (τ) , g∗ (τ))
fh (h
∗ (τ) , g∗ (τ))
θw (τ)
. (12)
2.4 Modelling recovery and workload explicitly
I will now take the system of equations above as described by (6),
(7) and (11) and consider a specific functional form for (1), that sat-
isfies the assumptions made and retains a form common in the labour
supply literature,
u (c (τ) , g (τ)) =
c (τ)1−η − 1
1− η − β
g (τ)1+γ
1 + γ
, (13)
where η ∈ R++ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution, β ∈ R+ is a weight parameter for the relative importance
of the disutility of fatigue in the instantaneous utility function, and
γ ∈ R+ is the elasticity of fatigue, and must be strictly non-negative
in order to satisfy the assumptions on utility and ensure concavity.
Therefore we can see that if β = 0 in (13) then ug (τ) = 0, and
we return to the more traditional CRRA utility function, by shutting
down the direct effect of psychological fatigue on well-being. How-
ever, if β > 0 then ug (τ) < 0, and thus individuals will experience
disutility in fatigue. This modelling choice then allows us to more
clearly assess the effects of being fatigue-resistant (low β) or fatigue-
sensitive (high β) on individuals. I also use a specific functional form
for the accumulation of psychological fatigue in (7),
f (h (τ) g (τ)) = φ
h (τ)1+ψ
1 + ψ
− δg (τ) , (14)
where the first term on the right-hand side of (14) captures the trade-
off between job demands and job resources, and the second term
models the recovery process.
The balance between demands and resources is the main mediator
for the progression of emotional exhaustion and is determined by the
individual’s work environment ([5], [2]). The two parameters associ-
ated with this trade-off are φ ∈ R++ andψ ∈ R+, where φmeasures
the relative weight of the effects of the (im)balance between demands
and resources in the accumulation of fatigue, while ψ measures the
elasticity of this process with respect to hours worked. We can think
of these parameters as capturing the effects of workload, supervisor
support, and work engagement, on the individual. We can see that if
this process becomes more responsive to hours worked (higher ψ),
then the partial effect of hours worked on fatigue accumulation will
decrease, and if ψ → ∞ then the individual’s exhaustion dynamics
would only depend on the recovery process2. If this becomes less re-
sponsive however (lower ψ), then as ψ → 0 then the marginal effect
of hours worked on fatigue accumulation will converge to the weight
of the demands-resources trade-off in (14), i.e. it will become lin-
ear in h (τ) with coefficient φ. We should note here that the reason
for these parameters to be exogenous to the model is that they per-
tain to the external work environment of the individual, thus they are
2 Since h (τ) ∈ [0, 1], we have limψ→∞ φh(τ)
1+ψ
1+ψ
− δg (τ) = −δg (τ) .
not directly affected by the behaviour of the individual, nor are they
chosen.
I further assume that the individual has a natural physical and men-
tal ability to recover from and cope with her own psychological ex-
haustion, and thus being either more resilient (high δ) or more sus-
ceptible (low δ) to it, but also by resting between periods of work.
Another way to think of this recuperation is to think of the time not
invested in labour supply as being used to regularly engage in activ-
ities to reduce her level of fatigue, either through exercising, resting,
or engaging in social activities in order to mediate the negative ef-
fects of fatigue. This process is captured by the parameter δ ∈ R+,
which we will call the recuperation rate of the individual, and will act
as a type of “depreciation” for g (τ). We can also think of this param-
eter as signalling the degree of physical fitness of an individual, with
more physically fit individuals having a higher capacity to cope with
psychological fatigue. This finds further empirical evidence in the lit-
erature (see [1] and [4]), where we find that individuals who exercise
less have higher levels of fatigue, showing that physical exercise also
has a role to play in the recovery process. Here I assume that this de-
preciation rate or recuperation rate is linear in fatigue and thus, does
not depend on the level of fatigue. This assumption of monotonic-
ity of g˙ (τ) in g (τ) implies that there exists only one steady-state,
as discussed in Section 2.2. Relaxing this assumption could allow
for multiple steady-states, however the focus of this paper is on the
qualitative aspect of recuperation for the individual. If there were
multiple fixed-points, say one stable and one unstable, then the only
difference to our current setup would be that there would be a range
of values for g (τ) where the system would converge, while beyond a
certain threshold it would diverge away from any equilibrium. If this
were the case, we would then focus on the requirements for fatigue
to be within the range where our system would converge, and return
to the analysis we are already doing here, except with the addition of
an extra condition on fatigue. The choice of recuperation, or coping,
strategies are not modelled here and cannot be endogenously chosen
by the individual. The assumption is that the worker can only affect
how much labour she supplies while recuperating naturally through
non-work activities. Thus I take the recovering strategies as given,
and focus solely on the labour supply problem of the individual.
Using (13) and (14) in the system described by (6), (7) and (11),
we can use (6) to replace in (11) and rearrange to obtain the following
system of equations,
h˙ (τ) = h(τ)
ψ+η
[
βg (τ)γ φh(τ)
ψ+η
[θw(τ)]1−η − δ − ρ+ [1− η]
w˙(τ)
w(τ)
]
(15)
g˙ (τ) = φh(τ)
1+ψ
1+ψ
− δg (τ) . (16)
We can see the dynamic rule for hours worked with the accumula-
tion of fatigue, pinning down the endogenous variables of the model.
These two equations now describe the reduced form of the system,
where we can study the properties for existence of the steady-state,
understanding how the parameters of the model affect it. Further-
more, we can then use this system to study the phase diagram in
h (τ) and g (τ), and how labour supply and fatigue evolve over time.
3 DYNAMICS OF THE LABOUR-FATIGUE
PROCESS
3.1 Long-run behaviour and psychological
resilience
The system described by (15)-(16) finds its steady-state when labour
supply and fatigue growth are equal to zero, and with a constant
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wage rate. If the wage rate is allowed to change over time, then the
long-run value for hours worked and fatigue will vary over time with
income (see Lemma 2). In other words, a steady-state can only be
found when the following conditions are met,
h˙ (τ) = 0, g˙ (τ) = 0, w˙ (τ) = 0. (17)
Our system of two equations in two variables can easily be solved
to obtain equilibrium steady-state values for labour supply and fa-
tigue, using the conditions above. These steady-state values for hours
worked and mental fatigue are summarised in Proposition 1, and al-
low us to understand the channels through which we can affect the
long-run behaviour of individuals.
Proposition 1 (Long-run equilibrium) Defining the following
term for ease of notation,
χ ≡ ψ + η + γ (1 + ψ) , (18)
we can write the steady-state level of hours worked as
h∗ =
[
[θw]1−η
β
ρ+ δ
φ
(
φ/δ
1 + ψ
)−γ] 1χ
, (19)
and the corresponding steady-state level of fatigue as
g∗ =
[
[θw]1−η
β
ρ+ δ
φ
(
φ/δ
1 + ψ
) η+ψ
1+ψ
] 1+ψ
χ
. (20)
We can see from expressions (19) and (20) that the determinants of
hours worked and fatigue in the steady-state will be very similar.
Specifically, we can see that the ratio of the perceived workload (φ)
to the recuperation rate (δ), weighed by the gross elasticity of exhaus-
tion (1+ψ) in hours worked will have different effects depending on
whether one looks at hours worked or fatigue. In the case of the for-
mer, it will have a negative effect owing to the elasticity of utility in
fatigue (γ). While the latter will be pushed upwards due to the elas-
ticity of utility in consumption (η) and that of fatigue accumulation
in hours worked (ψ).
In studying Proposition 1, we can decompose the long-run effects
of the underlying parameter set into two corollaries.
Corollary 1 (Labour paths)
(i) Individuals will be put on a higher labour path, if they are more
resilient, the accumulation of fatigue becomes more sensitive to
hours worked, as well as if they become more patient.
(ii) Individuals will be put on a lower labour path, if they become
more fatigue-sensitive, the weight of hours worked in the accumu-
lation of fatigue increases, and if utility becomes more sensitive to
changes consumption.
(iii) Higher labour income will put individuals on a higher labour path
if the substitution effect dominates the income effect.
In the long-run more resilient individuals (higher δ) will work longer
hours. This happens via two distinct channels, first through the di-
rect effect being able to recover more from fatigue, allowing the
consumer to work longer hours, and secondly indirectly by slowing
down the accumulation of fatigue and thus reducing the impact of
emotional exhaustion on the individual. This can be achieved by en-
gaging in social activities aimed at relieving stress outside of work,
or by improving the quality of the time spent off work in order to
recuperate better. Increases in the elasticity of fatigue accumulation
in hours worked (higher ψ), leads to an increase in labour supply in
the long-run through two channels, indirectly through the accumula-
tion of fatigue, that is as fatigue becomes more responsive to hours
worked, it increases faster, leading to an increase in hours worked in
equilibrium to compensate. And directly through the marginal effect
of hours worked on its own growth rate, that is, as fatigue becomes
more sensitive to responsive to hours worked, the individual will in-
crease labour supply faster to offset the corresponding increase in
fatigue. On the other hand, a lower long-run value for hours worked,
and consequently a lower labour path, are obtained when individuals
themselves, rather than fatigue accumulation, become more sensitive
to fatigue (higher γ). In this case, individuals experience greater di-
rect disutility from fatigue, i.e. its negative effects become more im-
portant, and thus individuals choose to work fewer hours by adjust-
ing their labour path. Similarly, increases in workload (higher φ) de-
crease long-run hours worked, by directly deterring individuals from
working, since any increases in work due to a higher workload will
be weighed by the gross elasticity of fatigue in the utility function
(1 + γ).
Corollary 2 (Fatigue paths)
(i) Individuals will be put on a higher fatigue path, if they become
more impatient, as well as if they are more resilient.
(ii) Individuals will be put on a lower fatigue path, if they are more
fatigue-sensitive, individuals become more receptive to exhaus-
tion, the accumulation of fatigue becomes more elastic in labour
supply, or if the income effect becomes stronger relative to the
substitution effect.
(iii) Increases in the productivity-adjusted wage will lead to a higher
fatigue path, while increases in the weight of hours worked in the
accumulation of fatigue will put individuals on a lower fatigue
path, if the substitution effect dominates the income effect.
From Corollary 2 above, we can see that impatient and resilient in-
dividuals will accumulate more fatigue over time, by being placed
on a higher fatigue path. Impatient individuals (higher ρ) will value
the present more, and thus work more hours to earn more income, in
order to consume more, with the side effect of pushing up the accu-
mulation of fatigue simultaneously. On the other hand, resilient indi-
viduals (higher δ) will also be put on a higher fatigue path because
of their ability to recover better. That is, since these individuals re-
cuperate faster from fatigue instantaneously, they work longer hours
and thus increase their fatigue in the long-run. Further, increasing
marginal disutility of fatigue for the individual, either for individuals
more sensitive to fatigue (higher γ) or for more fatigue-sensitive indi-
viduals (higher β), leads to a lower fatigue path in the long-run. This
is a simple behavioural reaction to the increasing negative effect of
fatigue on the individual. As the individual becomes more sensitive
to fatigue, she progressively adjusts her hours worked downwards,
also leading to a reduction in fatigue over time. Similarly when the
accumulation of fatigue becomes more responsive to hours worked
(higher ψ), individuals will once again react by slowing down the ac-
cumulation of fatigue through reducing their long-run hours worked.
As η increases, that is as the income effect becomes stronger rela-
tive to the substitution effect, or as relative risk aversion increases,
in a model with uncertainty, long-run fatigue will also decrease. That
is, as utility becomes increasingly concave in consumption, marginal
utility in consumption will become higher for lower levels of con-
sumption, leading individuals to adjust their hours worked down-
wards in the long-run, as higher levels of consumption will yield
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lower marginal utility than before, thus leading to a lower level of
long-run fatigue. Lastly, when η is small enough, and the substitu-
tion effect dominates over the income effect, two competing effects
take place, on the one hand higher wages will lead to higher long-
run fatigue, by leading individuals to increase their hours worked
and take advantage of their higher income as the relative change in
prices between fatigue and consumption changes; while on the other
hand, increasing workload (higher φ) will lead individuals to reduce
their steady-state level of fatigue and put them on a lower fatigue
path. This is due to the marginal effect of hours worked on the ac-
cumulation of fatigue increasing through φ, leading individuals to
decrease their hours worked, and thus their fatigue level. Increases
in the perceived workload can occur either directly, through increas-
ing work demands or diminishing job resources, but also indirectly,
for example if individuals cannot separate their work life from their
private life. Failure to psychologically detach themselves from their
work can reduce individuals’ ability to recover by effectively putting
added pressure on themselves about work-related issues in an envi-
ronment where they should normally be recuperating ([24]).
3.2 Equilibrium path and psychological health
In order to analyse the transitional dynamics of the model, we must
look at the two-dimensional system in h and g by taking the deriva-
tive of hours worked with respect to psychological fatigue, consid-
ering exhaustion as the exogenous variable using the system in (15)-
(16),
∂h (g)
∂g
=
h(g)
ψ+η
[
βgγ φh(g)
ψ+η
[θw(τ)]1−η − δ − ρ+ [1− η]
w˙(τ)
w(τ)
]
φh(g)
1+ψ
1+ψ
− δg
. (21)
As we can see above in (21), the system is not time invariant so long
as w˙ (τ) 6= 0. Thus variations in the wage will cause the equilib-
rium path described by (21) to move over time, and lead individuals
to adjust their labour supply accordingly. This pattern will depend
heavily on the size of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (η),
and whether it is greater or lower than one. If, on the other hand we
assume no wage growth, such that the only changes to income are
unanticipated, the system then finds a stable saddle-path to equilib-
rium (see Appendix for derivations), presented in Figure 1 below,
where the equilibrium path is described by the time-invariant version
of (21) above, given by
∂h (g)
∂g
=
h(g)
ψ+η
[
βgγ φh(g)
ψ+η
[θw]1−η − δ − ρ
]
φh(g)
1+ψ
1+ψ
− δg
. (22)
Furthermore, we can ensure that the individual remains on the
saddle-path to equilibrium, so long as the transversality condition
(TVC), defined as
lim
τ→∞
e−ρ[τ−t]λ (τ) g (τ) = 0, (23)
holds, where λ is the associated co-state variable of the model (see
Appendix). This condition ensures that fatigue cannot grow too fast
compared to its marginal value fixed by the shadow price λ. This
condition is equivalent to saying that the individual cannot gain by
deviating from the optimal path implied by equation (23) and never
returning to it. Thus the TVC, combined with the expression in (22),
gives us the optimal path for hours worked and fatigue leading to the
maximal level of lifetime utility the individual can achieve.
Figure 1. Dynamics of labour supply and fatigue along the stable
saddle-path
Proposition 2 (Optimal path) Psychologically healthy individuals
will work longer hours and reduce their labour supply as their
fatigue increases, while psychologically exhausted individuals will
work fewer hours and increase their labour supply as they recover.
Proposition 2 summarises the main message of Figure 1. When the
fatigue level is low, individuals will work a higher number of hours,
and progressively reduce their labour supply as mental fatigue starts
to accumulate. This behaviour is driven by individuals taking advan-
tage of their low level of exhaustion to work more and thus be able to
consume more and maximise their utility. However, as fatigue begins
to settle in and take its toll on the individual’s psychological state,
they will reduce their hours worked as the marginal effect of fatigue
on the utility becomes larger compared to the marginal effect of con-
sumption. On the other hand, if the individual fatigue level is high,
individuals will work fewer hours, in order to allow themselves to re-
cover from that state of psychological exhaustion, and they will grad-
ually increase their labour supply as their mental health improves,
until they can reach their long-run value for hours worked and fa-
tigue, characterised by the steady-states h∗ and g∗. Deviations from
the optimal path, though prevented by the TVC, would lead individ-
uals either to over work themselves and over accumulate fatigue, or
on the contrary to work a sub-optimal amount of hours and never
become psychologically exhausted (or recovering too much if com-
ing from the right-hand side of Figure 1), and eventually reduce their
hours worked down to zero. Consequently, working the optimal num-
ber of hours, as determined by the TVC and the first-order condition,
has a stimulating effect on individuals where they remain engaged
and choose to work rather than either overworking themselves or los-
ing interest in their work and eventually leaving employment, when
h = 0. The question now remains to know how long individuals take
to reach their steady-state, or an arbitrarily close neighbourhood of
their steady-state.
4 QUANTITATIVE RESULTS
The numerical analysis begins by showing the saddle-path to equi-
librium from Figure 1 quantitatively. We therefore look to Figure 2
to show the numerical counterpart to the phase diagram in the pre-
vious section. As expected, the optimal path to the steady-state de-
clines monotonically in fatigue, leading to a long-run value of hours
worked of around 34h/week, corresponding to the average weekly
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hours worked in Germany ([18], [26]), and a value for long-run fa-
tigue of around 12.7, corresponding to the average score for individ-
uals in full-time employment [11]. Therefore we can see that the nu-
merical analysis confirms the analytical solution derived previously
and shows a substantial shift in hours worked depending on the level
of psychological fatigue. If on the other hand the individual begins
to the right of the steady-state, where her mental fatigue level is high
and hours worked are low, then she will progressively adjust her work
hours upward while she recovers and her fatigue reduces. The ef-
fects of an unanticipated vacation on the equilibrium path would be
to reduce hours worked to zero, while leaving the individual at the
same level of fatigue, she would therefore jump to the horizontal axis
and progressively move to the left as her fatigue reduces. Eventually,
upon returning to work, the worker would jump back immediately on
her optimal path, as dictated by the TVC in (23), and she would re-
sume her decline in hours worked and accumulation of fatigue. This
strategy of unanticipated time-off can be relevant when the individual
finds herself to the right of the steady-state where the level of fatigue
is high. Figure 3 below plots the system characterised by (15)-(16)
Figure 2. Hours worked decline as psychological fatigue increases
over time. The time horizon taken is in years, while the left-hand
scale shows hours worked per week and the right-hand scale shows
the fatigue level. Individuals will begin at time 0 by working close
to 60 hours per week when psychological fatigue is close to zero,
however rapidly, when facing a constant wage income, hours worked
will decline and within 10 years approach 40 hours per week be-
fore slowing down and asymptotically converging to the steady state
over the remainder of the time horizon. Meanwhile, psychological
fatigue will accumulate and converge to its steady state value within
25 years. Thus, as individuals start their working lives with no men-
tal fatigue, they can afford to work longer hours and maximise their
labour income, which corresponds exactly to consumption, while the
progressive accumulation of the psychological strain on the individ-
ual will lead her to reduce her hours worked over time, converging
towards her steady-state level. If a sudden unanticipated permanent
positive shock to income were to occur, we would observe a discrete
jump in the hours profile upwards while the fatigue path would show
a kink and an increased steepness at the point where wage increases,
eventually leading to higher long-run values for labour supply and
mental fatigue. On the other hand, an unanticipated negative perma-
nent shock to wages would have the exact opposite effect an lead to
a lower steady-state. Productivity shocks would have the same ef-
Figure 3. Hours and fatigue profiles over time
fects, qualitatively. Thus unanticipated shocks yield only limited in-
sight into behaviour. If the shocks were anticipated, then the paths
for labour supply and mental fatigue would adjust slowly over time,
either upward in the case of increasing productivity or income, or
downward in the case of decreasing productivity or income. Never-
theless, Figure 3 shows that even in the absence of wage dynamics,
uncertainty, or human capital, substantial variations in hours worked
are still observed in the model once this fatigue accumulation chan-
nel is taken into account. This downward trend in hours worked can
be related to newer workers who invest too many hours in their job,
working overtime at home or on the job, before slowly adjusting to
more “normal” or more common levels of labour supply.
5 APPLICATIONS
5.1 Behavioural macroeconomics
The model presented here can be adapted to study further questions
in economics, such as understanding the determinants of labour sup-
ply over the life-cycle, given a non-linear wage profile in finite hori-
zon. In this case the interest would be in understanding to what ex-
tent accounting for fatigue in the labour supply process helps explain
variations in hours worked late in the working life of individuals at
the macro level, a puzzle which persists to this day in the data.
Another extension of the model would be to look at the effects of
burnout, the natural consequence of emotional fatigue, on individual
behaviour and see how it develops over the life-cycle of the affected
individuals. The rate of incidence of job burnout in the OECD is
known to be high, and is often claimed to be increasing in recent
decades [8]. Even though a more thorough analysis of the data may
be needed to obtain accurate figures, it remains that burnout affects
real economic variables and should therefore be studied in the con-
text of economics [14].
5.2 Computational modelling
Taking the structure of the model developed in this paper, one could
incorporate its components into a more comprehensive framework,
following the computational modelling of emotions tradition. To this
end we could identify some of the key elements and features of the
model. Here the steps through which the individual processes fatigue
is given by the following structure, which is closely related to a FA-
tiMA architecture [7]:
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1. perception of environment (e.g. learning about model parameters),
2. knowledge / memory is updated (here implying individual learns
her new environment),
3. appraisal (she evaluates impact of environment using the model’s
structure),
4. optimal state is determined (her long-run values for fatigue and
hours worked), and
5. action is taken (level of hours worked is chosen to fit).
6 CONCLUSION
The model predicts that fatigue-resistant as well as more resilient
individuals will actually work longer hours and accumulate more
psychological fatigue, while more fatigue-sensitive individuals will
work fewer hours and accumulate less fatigue. This result, that
fatigue-resistant individuals end up accumulating more fatigue, is
somewhat surprising and its implications for behaviour as of yet un-
explored in the literature. Furthermore, reducing the perceived work-
load of workers would actually lead to individuals working longer
hours, but the effect on fatigue will depend on the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution. An interesting caveat of the model is that if
the process of fatigue accumulation becomes more sensitive to hours
worked, individuals will work longer hours but accumulate less fa-
tigue over time. The model also predicts that individuals will begin
their working life by oversupplying labour, taking advantage of their
being psychologically healthy at the time, and then progressively re-
duce their working hours over time as mental exhaustion accumulates
and starts negatively affecting their well-being.
We can see therefore that mental fatigue plays a key role in deter-
mining hours worked over time, and that further work must now be
undertaken in order to understand the effect of assets and human cap-
ital accumulation in the presence of fatigue. The presence of savings
would allow the individual to partially insure against the negative ef-
fects of fatigue and would smooth out consumption, as well as hours
worked in the long-run. Modelling the effect of human capital would
be a more complex enterprise, as one would need to ascertain the re-
lationship between psychological fatigue and human capital. So far
the psychology literature has found only weak evidence pointing to
differences in fatigue levels across various education groups, with
a tipping point for individuals who have completed primary educa-
tion and a decreasing prevalence with further years of schooling ([3],
[13]). Thus investing in human capital early on could also serve as a
form of insurance against future levels of mental exhaustion. Another
application could be to consider the effects of a burnout on the indi-
vidual, which is the natural extension to psychological fatigue, and
bears further health risks that are relevant both for health economics
and labour economics [14].
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Abstract.  Cognition represents one of the most important and 
highly desirable abilities for robots engaged in human-robot 
interaction (HRI). An ultimate goal is to have a robot that can 
reason for itself and make decisions about its actions. Several 
frameworks focusing on different functionalities for autonomous 
robots have been tried and tested, and a particularly promising 
venue for cognition focuses on the modelling and development 
of robotic emotions. This paper presents an on-going project for 
developing an emotion-based architecture for a humanoid robot 
with the purpose of having fully autonomous interactions with 
humans.12 
1 INTRODUCTION 
When discussing cognition in the context of robotics, and more 
precisely for robots engaged in human-robot interaction, the term 
encompasses several crucial abilities. Echoing the definition of 
cognitive agents in [1]: a cognitive robot is primarily a robot 
capable of autonomous interaction with humans, by employing 
skills such as: environment perception, learning from experience, 
anticipating outcome of actions, adapting to new circumstances 
in the environment and ultimately ability to act independently 
with the purpose of achieving some inner goals. Additionally, 
depending on the cognitivist or emergent view on cognition, the 
robot can also be embodied, i.e. cognitively experience the world 
in a manner that would be unique to its own body and not the 
same as other robots with the same body and abilities [2]. 
It becomes evident that implementing full cognition in robots 
is quite a challenge. However, autonomous robots have been 
tested in experimental studies for HRI consistently for the past 
several years. There have been efforts in many different 
directions towards creating some kind of cognitive architecture 
or agent to be implemented in robots for interactions with 
humans. Some of these focus on recognition and employment of 
joint action [3], others orient towards using cognitive skills in 
robots that assist humans in achieving goals [4], but there is also 
an increased amount of studies concerned with emotion-based 
HRI, both from the aspect of modelling emotions in the robots, 
and in equipping the robots with functionality for recognizing 
the emotions of their human peers [5]. Our goals for this project 
are to see how affect can be modelled and integrated in an 
interactive robot for cognitive HRI. 
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2 THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS IN COGNITION 
From the definition of cognition in the previous section, it 
becomes evident that often the aim in creating artificial cognitive 
agents is for them to approach the human cognitive abilities as 
close as possible.  
     Even though some researchers opt not to include emotion in 
their cognitive robots [3-4], emotions (both expressing them and 
recognizing them in others) still remain a crucial part of 
cognitive architectures for truly autonomous robots. On one 
hand, the ability to recognize the expression of emotions in other 
agents provides the cognitive agent with an information about 
the state of the environment (i.e. the state of the agents with 
which is interacting) and can be used to evaluate how well the 
robot is performing its actions [6-7]. On the other hand, inner 
emotions constitute the value system in almost all cognitive 
agents and beings, as emotions are often used both as a 
motivation and an evaluation mechanism [1].  
    To summarize, the dual role of emotions in a cognitive 
architecture can be seen in the two necessary cognitive abilities 
of perception and motivation. While a cognitive agent can be 
non-autonomous and still be capable of learning, anticipation 
and adaptation, true autonomy is manifested by the presence of 
inner motivation and autonomous perception of the environment. 
2.1 Emotions as a motivation and an evaluation 
mechanism 
In cognitive beings (both natural and artificial), motivation 
represents the main drive of their value system and it is what 
makes them capable of autonomous action [8]. When it comes to 
providing a definition of motivation, there is some debate in the 
community depending on the different outlook (cognitivist or 
emergent) on cognitive agents. Proponents of cognitivism define 
motivation as the criteria for selecting a goal and the associated 
actions leading to that goal; whereas supporters of the emergent 
theory for cognitive agents interpret motivation as being the 
encapsulation of the internal value system that modulates the 
self-regulation and self-development of the agent [9]. Regardless 
of the finer nuances of the definitions, motivation is the 
necessary link that enables the agent to act autonomously and 
make decisions for itself.  
   There is a general tendency between roboticists to be biased 
towards human-inspired cognition when we consider cognitive 
abilities for robots, which is why emotions present themselves as 
a plausible motivation and value system for the cognitive robot. 
One way to implement this without delving too deep in the net of 
bio-inspired design is to consider an architecture for modelling 
emotions (inspired by the circumplex model [10-11] where we 
would additionally select between using one or both dimensions) 
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that would provide the robot with a limited range of emotions, 
but additionally implementing those emotions as a value system. 
    Research done in several HRI studies shows that there are 
benefits for the interaction even when the robot’s emotions don’t 
serve any other purpose from appearance [12-13]. This is 
particularly the case in child-robot interaction (CRI) studies, 
where even though the emotions are merely employed as an 
additional way to make the robot more human-like, the children 
still exhibit greater ease of interaction and greater engagement 
than when the robot does not display emotions [14]. However, 
our goal is to implement this limited range of emotions not only 
to make the robot more user-friendly, but also to facilitate 
anticipation, learning and decision-making. A way to modify the 
existing implementations of emotions would be to make them a 
part of the anticipation and decision phases in the robot’s 
schema. 
    To summarize, emotions can be implemented in a cognitive 
robot as a mechanism for anticipation of future states (in 
combination with memory), for learning and ultimately for being 
the motivation or the drive behind decision-making. 
2.2 Recognition of emotion as a hallmark of 
autonomy 
The previous section highlighted the importance of maintaining 
and expressing an emotional model for cognitive robots. On the 
other hand, complete perception of the environment is also a 
crucial skill for cognitive agents, and this is where the second 
role of emotion can be seen. When we are discussing a scenario 
of human-robot interaction, the description of the state of the 
environment, specifically the state of the human counterpart, is 
very relevant to the robot. Evidently, as an ultimate goal for HRI 
we would like to have intelligent robots that would also consider 
the environment surrounding the human in addition to the human 
itself, but for the level of HRI scenarios implemented today it is 
often sufficient to have the robot be able to perceive the state in 
which the human is. 
    A perceptive robot that aims at becoming fully autonomous 
would need to be able to detect the level of engagement, i.e. 
interest that the user has in the interaction; as well as to be able 
to identify the possible affect the human might be expressing. 
Prior results from both HRI and human-computer interaction 
(HCI) studies show that this two-dimensional evaluation of the 
state of the user (i.e. evaluation of the affect and engagement) 
can be sufficient for a balanced interaction that keeps the user 
engaged and satisfied [6-7][12-13].  
    This brings us to the point of how the robot should evaluate 
the state of its human counterpart. There are several different 
methods used in HRI/HCI studies currently for evaluating and 
tracking user affect and engagement. Favoured choices include 
emotion recognition with audio processing (i.e. from speech and 
emitted sounds) [15-17], body pose estimation and body 
language tracker (usually done with Kinect sensors) [6][18], 
detection of micro movements and expressions [19], evaluation 
by tactile and proximity sensors (so tracking the distance from 
the robot and the amount of touch) [20], but one of the most 
reliable and most often implemented is evaluation from facial 
expressions [21-22]. 
    Evaluating the user’s emotions from their facial expression is 
most commonly done by detecting the intensity of the facial 
Action Units (AUs) as described in the Facial Action Coding 
System (FACS) [23]. FACS is based on detecting anatomically 
based facial actions (i.e. AUs), which are one or few facial 
muscles that occur individually or in combinations, and can be 
associated with the expression of certain emotions. There are 
several open-source software packages for tracking AUs, one of 
the more commonly used being the OpenFace system [24], 
which detects the appearance and intensity of 17 facial AUs. 
These can be used to train models for classifying both the level 
of engagement and affect of the users. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The OpenFace Framework 
 
3 A COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURE FOR AN 
EMOTIONALLY-AWARE ROBOT 
Having discussed the two roles of emotions in a cognitive agent, 
as well as some of the ways to implement them as abilities, now 
we move on to our in-progress architecture for a cognitive robot 
that would have emotions as its core value system. The cognitive 
architecture developed for our project has already been partly 
tested out in the CRI scenario described in [14], which consisted 
of a study with preschool children in an attempt for autonomous 
CRI with education modules. The robot was equipped with a 
self-learning paradigm which enabled it to learn progressively 
more about the children in terms of which kind of modules each 
of the children preferred, and in this way keep the interaction 
novel and adapting.  
     However, as that project was done on the NAO humanoid 
robot with a limited scope of modules, the cognitive 
implementation was more primitive. The project had no 
functionality for autonomous emotion recognition, and only had 
interest as a one-dimensional variable for the users’ (i.e. the 
children’s) moods in the self-learning paradigm. Regardless, the 
learning paradigm used for the NAO robot proved as effective in 
enabling the robot to learn and select appropriate actions, so we 
kept and enhanced it. 
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3.1 Implementation of emotion-driven motivation 
and learning system 
Our aim for this project was to upgrade the existing interaction 
modules on the iCub humanoid robot with the purpose of 
achieving cognitive and autonomous HRI. For this, we needed a 
new architecture that apart from the interaction modules would 
also include a paradigm to enable the robot to learn on its own 
and a motivational drive that would provide the robot with the 
reasoning behind selecting and performing an action. 
    The first task tackled was the problem of how to make the 
robot self-learning. A self-learning robot cannot receive any kind 
of outside teaching or supervision, and instead has to develop 
and use its own internal mechanism (this in turn constitutes the 
motivational drive for the robot). Starting from the taxonomy of 
learning paradigms described in [25], we selected the self-
learning paradigm (LI-10) for our architecture. LI-10 is based on 
using inner emotions (i.e. the robot’s own emotions) as an 
evaluation mechanism instead of relying on outside advice or 
reinforcement.  
     The underlying concept of LI-10 is based on the robot 
iteratively perceiving the state of the environment, considering 
all possible actions it can undertake, and then selecting the one 
with the highest probability of affecting its emotional state in a 
positive direction. The interaction modules for the robot are 
loosely divided in two groups – modules more oriented towards 
playful interaction, and modules of a more informative nature. In 
every iteration the robot can choose whether to carry on with the 
same module it is already performing, whether to change the 
module but stay within the same group of modules, or whether to 
switch to the other group of modules. Evaluating which action is 
the most beneficial for the robot is carried out via Bayesian nets 
which express the interdependence between the robot’s actions 
and the changes in the users’ emotions.  
    We mentioned in section 2.1 that it might be better from a 
computational standpoint to begin with a smaller set of emotions 
for the robot and eventually expand that set. The three emotion 
states chosen for our robot are positive (i.e. happy), neutral and 
negative (sad). As per the principles of LI-10, the robot is 
directly affected by the changes in the state of the environment, 
which in our architecture is the level of engagement and affect 
expressed by the users. More specifically, the robot’s mood 
(expressed as a continuous value between -1.0 and 1.0) varies 
with the changes of the users’ mood – when there is increase in 
the users’ engagement level or expressed affect (or both), the 
robot’s mood also increases, and vice versa.  
    The self-learning can be observed in the modifications of the 
Bayesian nets which are unique for each user. The robot begins 
with two nets containing probability transitions for the 
connections between users’ mood and the robot’s action, and 
iteratively modifies them. If the robot believes that a certain 
action An will cause the user’s mood to change from Un1 to Un2, 
but in reality the user’s mood changes to Un3, then the robot 
modifies the probabilities of transition between those values. 
More detailed description of how these modifications are carried 
out can be found in [15]. 
 
 
 
3.2 Emotion recognition from facial expressions 
The second important implementation in our architecture was in 
the module for recognizing emotions. As mentioned in the 
previous section, the state of the environment is represented by a 
two-dimensional vector consisting of the values for the users’ 
level of engagement and expressed affect (i.e. arousal and 
valence [10-11]).  
    For our architecture we opted to evaluate these metrics from 
facial expressions, using the OpenFace platform [24] for the 
detection of AUs and the AM-FED database [26] for training our 
classifier. The module for recognition and classification of the 
users’ mood has several components. The first component 
includes the frame-by-frame extraction of AUs and their 
intensity, as well as other features (like eye gaze, landmark 
points, head orientation etc.) which are not used for our 
framework at the moment. After the extraction of the AUs 
intensity, this data is sent to the second component, which is the 
module for classifying.  
    The user’s affect is evaluated by the presence of several 
highly-salient AUs which are unique for separate emotions (i.e. 
positive affect is marked by the AUs for smiling, cheek raising 
and crinkling of the eyes, while negative affect is marked by the 
AUs for brow lowering, nose wrinkling and tightening the lips). 
If neither of these AUs groups is present in the frame, the user’s 
affect is classified as neutral.  
    On the other hand, classifying the level of engagement in the 
interaction is currently done using a Random Forest classifier, 
which was trained with the AM-FED database which consists of 
videos depicting people in engaged, neutral or bored states. A 
comparison was done for the accuracy of several classifiers, 
including K-nearest neighbours (KNN), Neural Networks (NN), 
Decision Trees, Support Vector Machines (SVM) and Random 
Forest. Although KNN had undoubtedly the fastest time for 
training, it ultimately showed as insufficiently precise, and for 
the time being we are using Random Forest to classify the 
engagement. As this is a project still in progress, we do not yet 
have processed data from testing these modules with users, but 
the preliminary results from the training show promise for 
successfully evaluating two-dimensional user moods.    
3.3 Review of the architecture 
In the introduction of this paper we listed the most crucial 
abilities for a cognitive robot – perception, learning from 
experience, awareness of the action-reaction principle, ability for 
anticipation and adaptation, and ultimately ability for 
independent action with the purpose of achieving some goals. As 
a final section in this paper, we will give a brief overview of how 
each one of these skills is implemented in our architecture:  
 Autonomous perception of environment – for cognitive 
robots, perception is a specific way of interpreting the 
environment as experienced by the robot’s sensors. In 
our architecture, the state of the environment is jointly 
represented by the levels of affect and engagement 
expressed by the users during the interaction (which can 
be loosely described as their emotions). The robot 
perceives these emotions by continuously processing the 
users facial expressions and classifying them. 
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 Ability to learn from experience – for our robot, learning 
is the process of acquiring new information about the 
users as well as learning how the robot’s actions affect 
users’ mood. The robot’s learning is reflected in the 
modifications of the probability graphs for each of the 
users. 
 Anticipating the outcome of actions/events – similarly as 
above, the robot’s anticipation relies heavily on the 
probability graphs which represent the robot’s 
knowledge of the world and how its actions might affect 
the users. The robot ‘anticipates’ the effect its action 
might have by calculating which of its actions has the 
highest probability of affecting the users’ mood in a 
positive manner and performing that action. 
 Adapting to changing circumstances – adaptation for a 
cognitive robot includes adjusting to the environment no 
longer reacting the same way it did before. Adaptation is 
triggered when an action doesn’t have the predicted 
outcome and is carried out by modifying the probability 
graphs and adjusting to them for the next iteration. 
 Acting independently to achieve goals – an autonomous 
robot acts in a self-driven manner when it is motivated 
by some inner goals. Our robot was equipped with 
emotions which were directly influenced by the users’ 
mood – i.e. the more engaged the users were, the happier 
was the robot. This, in turn, constituted the robot’s 
motivation for selecting an action – perform the action 
most likely to elicit positive response in the users and in 
turn most likely to make the robot happier. 
4 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Modelling emotions in a cognitive architecture for autonomous 
robots proved to be a rewarding, if challenging task. In this paper 
we proposed a complete architecture for evaluating the levels of 
engagement and interest in the users (i.e. the arousal and valence 
levels), as well as for providing the robot with a paradigm for 
self-learning.  
    Our hopes for our architecture are that it will enable the robot 
to autonomously perceive the levels of affect and engagement 
expressed by the users. Additionally, the robot will also be 
endowed with the ability to learn the users’ responses to its 
performed actions and to anticipate the outcome of its own 
action. This innovative approach will provide the humanoid 
robot iCub with the capability to adapt to changing 
circumstances and to act autonomously to achieve its goals. 
    For our future work we intend to develop the two novel 
groups of informative and interactive behaviours for the 
humanoid robot iCub. Additionally, we plan to evaluate the 
emerging behaviour in interactive sessions with users. The 
objective is understand how iCub will adapt specifically to each 
user, as well as to observe how the users are affected by the 
behaviour of the robot in ecological interaction.  
    Our hope for this novel approach to autonomous HRI is to 
eventually pave the way to long-term, adaptive interaction 
between humans and robots. 
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Modeling the Enactive Emotion Theory:
Methodological Considerations
Martina Truschzinski 1 and Maike Klein 2
Abstract. In emotion research, there is an increasing gap between
emotion theory and emotion modeling. Many emotion theories ex-
ist but most emotion models depend on emotion theories that may
not describe emotions adequately. We suggest that this gap can be
bridged by a close interdisciplinary collaboration which unites the
strenghts of the disciplines involved and that at the same time en-
sures the general comprehensibility of the modeled emotion theory.
This may be achieved by a dynamical systems approach to emotion.
In this paper, we take up the possible computational modeling of Gio-
vanna Colombetti’s enactive emotion theory which explains emotion
in dynamical terms, because (1) it overcomes emotion theoretical
problems other emotion theories face, (2) it is philosophically and
technically plausible, and (3) it can fulfill our demand of a close in-
terdisciplinary grounding.
1 INTRODUCTION
Emotions and their modeling have been studied over years in sev-
eral disciplines and in interdisciplinary projects [34, 28, 44, 41, 16].
Psychologists investigate how emotions influence our performance
[38, 42, 55], well-being [11] and decision-making [58, 37]. Com-
puter scientists and roboticists investigate human emotional expres-
sions [8], emotional neuronal networks [29] and emotional appraisal
[39, 32] in order to build the perfect companion [18] or software that
supports humans during work, free time and at home [9, 57, 12, 5].
Emotion research, however, faces some problems. One of those af-
fects the relation of emotion theory and emotion modeling.
In this respect, the use of the notions ”model” and ”theory” and
their relation need some clarification. We understand a theory as
frame-giving, it integrates philosophical insights, for instance clear
and sound definitions, and scientific findings and should be logically
consistent. It is abstract and concrete at the same time: abstract be-
cause it is not (yet) applied, it refers to general laws and consid-
erations, and concrete because of its clear definitions and explana-
tions that may be put into words. In contrast to a theory, a model
is an application of a theory to a part of reality that serves a certain
purpose. A model is more specific than a theory, it stays within the
methodological framework derived from the theory and within the
given methods of the discipline the model is designed in. Therefore, a
model is in a certain manner more limited than a theory. In this paper,
we mention psychological and computational models. Psychological
models are designed to test whether a concept provided in a theory
is empirically plausible. For this purpose, psychologists mostly use
1 Institute of Automation, Chemnitz University of Technology, Germany,
email: mtru@hrz.tu-chemnitz.de
2 Institute of Philosophy, University of Stuttgart, Germany, email:
maike.klein@philo.uni-stuttgart.de
linear and sometimes also dynamical models. These models transfer
”loose” theories into measurable concepts. In this way, they depict a
part of reality. A psychological model is at the same time more ab-
stract and more concrete than a theory: more abstract because some
specifications are taken away from the theory, a method is applied
to depict a part of reality, and more concrete because within this ab-
straction, the investigated relation can be described. Computational
models are the further application of measurable concepts into com-
putational concepts, so to say, numbers and mathematical functions.
It is at the same time more abstract and more concrete than a theory
or a psychological model: more abstract because some specifications
are taken away from the theory (and the psychological model), its
input and output are numbers and functions, and more concrete be-
cause the model makes the theory applicable in practical settings. It
is important to note that there ideally is an exchange between theory
and model: both should be open for possible impacts (e. g. due to
new findings) of the other.
There is, however, a gap between emotion theory and emotion
modeling: There are many emotion theories while most emotion
models [33, 3] are constructed on the basis of emotion theories (e. g.
Basic Emotion Theory [17] and Appraisal Theory [45]) that do not
seem to describe emotions in living systems adequately, that seem to
take away aspects of an emotion that are a part of the phenomenon.
One main problem of Basic Emotion Theory lies in the explanation
of higher emotions such as jealousy. As Colombetti discusses, this is
done by either blending Basic Emotions or by claiming that higher
emotions are of a different kind than basic ones. As a consequence,
they need a different description. Appraisal Theory faces the problem
that bodily signals accompany the emotion but are separated from the
cognitive component. Thus, the theory does not consider the body ad-
equately [10].
It seems that over years the gap between emotional theories and com-
putational modeling increased despite of the fact that research in
these disciplines provides new insights in emotions of humans and
their modeling. One reason is, of course, that we have no exact def-
inition of emotion. There exist several discussions about what emo-
tions, feelings, and other affective phenomena are and how we could
classify and establish a border between them [15]. Another reason is
that different disciplines use different methods to describe and pro-
duce their results and each discipline has an own standard by which
results are accepted [6, 26, 31]. This leads to criticism on both sides:
on the one hand, psychologists criticize computer scientists for mod-
eling only older and ’easier’ theories without any validation in the
real world [21]. On the other hand, computer scientists criticize that
psychologists do not take note of the insight they gained [6, 7]. Close
interdisciplinary work that is needed to overcome the gap seems to
be difficult [43].
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In this paper, we present Giovanna Colombetti’s enactive emotion
theory as a candidate for an emotional model because it could over-
come the gap between emotion theory and computational emotion
modeling: First, it provides an account of emotions which does not
have problems faced by other emotion theories of living systems.
Second, it is interdisciplinary in three ways: The theory already com-
bines several disciplines, its modeling requires close interdisciplinary
work, and it can be understood by each discipline involved because
of its grounding in dynamical systems theory, which directly con-
nects the philosophical theory to computer science, engineering, and
natural sciences.
2 WHY IS COLOMBETTI’S ENACTIVE
EMOTION THEORY PROMISING FOR
EMOTIONS IN ARTIFICIAL SYSTEMS?
2.1 Philosophical considerations
Based on the enactive approach [52, 56], Colombetti’s emotion the-
ory does not explain emotions in cognitivist terms. Within the enac-
tive approach, a living being is understood on one hand biologically
as a living system and on the other hand phenomenologically as a
subject of experience. In sum, a cognitive agent is a dynamic and
embodied individual that brings forth its world through the interplay
of brain, body and world. This interplay enables cognition that is
thus rather something that we do than something that happens inter-
nally [52, 10]. We believe that the advantages of this theory are at
least twofold, compared to other emotion theories [40, 47, 48]: First,
through its non-cognitive theoretical framework described above, it
accentuates the context as part of the affective process. Second, it
appears to be rather concrete because it describes emotions in dy-
namical systems vocabulary. This should facilitate modeling it while
being at the same time philosophically plausible. This integral per-
spective is interesting, as cognitivist approaches to emotion model-
ing did not lead to a breakthrough up until now. Colombetti explains
emotions as embodied and context-related phenomena. In her the-
ory, an emotion can take place as a more complex process within the
basic affective attitude every living being possesses (she calls this
basic affective stance ”primordial affectivity”; this is comparable to
”proto-affect” [39]). Emotions are of the same kind as cognition. The
cognitive and affective activity is called ”sense-making”, which is
the enactivist term for the basic activity of each organism to actively
be in its environment, extracting personally important parts out of it
[53]. Even very basic life forms practice sense-making.
In other words: The system that is always situated in a world cre-
ates itself a meaningful environment. It is able to make sense of its
world, in an affective way. This means that it is able to get away
from harmful things and to strive to things which help to maintain
its integrity, for example, food. Moreover, because of the interplay
of the system components in sense-making, cognition and emotion
arise. Primordial affectivity, the default affective stance that belongs
to every living being, is already given in the simplest life forms, as
long as they possess a certain form of autonomy. Within primordial
affectivity, further affective phenomena can occur. But: Only more
complex systems may have further forms of affectivity, namely feel-
ings, moods and emotions. Those are restricted to conscious beings,
and within the framework of the enactive approach, consciousness
arises only in systems that have a certain level of complexity.
As Colombetti’s theory describes affective phenomena of living
systems, further considerations of how to transfer some of her used
concepts and notions to artificial systems, e. g. autonomy, cognition,
and sense-making [19, 53] are necessary in order to create a compu-
tational model of her emotion theory. Although this cannot be part of
this paper, we would like to mention that for instance a possible syn-
thetic notion of life is discussed in philosophy, robotics and synthetic
biology [13].
Colombetti [10] describes emotions as ”dynamical patterns” that
can temporarily enlarge primordial affectivity. ”Emotional episodes
are best conceptualized as dynamical patterns, namely, as self-
organizing configurations of the organism or emotion forms. These
patterns are flexible and loosely assembled, can be culture specific
and even individual specific, but may also occur reliably across cul-
tures” (p. 82). This suggests that Colombetti’s account is sufficiently
flexible to integrate any emotion function, no matter whether it is al-
ready known or may be discovered in the future. We have to keep in
mind that emotions in natural and artificial systems may have differ-
ent functions.
2.2 Computational considerations
Colombetti’s emotion theory can be modeled mathematically, as
it is based upon dynamical systems theory, which is an area of
mathematics. In the run-up to modeling this emotion theory, further
work has to be done in order to bring out its grounding in dynamical
systems theory more clearly. Dynamical systems are established in
natural sciences and engineering disciplines, they are described as a
rule for time evolution on a state space [1]. In his work, Lewis [30]
described such a dynamical system for emotion, which is able to
bridge the gap between emotion theory and neurobiology because
nonlinear dynamical systems operate through reciprocal, recursive,
and multiple causal processes. He claims ”that process models
have the potential for more realistic explanations; but the linear
sequencing of appraisal events, and the general disinclination to see
emotions as componential, leaves no place for emotional effects
on the formation of whole appraisals” (p. 16). Moreover, several
evidences from across the branches of emotion theory indicate that
many cognitive processes influence emotions and emotions influence
many cognitive processes, which suggest complex, causal relations
that go in both directions.
The fact that these dynamical systems are not only applied in neuro-
biology but as well in electrical engineering [22] and in computer
science [4] suggests that they may have a key function in bridging
the gap between emotional theory and computational modeling of
emotions.
Moreover, we suggest that dynamical systems theory could help to
bridge the gap between computer science and psychology if we as-
sume it as the common ”language” or theoretical background of the
disciplines involved. There is some existing research that considers a
dynamical perspective for psychological emotion research [46, 35],
where new approaches can draw upon. In terms of process modeling,
a model is described by an input, an output and a transfer function
which describes the dynamic change that a given input provokes in
the output [23]. In psychological experiments, we have independent
variables, dependent variables and a regression or variance analysis.
In most psychological experiments, linear models are used but
this seems not to be adequate [30]. If we describe the independent
variables in terms of dynamical systems theory as inputs with step
or impulse functions and the dependent variables as system states in
the output, we have a full range of possibilities to analyze underlying
dynamic functions and principles from linear to nonlinear or from
direct to indirect or from non-recursive to recursive [23].
An example are our preliminary results for modeling workload [54],
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this approach can also be used in other contexts, like for example
modeling emotions. As described in the paper, we conducted an
experiment within an simulation where participants were asked to
solve an air controller task. Within this task we logged several events
that may influence the workload of our participants, e.g whether
a couple of aeroplanes appeared or disappeared when participants
changed the routes of displayed aeroplanes or when a collision
between aeroplanes happened. Within this setting the logged events
are our independent variables and could also be described as step
responses (see [54]). During the experiment we recorded the pupil
dilation, following Beatty and Lucero-Wagoner (2000) who reported
that task-evoked pupillary responses could be used as a measurement
of processing load or in our context workload [24, 2]. Thus in our
experiment the recorded pupil dilation as the measurement of
workload is our dependent variable. In our systems theory approach,
we found dynamical patterns in our modeling data set that described
in mathematical functions the increase of workload during our
logged events. Based on this, we built an dynamical system that was
able to make predictions about the workload of participants in our
validation data set (obviously these participants were excluded from
the modeling part).
Indeed, modeling workload may not be equal to modeling emotions
but bodily expressions of the internal emotional process, like in our
approach the pupillary response, could be found in the face [17, 49],
in the body [25, 14] and in other physiological measurements
like EDA [20, 27] and EEG [49, 14]. These signals could give
researchers in both disciplines, psychology and computer science,
access to the current emotional state. Moreover, since the signals
could continuously be recorded, it could give them the ability to
analyze the dynamic behavior of the induced emotion(s) over time.
For computer scientist this could create a large database to build
their models on real data including the individual starting points and
individual differences in feeling and expressing emotions during the
conducted experiments.
Based on this data, we may have found a general dynamical pattern
as a mathematically description how humans react to emotional
events. To take into account other emotion theories and that our
emotion is not only based on our bodily reaction but as well
in the interpretation of our situation we would suggest that this
measurements can be used in combination with more subjective
measurements like questionnaires that access the mood and emo-
tional state of humans (e.g. [51, 36, 50]). The combination of both
measurements could enable researchers to map higher emotions
or emotional constructs to emotional, bodily expressed dynamical
patterns that could be analyzed over time and could be used to
build dynamical systems of emotions. We think that emotion models
based on the combination of dynamical systems and other subjective
measurements like questionnaires that are used as an adjustment be-
tween bodily expression and cognitive interpretation could provide
further insights in the phenomena of emotions. A dynamical model
which takes into account that we are embodied living individuals
could be implemented based on the real data we collect during the
experiments.
With her enactive emotion theory, Colombetti integrates dynamical
systems theory into the phenomenon of emotion in its entirety,
which due to its enactive nature includes as well the phenomenality
of emotions. Thus, by modeling her theory, an emotion may be
modeled as an integral, embodied phenomenon. It is to note that,
as stated above, the exact grounding of her theory in dynamical
systems theory is still to be done.
2.3 Considerations from emotion research as an
interdisciplinary endeavour
Colombettis theory can overcome the gap between emotional theo-
ries and computational modeling because of at least three reasons:
First, as mentioned above, it seems to meet philosophical and techni-
cal demands while providing a description of emotion that does jus-
tice to the phenomenon. Thus, it overcomes problems faced by other
emotion theories. Second, as a theory that reunites findings of differ-
ent disciplines such as mathematics, biology, psychology, and philos-
ophy, it provides a basis for interdisciplinary work. Third, modeling
Colombettian emotions requires interdisciplinary work.
3 IDEAS FOR AN INTERDISZIPLINARY
PROJECT ON COLOMBETTI’S EMOTION
THEORY
In this paper, we will stress point 2.3, the considerations from emo-
tion research as an interdisciplinary endeavor. We do not aim at
providing a computational model at this stage of our research. In-
stead, we aim to prepare the ground for this. We will argue that in
order to achieve a common goal, it is not enough to work on the
same subject in different disciplines. Rather, a close collaboration
between the disciplines which is process-oriented through continu-
ous exchange and interaction is required. This includes that the goal-
relevant tasks have to be distributed according to the competences
of every involved discipline. At the same time, every involved dis-
cipline has to make a move towards the others and their respective
practices. This is what we mean by ”close interdisciplinary collab-
oration”. For instance, modeling Colombettian emotions in an inter-
disciplinary project involving philosophy, psychology, and computer
science could be structured as follows:
3.1 The philosopher’s tasks
Philosophy provides the conceptual and theoretical basis of the ob-
ject of investigation. In the case of modeling emotions in artificial
systems, this includes elaborating a reasonable and well-founded
working definition and a theoretical framework of emotions. This
has to take into account existing emotion theories and it has to meet
philosophical and technical requirements. We suggest that Colom-
betti’s emotion theory could accomplish this. During the process of
the interdisciplinary project, the philosopher’s task would be to en-
sure consistency as well as to tune and to update the working defini-
tion of emotions on the basis of the results the computer scientists
and psychologists obtained. He or she should constantly consider
the following questions: ”What is an emotion?”, ”Is the phenomenon
tested or modeled (still) an emotion (and in what way)?”, and ”What
should be added or removed in order to classify this phenomenon as
an emotion?”.
3.2 The psychologist’s tasks
In order to empirically investigate emotions, psychologists choose
a working definition and test whether it is valid or not. In case of
our interdisciplinary project on emotions and emotion modeling, we
suggest that the philosophically provided definition is used, as it has
already been well thought-out not only within one discipline but with
the goal to provide a working definition that actively considers the re-
quirements of the disciplines involved. Generally, experimental test-
ing requires to subtract all disturbing influencing factors from the test
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setting to define how hypothetical factors are relevant to explain vari-
ance differences. This leads to the result that experiments are only
able to describe a part of the whole phenomenon. Moreover, psycho-
logical experiments are mostly validated as points in time and not
as processes, thus the analyses of the relationship are only valid for
the measured range of values. This is shown as an assumed linearity
leads to infinite increasing or decreasing of variables. Humans, how-
ever, have limited capacities in e. g. working memory, attention, and
feeling emotions. Thus, variables that increase towards infinity are
implausible.
3.3 The computer scientist’s tasks
At this point, computer scientists can complete the endeavor to cap-
ture the processuality of emotions. They use the factors involved in
emotions that result from psychological experiments (which are ide-
ally expressible by functions) to build models that describe (parts of)
emotions as processes. From these processes, psychologists can ex-
tract new hypotheses for further experiments.
Thus, the complete dynamical system of an emotion can be described
through a close interdisciplinary collaboration and exchange. In or-
der to ensure a consistent model which can be easily understood
by the involved disciplines, the mathematical vocabulary should be
standardized for example by using the dynamical system theory ap-
proach in psychological measurements. This implies that the mea-
sured points or states (ideally as many as possible) psychologists
record during their experiment are not only used to postulate a sig-
nificant effect or influence, but also to find the underlying dynamical
function. In a first step, system identification methods could help to
find a mathematical model derived from the measurements [23]. Af-
terwards the identified model could be implemented and analyzed.
The important impact of such a dynamical system model is that it
does not only describe the given data set (points of the measure-
ments), but that it can also extrapolate and predict new data points
or hypotheses which could be used in further experiments.
4 CONCLUSION
As we have discussed in this paper, developing computational mod-
els of emotions is an interdisciplinary endeavor that has to be clearly
structured. It needs to take into account the respective scientific prac-
tices of the disciplines involved in order to achieve the common goal.
As an example for a future interdisciplinary project in emotion re-
search, we discussed the possible transferral of Colombetti’s enactive
emotion theory into a computational model. This is promising for at
least two reasons: First, dynamical systems theory is the grounding
of Colombetti’s emotion theory for living systems that overcomes
problems faced by other emotion theories. Thus, it can bridge the
gap between emotion theory and emotion modeling. Second, it can
be applied by computer scientists to model emotions as processes.
For this, they require measurable parameters and relevant factors
of emotions, discovered by psychological experiments. This close
interdisciplinary collaboration of philosophy, psychology and com-
puter science based on dynamical systems provides the possibility to
find a definition, a theoretical framework, and a model of emotions
that contain the relevant insights of each discipline involved. Further-
more, because Colombetti’s philosophical emotion theory is already
based on dynamical systems theory, all involved disciplines can un-
derstand the resulting model in its integrity. Moreover, new findings
can be easily integrated in every involved discipline because they all
use the same conceptual vocabulary of dynamical systems.
To put this paper in a larger context, we conclude by emphasiz-
ing that working on the transferral of Colombetti’s enactive theory
of emotion has positive impacts for emotion research and emotion
modeling. Generally, it helps to better grasp and define the entire
phenomenon of emotions. On one hand, this has impacts on the study
of artificial systems: We can develop better artificial systems that dis-
pose of emotional aspects while keeping in mind that the overall goal
is to build the perfect companion that is able to (1) understand human
emotions, (2) to estimate and react adequately to human emotions,
and (3) make use of the functions that emotions dispose of (e. g. bet-
ter decision making, motivational factors). On the other hand, due
to the developing of a computational model of Colombetti’s emotion
theory, we can equally gain new insights about emotions in living
systems.
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Symposium VI
Cognition And OntologieS (CAOS)
Human cognition has been the main inspiration for methods on how to formally model the relationship
between the mind and the world. The traditional view that cognition is computation has seen many paradigm
shifts during the last decades and recently the embodied mind hypothesis has taken hold of the research
field. Improved neuroimaging techniques increased our understanding of how the human brain works and
neural networks and machine learning techniques were quick to put this knowledge into practice, with great
success.
However, classic knowledge representation methods such as logical representations and formal ontologies
still have a strong influence in the field of artificial intelligence. For instance, cognitively inspired AI may also
be build on theories such as image schemas and affordances which capture the spatio-temporal
relationships learned from embodied experiences respectively the potentiality for actions offered to an agent
by some feature of the environment, and for which formal, logic-based methods are increasingly being
pursued in recent years.
Following the spirit of the first edition (at FOIS, Annecy 2016), CAOS aims to provide a forum for researchers
from a range of disciplines, perspectives and opinions to discuss the difficult and topical question of how key
cognitive phenomena and concepts (and the involved terminology) can be formally and ontologically
understood, analysed and represented. Topics of interest include:
• Modelling cognitive phenomena
• Formalization of language, image schemas and/or affordance
• Concept invention and computational creativity
• Cognitive development from an ontological perspective
• AI for language understanding
• Natural language applications / system-demonstrations
• Embodied approaches to knowledge acquisition in AI and Robotics
Maria M. Hedblom, Otto-von-Guericke University, Magdeburg, Germany
Tarek R. Besold, University of Bremen, Germany
Oliver Kutz Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Italy
Organizers
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Are Objects Ontologically Dependent on Processes?
(Extended Abstract)
Antony Galton1
1 Substance Ontology vs Process Ontology
The dominant ontological paradigm throughout Western philosophy
has been the Aristotelian substance ontology, according to which
substances — including what we would nowadays more generally
refer to as objects or things — are independent entities (“first-class
citizens” of the ontology), whereas processes and events are “acci-
dents”, that is, “second-class” entities that are dependent for their
existence on the objects that enact or participate in them.
Despite its dominance, the substance ontology has not gone un-
questioned. Repeatedly in the history of philosophy there have been
thinkers who have sought to elevate processes to the rank of first-
class independently existing ontological elements, sometimes even
reversing the dependence to make objects ontologically dependent
on processes. Indeed, this line of thinking had already appeared be-
fore Aristotle, being traceable at least as far as Heraclitus, more than
a century earlier.
In more modern times, some form of process ontology has
been advocated by thinkers such as Whitehead [17], Heidegger [8],
Rescher [13], and Dupre´ [2], amongst others, and has particularly
found favour amongst philosophers for whom the primary focus of
interest is living organisms, as opposed to, for example, human arte-
facts. Outside Western philosophy, Buddhist philosophy in particular
has had a long history of treating processes as more fundamental than
substances [12].
My purpose in this talk is to examine a number of considerations
that I consider to be of key relevance to the debate between sub-
stance ontologists and process ontologists. My general orientation
will be towards the latter, but before presenting a positive case I be-
gin by drawing attention to what I believe is a serious problem with
substance ontology.
2 The Cinematographic Model of Reality
If the fundamental elements of reality are substances, how are pro-
cesses and change to be accounted for? In mainstream thinking, the
standard account of change is somewhat as follows. At each instant
of its existence, an object has certain properties; but it need not have
the same properties at every instant. Change is what happens when an
object x has some property P at some time t1, but lacks that property
at some distinct time t2:
∃t1∃t2 P (x, t1) ∧ ¬P (x, t2).
Suppose at a given instant t we take together all the properties of all
the objects existing at that instant, and call that ensemble the state of
the world, or world-state that holds at t: call thisws(t). On this view,
1 University of Exeter, UK, email: apgalton@ex.ac.uk
the history of the world essentially consists of the mapping ws from
instants to world-states. Each world-state is itself unchanging, and
the existence of change in the world reduces to differences between
successive world-states.
I call this the cinematographic model of reality. In the cinema we
think we see moving images on the screen. But we know that in fact
nothing moves: what we are seeing is a succession of still images in
each of which there is no change or movement. The view of change
described above, which is naturally associated with the substance on-
tology, works in the same way. Motion and change are reduced to
some kind of “illusion” produced by stringing together world-states
from which motion and change are absent.
This a problem for us if we believe that changes in the world are
continuous, as expressed by Leibniz in the catchphrase natura non
facit saltus (“nature does not make jumps”). Continuity is important
for substance ontology because it provides one of the major under-
pinnings of the concept of identity. If asked what it means to say that
the person you see in front of you now is the same person as the one
you saw entering the room at the beginning of the talk, you may re-
ply in various ways, but most probably you will invoke some form of
continuity, be it spatio-temporal, material, or psychological.
On the cinematographic view, we require the functions ascribing
quantitative property values such as position to substances to be con-
tinuous. What this means is that by focussing on sufficiently small
time periods, we can make the changes that we see as small as we
like. This is what is expressed in the standard mathematical defini-
tion of continuity for a numerical function:
∀t ∀ > 0 ∃δ > 0∀t′ (|t− t′| < δ → |f(t)− f(t′)| < ).
Now the problem is that this formula — which expresses a mathe-
matical notion of continuity — only comes close to capturing some-
thing that resembles the physical continuity we believe we see in the
world if the set T of times over which the variables t and t′ range
satisfies the Dedekind completeness condition: any set of numbers
with an upper bound has a least upper bound. This in turn means that
T must be modelled by something like the set of real numbers R.2
You can easily see what goes wrong with, say, the rational numbers
(Q) by constructing a function which maps x to 1 if x2 < 2 and to
0 otherwise; this function is continuous on Q but gives a very bad
model of any physically continuous variation.
There are two reasons why we should feel uncomfortable about
having to use the real numbers to model space and time. The first is
2 Perhaps it does not have to be the full non-denumeratble set of real num-
bers: maybe a denumerable set such as the computable numbers, or the real
algebraic numbers, which satisfy the first-order form of Dedekind com-
pleteness (quantifying over first-order expressible sets only) but not the full
second-order form, would do.
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that they require us to admit the existence of actual infinities. Within
any time interval, however short, there must be infinitely many in-
stants, one for each real number falling between the numbers as-
signed to the endpoints of the interval — and likewise with spatial
regions. The second problem is how we are to account for the facts of
duration (in time) and extent (in space). If a time interval is nothing
but an agglomeration of durationless instants, where does its duration
come from? However many zeros you add together, you will never
get anything other than zero; and yet we are invited to suppose that
the positive duration of a time interval somehow emerges from the
combination of all the instants it contains.
None of this means that we should give up using real number
mathematics for the purposes of science. The use of R to model
physical continua may be a metaphysical fiction — indeed a meta-
physical absurdity — but it is the only way we know of providing
a formal underpinning for the kinds of calculations needed to obtain
quantitatively meaningful results about the real world. It supports the
“unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences”
[18]. Despite that, I believe the foregoing considerations render the
traditional substance ontology untenable.
3 Taking Time and Change Seriously
In the argument presented above, the notion of duration played a key
role; this is as it should be, for surely duration is the very essence of
time. That is why it is so absurd to try to build time out of duration-
less instants. Furthermore, the essence of duration is surely change:
any duration has parts, and without change, how can one part of a
duration be distinguished from another?
Although I do not postulate any such thing as a minimum dura-
tion in actuality, subjectively the present moment seems to be a kind
of minimum duration, reflecting the limit of the temporal resolution
of our immediate experience. By technological means, we are able
to measure temporal separations much shorter than we can discrim-
inate ourselves, but no technology can identify for us an absolute
minimal duration. What is crucial here is that time always comes en-
dowed with duration; durationless time seems utterly contradictory.
And therefore time depends on change: a temporal duration com-
pletely lacking in change also seems contradictory.
It follows from this that the present, which is part of time given
in experience, encompasses change. This is radically opposed to the
standard picture of real-number time, in which the present is por-
trayed as a durationless instant and therefore completely lacking in
change. I propose therefore that we should embrace the notion of
the dynamic present. A ‘snapshot’ of the world, if such can be con-
ceived, so far from being the static ‘time slice’ postulated by conven-
tional ontologies, itself contains motion and change: the processes
of the world are active at all times of their existence. Elsewhere I
have advocated a view of processes as being, if not actual continu-
ants, at least in important respects continuant-like [5, 6, 7]. Processes
are wholly present at each time of their existence, and have attributes
which themselves can undergo change, resulting in metaprocesses,
such as the fluctuation in loudness of a noise, or the acceleration of a
motion. This is fully in accord with the picture I am painting here.
In order to allay possible misunderstanding, I must clarify that I
am here using the word ‘process’ to denote something that is ongo-
ing, open-ended, a pattern of activity rather than a completed episode
with a beginning and an ending. It is the sense of process that is
aligned with activity in Vendler’s well-known classification of verb
meanings into achievements, accomplishments, states and activities
[16]; in [11], these are called processes. It also corresponds to the cat-
egory ‘process’ in the DOLCE ontology. This is not the same as the
‘processes’ of BFO [1]. A BFO process is a four-dimensional entity,
similar to the completed episodes of the kind I mentioned earlier; in
more standard terminology this could be described as an event rather
than a process.
It cannot be stressed too strongly that most of what I say about pro-
cesses in this talk would be false or unintelligible if ‘process’ were
to be understood as meaning a BFO process. A process ontology,
BFO-style, would be perdurantism: like the substance ontology (or
endurantism), it too is unable really to come to terms with the no-
tion of real change. Whereas endurantism must simulate change cin-
ematographically by compounding together infinitely many change-
less instants, perdurantism reduces change to difference amongst the
temporal parts of a four-dimensional whole which represents a sub-
stance by means of its entire life-history. In the kind of process ontol-
ogy I am advocating, change is fundamental: it is a primitive given,
not to be explained away in terms of changelessness.3
4 Object, Process and Event as Ontological Aspects
In [6] I defined two contrasting, and complementary, perspectives
we use in describing the world. On the one hand, we may describe
reality in terms of how it presents itself to us in experience, taking, in
other words, a present-tense point of view. I call this the experiential
perspective; forms of description appropriate to this perspective may
be said to present elements of reality under an experiential aspect. In
this aspect we see objects and ongoing processes. On the other hand,
we can as it were stand back from the immediately experienced world
and present a synoptic view, integrating over a period of time to form
temporally extended episodes that we call events. This is called the
historical aspect. The use of the term ‘aspect’ here reflects its use
in linguistics to denote distinctions such as that between perfective
and imperfective forms of the verb, which typically correlate with
the historical and experiential aspects respectively.
Within the experiential perspective we find both objects and pro-
cesses, but contrary to the impression given by the substance ontol-
ogy, it is not always easy to distinguish between these two categories.
In previous work [3, 4] I drew attention to what I called dual-aspect
or multi-aspect phenomena, such as rivers, waterfalls, ocean currents,
waterspouts, hurricanes, and tornadoes; depending on how one views
these, they may equally well be described as objects, processes, or
events. A hurricane, for example, as captured in a series of satellite
images, has size, shape, position, and motion along a trajectory, all
features typically associated with objects; but to the unfortunate vil-
lager in the path of the hurricane, it is not an object but a process, a
ferocious rushing of the wind, wreaking destruction as it passes by;
or else, taking the duration of its passing as a whole, it is an event.
There are, indeed, complex interdependencies between the objects
and processes we see in the world. In the spirit of [7], we can read-
ily recognise that a human being, for example, is dependent on its
metabolic processes by which the living fabric of the body is main-
tained in working order; but these processes are themselves depen-
dent on the molecules which participate in them. They in turn are
dependent on the atomic and subatomic processes which hold them
together. For a process philosopher the nature of the dependence of
an object on processes might best be described in terms of constitu-
tion: the processes are constitutive of the object. This does not mean
that the object ‘does not exist’ but rather tells us something important
3 I am indebted to Anne Sophie Meincke for helping me to clarify my under-
standing of the deficiencies of both endurantism and perdurantism.
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about what it means for an object to exist: in effect, it suggests that
existence is a process rather than a state.
5 An object image schema
If ‘object’ and ‘process’ are to be understood as aspects of the same
experiential reality then an appropriate approach to explaining their
relationship might be to examine the cognitive apparatus through
which we apprehend and experience them. Here I explore the poten-
tial of the image schema as a tool to aid us in this examination. An
image schema [9, 10] is a recurring “semi-abstract” pattern by which
we can mould our raw experiences into a structured understanding
of the world. As Johnson [9] puts it, “image schemata operate at
a level of mental organization that falls between abstract proposi-
tional structures, on the one side, and particular concrete images, on
the other”. Typical examples of image schemas include PATH, CON-
TAINER, FORCE, LINK and COLLECTION.
Johnson’s list of image-schemas includes both PROCESS and OB-
JECT, but he says frustratingly little about these. Subsequent authors
have elaborated on them somewhat, but I have the impression that
these schemas have not been subject to the same scrutiny as many
others. Santiba´n˜ez [14] attempts to characterise the main features of
an OBJECT image-schema, but seems to be limited to rather a nar-
row conception of ‘object’ as prototypically middle-sized, solid, in-
ert, and manipulable: cars, books, keys, tables, and apples rather than
hurricanes, animals and trees. Szwedek [15] distinguishes static and
dynamic object schemas, but the dynamic schemas exclusively relate
to the external processes of objects and in no way support any notion
that objects may be inherently processual in nature. Can we do better
than this in support of the process-ontological theory?
What features do we expect to find in an object in the most general
sense? Most fundamentally there is persistence: an object manifests
a certain stability, either of matter or form. This is achieved through a
balance of internal processes (a living organism undergoes a constant
exchange of matter with its environment, rebuilding itself throughout
its life; an inert chunk of matter maintains a balance between attrac-
tive and repulsive forces at atomic and subatomic scales). An ob-
ject owes its identity to this stability. But objects also enact changes,
manifested as their external processes or activities. Changes can be
intrinsic, affecting the matter and form of the object itself, or ex-
trinsic, affecting its relation to its environment — the most obvious
extrinsic change is change of location, or motion. These changes or
motions can come about either autonomously, as a result of the ob-
ject’s inner processes, or in response to impingements by environ-
mental processes: thus an object’s external processes comprise both
action and reaction. But because of stability, an object is able also
to resist impingements, giving us resilience. Finally, if the balance
of the internal processes cannot be maintained, perhaps as a result of
external forces too strong to respond to while maintaining stability,
the object may undergo destruction, involving the separation or dis-
solution of its parts. All these features are illustrated schematically in
Figure 1, where the arrows represent various kinds of causal relation.
The key point to observe here is that the object schema is speci-
fied in terms of processes. If this schema comes anywhere close to
capturing what it is to be an object, then objects must be dependent
on processes. For a thoroughgoing process ontology one must go fur-
ther than this and maintain that objects are dependent on nothing but
processes; only thus could we claim that objects are constituted by
processes, that the nature of objects is essentially processual. All the
considerations I have put forward in this talk tend in this direction,
but I readily admit that the case is not proven.
internal
processes
action
persistence
impingements
reaction
resilience
external processes (activity)
stasis/stability
dissolution/
destruction
Figure 1. A sketch for a process-oriented OBJECT schema.
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Ontologies as Backbone of
Cognitive Systems Engineering
Ricardo Sanz1 and Julita Bermejo1 , Juan Morago1 and Carlos Herna´ndez2
Abstract. Cognitive systems are starting to be deployed as appli-
ances across the technological landscape of modern societies. The
increasing availability of high performance computing platforms has
opened an opportunity for statistics-based cognitive systems that per-
form quite as humans in certain tasks that resisted the symbolic meth-
ods of classic artificial intelligence. Cognitive artefacts appear every
day in the media, raising a wave of mild fear concerning artificial
intelligence and its impact on society. These systems, performance
notwithstanding, are quite brittle and their reduced dependability
limips their potential for massive deployment in mission-critical ap-
plications —e.g. in autonomous driving or medical diagnosis. In this
paper we explore the actual possibility of building cognitive systems
using engineering-grade methods that can assure the satisfaction of
strict requirements for their operation. The final conclusion will be
that, besides the potential improvement provided by a rigorous engi-
neering process, we are still in need of a solid theory —possibly the
main outcome of cognitive science— that could sustain such endeav-
our. In this sense, we propose the use of formal ontologies as back-
bones of cognitive systems engineering processes and workflows.
Keywords: Cognitive systems; trust; dependability; engineering
processes; autonomy; life-cycle; ontology.
1 INTRODUCTION
These days we are seeing in the media a continuous flow of reports
about self-driving cars, mobile phone natural language assistants or
machines that win at games traditionally considered reserved to hu-
mans (e.g. Go or Texas hold ’em poker). Artificial intelligence (AI)
seems to be re-flourishing and this is raising a global awareness of its
potential and a global concern of its risks. The recently created Part-
nership for AI3 has been “Established to study and formulate best
practices on AI technologies, to advance the public’s understanding
of AI, and to serve as an open platform for discussion and engage-
ment about AI and its influences on people and society.”
The current flourishing of AI is characterised by an availability of
high performance computing platforms that has opened an new op-
portunity for statistics-based cognitive systems. These systems can
perform quite as humans in certain tasks that resisted approaches
based on the symbolic methods of classic artificial intelligence and
the formal representation approaches of cognitive science. More or
less cognitive artefacts are appearing every day in the media, raising
a wave of mild fear concerning artificial intelligence and its poten-
tial impact in society —both positive and negative. However, from
1 Universidad Polite´cnica de Madrid, Autonomous Systems Laboratory,
Spain, email: ricardo.sanz@upm.es
2 TU Delft Robotics Institute, Delft University of Technology, The Nether-
lands c.h.corbato@tudelft.nl
3 https://www.partnershiponai.org/
a real-world systems usability perspective —the perspective of sys-
tems engineers— these systems are still quite brittle and their re-
duced dependability is seriously limiting their potential for massive
deployment in mission-critical applications. A clear example are au-
tonomous cars, where this intrinsic brittleness when deployed in real
roads is limiting their widespread deployment.
In this paper we will analyse the issue of the engineering of de-
pendable cognitive systems. A transition from pre-engineering to
true-engineering methods is in need. The construction of a cogni-
tive system (CS) in the past has always been a form of craftsmanship
and not an instantiation of proven, repeatable engineering processes.
Most CSs have not gone beyond the research phase. In a sense, all
CSs that we have seen are one-of-a-kind systems. The customer-
oriented repeatability of engineering methods has not been mani-
fested at all in the domain of CS construction. Even the reuse of
“commercial” cognitive technologies as IBM’s Watson is still a kind
of hacking. This being said, the achievement of a systematic use of
engineering-grade methods for CS implementation is very important,
because it could enable the strict fulfilment of user-centric require-
ments for their operation. This is a need for real-world deployable
systems, from the dual perspective of their capability and their de-
pendability.
This is a position paper in which we analyse the role that ontolo-
gies can play in this transition. Anticipating the final conclusion of
our analysis we believe that, to achieve the potential improvement
provided by using a rigorous engineering process to build CSs, we
are in need of a deeper, unified cognitive science —a solid theory of
mental processes— that could sustain such endeavour. Engineering
methods based on this science of the mind will lead to the synthesis
of the two classes of engineering assets that are necessary for CS en-
gineering (CSEng): design patterns —structural/behavioural aspects
for cognitive architectures— and ontologies —concepts to bind i) the
minds of the engineers and system stakeholders; ii) the mind of the
engineer to the CS under construction; and iii) the mind of the CS to
its world and the world of its user.
The paper is structured as follows: first we analyse the concepts of
system, mission and cognition in the domain of CSs; then we provide
an overview of the engineering task of building CSs; after this, we
offer a brief analysis of fundamental architectural aspects of these
systems; a section on the question of dependability, resilience and
trust follows; next a discussion of the need of CS-specific engineer-
ing methods; finally we include the core analysis of the need of a
solid theory of cognition —based on patterns and ontologies— to
support the engineering life-cycle of CSs. The paper ends with some
conclusions and future perspectives.
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2 ENGINEERING COGNITIVE SYSTEMS
The issue that we stress in this paper is the need of having system-
atic engineering methods to build custom cognitive systems and the
critical role that ontologies will play in achieving this.
2.1 Systems and Missions
AI is artificial not because it is not natural, but because, as described
by Simon [63], things are built to satisfy a purpose. Real-word sys-
tems4 should be useful to people; their users. Users expect that the
systems will be able to fulfil their missions as planned.
When we ask Siri to find a nearby Spanish restaurant we expect
i) to get an answer; ii) that the restaurant suggested is close to our
position; and iii) that it is indeed a Spanish restaurant and not a Mex-
ican one or a New-yorkean tapas bar. Good engineering is always
concerned about building systems that reliably fulfil their missions
[39].
The use of AI techniques in any kind of systems help these sys-
tems deal with complex problems and situations. We call these sys-
tems cognitive because they “know”, i.e. hey exploit some form of
knowledge5 in the performance of their missions6. AI systems have
been able to progress in problem solving steadily [46], overcoming
many of the predicted limits [24]. Most of the envisioned limits of
AI are related to aspects of the human mind that are considered par-
ticularly peculiar like creativity and consciousness. These and other,
simpler aspects of human minds are the essential focus of Cognitive
Science (CogSci) and are explored in the heterogeneous ways and
domains that characterise CogSci [71].
Computer implementations of CSs have always been focused on
essentially two parallel but different purposes: i) the evaluation by
computer simulation of cognitive theories of the biological mind
(esp. human); and ii) the construction of artefacts able to intelligently
deal with their complex worlds. In some cases these two threads are
mixed —e.g. when implementing cognitive anthropoids— leading to
confusion about the purposes and the degree of success of the devel-
opment of the CS.
Precise statement of system goals and operational requirements is
a strong principle (almost a dogma) of systems engineering and is
badly needed in the context of CS construction; otherwise projects
get lost into disparaged explorations sometimes concerned about the
mission of the system, sometimes about properly mimicking human
features, and sometimes about the exploration of the elusive land-
scapes of cognitive capabilities.
In the domain of Cognitive Systems Engineering (CSEng)7 it is
necessary to focus on the mission that the CS shall perform, trying
to avoid vagaries into its human resemblances. On the other hand,
mimicking humans is a perfectly valid class of mission. So, we can
indeed undertake the mission of modelling the human mind using
4 We use the term real-world to refer to systems that are deployed to serve a
specific purpose, in contrast to research-oriented systems.
5 While knowledge and belief are obviously different things, for practical
reasons in this paper we do not make a strong distinction between them.
6 Note that this conception of cognitive somehow departs for a widespread
understanding of the term that equates it with having some resemblance of
human mental processes. This conception of cognition is excessively an-
thropomorphic and lessens the possibility of advancing in a general cogni-
tive science.
7 The term Cognitive Systems Engineering has been used by other authors
[36, 55, 72] to refer to systems that include humans doing cognitive work
—see next Section— but we use this term here to refer to the engineering
of (maybe artificial) cognitive systems like those mentioned before —e.g.
Siri or the Tesla autonomous car.
engineering-grade methods, but this requieres a precise statement of
this goal and a method of verification, i.e. his needs an objective test
of human-likeness. However, this specification of an objective Turing
test is however still a dream.
In essence, CSEng seeks to properly use artificial intelligence at
the service of improving mission-level capability. Cognitive systems
are able to see, perceive objects and affordances, making good deci-
sions and acting properly in the world in the service of a pre-specified
mission —all this driven by knowledge available to the agent or
gained through the senses. Besides having intrinsic capability —e.g.
the capability of following a path— cognitive systems must also be
dependable. Trust and usability rely both on dependability.
Robustness —the capability of tolerating disruption— and re-
silience —the capability of functional recovery— [35] are hence crit-
ical aspects for real-world systems and one the main negative aspects
of research-grade CSs.
2.2 Engineering Life-cycles for Cognitive Systems
The expression Cognitive Systems Engineering (CSE)8 has been used
by other authors to refer to the engineering of systems that include
humans performing cognitive tasks. In essence it is used to refer to
a special discipline of human factors in systems development that
addresses the design of human-cognitive socio-technical systems (a
system in which humans are the providers of essential capability
related to perceiving, evaluating, deciding, planning and executing
[36, 55, 72]. CSE is in essence the system analysis and design ef-
fort necessary to support the cognitive requirements of human work
inside socio-technical systems [41, 48].
In this paper, however, we will use the term Cognitive Systems En-
gineering to refer to the wider discipline of building systems that are
cognitive (e.g. including humans, AIs or both) in support of the mis-
sion itself. Inside this large domain, we are specifically interested in
artificial systems that are cognitive by themselves, not by being in
relation with humans who are the thinkers. Obviously, the character-
isation of what is cognitive and what is not deserves special attention
[1], and, while it is not the central aspect of this paper, it will be
necessarily addressed later in the section on the need of a deeper
cognitive science (see Section 3).
Cognition is a general capability ( i.e. ot exclusively human or
biological) that can be provided by machines, hence the inclusion of
humans is not a necessary condition for a system to be cognitive. Nor
it is necessary for a system to behave like a human to be cognitive.
In our work at the UPM Autonomous Systems Laboratory, we are
specifically interested in CSs that do not depend on cognitive capa-
bilities of other agents —esp. humans— to fulfil their missions. We
are interested in autonomous CSs. Cognition in artefacts can span a
wide range: from minimal cognition [8] to human-like performance
in specific tasks [66].
This wide spectrum of cognition apparently implies that there is no
possibility of having a single, established engineering process and
cognitive system life-cycle. This process and life-cycle would sim-
plify the construction process and provide improvements concerning
the predictable fulfilment of user requirements. A systematic engi-
neering methodology for CSEng is needed [14] and it shall be based
on the right architectural patterns and reusable assets [19].
Figure 1 summarily depicts a part of the engineering processes and
system assets that are performed and appear along the life-cycle of a
cognitive system. It shows the two/three major phases in a CS life-
cycle: i) engineering —design and construction— and ii) operation.
8 Note that this is different from CSEng described before.
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Requirements
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Cognitive System
Patterns
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Assets
Ontology is leveraged throughout the life-cycle
Figure 1. The cognitive system engineering life-cycle. Systems concepts support the whole process, providing a framework for analysis, design, construction
and operation of targeted cognitive systems. Ontologies capture the concepts in the mind of engineers and their formalisations can be used to synthesise parts of
the architecture of the target cognitive system including the representations used for its mental content: perceptions and reflections of the CS’s world.
Resilient CSs use runtime models of their operational environment
and models of themselves to sustain their activity. The CS is built
from assets realised by transformation of the CS engineering models
and reusable assets in the form of ontologies and patterns. In this
paper we focus on the role of ontologies. Details will be given later
(in Section 4).
2.3 Cognitive Systems Designs
The literature on cognitive systems is full of examples of architec-
tures for cognition [43]. Some of them are focused on very specific
tasks while others are postulated as almost universal [42, 4]. Some of
these architectures come with associated engineering methods that
can be applied to build custom systems using the reusable assets that
the architecture provides [2]. However, from a perspective of gen-
eral CSEng, these architectures come with excessive a priori com-
mitments that limit the decisions that a cognitive system architect
may take [62].
There is a need of lowering the sophistication and completeness
of descriptions of generic cognitive systems, going back from full
creatures [12, 22] to focused functional patterns [3, 15, 49] that can
provide specific capabilities (e.g. recognition, learning, metacogni-
tion, etc.). From the CSEng perspective, there is a need of moving
back from the search of unified theories of cognition proposed by
Newell [50] into a search of unifiable patterns of cognition.
This means that cognitive systems designs shall be described at
two levels: i) at the whole system level in the form of reference ar-
chitectures and ii) at the functional subsystem level in the form of
specific cognitive patterns [17, 18].
Reference architectures and cognitive patterns are the necessary
design assets for the realisation of the engineering process suggested
in the previous section. Note that the patterns are what provide the
specific capabilities while the architectures provide the framework
for their integration [60]. Note also that autonomous cognitive sys-
tems require both direct capabilities —e.g. face recognition— and
meta capabilities —e.g. learning— to provide the required levels
of autonomy [16]. Note also that patterns for general resilience —
necessary to build up trust— are mostly based on reflection and cog-
nitive self-penetrability of the agent itself [54].
3 A DEEPER COGNITIVE SCIENCE?
The previous analysis implies that there is a need of clarifying “cog-
nition” from the perspective of elementary capabilities. The unifiable
patterns of cognition mentioned earlier should be general systems’
generalisations of the micro-theories that psychology has been build-
ing about cognitive phenomena in humans [51]. Stork [67] claims for
a scientific foundation for engineering cognitive systems but, for the
reasons explained before, this scientific foundation shall also encom-
pass humans —and animals. We need a deeper cognitive science that
can ground the rigorous engineering of cognitive systems.
Identification of common concepts between humans and machines
is critical to provide a grounded integration of humans in cogni-
tive socio-technical systems [53]. The conventional approach of pro-
viding conceptual mappings through the human-machine interface
(HMI) between extremely different human/machine ontologies does
not provide the constructibility, flexibility, and dynamic allocation of
tasks that is needed for mixed autonomy resilient systems [23].
The real possibility of a scientific, unified cognitive science is still
a theme of debate [70, 25]. There is a common thought that “cogni-
tive science” was a different discipline to different groups of schol-
ars, and that even fundamental aspects would remain open forever.
For example, Peterson [52] bewares of unification risks, pointing at
the possibility of empty relabelling of mental phenomena done by
“representational cognitivism” and the practical neglect of different
viewpoints (like enactivism or embodiment). In the same vein, Hus-
bands says that “More than a decade ago, in his fine exploration of
the then burgeoning cognitive science movement [30], Gardner asked
if neuroscience would devour the entire field. His answer was no, for
the same reasons that he could see no prospects for a single unified
discipline: there will always be separate subject areas, we will al-
ways need diverse multi-level descriptions and explanations.” Dale
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[20] warns us that “cognitive scientists should take seriously the pos-
sibility that a single, unified framework for all of cognition is an un-
realistic expectation for its diverse interdisciplinary goals and subject
matter”.
However, there is also a generalised feeling of an intrinsic, un-
derlying reality of cognition that shall be captured by a deep cogni-
tive science [59]. For example, Husbands [37] says that “solutions to
the problem of how brains produce adaptive behaviour would nec-
essarily entail (at least implicit) specifications for building artificial
brains [...] being potentially useful practical devices”. This points to
the cognitive patterns mentioned in the previous section.
Cognitive science shall be a science of cognition and not only a
science of human cognition. Obviously, human minds are specially
capable in some contexts and hence their preeminence in cognitive
science. However non-human minds9 are also very relevant for a uni-
versal science, non anthropocentric view [33, 40]. This is of special
importance on the coming years where cognitive artefacts will pro-
gressively take roles reserved to humans. A solid theory of mind —
esp. the artificial mind— is needed to fulfil requirements and to avoid
emergent, disruptive phenomena [11, 44].
The possibility of a unified science of mind may seem remote, but
note that the “computer” mind model seems distant to human minds
due to its digital nature. The sentence “thinking is computation” may
hence be seen as plainly false. It is necessary to stress the fact that
“computation” is not necessarily “digital computation”. A paradig-
matic example of this case are analog computers. Note also that the
brain is both discrete and continuous. In the words of Schade´ and
Smith [61]: “Thus one single neuron possesses the qualities of a hy-
brid computer.”
There is a strong need of finding the right framework where to
build the definite theory of mind10. The theoretical frameworks we
are using today to formalise system structure and behaviour are quite
disjoint. For example, when reasoning about temporal dynamics of
system state, consider the difference between representing change by
means of temporal logic [27] or systems dynamics [45]. The models
that we use are sometimes seen as mere rough approximations [64].
While it may seem difficult to achieve a theoretical agreement on
a universal theory of cognition, most present theories are not too far
from each other. The cognitive science debates are grounded not on
theoretical issues but on attachments to disciplinary practices and
languages, excessive targeting of full-fledged human cognition or ex-
cessive narrowing on specific cognitive tasks and feats. For example,
when analysed in terms of general systems theory, classical cogni-
tivism, embodied cognitive science or enactivist cognition are not so
far from each other [47]. In fact, if we eliminate representation, what
remains is mindless body; it may be performant, but only in a singu-
lar task11. If there is no information, there is no adaptation. We must
be able to separate what minds are from what happens when minds
are attached to a particular environment.
4 ONTOLOGIES AS BACKBONE
The essential question is: What are the bricks to build the edifice of
the deep cognitive science described in the previous section? What is
9 In this context, “mind” shall not be understood as a full-fledged human
psyche. A mind is an information-driven controller for a system. These
appear in all the biological and artificial spectrum in different degrees of
capability, consciousness and self-awareness [57].
10 A single account for human, animal and artificial minds.
11 Arguments about the possibility of non-representational minds (e.g. [13])
are easily deflated by simple pointing at the representations used in the
proposed “representationless” architectures.
the theoretical substrate that grounds the description of architectures
and patterns needed for cognitive systems engineering? The answer
is simple: concepts [5, 29]. Fundamental concepts about mental phe-
nomena will provide the necessary assets to build the cognitive ca-
pability theories and the patterns and architectures that reify them.
Ontologies —as conceptual structures— will be the backbone that
will sustain the cognitive systems engineering processes of the fu-
ture, because they will both support the human engineering activities
and the operation of the cognitive systems themselves.
It must be noted that these ontologies shall not be restricted to
mind internals, but must also capture the realities outside cognitive
agents [?]. The CS environment shall be formally addressed in onto-
logical work to enable both the engineering of single-CS activity and
multi-CS cooperation. Note also that these ontologies and their use
must be flexible enough as to be able to accommodate differences
and inconsistencies between different CS (or even between the the
ontologies themselves). Ontologies shall move to use less rigid logi-
cal frameworks (capable of addressing belief, uncertainty and
emphinconsistency).
Within computer science and software engineering, an ontology
defines a set of ontological elements as representational primitives
that can be used to model a domain of knowledge [31], [32]. The
underlying idea is that ontologies provide a common vocabulary with
explicit semantics [65].
Ontologies would act as a foundation for system science, where
they facilitate organising the domain knowledge and formalising the
different engineering artefacts or entities (e.g stakeholder, require-
ment, function, scenario, etc.) and their relationships, to resolve am-
biguities and check for consistency and completeness [10], [38]. As
examples of this approach, ontologies have been used to: assist the
systems engineering process when it comes to establishing require-
ments [28]; drive the specification of the structural, functional, be-
havioural knowledge for a domain–specific system design [6]; or es-
tablish a set of common and shared concepts identified and agreed
upon for autonomous systems representation and engineering [7].
When ontologies are reified as mental assets for autonomous CSs
they will play both roles of defining the meaning of terms and
grounding the understanding of the world ( i.e. he CS itself and
its environment including other CSs). Ontologies would act as a
representation-based mechanism expressible in a computational lan-
guage, to describe the different entities participating in the design
and operation of the system. Concepts will then become computa-
tional elements in knowledge models that would exist through their
representations in software, such as UML diagrams [26] or ontology-
related languages such as OWL [68]. Concepts in engineering minds
and engineering models will also be reified as physical elements in
the CS or in its environment. This accounts for the modelling relation
that underlies life and cognition [56]. As a consequence, the knowl-
edge models will no longer be characterised by the usual high level
of arbitrariness or difficult reuse, as it happens when knowledge is
formalised as vocabularies expressed in natural language —the usual
practice in cognitive science. How the meanings of concepts defined
in the ontologies are understood by different components of the cog-
nitive system is as much the focus as how the different actors in the
CS life-cycle can use a common conceptualisation of the problem
under scrutiny, to come up with a possible solution.
The complementary element of this ontological vision is the use
of design patterns for description and engineering if system capabil-
ities, as they provide solutions to design problems that happen re-
peatedly [34]. Such design patterns will act as the cornerstones of
reusing CS architectures [60]. These patterns could be either archi-
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tectural or domain patterns [15]. Architectural patterns express the
structural organisation of a cognitive system, i.e. hey realise its ar-
chitecture. Domain patterns describe a mechanism to solve a con-
crete but recurring problem in a particular context. These point to-
wards the cognitive micro-theories that populate the literature. Note
that architectural and domain patterns are not usable in isolation; in
a concrete CS both shall be merged to put mind —architecture– to a
task —domain.
It is worth pointing out that these patterns will not be used in-
dependently but having a domain ontology acting as backbone (see
Figure 1). The architectural patterns will describe the cognitive sys-
tem internal organisation and dynamics, based on the interactions
between the ontological elements that describe the system elements
themselves. Domain patterns in turn will describe the interactions
among the cognitive system components, and with the environment,
by using the underlying conceptualisation specified by the ontology,
that represent design solutions so that the behaviour of the cognitive
system fulfils the engineering requirements. Thus all system patterns
will not only be specified from the ontological concepts, but eventu-
ally will become part of the ontology itself, modelling the relations
and interactions between them as designed by the engineers [9].
5 CONCLUSIONS
Dale, Dietrich, and Chemero [21] defend the idea that “ the ‘frame-
work debate’ in cognitive science is unresolvable. The idea that one
theory or framework can singly account for the vast complexity and
variety of cognitive processes seems unlikely if not impossible.”.
In the context of cognitive systems engineering —with and with-
out humans— this idea is untenable for two reasons, one theoretical,
one practical:
• Science advances by unification [69]. This can be considered a
theoretical dogma or just a leitmotif of science. In any case, it is
inalienable in the opinion of these authors because it is needed to
support engineering-grade CS construction (see Section 2).
• Engineering works by using commensurable designs. There are
not —there cannot be— different theoretical frameworks underly-
ing systems of “vast complexity and variety” no matter what level
of complexity they have. This does not mean that there cannot
be different realms, but all them shall integrate seamlessly under
a common framework. For example, mechanical engineering and
electrical engineering address different domains of knowledge and
practice. However, both fall under the physical framework. This is
what enables the construction of solid electromechanical systems
(e.g. the concepts of energy, force and torque are shared in both
realms; this is what enables electrical motors moving machines).
Science and engineering are necessarily bound together under a
common framework. The differences that manifest in different sys-
tems or theories shall be sought for not in the theoretical framework
but in the concrete instantiations of that framework on specific en-
tities. For example, electrical systems theory is a single theory even
when the electrical systems in the US and in Europe have very im-
portant differences. Having a common theoretical framework implies
that differences can be overcome; electrical systems can be intercon-
nected and interoperate as a system-of-systems able to fulfil a single
mission. The same can be said about cognitive systems: differences
shall be found in concrete realisations, not in the theoretical concepts
that underlie them.
Intense work shall be done to identify, clarify and formalise the
concepts and patterns that underlie all classes of cognitive behaviour
beyond the anthropomorphic trap [58]. Their expression in the form
of formal ontologies will then constitute core assets for the engineer-
ing of the trustable autonomous cognitive systems of the future. The
fundamental concepts used by engineers to think about the cognitive
system under construction and the fundamental concepts used by the
cognitive system itself in its interaction with its world —including
itself— will be the same and captured in a formal representation.
This will open a new world of capabilities for cognitive systems that
will be able to deeply adapt to changing worlds in pursue of their
missions.
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Using the enaction paradigm as a basis for database
exploration to favor users sensemaking
Landy Rajaonarivo, Pierre De Loor, Eric Maisel, Matthieu Courgeon 1
Abstract.
This paper presents an interface between a user and a database
inspired by the enactive field of cognitive science. This interface
aims to favor the knowledge understanding for the user during his
exploration of data. It proposes data progressively by estimating,
in real time, the user centers of interest. Thus, a co-evolution
between the user representations of the links between data and the
navigation environment appears. To address the embodiment side of
the cognition promoted by the enactive field, the user is immersed
in a virtual museum that grows progressively, in real time. The data
are embodied in 3D objects endowed with an interactive behavior.
The structure of the data such as ontologies are also embodied in
interactive graphical objects. Thanks to the co-evolution between the
user and the environment, the resulting museum is specific for each
user. The paper presents some arguments to raise this approach and
provides some explanations about the links between the behavior of
the user relative to the embodied data and the realtime evaluation of
their respective relevances.
Keywords: data exploration, intelligent user interface, enaction,
co-evolution, ontologies, embodiment, metaphor, sensemaking.
1 Positioning
In cognitive science, one paradigm that addresses the notion of hu-
man sensemaking is enaction which claims that cognition relies on
the history of the interactions between an individual and his environ-
ment [5, 11]. Living beings modify their environment which, in re-
turn, impacts on the possibility of actions for them. After a while, this
co-construction of the agent and his environment implies a strong in-
terdependence between them. This coupling is inseparable to the ex-
planation of the cognition and of the representations of individuals.
The coupling lets emerge a specific understanding, individual to each
person. Concept like affordances [2] is in line with these principles
because it characterizes the influence of the environment in humans’
actions. Enaction is also inspired by some phenomenologists, which
considers that Humans find a stable representation of their own world
from sensorimotor invariant [6, 7]. Eventually, enaction is also close
to constructivism and embodied cognition because it highlights the
role of the action in cognition and then, in sensemaking.
Our positioning is to take enaction as a basis of inspiration to
develop awareness of users that should understand a huge amount of
data. The challenge here, is to propose a user interface which favors
the emergence of understanding. Currently, research engines only
propose a list of suggestion to users according to some keywords
1 ENIB/CERV Lab-STICC, Brest, France, email: {rajaonarivo, deloor,
maisel, courgeon}@enib.fr
but rarely address the embodied part of the cognition nor the real
time behavior of the user relative to the propositions of the research
engine. In our approach, we embody data in 3D objects which are
introduced in a virtual environment. This last is used by the user to
favor his embodiment relative to the data. We use also an on-line
self-organization of the graphical representation of the data. Our
claim is that it is more important to let the user actively discover
links between information, making choice among these links, than
giving to him a list of propositions without some cues.
In the literature, some works claim their links with enaction. For
example, Kaipainen et al propose in [4] an enactive system allowing
to study the co-influence between the human experience and the
technologies. This system is based on the psycho-physiology of
facial expressions and avatars that mirror them. Another enactive
system is proposed in [8] which is implemented to design the bodily
interaction with a virtual agent.
Our study can be considered as less embodied (even if it is one
of our objective to immerse the user) than these previous works but
more focused on the coevolution between humans and systems and
moreover, more focused on the human sensemaking through his
interaction and the subsequent evolution of his environment.
Indeed, our work aims to mix adaptive methods of information vi-
sualization and self-organization of data while introducing the user in
the interactive loop. We also define an interactive intelligent system
designed to guide the user to construct a representation of a problem.
By this way, we transform the idea of artificial intelligence based
of predefined knowledge (classical artificial intelligence) toward an
evolving, not predefined and human coupled system that we design
as an enaction-based artificial intelligence system [1]. This paper is
structured as following, section 2 presents the theoretical principles
of our proposition. This proposition implies a realtime evaluation of
the user’s center of interest according to some concepts. Section 3 is
focused on the formalization of the concepts through ontologies as
well as on the formalization of the evaluation of user’s center of in-
terest. Section 4 provides an illustration of the results obtained with
this proposition.
2 Principles
We propose an interface for database exploration favoring the co-
construction of the user sensemaking and his environment that we
call ”enactive interface” in reference to the inspiration that this re-
search field gives to us for this study. The user is considered as the
agent of the theoretical stance of enaction and his environment is a
virtual living museum. It represents the database as well as the se-
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mantical relations between the data. Our virtual museum is consid-
ered as ’living’ because it evolves in realtime according to the user’s
behavior.
Figure 1. Enactive interface for database exploration
The figure 1 shows the functional principles of our proposition: the
user interacts with a virtual environment and all his interactions are
recorded. These are used to estimate the centers of interest of the
user. The museum evolves and grows according to the estimation of
the users interests. By evolving, we mean that the objects presented to
the user are dynamically organized and by growing we mean that the
topics of the next rooms are also defined dynamically. The evaluation
of the user is provided from his actions in the virtual museum. For
that, the user can use different interactive tools that are linked with
some semantic concepts of the data (topic, space and time). This se-
mantic concepts are defined by our research partners in cultural her-
itage and linguistics domains and formalized by three ontologies. For
example, cultural topics are in an ontology that contains concepts like
society, economy, mentality, natural cultural heritage, industrial cul-
tural heritage, etc (dozens of concepts). The figure 2 illustrates the
structure of these abstract concepts at a macro level and the figure
3 details the micro-level of one of the abstract concept ”Patrimoine
industriel et artisanal” ( which means in English Industrial and arti-
sanal heritage).
Figure 2. Structure of the concepts at macro level
The topos ontology can be described in the same manner. It de-
fines places like towns, regions, geographical coordinates. Chronos
ontology is divided in dates, years, century, ages, etc.. The cultural
heritage objects of the database are connected to the concepts
located at the leaf of the ontology.
Interactive tools are adapted to the meaning of these ontologies.
For example, a map tool allows for the designation of places that
represent the ontology structure (see Figure 4 on the bottom right).
The use of this interactive tools as well as the behavior of the user
Figure 3. Structure of the concepts at micro level
can be interpreted in terms of concepts that interest him. Then, as the
data are tagged with concepts, and as these concepts are linked to-
gether through ontologies, it is possible to choose data semantically
close to the estimated user’s center of interest. Moreover, as the con-
cept are hierarchically organized, it is possible to choose more or less
abstract concepts for the topics of the next rooms. Thanks to virtual
environment, the user doesn’t manipulate directly the concepts nor
the ontologies. For example, if he stays a certain amount of time in
front of an object, the system deduces that the concepts associated to
this object are important. Some interactive tools are more explicitly
linked with the ontology: for example, each object are linked with
a place in the world (and are tagged with this place which is in the
ontology). By this way, concepts that are easy to be represented nat-
urally (as place in the world) and are explicitly represented with the
tools while concepts that are more abstract, are just deduced from the
behavior of the user. In short, the environment influences the user by
suggesting objects that are linked semantically but not explicitly. It is
their apparition during the visit and the distance that separate them,
that express a semantical proximity. In the same time, the understand-
ing of the user as well as its corresponding behavior evolves. It lets
appear the co-evolutive loop between the agent and its environment.
3 Formalization
These section presents how the system estimates the center of inter-
est of the user and how it will update the environment. For that, we
specified a list of actions that the system can infer from the user’s be-
havior his visit. The actions which are considered are the following:
• Enter in a room
• Display the information about an object
• Stay in front of an object
• Bypass an object
• Use a navigation tool
• Take an object
As each element of the museum is connected to at least one concept
in the ontologies, we attribute a value to each concept that we call
relevance and this last will be updated through the actions of the
user. All user actions have a degree of interest, so, the updating of
the relevance of one concept is different from an action to another.
We suppose that:
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• We have n types of possible actions and each type typei has a
weight wi which indicates the degree of interest of the user ac-
cording to his actions. For example, when the user stays in front
of an object, his center of interest on this object is lower compared
to his center of interest when he takes this object with him. The
more w is high, the more the user is supposed interested.
• An action a is defined by a = {typea,Γa, ta} where Γa:a set
of concepts involved in the action a, typea: the type of the ac-
tion a having a weight wa, ta: the time that the action a has been
realized.
We consider now that the user do an action a of type typea at the
moment ta. So,
∀c ∈ Γa, τc(t) = τc(t− dt) + [wa ∗ (τmax − τc(t− dt))] ∗ dt
where τc is the relevance of the concept c and τmax the maximal
relevance of all concepts.
As our objective is to favor the data discovery for helping
understanding on a domain but not the research for data, we
propose to the user not only the relevant concepts but also the
concepts semantically close from the relevant concepts. For that, we
introduce the measure of similarity distance between two concepts
in a same ontology through the measure of distance proposed in [12].
It is based on the fact that concepts are hierarchically organized
in trees of nodes. Each nodes represent one concept of the ontology.
Thus, a concept has an upstream concept and some potential down-
stream node and there is a unique root concept which has no upstream
concept.
The conceptual similarity between c1 and c2 is dependent on the
least common superconcept of c1 and c2 designed as c3 as well as
on the root concept of the ontology :
ConSim(c1, c2) =
2∗N3
N1+N2+2∗N3 where, if we consider that
each concept is a node in the hierarchical tree of the ontology :
N1 is the number of nodes on the path from c1 to c3. N2 is the
number of nodes on the path from c2 to c3 . N3 is the number of
nodes on the path from c3 to root.
4 Example
We show through the following example how and when our system
evolves according to the interactions of the user during his explo-
ration.
Figure 4. Data exploration system using virtual museum as navigation
metaphor
Figure 4 Shows the virtual museum. The data are embodied in
photo frames and the interactive tools are accessible through the three
icons in the top left.
Figure 5. example of user’s exploration path with dynamic creation of the
museum’s rooms: the red color rooms are the rooms which are not visited by
the user. Legends: e´glise: church, chapelle: chapel, preˆtre: clergyman,
calvaire: calvary, mairie: town hall, maire: mayor
Figure 5 illustrates the growing of the virtual museum during the
user’s navigation.
Each room is tagged by one or two concepts providing from the
ontologies. Each object of each room is linked to concepts that
are considered close to the room concepts. Moreover, the distance
between the object is relative to the semantical distance defined
in section 3. This grouping system is supposed to help the user to
explore data that interest him. In the beginning of the interaction,
the museum has just one room and a number of data is limited by
the size of the room. For the example in the Figure 5, the system
presents data related to the topic:Eglise (which means Church in
English). We enumerate below the process of the dynamical creation
of the other rooms and object selection :
1. The system proposes to the user a data extract about a given topic.
2. Referring with the user’s interaction with the data proposed, the
system creates another room close to the user. The topic of this
new room is more or less close semantically to the room’s topic
where the user is. The topic is displayed on top of the room’s door
and there is a sound of door opening. It lets the system to influ-
ence the user to explore another data which may interest him (af-
fordances). For this simulation, the user decided to enter in this
new room (the course of the user is in red dotted lines).
3. At this step, the system creates a third room, the user entered in
this room, but he was not interested by the data inside this room,
so he went back to the second created room where he was.
4. The user continued his path in order to return to his initial position.
5. The system takes into account the displacement of the user in
the environment and the time during which he has stayed in each
room. After that, it creates new rooms with topics estimated close
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to user’s interest. For this step, the user ignores the room with
a topic Calvaire but he visited the room with the topic Preˆtre.
When the user entered in one room, the system makes him aware
of the impact of his interactions on his exploration by creating new
rooms.
6. This last step shows that the user token his last path to return back.
This example shows that our system draws attention of the user
during his exploration by proposing new information, and by indi-
cating paths of navigation. It takes into account the user’s interaction
to propose the new information. So, the system could always propose
new information even if the user did nothing.
5 Next stages
In the future, we plan to exploit the notion of affordances to improve
the understanding knowledge for the user. For example, in the actual
version, when new rooms are defined, a door opens and a sound that
draw user’s attention is emitted. We imagine also to improve the re-
lationship between the user and the environment by inspiring of the
models presented in [3]. In the future, we will work on the shapes of
these doors and of other graphical representation. We will also work
on the position of the objects relative to the user (below, above, small,
big ...). Then, we plan to test immersive technologies like VR head-
set to address the effect of the embodiment on human understanding
during data exploration. For this, we want to evaluate if the fact that
the user walks physically into the data improve his ability to remem-
ber some information or links between these information. Finally, we
also work on the mean to favor serendipity by the use of the structure
of the ontology in parallel with some exploration policies to favor
novelty during the exploration. The reader who needs more technical
information about this study can refer to [10, 9].
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A Cognitive Ontology of Rhetorical Figures 
Randy Allen Harris,1 Chrysanne Di Marco,2 Ashley Rose Mehlenbacher,3 Robert Clapperton,4 Insun 
Choi,5 Isabel Li,6 Sebastian Ruan,7 and Cliff O’Reilly8 
Thought is metaphoric ... and the metaphors of language derive therefrom. 
—I. A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric 
 
Abstract.  We report on an ongoing research project that uses 
OWL and a corpus of figurative instances to explore the cognitive 
dimensions of rhetorical figures. We argue that figures beyond fa-
miliar tropes like metaphor and metonymy are deeply cognitive. 
We adopt the position that figures are form/function pairings 
which make them especially promising for Advanced NLP, taking 
one figure as exemplary, the reverse-repetition scheme, antime-
tabole (e.g., “All for one and one for all”). We illustrate three dif-
ferent methodologies for building ontologies—top down, middle 
out, and bottom up. And we demonstrate the fruitfulness of cog-
nitive ontological modelling by the way it reveals new categorical 
arrangements, new conceptual relationships, and important but 
hitherto unsuspected properties of figures, their multiplicity (fig-
ures working together) and their multiplexity (figures having mul-
tiple types of instantiations).    
1. INTRODUCTION 
Rhetoric is the ancient study of persuasion, with particular atten-
tion to the effects of expressive style on belief, action, and 
knowledge. Rhetorical figures are units of style, and their effec-
tiveness is based on their cognitive appeal. The burgeoning work 
on metaphor, metonymy, and a very small handful of other tropes 
has established that fact for conceptual figures. But the same is 
true of schemes, figures based not in semantics (“meaning”) but 
in phonology, morphology, lexis, and syntax (“form”). Many fig-
ures, for instance, like ones we take up in this paper, are based on 
repetition, and we all know how effective repetition is in aiding 
memory, shaping belief, and supporting reason. A syllogism is 
impossible without repetition.   
Remarkably, however, rhetorical theories of figuration have 
rarely been mapped against the results of cognitive science, a 
metadiscipline that is to the current intellectual environment what 
evolutionary theory was at the turn of the twentieth century. In an 
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9 Mann and Thompson's Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST; [21]) is symptomatic of this (understandable) ignorance. While it has made some valuable 
insights into text linguistics, it is simply incorrectly named, by scholars who appear to know little or nothing about rhetoric. RST has really to do with 
text coherence rather than with rhetoric as traditionally understood, as the study of suasive language. 
earlier paper ([16]), we made the case that ontological representa-
tion was a natural way to chart the cognitive dimensions of fig-
ures, with the promise of considerable Advanced Natural 
Language Processing (ANLP) payoffs. While this project has con-
nections with other work in the field, most notably suggestions by 
James Crosswhite, a rhetorician ([6]), and the explicit proposal by 
Floriana Grasso, a computer scientist ([12], [14]), of a Computa-
tional Rhetoric subfield, it is surprisingly novel. Crosswhite 
briefly suggests the importance of rhetorical figures for argumen-
tation studies, a suggestion Grasso endorses, both of them in a 
computational context. But neither of them make any suggestions 
of how figures might be made computationally amenable, what 
functions they might serve in argument mining or other ANLP 
domains. 
Our project is innovative in the field of rhetoric, where the 
cognitive dimensions of figures have seen very little attention 
(though, see [10], [4]), computational methods have not been used 
to investigate figures, and ontological research is very rare; and 
our project is unique, to the best of our knowledge, in computer 
science, artificial intelligence, and NLP, where rhetorical figures 
are largely unknown and rhetoric is poorly understood.9 An excel-
lent recent survey of argument mining, which conspicuously men-
tions rhetoric many times, nevertheless does not mention 
rhetorical figures ([20]). 
We say “surprisingly novel,” for two main reasons. Firstly, 
Jeanne Fahnestock’s work shows very clearly how relevant fig-
ures are to argumentation ([8], [9], [15], [28]). They epitomize 
lines of argument. Secondly, many figures are highly amenable to 
computational modelling and detection. Rhetorical figures are vir-
tually tailor-made for ANLP.  
We have been heartened to see a few others adapt our ap-
proach or pursue our goals, work we have profited considerably 
from. Dubremetz and Nivre  ([7]) and Hromada ([18]) have had 
promising success detecting figures.  Mladenović and Mitrović 
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([22]) have built an impressive ontology of rhetorical figures in 
Serbian.  
Our RhetFig Project has continued to develop ([19]), and we 
report on it further in this communication. We are building a com-
prehensive cognitive ontology of rhetorical figures in OWL—that 
is, an ontology organized along known cognitive affinities (like 
repetition, similarity, and contrast)—for Linguistic Linked Open 
Data (LLOD). We envisage a wide range of potential applications, 
including genre detection, sentiment analysis, and argument min-
ing. After working with both a top-down and a middle-out meth-
odology, both having their value, and both discussed below, we 
have shifted to a data-centric, bottom-up methodology, develop-
ing the ontology to accommodate specific instances, rather than 
the abstract classes.  
2. RHETORICAL FIGURES ARE COGNITIVE 
The machinery of argumentation specifically, persuasion gener-
ally, is guided by the organizational principles and natural affini-
ties of the human mind. No one disputes this for analogy and 
metaphor, research into which goes back decades in cognitive sci-
ence, but it is demonstrably true for a wide range of other rhetor-
ical patterns. We know, for instance, that words aid in the recall 
of certain other words, those which share some of their phonolog-
ical, morphological, or semantic characteristics (if you hear "key" 
you more readily call up words like "cue" "keystone" or "door"). 
Lexical priming, the phenomenon is called, and it is often de-
scribed as a "spreading activation" among related words in neural 
net models. We know, too, that the brain is particularly attuned to 
sounds of similar duration and frequency. We know that repetition 
is critically important for fixing sequences in memory (one repeats 
a phone number or an address to remember it). All of these brain-
function facts are reflected in the schemes and tropes of rhetorical 
theory.  
Consider, for instance, the implications of Kenneth Burke's re-
marks about antithesis (a trope of juxtaposed oppositional mean-
ing): 
[I]magine a passage built about a set of oppositions ("we do 
this, but they on the other hand do that; we stay here; but they 
go there; we look up, but they look down," etc.) Once you 
grasp the trend of the form, it invites participation regardless 
of the subject matter. Formally, you will find yourself swing-
ing along with the succession of antitheses, even though you 
may not agree with the proposition that is being presented in 
this form. ... Thus, you are drawn to the form, not in your ca-
pacity as a partisan, but because of some "universal" appeal in 
it. [3] 
Burke shows very clearly here how cognitive inclination (swing-
ing along) works linguistically. In doing so, he opens the question 
of how it is that minds function when they are exposed to the tra-
ditional furniture of rhetoric: broad patterns of reasoning and fig-
uration.  
What, we want to know, are the sources of the "universal" ap-
peal that Burke identifies? Or, put in the terms of a highly rhetor-
ical, ubiquitous contemporary praxis, why does that chocolate-bar 
jingle stay with you endlessly, despite your lack of interest in the 
chocolate bar, despite even your active dislike of the jingle? The 
intuitive answer is that there is something in the way your brain 
operates that allows the jingle to exploit it, colonize it, set up shop. 
And the intuitive answer is surely right.  
Your brain functions with affinities for rhythm, repetition, sim-
ilarity, and difference (among others). The jingle is rhythmic, rep-
etitious, and contains patterns based on similarity and difference 
(rhyme, assonance, alliteration, ...); indeed, rhythm itself is a func-
tion of repetition, similarity and difference. The jingle, in short, 
insinuates itself into your consciousness by exploiting the sub-
merged processes from which your consciousness emanates.  
Look again at the three antitheses Burke offers: 
• we do this, but they on the other hand do that;  
• we stay here; but they go there;  
• we look up, but they look down; 
Antithesis is a trope (conceptual opposition), but it is quickly clear 
that antithesis is not the only figure at work here (figures very fre-
quently work in concert). Other formal patterns suffuse the pas-
sage. I will give their rhetorical names, but what is important is 
the patterns those names identify. The passage includes parison 
(parallel syntax), isocolon (parallel prosody), epanaphora (clause-
initial lexical repetition), and mesodiplosis (clause-medial lexical 
repetition), all of which contribute to the "swinging along" 
Burke's example illustrates, and all of which partake of the same 
universal character—universal for two reasons.  
First, figuration is linguistically inescapable. Figures are omni-
present in language, communicating intentions and desires, cod-
ing information and attitudes, propagating belief and knowledge. 
There is no degree-zero, purely literal language. Language cannot 
but be figured; it flows in what Edward Sapir figured as "well-
worn grooves of expression" ([26]). These grooves can be used or 
abused, optimized or overblown—which is where formal theories 
of figuration come in—but there are no other grooves. So, when 
we look to figuration, we look to primal organizing patterns of 
language use.  
Second, and causally related to the first, figuration reflects the 
way our brains percolate and process. This reflection is perhaps 
most evident in the overtly purposive use of figures. The tradi-
tional literary purpose, generating aesthetic pleasure, is best 
known. But mnemonic formulas ("i before e except after c"), prov-
erbs ("a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush"), oral traditions 
("rosy-fingered dawn"), children's literature ("I meant what I said 
and I said what I meant / an elephant's faithful, one hundred per-
cent")—in short, all linguistic configurations serving purposes in 
which cognitive functions like attention, learnability, and recall 
are at a premium—take a form that rhetorical theorists in the clas-
sical and early-modern periods identified as a figure. It is this in-
sight, coupled with the high degree of overlap between the 
organizing principles of cognition and the organizing principles 
of figuration (similarity, contrast, balance, repetition, and the 
like), that motivates cognitive rhetoric and argues for ontological 
representation.  
Let’s turn to an extended example, the seemingly esoteric 
scheme of reverse lexical repetition, antimetabole. 
3. ANTIMETABOLE 
This figure (from Greek anti “in opposite direction” + metabole 
“turning about”) is a poorly researched and largely unknown but 
remarkably widespread rhetorical device characterized by sym-
metrical lexical inversion. Its most famous modern exemplum 
may be John F. Kennedy’s summarizing antimetabole in his inau-
gural address: 
(1) Ask not what your country can do for you. Ask what 
you can do for your country 
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But it appears in almost every imaginable discourse: 
Science  
(2) If you press a stone with your finger, the finger is also 
pressed by the stone. (Newton) 
(3) La vie, c'est le germe et le germe, c'est la vie. (Pas-
teur) 
(4) [T]he wire moves in opposite circles round each pole 
and/or the poles move in opposite circles round the 
wire. Faraday). 
Political Science  
(5) It is not the consciousness of men that determines 
their being, but, on the contrary, their social being 
that determines their consciousness. (Marx)  
(6) When the people fear their government, there is tyr-
anny; when the government fears the people, there is 
liberty (Jefferson) 
Algebra 
(7) m + n = n + m; m/n ≠ n/m 
Logic  
(8) (p & q) ↔ (q & p) 
Advertising  
(9) I am stuck on Band-Aid, and Band-Aid's stuck on me 
(10) StarKist doesn't want tuna with good taste, StarKist 
wants tuna that tastes good. (Starkist Tuna) 
(11) Friendly Americans with America friends. (United 
States Travel Service) 
Ordinary Language  
(12) When the going gets tough, the tough get going. 
(13) Winners never cheat, and cheaters never win 
(14) A place for everything, and everything in its place 
Antimetaboles also show up in all the places one would normally 
expect to find a ‘fancy’ figure like this—fiction, poetry, philoso-
phy, oratory, popular music (hip hop is full of antimetaboles). It 
is present in the ancient texts of China, India, Egypt, and Meso-
potamia, and in the daily twitter feeds and status updates of the 
21st century. They course through social media; Mark Zucker-
berg’s recent claim about Facebook, for instance: 
(15) We don't build services to make money; we make 
money to build better services 
It was tweeted and retweeted, posted and reposted, far and wide, 
despite its obvious questionability and clear promotional purpose.  
Antimetaboles, in short, are rampant, which gives us some very 
significant facts about language and the mind—chiefly, the pro-
found importance of cognitive affinities for all facets of commu-
nication. Cognitive linguists have solidly established the 
fundamental importance of what they call “conceptual metaphor” 
(we call them “analogic frames”) and “conceptual metonymy” 
(“correlational frames”). But these affinities (that is, of the mind 
for similarities and correlations) are only two of the several mental 
dispositions that shape our perception, reasoning, memory, and 
communication.  
Antimetabole leverages three cognitive affinities: symmetry, 
opposition, and repetition. One might note, to start, that all three 
of these affinities are important to the gestalt-theory perceptual 
tool-chest, which has been empirically ratified very thoroughly. 
But more specifically, we respond more favourably and recall 
more easily symmetrical patterns (symmetrical faces and bodies 
are judged more attractive than asymmetrical faces and bodies; 
abstract symmetrical graphics, such as the yin/yang, are recalled 
more quickly and robustly than asymmetrical graphics). The two 
cola of the antimetabole are symmetrical with each other. We cat-
egorize by similarities, of course, which is the affinity underlying 
metaphor, but also by opposition, and many base-level concepts 
are organized in oppositional dyads (up/down, in/out, adult/child), 
as the Burke passage illustrates. The lexical sequencing in anti-
metabole is formally opposite. At the deepest operational levels 
of the brain, there are repetitions of neuronal-population firing 
patterns, reflected at the level of cognition by the importance of 
repeated stimuli. Antimetaboles have a double repetition.  
Antimetaboles are aesthetically pleasing, memorable, and cul-
turally pervasive because they stack up three cognitive affinities. 
Other rhetorical figures leverage these affinities (and others) in a 
range of similar, different, and overlapping ways. Figure 1 illus-
trates some of these ways, which our RhetFig Ontology systema-
tizes.
 
 
Figure 1. Ontological relations among figures, including antimetabole  
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4. FORM/FUNCTION PAIRINGS 
If our work only went this far, one might fairly criticize it with a 
familiar line of attack against rhetoric, that it is ‘merely stylistic,’ 
that it tells us only about the peripheries of language, nothing 
about its conceptual depths. But most humanists, and all rhetori-
cians, realize that there is nothing mere about style, that style in 
fact offers different routes to those depths. Antimetabole charts 
three specific routes to a highly constrained, inter-related set of 
conceptual alignments ([10], [11], [25], [28]). Newton’s and Pas-
teur’s examples above are antimetaboles of reciprocality; the law 
of commutation, irrelevance-of-order; the “winners” and “place” 
ordinary-language examples, comprehensiveness.  
What is compelling about this tight form/function coupling 
from a computational perspective is that once you find the form, 
the function is highly predictable. And the form of antimetabole, 
and of all schemes (tropes are a trickier matter), is computation-
ally very tractable, in the sense that they can be modelled for-
mally. Here is how Harris and Di Marco [16] render it as a Regular 
Expression (using the Waterloo Figure Representation formal-
ism):  
Wx … Wy … Wy … Wx 
In our Newton instance, for instance, Wx = finger, Wy = stone; the 
triple dots loosely express intervening elements (possibly null). 
This sort of representation is flexible and resilient—extensible to 
other constituents (phonemes, syllables, and phrases, as well as to 
words) and to all of the basic figurative operations (omission, ad-
dition, and substitution, in addition to iteration and permutation, 
as above), and it has proven value in computational research.  
This representation is amenable to coding, and has been ren-
dered in Perl, for instance ([17]). It has now been used for such 
purposes as text summarization ([1], [2]) and figure detection ([7], 
Error! Reference source not found., [11], [17], [19], [24] [27]). 
But it was never meant as anything more than a sketch of possi-
bilities; our project is regularizing the formalism, axiomatizing it 
with definitions of necessary concepts like identity, proximity, 
and sequence; and enforcing an overall rigour on the computa-
tional representations. Regular Expressions, too, only do half the 
job, by representing the pattern of figures; we need a parallel for-
malism for the functions they serve.  
We ar  exploring how the necessary formalism may be found 
in Construction Grammar (CxG), a new morphosyntactic archi-
tecture developed over the last decade in close conjunction with 
Frame Semantics ([18]). In the Newton instance above (2), the 
function is reciprocality; Newton utilizes the antimetabole to ex-
press the utter balance of reciprocal forces. To the precise extent 
that the finger presses on the stone, the stone presses on the finger. 
Figure 2 captures this conceptual structure in CxG terms.  
 
 
Figure 2. CxG representation of the reciprocal function of antimetabole 
Figure 2 is only partially applicable, in that it captures antimeta-
bolic instances like the Newton example (2), but fails with others, 
like the Pasteur instance (3) and the algebraic instance (7), in nei-
ther of which are their trajectors. But it provides a template for the 
sorts of CxG expressions needed for figural representation.   
The abstract sequence of the antimetabole, represented in the 
Waterloo Figure Representation Notation above ([16], [25]), is 
precisely the kind of pattern a computational text analyser can find 
very easily; the abstract conceptual structure represented in Figure 
2, and the combination of computational tractability with narrow 
functional range means that antimetaboles can be used to digitally 
diagnose major discursive themes and epitomize arguments. Here 
is where our work falls into the closest alliance with schools of 
Computational Argumentation.  
Despite the hundreds of rhetorical figures that have been cat-
alogued over two millennia, they fall into a relatively few, par-
tially overlapping classes. While we have not worked out an 
exhaustive set of classes and relations, we are especially intrigued 
by the way in which the natural organizing principles of figures 
manifest well known cognitive affinities, like comparison, con-
trast, and symmetry, and by the interplay of well-known linguistic 
operations in the patterning of figures, like addition, deletion, and 
permutation. Our work applies these insights to the construction 
of a cognitive ontology of rhetorical figures.  
5. ONTOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 
METHODOLOGIES 
Rhetorical figures are prime candidates for a cognitive ontology. 
They are both richly, demonstrably cognitive, and richly, demon-
strably valuable for NLP tasks like argument mining. The rhetor-
ical tradition also suggests they hold considerable promise for a 
range of other automated text processing tasks, such as authorship 
attribution, genre detection, sentiment analysis, credibility assess-
ment, pathology diagnosis and monitoring, voice interaction sys-
tems … virtually any activity that implicates pragmatics or style. 
Ontological representation seemed so obvious to us, so natural, so 
inevitable.  
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 We started with a top-down approach. We used the catego-
ries: Cognitive Affinities (such as CONTRAST, SIMILARITY, 
SEQUENCE, REPETITION, and POSITION); Linguistic Domains 
(such as PHONEMES, SYLLABLES, MORPHEMES, WORDS, and 
PHRASES); and Figure Kind (such as TROPES and SCHEMES, as 
well as two somewhat novel categories, CHROMA and MOVES—
see [4], [11]). Antimetabole, for instance, is a scheme of words 
utilizing affinities for repetition, sequence, and contrast, or 
<SCHEME; WORD; REPETITION, SEQUENCE, CONTRAST>.10 
We followed this approach to considerable profit. We quickly 
realized that we would do better with multiple linked ontologies 
than trying to incorporate everything into one ontology, so we 
built a Cognitive Affinities ontology and an abbreviated Linguis-
tic Domains ontology (we are hopeful that we will find existing 
ontologies that we can link to our RhetFig Ontology, and are 
aware in particular of multiple existing linguistic ontologies, but 
we have not had the chance to pursue this very far; we are still in 
the sandbox phase). Since OWL uses subsumption as its guiding 
organizational principle, we capitalized on the features of inher-
itance, which led us to reanalyse the conventional taxonomy of 
figures. So, for instance, there is figure known simply as ploce in 
the rhetorical tradition, a figure of unconstrained lexical repetition 
(that is, <SCHEME; WORD; REPETITION>), as in these instances: 
(16) The best surprise is no surprise at all. (Holiday Inn 
marketing slogan) 
(17) Villain, villain, smiling, damned villain! (Shake-
speare, Hamlet) 
But antimetabole, as well as a host of other lexical repetition fig-
ures, all of which are constrained in various ways, also satisfy the 
description <SCHEME; WORD; REPETITION>, except that they are 
constrained by other affinities, such as sequence or position. An-
timetabole, for instance, is constrained by relative sequence (the 
repetitions must be in reverse order). Epanaphora is constrained 
by position. We developed a hierarchy corresponding to this real-
ization, partially illustrated in Figure 3.  
This new hierarchy provides us with a different understand-
ing of figures in terms of their mutual relations based on cogni-
tively principled categorization. 
But the welter of rhetorical figures that have been catalogued 
over the millennia since their discovery soon made the top-down 
approach rather unwieldy and we opted for a middle-out develop-
ment methodology, focussing only on figures of repetition. These 
include lexical repetitions (such as epanaphora and antimetabole), 
but also repetitions of phonemes (as in alliteration, repeating 
word-initial consonants), syllables (as in rhyme, repeating word-
final syllables), morphemes (as in homoioptoton, repeating af-
fixes), and so on. It also includes tropes such as synonymia (re-
peating concepts in different words), but we have restricted 
ourselves to schemes. 
                                                
10 The formalism is as simple as it looks. The expressions are de-
limited with angled brackets. The main classes of information 
(figure type(s), linguistic domain(s), and cognitive affinity(/ies)), 
all mandantory, are separated by semi-colons. The specific 
  
 
Figure 3. A new understanding of rhetorical figures of lexical 
repetition, based on the inheritance characteristics of ontologies  
 
 
Again the approach was profitable, but again we ran into com-
plications. On the profit side of the ledger, we found efficient 
ways to characterize the similarities and differences of figures. 
For instance, polyptoton is a figure in which the lemma is repeated 
but with different morphology, while in homoioptoton mor-
phemes are repeated but with different lemmata, and (as you re-
call) ploce is a figure in which lexemes are repeated (i.e., both the 
lemma and the morpheme are repeated). Our use of linguistic do-
mains in our categorization also allowed us to make further dis-
tinctions that had not been observed in the rhetorical tradition. 
Consider the following instances (all from James Baldwin’s Go 
Tell it on the Mountain):  
(18) It was later to become his proud testimony that he 
hated his sins—even as he ran towards sin. (Ploce) 
(19) He wanted to be with these boys in the street, heed-
less and thoughtless. (Homoioptoton)  
(20) You know honey, the Word tell us to hate the sin but 
not the sinner. (Polyptoton)    
The formal structure of instances (18) and (20) superficially look 
the same. Both have the repeated lemmata with different mor-
phemes. But (18) we categorize as ploce, because the morphology 
is inflectional, with negligible syntactic or semantic effects (sins, 
sin), while (20) is polyptoton because the morphology is deriva-
tional, with marked syntactic and/or semantic effects (sin, sinner). 
By categorizing these figures in the directions that OWL led us, 
we end up with a very efficient system that reminds one of the 
Principles and Parameters programme of Chomskyan linguistics: 
Ploce <SCHEME; WORD-LEXEME; REPETITION> 
Homoioptoton <SCHEME; WORD-LEMMAX, MORPHEMEY; 
REPETITIONY, CONTRASTX> 
Polyptoton <SCHEME; WORD-LEMMAX, MORPHEMEY; 
REPETITIONX, CONTRASTX> 
type(s), domain(s), and affinity(/ies), when there are more than 
one, are separated by commas.  
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(Subscripts are markers of affiliation: for homoioptoton, 
MORPHEME goes with REPETITION; WORD-LEMMA goes with 
CONTRAST; vice versa for polyptoton.) Homoioptoton is a figure 
in which lemmata contrast, but a morpheme repeats. Polyptoton is 
a figure in which a lemma repeats, but morphemes contrast.  
Ploce is, in these terms, a figure of simple lexical repetition, 
in which morphology goes unmentioned because it is inflectional. 
Homoioptoton and polyptoton both share the affinities of repeti-
tion and contrast, and both share the linguistic elements of word-
lemma and morpheme. They differ only in terms of affinity-ele-
ment assignments. The similarity between this treatment and the 
“switchbox” of Principles and Parameters ([5]) is suggestive on 
this level. Set the switches one way, you get polyptoton, set them 
another, homoioptoton. When the cognitive charting of figures ad-
vances to become fully cross-linguistic—as any cognitive atten-
tion to data must—we feel that there may be value in a framework 
of this type (though, of course, we can’t know until the data is in 
what approach will be of value, and there is not even an initiative 
to collect such data). Free word order languages and fixed word 
order languages, for instance, will have different propensities to-
ward figures implicating lexical sequence and figures implicating 
morphology.  
The middle-out method soon hit a wall of diminishing returns 
as well—not, in this case, because of the great variety of figures 
but because of the limitations of OWL, and of description logics 
more generally, which present difficulties with capturing im-
portant notions like sequencing and indexing (since we need to 
represent relative and absolute order). We are familiar with some 
work that addresses some of these limitations through a tight and 
customized linking of ontologies. O’Reilly’s work in particular 
([23], [24]) modelled concepts and relationships such as hasFirst-
Word, hasLastWord, hasNextWord, and so on, in one ontology. 
Rhetorical Figures like epanaphora and epistrophe (clause-initial 
and clause-final lexical repetitions, respectively; they are types of 
complex ploce in our terms) went into another ontology, with Se-
mantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) logic rules defining figures. 
While we feel these methods are productive, and we encourage 
O’Reilly to continue this work, others to emulate it, we are hope-
ful of more direct ways to express cognitive affinities like se-
quence and position. More importantly, we increasingly found 
that our instances were not falling into neat categories, and we 
changed to a data-centric approach, building the ontology from 
the bottom up.    
We began by somewhat arbitrarily choosing a single instance 
of antimetabole, an exchange from Hemingway’s For whom the 
Bell Tolls:  
(21)      “Coward,” Pablo said bitterly. "You treat a man as 
a coward because he has a tactical sense. Because he 
can see the results of an idiocy in advance. It is not 
cowardly to know what is foolish." 
     "Neither is it foolish to know what is cowardly," 
said Anselmo, unable to resist making the phrase. 
This seemed like an unassuming little antimetabole in which one 
character uses the reverse order of the figure in a kind of refutation 
of another character’s utterance. We like it especially for the 
phrase that Hemingway uses to summarize Anselmo’s motivation, 
“unable to resist making the phrase.” Just as the first-one-order- 
then-the-other-order is the most natural and iconic way to repre-
sent the commutative principle in math and logic—i.e., (7) and 
(8), which exemplify the irrelevance-of-order antimetabolic func-
tion—a reversal of someone’s utterance seems the most natural 
and iconic way to represent its repudiation. Hemingway, one of 
the most resolutely anti-rhetorical authors (an anti-style stylist, if 
you will), found the venerable antimetabole irresistible here to ex-
press the antipathy between his two characters, ascribing the com-
pulsion to one of those characters.   
Approaching categorization from the bottom had two unex-
pected benefits, discovering the multiplicity of figures and the 
multiplexity of figures.  
The Hemingway instance (21), we soon realized, contains a 
multiplicity of figures, so that it was an instance not just of anti-
metabole, but of other figures as well, and if we were going to use 
our data to learn about the functional role of figures in language, 
we would have to be more thorough in our classifications. Fortu-
nately, OWL intrinsically allows assigning one instance to multi-
ple classes. Some of these other figures seemed somewhat 
incidental to the refutational function of the antimetabole—polyp-
toton, for instance (coward, cowardly), and epanaphora (because 
he …, because he …). Others are more integral—in particular, 
mesodiplosis (clause-medial lexical repetition; here … to know 
what is …, … to know what is …). Indeed, as we looked through 
our data, we came to realize that most of the most clearly func-
tional antimetabolic instances were not just reverse lexical repeti-
tions but reverse lexical repetitions around another stable lexical 
repetition. That is, they are more fully represented in the following 
terms (where the  Wx  and  Wz  constituents represent the antime-
tabole, the Wy constituents represent the mesodiplosis): 
Wx … Wy … Wz … Wz …  Wy … Wx 
If you look back at the antimetabolic instances in this paper, armed 
with this insight, the structure is impossible to miss. For (2) the 
mesodiplosis constituent is press, for (4) it is moves in opposite 
circles, for (5) it is that determines their, for (6) it is fear, for (7) 
it is the addition and division signs, and so on.  
Moreover, some figures have particularly strong bonds with 
one another. Antimetabole manifests a syntactic (sequential, for-
mal) opposition. Antithesis manifests semantic (conceptual, idea-
tional) opposition. So, the two frequently co-occur, reinforcing 
each other. A huge proportion of antimetaboles are also antitheses, 
like the famous Kennedy aphorism (1), as well as the Marx (5) 
and Zuckerberg (15) instances. More compellingly, the combina-
tion of figures usually doubles down on the functional constraints. 
All of the antimetabole-antithesis expressions we have found 
combine the comprehensiveness function of the first figure with 
the rejection function of the second figure. Adding antithesis to 
antimetabole, that is, always produces an utter rejection of one 
proposition, concomitant with its utter replacement by the other, 
either assertively (Kennedy, Marx) or implicationally (Zucker-
berg). 
Rhetorical functions, in short, are very often the result of spe-
cific compounding effects. Figures work in multiplicities.  
The data, we also discovered through the careful attention that 
ontological considerations forced on us, is multiplex. In particu-
lar, we found as we worked through the instances, especially in 
our focus on linguistic domains, that what we thought was one 
figure, antimetabole (and what the rhetorical tradition often 
treated as one figure, sometimes two) was in fact at least seven 
distinct patterns, which we identify as follows (some of the in-
stances are repeated from above, under this new categorization; 
some of them are original):  
Antimetathesis  
(22) She sells sea shells by the seashore.  
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Antimetabole  
(23) It's Trump calling real journalism "fake news" and 
holding up "fake news" as real journalism. (tweeted 
by (@ExportedFromMI) 
Morphological Chiasmus  
(24) Friendly Americans with America friends.  
Syntactic Chiasmus  
(25) Despised, if ugly; if she’s fair, betrayed. (Leapor. “Es-
say on Woman”) 
Antimetalepsis  
(26) [T]he new metaphor — the brain as a calculating ma-
chine — is ... fraught with the danger of anthropo-
morphizing the machine and mechanizing the man.  
Pseudo-Antimetabole  
(27) StarKist doesn't want a tuna with good taste. StarKist 
wants a tuna that tastes good.  
Implied Antimetabole  
(28) Britannia waives the rules [evoking the familiar in-
verse phrase, “Britannia rules the waves.”].   
We call this grouping of figures The Chiastic Suite, after one of 
the related terms for antimetabole from the rhetorical tradition, 
chiasmus, itself named after the Greek letter chi (c, the repeating 
elements are said to ‘cross’ each other). 
There’s more going on here than just a new data story. Identi-
fying this cluster of figures from the instances (each and every one 
of these configurations has been held to exemplify antimetabole, 
or one of its synonyms, in the tradition) allows us to ‘purify’ anti-
metabole for analytic terms. This is most obvious with pseudo-
antimetabole. It is a pseudo-antimetabole because the two occur-
rences of taste in our example evoke different meanings (there-
fore, different words). The first word is taste in cultured 
appreciation of the arts sense, the second is taste as in the gusta-
tory sense. There is, in other words, no repetition of taste; rather, 
there is a pun (formally, a paronomasia), a ‘repetition’ of the se-
miotic vehicle without the semiotic interpretant, along with a rep-
etition of good. If one builds an automatic detector for 
antimetabole in order to do argument mining and comes across an 
instance like (27), the algorithm needs to be able to filter it out.   
On the other hand, antimetalepses pattern conceptually very 
much like antimetaboles, which suggests one should widen the 
search pattern to include instances of ‘crossed’ synonymia, for ar-
gument mining. Instance (26), for example, serves a comprehen-
siveness function; the claim of the sentence is that the mind-as-
machine metaphor that was so prevalent in early cognitive science 
is completely dangerous, because it misconceives minds and it 
misconceives machines.  We don’t have the space to map out all 
of the chiastic suite—and, to be frank, we haven’t fully done so; 
the interactions are tricky, calling for considerably more investi-
gation—but they demonstrate the productivity of cognitive ontol-
ogies for research into linguistic patterns.    
 6. CONCLUSION 
Cognitive ontologies are highly productive, and vastly under-uti-
lized, research tools for ANLP, especially in matters of style, 
pragmatics, and argumentation. Our research project demon-
strates their virtues in multiple ways. Figure ontologies provide 
mechanisms for plumbing texts. And they reveal unsuspected fea-
tures of linguistic configurations. But this research is in very early 
days. Our future plans for the project include (i) exploring other 
ontological representations, (ii) developing our annotation 
scheme, (iii) linking other ontologies, (iv) applying our bottom-
up methodology in other figurative domains, (v) expanding our 
research to include other categories of rhetorical figures, beyond 
schemes, and (vi) expanding and refining our detection engine.  
i. OWL has been particularly restrictive in its limitation to 
the IsA relation, which is insufficient both for the relations 
among many figures (including, for instance, various 
kinds of meronymy) and for the kind of information we 
foresee necessary for applications. So, we are looking at 
ways to incorporate other relations in OWL, and to aug-
ment OWL’s expressiveness in other ways. But we are not 
committed to OWL. So we are also looking for other rep-
resentational languages.  
ii. The annotation scheme has multiple challenges. We only 
annotate the form of the figures at this stage, but annotat-
ing their functions is equally important, perhaps more so 
for activities like argument mining and text summariza-
tion. The tendency for figures to cluster in the same 
stretches of also makes for very messy annotation, so we 
are exploring stand-off markup. In both instances, we will 
ensure standardization as best we can, to increase the use-
fulness of our work, by following Apache UIMA (Un-
structured Information Management) guidelines.  
iii. We have been unsuccessful at finding other ontologies we 
can link to ours, and plan to expand our efforts at finding 
them, especially linguistic and cognitive ontologies.  
iv. The bottom-up strategy has its limitations, but has been the 
most productive methodology we have adopted. We began 
with a single instance, but it was not arbitrarily chosen. It 
was an antimetabole, which we knew had various interest-
ing implications and it has led to the discovery of the chi-
astic suite. We plan to begin another ‘mini-ontology,’ 
bottom-up with instances of the figures gradatio, because 
of its relation to the scheme anadiplosis (anadiplosis is lex-
ical repetition at the end of one phrase and the beginning 
of the following phrase; gradatio is two or more successive 
anadiploses, so anadiplosis is a PART-OF gradatio), such 
tropes as incrementum and decrementum (successive 
words with semantic inclines or declines), and the com-
pound figure (part scheme, part trope), climax (gradatio + 
incrementum). We apologize for the necessarily enigmatic 
description of these plans Adequately defining and exem-
plifying the figures here would require too much space. 
But we invite interested readers to consult Fahnestock’s 
([8]) chapter on incrementum and gradatio for more detail 
about some of these figures, many examples, and an ac-
count of how they function in argumentation.   
v. Work on a gradatio mini-ontology, as we’ve just sug-
gested, will involve the inclusion of tropes and compound 
figures, but there is room for expansion into other tropes, 
into chroma as well, and other figures as well. There has 
been considerable work on Argument Schemes in argu-
ment mining, for instance, a nice overview of which can 
be found in a recent paper by Argument Scheme guru, 
Douglas Walton, with Fabrizio Macagno ([29]). There are 
many figures, chiefly the ones we call Moves, that are 
strikingly similar to Argument Schemes (for instance, pro-
lepsis, which is the projection and refutation of a counter-
argument, and paralipsis, the insinuation of premises 
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while decrying their inclusion in an argument), and we en-
vision a convergence of our research with Walton’s line, 
starting with the incorporation of moves into our ontology.  
vi. Jakub Gawryjolek developed JANTOR (Java ANnotation 
Tool Of Rhetoric) in 2009 ([11], [12]) at the outset of our 
project, an ambitious and accomplished but preliminary 
tool for the detection and annotation of rhetorical figures 
in HTML files. We plan to update and enhance JANTOR 
and make it available for other research groups  
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Towards Building Ontologies from
Crowdsourced Data
Paula Chocron1 and Dagmar Gromann2
Abstract. Building computational conceptual models that
are flexible and context-independent is an important chal-
lenge given the growing interest in cross-domain applications
that need to deal with real-world objects. While crowdsourc-
ing methods have been used extensively in ontology engineer-
ing and evaluation, few approaches apply these methods to
retrieve data. However, retrieving data from a large crowd
promises to elicit the whole spectrum of associative knowl-
edge humans use to cognitively represent concepts. In this
paper, we propose to use two crowdsourcing techniques - a
mechanized labour-based and a game-based approach - as a
data acquisition method and a semi-automated approach for
building a domain-specific ontology from this data for the con-
cept city. Our approaches are indirect, asking participants to
describe instances of cities. In a second phase, we implement
techniques to extract semantic classes from the obtained data.
We evaluate our results against another collaboratively built
ontology for city, extracted from Wikipedia. We compare the
techniques used, analysing benefits and drawbacks for each
one.
1 Introduction
The past decade has witnessed an increasing interest in inte-
grated visions that propose a tight and optimised relation be-
tween Web technologies and everyday real-life domains, such
as the Internet of Things [1] or Smart Cities [7]. These efforts
require sound computational models that represent concepts
ubiquitous in our everyday life. Moreover, since different do-
mains interact in these approaches, the models need to be
as context-independent as possible, very flexible, and easy to
adapt to diverse applications or to change and evolution.
The computational modeling of these concepts is a diffi-
cult problem that has been largely discussed from both the
philosophical and the engineering perspective. Concepts that
people can easily understand in informal conversations can
be challenging to define and model formally, something that
seems to be particularly true for spatial and geographic con-
cepts, as it can be seen in the well-known discussion about
the definition of forest (see, for example, [4]). An alternative
solution would be relying on a group of experts to build the
concept descriptions. This is, on the one hand, a time- and
cost-intensive task [31]. On the other hand, it is not free of
1 Artificial Intelligence Research Institute (IIIA-CSIC) and Univer-
sitat Auto`noma de Barcelona, Spain, email: pchocron@iiia.csic.es
2 Artificial Intelligence Research Institute (IIIA-CSIC), Spain,
email: dgromann@iiia.csic.es
arbitrariness, since the resulting conceptualisations can be bi-
ased by the view of the person(s) in charge of building them.
We believe that relying on a large population for acquiring
associative knowledge drastically reduces this potential bias.
In the past years, crowdsourcing techniques received in-
creasing attention as methods that can overcome these two
problems. Crowdsourcing consists of a collective of non-
experts (a crowd) performing short and accessible tasks that
are then combined to tackle a larger problem. Crowdsourcing
methods are particularly well suited for tasks that are difficult
to automate completely, but are at the same time too large
to be completed by just one person, or that benefit from the
diversity of the participants.
In this paper we propose a method that uses two crowd-
sourcing techniques – a mechanized labour-based and a game-
based approach – to build concepts for ontologies, identifying
different types of knowledge that humans use to describe in-
stances. In line with results of Parasca et al. [22] we observe
that people extensively rely on prior knowledge as well as
synonymy, antonymy, and hypernymy to describe concepts.
This kind of task can benefit from collaboration, as it is dis-
cussed in [15], where the authors compare conceptual maps
created individually and collaboratively, concluding that the
latter ones are of higher quality.
Using crowdsourcing can provide a description that reflects
the collective perception of a concept, identifying categories
that are socially relevant, but not immediate when explic-
itly trying to define them. For instance, five participants in
the mechanized labour-based approach used cafe´ to describe
Paris. In the approach using a word guessing game, four par-
ticipants used baguettes to describe Paris, which was guessed
correctly upon this first hint in four different games. When
asked directly to describe city it is unlikely that participants
would provide similarly specific associations. Our approach
is still preliminary, but the data obtained3 can be used as a
pattern to describe concepts in applications where the social
aspect is relevant or as a human-created standard to evaluate
automated techniques. We also believe that the game-based
approach can provide a valuable method for cognitive applica-
tions, since it can specify the type of knowledge to be elicited
in a way that is entertaining to participants.
We chose to perform our experiments using the concept of
city. The concept of cityness has been extensively discussed
in the urbanistics literature, remarking its social and dynamic
3 Data obtained from and source code used in this ap-
proach can be found at https://github.com/paulachocron/
CrowsourcedKnowledgeAcquisition
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aspects. In particular, we consider city to be a good concept
to perform this experiment, since it has clear instances which
are in general well-known by a random crowd. In addition,
although a city can be uniquely identified by means of its co-
ordinates, these are in general not the most immediate char-
acteristics that come to mind, and the resources used when
describing an instance are very varied.
After introducing related work, Section 3 explains the de-
sign and implementation of two crowdsourcing methods that
retrieve data by asking participants to describe instances of
a city. The mechanized labour-based technique asks partici-
pants directly, while the second one presents the task in the
form of a game, making it more attractive to participants.
This game-based method can be seen as an extension of the
first one, that could potentially complete the descriptions
obtained. In Section 4 we explain a post-(crowdsourcing)-
processing phase, in which we implement two methods to au-
tomatically extract categories related to cities from the crowd-
sourced data. We evaluated our approach by comparing its
results to another crowdsourced description of cities that we
extract from the Wikipedia Tables of Contents of city pages.
2 Related Work
Crafting ontologies manually is a costly task, and the obtained
results are not free of arbitrariness. For these reasons, the field
of ontology learning has been extensively studied in the past
years [18]. Many of these approaches, particularly those from
the first years of the area’s development, rely on predefined
patterns and rules or static resources, such as WordNet [31].
However, these static approaches have two drawbacks, namely
they are neither scalable nor easily portable between domains.
Recent approaches seek to be more dynamic, for example by
using machine learning to extract relations from an existing
seed ontology [23] or to develop axioms extracted from text
[27].
Using static resources in ontology learning is not straight-
forward due to the multiplicity of senses associated with each
word. To address this problem, Bentivogli et al. [5] asso-
ciate senses with a WordNet domain ontology they create and
which we also use herein to classify words. A similar idea is
presented by Izquierdo et al. [14] who associate the Kyoto on-
tology of the project with WordNet senses and also a number
of upper level ontologies. Those associations are then used
to present a class-based word sense disambiguation method.
Alternatively, distributional semantic approaches have been
investigated for word sense disambiguation with context-poor
data sets. For instance, Basile et al. [3] extract DBpedia
glosses for each word in tweets and then compute the cosine
similarity between the context of the word in the tweet and
each gloss to find the most related one(s), a second approach
we adapt in this paper. Similarity between sets of words can
be computed by composing their vectors in different ways; in
[3] the authors use addition.
The use of crowdsourcing techniques in ontology learning
has received considerable attention in the past few years. One
prominent example can be found in the approach of Hanika et
al. [13], who present approaches that solve some specific tasks
in ontology engineering via crowdsourcing, mainly related to
specifying relations between terms and verification. Eckert et
al. [11] propose a method to crowdsource concept hierarchies,
asking users questions about how concepts are related. In gen-
eral, these methods start from an existing set of concepts and
attempt to add relations collaboratively, without allowing the
discovery of new concepts. Crowdsourcing has also been ap-
plied to ontology evaluation (both for the subclass-superclass
hierarchy [21] and for entire ontology statements [32]) and
alignment [24].
In an effort to make crowdsourcing tasks more appealing
to participants, the idea of gamification was introduced that
presents the problems to be solved in form of an interactive
game, which is thought to foster motivation to participate
[25, 29]. Some well-known examples are Duolingo [28], an ap-
proach to crowdsource the translation of the Web, and re-
CAPTCHA [30], a method for digitizing paper copies of doc-
uments. Parasca et al. [22] utilize a guessing game to elicit
associative knowledge to define words provided to the play-
ers. They analyse the type of associative knowledge obtained
this way and suggest their data set to be used to evaluate
distributional approaches, which makes their method more
focused on linguistics. Verbosity [29], a game to elicit com-
monsense facts in a structured way, restricts the elicitation
of knowledge to specifically related items in order to obtain
already related expressions. We decided against this design to
have a non-restrictive elicitation of associative knowledge.
Individual ontology engineering tasks have been crowd-
sourced as games as well, such as for classification and pop-
ulation [26]. In [20] a game is proposed to obtain attributes
for concept descriptions. Their approach is explicit in that it
asks players to name properties directly. In combination with
ontologies, a specific part of the ontology building task is usu-
ally crowdsourced but not the knowledge acquisition step that
precedes the ontology building as in our approach.
3 Crowdsourcing Concept Descriptions
We propose two different crowdsourcing mechanisms to collect
descriptions of city instances that will later be used to build
the concepts related to city. The approach, from the data
collection to the evaluation, is illustrated in Figure 1, where
rectangles are steps and circles are the different techniques
that we explore.
Crowdsourcing methods can be divided into two major cat-
egories [10]. Explicit methods are those in which participants
are asked directly to perform some task, and then their work
is combined to solve a larger problem. In the implicit ap-
proach users are given a task that is only indirectly related
to the problem to solve; then some kind of post-processing is
applied to extract the desired information from the retrieved
data. The implicit approach allows designers to make the task
more attractive for participants, for example by presenting it
as a game. For some tasks, implicit approaches can result in
more interesting and fine-grained results, and for some exper-
iments it is crucial that participants do not know the final
objective to avoid cognitive biases.
We used two different implicit crowdsourcing methods, in
which we ask participants to describe specific instances of
cities either as a direct question or as part of a game to ob-
tain a general characterization of city as a concept. We believe
that using an implicit approach for our problem can lead to
richer and more fine-grained ontologies than the explicit one.
However, the direct comparison to this kind of task is yet
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Figure 1. Overview of Concept Formation Method
to follow. The kind of technique we propose here is partic-
ularly applicable when describing abstract concepts that do
not have a clear physical correspondence, where the properties
are less evident. To form concepts, we group the descriptions
we obtain from the crowdsourced data by their sense that we
disambiguate and by their semantic category that we extract.
A first approach, which we call mechanized labour-based
knowledge acquisition, uses a popular crowdsourcing online
platform (CrowdFlower) in which users can register and com-
plete mechanical tasks in exchange for payment. The task we
proposed consisted in directly asking participants to provide
the first ten words they associate with a city name displayed
to them. In the second approach we adapted the well-known
Taboo game, in which one player describes a city instance to
the other player without using any of the words on a list that
is provided to them. This second technique was developed as
an extension to the first one, and it therefore uses the results
of the first one as words that cannot be used in the game in
an effort to obtain more fine-grained, original descriptions of
city.
For both methods we used as input a list of city names
that we built with input from online listings of popular cities
retrieved by a search engine query. Participants had to be
first language English speakers since the data we wished to
obtain are in English. They were always given the possibil-
ity to skip a city if they were not familiar enough with it.
They were explicitly instructed to only use common nouns
with adjectival/verb modifiers. There are two main reasons for
this restriction: (1) proper nouns trivialize the identification
of cities as they uniquely identify them, e.g. Eiffel for Paris,
and (2) we were interested in ontology building from com-
mon language and not based on instances or named entities.
Participants were explicitly instructed to comply with this in-
put restriction, in the mechanized labor-based approach even
tested on them, and non-conforming characterizations were
omitted from the final data set. In the following subsections
we explain each of the two approaches in detail.
3.1 Mechanized Labour-Based Knowledge
Acquisition
Description
In the first of our approaches we ask participants directly to
provide descriptions of a given city. This was implemented
using the online crowdsourcing platform CrowdFlower. In a
crowdsourcing task, participants were provided with the name
of a city (for example, Paris), its country name (France), and
its latitude and longitude (48.85◦ N, 2.35◦ E), plus ten input
fields for city descriptions as illustrated on the right hand side
of Figure 2. The instructions clearly described the task and
specified the input restrictions to describing cities by using
common nouns with possible adjectival/verbal modifier as de-
scription, no words other than English including loan words,
and a categorical omission of personal opinions. For instance,
stinky cheese to describe Paris by means of one of its most
prominent food exports would be permissible in the sense of
providing a common noun in English but clearly violates the
instruction of not providing a personal opinion. Each page in
the task displayed a total of five city instances to each par-
ticipant, asking for their descriptions following the specified
input restrictions.
The left hand side of Figure 2 shows the first part of a
page displayed to the participants, where they could indicate
whether they had heard of the city, had been there, or are
not familiar with it. The right hand side of Figure 2 shows
the view when clicking one of the first two options, where the
user is prompted to provide a maximum of ten words they
associate with that city. We uploaded a list of 300 cities that
we collected from online resources and there was no limit to
how many descriptions participants could provide.
We took several measures to ensure the quality of the re-
sults for this crowdsourcing technique. First, we conducted a
pilot study to evaluate the kind of results we were to expect
and to improve our test setup. Second, we asked each partic-
ipant 20 test questions to ensure their ability to comply with
the instructions regarding the input restrictions. For example,
we asked participants whether Breaking Bad is an adequate
description of Albuquerque, USA, to test the ability to differ-
entiate common from proper nouns. Only participants with
an accuracy above 70% on the test questions were permitted
to complete city descriptions. Finally, answers on which par-
ticipants spent less than ten seconds on the question were not
considered, a setting enabled by the platform.
This measure was taken because it can be reasonably as-
sumed that a participant who spends less than on average ten
seconds on the description of five city instances has not taken
the time to provide enough descriptions or delivers poor qual-
ity. For instance, if a participant provides cathedral for all five
cities and no other input it might be possible to do so within
ten seconds, but this does not mean that cathedral is an ad-
equate description for those cities. It is highly unlikely that
a human being is able to process five city names and type at
least one association for them within ten seconds. This is a
common quality measure in crowdsourcing approaches and in
combination with the test question turned out to be a very
effective way to obtain high quality contributions. The pilot
study was particularly important since the improved actual
study received a better evaluation by the participants, which
increased participation. The more participants, the faster the
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Figure 2. Example Question on CrowdFlower
specified number of targeted descriptions can be achieved.
Results
The task was online on CrowdFlower for six days asking
participants to describe a total of 300 cities. At the end of
the task, 82 participants mainly located in the United States
(65%) and the United Kingdom (30%) curated a total of 3,616
descriptions for 275 of the 300 cities. For the remaining 25
cities, no descriptions were provided since the participants
had the option to indicate that they did not know a city dis-
played to them in the task. We did not limit the number of
descriptions that could be provided by an individual partici-
pant in the overall task and some top contributors provided up
to 85 descriptions. The proportion of participants that passed
all the trust tests (70% accuracy on the test questions and an-
swer time not too short) was 91%, which shows that the task
was well designed and accessible for participants. This argu-
ment is further supported by a final contributor satisfaction
rating of 4.2 out of 5 potential points for our task.
The 3,616 descriptions we obtained for the 275 cities con-
tained duplicates. In a first processing phase, we kept dupli-
cate descriptions across the data set but de-duplicated the
ones for each city. For instance, we would de-duplicate the
five mentions of cafe´ relating to Paris, France to one while
keeping cafe´ as a description of Tangier, Morocco. This was
done automatically by applying similarity measures from the
WordNet Similarity for Java (WS4J) library4 combined with
the Levenshtein distance [17]. This approach was also used to
identify the descriptions that were provided most frequently,
for example, there are in total 576 descriptions that were pro-
vided by more than one user. For instance, for Paris the de-
scription cafe´ was identified as one of the most frequent ones
4 https://code.google.com/archive/p/ws4j/
as it was provided by five distinct participants. To reduce
the bias of individual associations regarding specific city in-
stances, we decided to choose only those frequent descriptions
for the concept formation task.
3.2 Game-Based Knowledge Acquisition
Our second crowdsourcing technique presented the city de-
scription task as a game that was designed by adapting the
popular board game Taboo™5, which we call GUESSence.
First, we will briefly describe the original Taboo™ game, then
our version, and finally the results we obtained from the game.
Description of the Taboo Game
The popular board game Taboo is a word guessing game,
where an even number of players is grouped into competing
teams. One player of one team draws a card and describes a
word it provides, with the objective of having their team col-
leagues guess the word without using the word itself or five
related words indicated on the same card. The five related
words are called taboo words and neither the words them-
selves, their components, nor their inflectional variants can
be used. For instance, if the word is basketball, it is not per-
mitted to use ball, baskets, or basketball to describe it, and
neither is it permitted to use any of the given taboo words,
for instance court, player, bounce, baseline, game. The goal
is to have your team guess as many words as possible within
the alloted times. Players take turns at describing words and
after the alloted time is over, it is the turn of the next team.
Each team receives one point for a correct guess and the team
with most points at the end of the game wins.
5 http://www.hasbro.com/common/instruct/Taboo(2000).PDF
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Description of GUESSence
In our two-player version of Taboo™, there are two roles a
player might assume: describer and guesser. The describer
provides hints to the guesser that describe a given city and
the guesser responds with a city name that is believed to
be the correct result. As a further restriction, the describer
is not allowed to use any of the phrases that are provided
as taboo words along with the city name and the country it
is located in. The objective of the game is that the guesser
finds out which city is being described. The game is collab-
orative, since when the guesser names the correct city both
players win. As an example depicted in Figure 3, if the city
to describe was Paris, France, the describer would get the list
of taboo words capital, cafe´, romance, croissant, art, tower,
fashion, museum, palace, terrorist, cathedral. Then a game
could be developed as exemplified in the following, where the
describer starts the game by saying river and the guesser pro-
vides the first guess. When the guesser types the correct city
name the game was successful and both players are automat-
ically assigned to a new game.
describer: River
guesser: London
describer: Famous pastries
guesser: Vienna
describer: Hunchback
guesser: Paris
The taboo words for this game were the descriptions ob-
tained from the first data collection method, ensuring that
there was no overlap between the data set gathered with the
first knowledge production method and this one. Addition-
ally, we intended to analyse if this would trigger the use of
descriptions belonging to different categories in an effort to
find original descriptions. We only used cities for which we
had enough taboo words, omitting all cities with less than
five descriptions in the first task. This reduced the number
of 275 cities from the first task to 244 in the game. In an
effort to make each game equally challenging, we decided to
include some hand-picked additional salient descriptions as
taboo words if they were missing, such as canal for Venice.
By hand-picked we mean we complemented the most frequent
descriptions of the first task by associations that only one or
two CrowdFlower participants had who indicated they had
visited the city before.
We determined the number of taboo words on the basis of
the number of descriptions provided for each city by the crowd
of the mechanized labour-based approach. This was based on
the assumption that the more associations participants of the
first crowdsourcing method had with a specific instance of a
city, the easier it was to retrieve those associations and the
more well-known specific associations for that city might be.
To make the description of each city instance equally chal-
lenging in the game-based crowdsourcing approach, we kept
more taboo words for cities with a large number of associa-
tions while keeping fewer taboo words for cities with a lower
number of associations from the first crowd. Concretely, cities
with more than 25 descriptions were equipped with 12 taboo
words in the game, cities with 20 to 25 descriptions were as-
signed 10 taboo words, and 8 taboo words were provided for
cities with less than 20 descriptions from the first crowd on
CrowdFlower. Cities with less than five descriptions from less
than two participants were omitted in the game-based ap-
proach since this can be seen as an indication that not enough
associations could be elicited from the crowd and thus the city
might be more challenging to describe in the game-based ap-
proach than the other city instances.
Crowdsourcing
Since the game requires collaboration, participants had to be
online simultaneously, which made the use of crowdsourcing
platforms challenging. As we observed in the first data col-
lection method, the number of participants that simultane-
ously accessed the crowdsourcing task rarely exceeded two
at a time. Thus, we had to devise an alternative method
to recruit participants. We contacted colleagues within the
ESSENCE project6 at the School of Informatics at the Uni-
versity of Edinburgh, and asked them to send out an invitation
to participate on internal mailing lists and invite personal con-
tacts. This local recruitment should ensure that participants
in the game were first language English speakers in line with
the first crowdsourcing method and this was the only partner
institution located in an English speaking country. As an in-
centive to participate, we offered a small shopping voucher. To
avoid personalized hints when participants knew each other,
the method for joining two players in a game was automated
and both players had no means of identifying who the other
player was.
We developed an online platform7 and pre-scheduled game
sessions with up to nine players at a time, who were assigned
automatically and anonymously to two-player games. The
first player to log onto a game would be assigned the guesser
role. The second player to join a game session would be the
describer, who in contrast to the guesser would see the city
name, country, and taboo words, the view that is illustrated
in Figure 3. The game starts with the describer providing a
hint and ends with the correct guess from the guesser. Play-
ers were newly assigned automatically and anonymously to
each game. The same input restrictions as in the first crowd-
sourcing method were applied for the hints of the describer,
which was additionally enforced by automated warning mes-
sages. For those warnings, we implemented several named en-
tity recognition processes using NLTK [6] and the Stanford
Named Entity Recognizer (NER) [12]. Upon a correct guess,
the interface automatically redirects both players to a suc-
cess page. Should the automatic detection of a correct guess
fail because of spelling errors or other reasons, we provide a
“Guess Correct” button on the interface. If a player decided
to leave the game and start a new game, the other player
was automatically informed by the system that the game was
over.
A total of 30 participants played the game in five online
sessions. This resulted in 316 games, of which 174 were suc-
cessful, i.e., the city was guessed correctly. We decided to limit
our data set for the concept formation process to successful
games only. This ensures the quality of the hints, i.e., they
are indeed associated with the city being described to a degree
that allows a human player to identify the city. The lengths of
the games varied substantially. At times players were able to
6 https://www.essence-network.com/
7 http://taboo.iiia.csic.es
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Figure 3. Example GUESSence Game: Describer View
guess the correct city name upon receiving the first hint, such
as baguettes immediately triggered the response Paris when
indeed Paris was the target city. In other games players re-
quired up to ten hints to correctly guess the target city. It can
be presumed that first hints that immediately and in several
games trigger the correct target city are more associated with
the instance then hints that require further descriptions to
lead to a correct result. For instance, baguettes as a first hint
for Paris lead to four successful games with different players,
which means that baguettes is closely related to the city. We
could observe a strategy of guessers to first provide the capi-
tal of a country they presumed the target city to be in, so it
could be argued that baguettes is more related to the country
itself then the city. Indeed, the types of knowledge used by the
participants to describe a city came from different categories,
such as regions, continents, climate, food, fauna, flora, among
many others.
Those successful games were manually evaluated by 12 on-
tology engineers and researchers regarding their compliance to
the restriction to common nouns and the rules of the game,
e.g. not containing a Taboo word, which reduced our data set
of successful games to 73 games of 62 cities and a total num-
ber of 202 descriptions of cities. This set of 202 descriptions of
the second technique and the 322 descriptions from the first
crowdsourcing technique provided the input to our concept
formation method.
4 Building Ontologies
Building ontologies from natural language descriptions is a
four step process that requires concept formation (e.g. [8]),
extraction of hierarchical relations (e.g. [9]), learning non-
hierarchical relations (e.g. [23], and finally extracting axioms
(e.g. [27]). In this paper we focus on the first step of form-
ing concepts from the instance descriptions we obtained in
the two crowdsourcing processes. Concept formation is usu-
ally understood as the process of grouping terms into classes
based on their shared semantic properties [31]. This involves
detecting term variants, which is commonly done by using
predefined background knowledge [31].
In our data, the available semantic property is the relation
of each word to a city instance. Thus, we need to disambiguate
each word and then group them by means of their related
senses that we retrieved form existing lexical resources. We
also retrieved predefined semantic categories into which data
from both crowdsourcing approaches are classified. In this
section we will differentiate between the data from the two
approaches by referring to data from the mechanized labour-
based approach as taboos and descriptions from the game-
based approach as hints. To continue with our example, the
hint baguette is related to Paris and the sense we want to
obtain is that of “a long, narrow loaf of French bread” with
the semantic category Food, where the category provides the
general characteristic people use to describe a city. This is the
ultimate objective of our approach: find the types of concepts
that people associate with the general concept city. To evalu-
ate our obtained concepts, we use an ontology that we created
manually based on Wikipeda Tables of Contents (TOCs) of
specific instances of cities. We will first explain how we ob-
tained this evaluation ontology and then detail the approach
to disambiguate and classify the crowdsourced data.
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4.1 Building an Evaluation Ontology
When searching for characteristics of specific cities, we found
that the Table of Contents (TOCs)8 of Wikipedia pages for
city instances shares some interesting characteristics with the
kind of ontology that we attempt to build. ToCs are organised
hierarchically, including subsections and even lower levels. As
a collaborative encyclopedic resource where each page is qual-
ity assured by several community members, Wikipedia could
be considered a long-term crowdsourcing approach and due to
its quality assurance can be considered an excellent testbed
for the concepts we form. Thus, we decided to manually build
an ontology from TOCs of Wikipedia pages as a gold standard
ontology for the characterization of city.
To build this ontology, four ontology engineers extracted
Wikipedia TOCs of 20 randomly selected cities from our list
of 300 cities. We merged the TOCs of those city pages, keep-
ing the most general ones. In this way, we removed categories
that were very specific to one city or region (such as “2.1.1
Legend of the founding of Rome”). In general it was easy to
achieve an agreement, which suggests a high degree of con-
sistency in Wikipedia’s ToCs. Since many participants in the
crowdsourcing processes used descriptions related to the coun-
try or region the city is in to describe the city, we repeated
the ontology construction process from TOCs for countries,
regions, and continents, which provided us with a four-layer
gold standard ontology we used to evaluate our ontology built
from crowdsourced data9.
4.2 Concept Formation
To group our data into semantic categories, we retrieved the
available senses and classifications for each noun and noun
phrase from WordNet and an online dictionary, called Word
Reference10. We opted for this combination since we found
that semantic categories provided by Word Reference fre-
quently complement WordNet domains [5]. An unexpected
level of complexity was found at this point, triggered by the
multiplicity of senses that may exist for each hint. In many
cases, different senses corresponded to different categories; to
continue with our example, baguette can be interpreted as “a
small convex molding especially one of semicircular”, which
is classified as Architecture instead of the desired category
Food for this hint. To overcome this problem, we implemented
and compared several word sense disambiguation techniques.
Since the focus of this paper is on crowdsourcing and ontol-
ogy building, we will only briefly report on the most successful
technique we applied.
By means of a word sense disambiguation approach based
on distributional semantics adapted from [2], we identified the
meaning that is semantically closest to the the general con-
cept of city from WordNet and Word Reference definitions.
We used each word of our input data in a vector represen-
tation and composed it with the vector of the city name. In
a second step, we created a vector representation of each ex-
tracted definition and compared it with the first vector. The
8 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:Section
#Table of contents .28TOC.29
9 The ontology is available at https://github.com/paulachocron/
CrowsourcedKnowledgeAcquisition
10 http://www.wordreference.com
one combination of a definition vector with the (word, city)
that returned the highest similarity measure was the sense
we chose automatically to be closest to the general concept
of city. For instance, in the case of the two baguette senses
related to Food and Architecture, the disambiguation process
compares the vector for (baguette, Paris) with the vector for
each sense that is composed from the words in their glosses
and returns a higher similarity for Food. Our composition
method for vectors is that of averaging as implemented in the
word2vec library [19]. All obtained senses were manually eval-
uated by two raters and only senses that both raters agreed
upon were kept. We determined an F-Measure of 82% (164
taboos from 199) for the first crowdsourcing platform data
set and 80% (89 hints from 112) for the second game-based
data set. Given the highly ambiguous nature of the input data
and the lack of context, we consider this a good result. For
instance, boot has 7 different senses and no obvious connec-
tion to Wellington. Our algorithm identifies the correct sense
of ‘footwear’, since the description most likely hinted at the
famous ‘Wellington rubber boot’.
We implemented two different approaches to extract pre-
defined categories from descriptions of particular cities: cate-
gories from an online dictionary and ontology classes mapped
to WordNet senses. In the first technique, we exploited the
fact that Word Reference associates words with general la-
bels that can be generally seen as its superordinate class.
For example, Sushi is labeled as Food as is baguette which
groups them together. To use this information, we first ex-
tracted all nouns in the crowdsourced city descriptions and
then retrieved all existing glosses and categories from Word
Reference where available. We used our distributional seman-
tic disambiguation approach on the glosses to which labels
were assigned to find the best gloss and extract its associated
category. Our second approach consists of using WordNet to
obtain the semantic classes mapped to its senses. Due to the
fine-granular nature of WordNet senses, it was necessary to
use ontologies associated with WordNet synsets to obtain gen-
eral categories, as it is described in detail below.
In general, both Word Reference (WR) and WordNet (WN)
contained definitions for the words in the descriptions, al-
though there were some exceptions, most of which corre-
sponded to words that can be considered from foreign lan-
guages (for example, names of foods or sports). For the ma-
jority of the words that were defined, the resources included
the sense that was intended by the describer as one of the pos-
sible definitions, as it is shown in Table 1. We use the name
hints to refer to data obtained in the game from the describer
and taboos for the results of the first mechanized labour-based
task. By not available we mean that the word is in the re-
source but the required sense is not. In some other cases, the
describer used the word in a very complex or informal way,
which was not included in the utilized resources. This is the
case of, for example, using sack to describe Sacramento. The
evaluation was done manually by three researchers.
We also measured the number of available correct categories
in Word Reference as depicted in Table 2. In this case the
values are lower, because many glosses in Word Reference are
not classified into a category. At times, the categorization in
the resource is not entirely accurate, as for instance beer is
classified as wine instead of alcoholic beverage. Nevertheless,
in most cases the quality of the categories is surprisingly high
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Available Not Available
WN (taboos) 199 1
WN (hints) 112 6
WR (taboos) 194 6
WR (hints) 109 9
Table 1. Availability of correct senses for WordNet and Word
Reference
and the accuracy we obtained exceeds 80% for both data sets.
This means that 80% of the extracted semantic categories
were correctly assigned, which is a good result given the lack
of context.
Available Not Available Correct Accuracy
taboos 132 64 119 0.90
hints 77 42 65 0.84
Table 2. Availability of categories in Word Reference
We also evaluated the Word Reference categories by com-
paring them with the city ontology from TOCs. We per-
formed this evaluation only for the categories that were dis-
ambiguated correctly with the distributional semantics ap-
proach, since we are interested in how far the data collected
by crowdsourcing reflect a proper description of the general
concept city. These categories are not organized in a taxon-
omy, and thus only the number of semantically equivalent
categories with the Wikipedia resource was analysed.
When removing duplicates in the categories from Word Ref-
erence, we obtained a total of 29 categories for the hints and
31 for the taboos. In Table 3, we show the matching propor-
tion with the Wikipedia taxonomy of cities, modulo obvious
term alignment (such as Food ≡ Cuisine). We count in N the
categories that did not match, and then present the ones that
were present directly, the ones that were subconcepts of a
present one (for example Mammal) and the ones that were
present in the Wikipedia taxonomies for region or country. In
both cases, 9 of the 12 first-level categories in the Wikipedia
taxonomy were represented, either by themselves (in 6 cases)
or by one of their subcategories.
N N (%) Present Subconcepts Other tables
taboos 5 16% 15 5 6
hints 2 6% 18 8 1
Table 3. Evaluation with Gold Standard Ontology for the WR
categories
To classify the WordNet definitions, we used existing map-
pings to ontology concepts in YAGO11 and the Kyoto map-
ping to WordNet [16] to extract classes associated with de-
scriptions. Using the disambiguated WordNet senses we first
extracted all WordNet Domains (WNDs) [5] associated with
them from YAGO. This resulted in 17 for the hint data set
and 6 for the taboo data set, of which one for each data set
was incorrect. Those numbers already refer to de-duplicated
senses used as input, that is, each WND was only counted
once. Where there was no WordNet domain, we queried asso-
ciated Kyoto classes and used the Word Reference categories
11 www.yago-knowledge.org/
to automatically select the best class. This was then again
evaluated manually. We extracted a total of 78 classes for
senses for the hint and taboo data set with an accuracy of
80% for the first and 91% for the second.
In a nutshell, our approach to concept formation consists
of disambiguating individual specifications of city instances
and grouping them by semantic categories. We obtain the
semantic categories from WordNet domains and Word Refer-
ence categories. Those are then compared to concepts of the
Wikipedia ontology we created as a means to evaluate our
approach. Each concept created by this method comprises nu-
merous characterizations of city instances. The set of concepts
we obtain characterize the general concept city.
4.3 Comparison of Acquisition Approaches
Since the data of the mechanized labor-based acquisition
method served as input to the game-based approach, the data
sets we obtained are mutually exclusive. On a higher level of
abstraction, that is, on the level of the semantic categories
we obtained from Word Reference, the overlap between the
obtained categories was 60%. Many of the remaining 40%
that did not correspond across the two data sets were more
specific concepts. For instance, the hints resulted in Religion
while the taboos also returned Eastern Religion. Another ex-
ample of the reverse phenomenon is that the hints only lead
to Clothing while the taboos also lead to Textiles. Based on
some concepts returned, such as Drugs, and an examination
of the crowdsourced data we found that the game-based ap-
proach tends to provide more informal descriptions than the
mechanized labour-based approach. This could be explained
by the fact that the latter task itself has a higher degree of
formality where participants are formally paid, while a word
guessing game can be considered an informal situation. How-
ever, in some cases the use of informal words to avoid using
the forbidden taboo words has been observed as a strategy.
For instance, a player used haggling to describe Bangkok since
the crowd on the online platform had provided bargaining as
a taboo word.
The paid crowdsourcing task was conducted mainly by par-
ticipants in the United States and also several participants
from the United Kingdom (UK). In contrast, the game-based
method was exclusively based on participants from Eding-
burg, UK. It could be expected that this difference in coun-
try of residence of the participants would affect the nature
of the data in the sense of introducing a cultural bias. How-
ever, with very few exceptions no local expressions or dialect
could be observed in the data. Interestingly the difference
between American and British English was used to describe
specific cities, such as an American participant using soccer
to describe Newcastle in the UK. The same phenomenon oc-
curred with other languages, such as a British participant in
the labor-based approach who used the German s-bahn (rapid
transit railway) to characterize Berlin in Germany or a player
in the game describing Osaka with okonomiyaki (a type of
Japanese pancakes). We kept the British expression in the
previous example, but did not keep the German or Japanese
in the data sets. In the paid crowdsourcing process we be-
lieve that the formality of the task as well as the nature of
the task might have led people to opt for a more standard
version of English. In the game-based approach people were
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neither informed nor aware of the fact that all other partic-
ipants were equally based in Edinburgh. Since participants
met online without any means of identifying the other player
in each game, virtually no local expressions could be found in
the final dataset. However, participants presumed to be in the
same region since they repeatedly used cardinal directions to
describe cities, such as West, which only helps in the game if
this direction points to the same locations for both players.
5 Discussion
The two crowdsourcing techniques that we used in this ap-
proach returned useful input for the ontology building pro-
cess. We found that the time needed to obtain data from
the mechanized labour-based approach exceeded the time of
the game-based approach to return the same amount of data.
The former was running for more than a working week, while
the latter achieved the same in just five sessions each a bit
more than an hour. This is because the incentive to partic-
ipate in an interactive online game seemed much higher. In
fact, participants asked for the permission to play again af-
ter the first session, and four of the 30 participants joined a
second session. One crucial point in accelerating the labour-
based approach was the overall contributor satisfaction. In
the pilot study, which also served to evaluate the accuracy
of our test questions, we obtained a lower ranking of only
3.5 out of 5 points and several comments from contributors
regarding suggestions to improve the quality of the test ques-
tions. In the actual study, we obtained a rating of 4.2 out of 5
points, which considerably increased the frequency with which
new participants joined the task. Thus, we could observe that
a high ranking can considerably accelerate the labour-based
approach, however, it is unlikely that it even a the highest pos-
sible ranking would come close in performance to the game-
based approach.
The low number of and locally restricted recruitment
method of participants for the game-based approach might
have a biasing effect on the data set obtained from this
method. While the results from the concept formation stage
seem to be comparable to the data obtained from the labour-
based crowdsourcing step, we still believe that it would be
more interesting to compare both methods with a larger num-
ber of participants. To this end, we have already developed
a mobile app version of GUESSence that will allow an asyn-
chronous access to the game and allow for an open access
without any restriction to a specific region.
When applying the ontology building process to the data
sets obtained with both crowdsourcing techniques, it can be
observed that the mechanized labour-based technique returns
more specific categorizations. This implies that the game is
not useful as an extension of the first method, as we initially
suggested. However, there are only minor differences in the
results obtained with both approaches, and they both per-
form well when compared to our gold standard ontology. This
means that the game returned results that were as robust as
the direct technique, and can therefore be used on its own to
retrieve descriptions. These kind of describing and guessing
games are very popular, easy to play, and can be extended
to different domains, which turns them into a good candidate
to obtain this kind of data. They can even be included in an
online gaming platform, which would provide very large sets
of data.
This extensibility of the game-based acquisition method to
other domains or other target concepts than city is also true
for the labour-based approach. Any instances of a specific con-
cept could be used to trigger responses from participants as
long as they are general enough to be known to a crowd of
non-experts, such as Food as a general category or Movies.
The results of the first approach could again be used as taboo
words for the game. Alternatively, the taboo words could be
generated manually. However, the design of the game relies on
those input restrictive characterizations we call taboo words.
The main restriction in terms of portability of the approach
to other domains are: a) the domain and its instances have to
be known by the participants to a degree that allows them to
describe them, b) the domain has to be covered by some pre-
defined knowledge or lexical resource to allow for the disam-
biguation and classification approach as it is proposed here to
work. This means that highly domain-specific contents, such
as fishing rod and the specific types of rods as instances, would
not work well for this approach since a low number of partic-
ipants would be able to describe their characteristics and few
resources would contain the words, however, the more general
category sport or sport equipment could be used.
Regarding the concept formation, the two resources that we
used for the extraction of senses (Wordnet and Word Refer-
ence) were accurate in that they contain the correct sense for
most of the words in the city descriptions. Word Reference is
convenient because it already provides a classification of the
senses in the form of semantic category, however, there are
many senses for which that classification is missing, which re-
sults in a great loss of useful data. A resource like this one but
with a complete classification would be ideal for our purposes.
For WordNet, the labelling feature is not immediately avail-
able, so more complex techniques need to be implemented to
retrieve a classification of our data. In both cases there were
many other senses available, so some kind of sense disam-
biguation is necessary.
The comparison of the categories retrieved from Word Ref-
erence with the ones in the gold standard shows that in most
cases the labels match. Some of the ones that do not match
directly are in turn subcategories of Wikipedia labels, which
seems to show that creating an organized taxonomy using the
Word Reference taxonomies as seeds would be a promising di-
rection. In other cases, the categories match with others in the
Wikipedia taxonomies for country or for region. This should
be taken into account when using this kind of approach, since
players tend to describe instances not only with their proper-
ties but also with properties from their upper categories.
6 Conclusions
We presented and discussed methods to automatically build
concept descriptions from crowdsourced data. The two crowd-
sourcing techniques that were proposed gave good results in
terms of quantity and reflecting associative knowledge. The
results obtained with the game-based approach are as ro-
bust as the ones obtained with the mechanised one, although
slightly less fine-grained. The final results we obtained could
be very valuable as a seed for ontology learning to be extended
with hierarchical, non-hierarchical relations, and axioms.
Multiple directions of research are derived naturally from
SYMPOSIUM VI. COGNITION AND ONTOLOGIES (CAOS) 244
Co
nfe
re
nc
e
ed
itio
n
this work. Regarding the crowdsourcing methods presented,
it would be interesting to compare, for this particular prob-
lem, the use of implicit techniques, like the ones we propose,
with explicit ones. The implicit techniques already have as
an advantage that they can be easily presented as a game,
making the task more attractive. However, it would be inter-
esting to compare the differences in the results. To this end,
a third experiment in which users are asked directly to name
properties of cities should be performed.
At the moment we focus on concept formation. In order to
have more interesting and useful ontologies, this part should
be developed to extract hierarchical and more informative
non-hierarchical relations. There is a variety of approaches
that tackle the relation extraction problem, both with au-
tomated and crowdsourcing techniques. However, their ade-
quacy to our problem should be analysed, since they are not
particularly designed to identify relations between a concept
and its attributes.
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Representing Types through Image Schemas and Patterns
Claudio Masolo and Emilio Sanfilippo1
Abstract. We propose a formal framework to represent types in-
tended as (intentional) complex properties characterised in terms of
(i) simple qualities, e.g., colors or weights; (ii) structural proper-
ties, i.e., properties concerning the spatial distribution of qualities,
e.g., being polka-dotted or being uniformly dense; and (iii) struc-
tured properties, i.e., properties concerning the topological arrange-
ment of the components of assemblies. Our framework is inspired
by work done in cognitive science, in particular by Ga¨rdenfors’ the-
ory of conceptual spaces, as well as by the notion of image schema,
the latter being a theoretical construct to represent general patterns
and the way they apply to heterogeneous cases. Hopefully, our ap-
proach can also contribute to the understanding of the notions of im-
age schema and conceptual space.
1 Introduction
The formal representation of types is of fundamental relevance for
conceptual modelling and knowledge representation purposes [17].
In the context of engineering design, for example, it is common to
distinguish between artefacts as individual spatio-temporal objects,
and artefact types as complex properties that classify individual arte-
facts. Take, e.g., John’s and Mary’s Fiat500 cars, namely two distinct
objects. Classifying them as artefacts of the type Fiat500 means that
they have a certain shape, weight, height and spatial arrangement of
components that are characteristic of the Fiat500 type. Generalising
from design, the distinction between types and their corresponding
instances apply to disparate categories commonly used in knowledge
representation, e.g., events, among others.
The modelling of types is challenging. Philosophers have been dis-
cussing about the nature of properties since the early days of philo-
sophical disputes, e.g., whether they are mind-independent univer-
sals, or whether they reduce to human ways of categorising phenom-
ena.2 The latter view is at the core of cognitive studies according
to which knowledge acquisition and perception are guided from (or
give rise to) some sort of conceptual structures [4, 20].
Departing from a metaphysical stance, we propose an approach
for the representation of types grounded on cognitive theories. More
specifically, we shall focus on the compound nature of types, namely,
the fact that they are characterised in terms of properties concerning
(i) qualitative aspects (qualities), (ii) the distribution of such qual-
ities across space and/or time (structural properties), or (iii) other
types each one classifying the component of a topologically struc-
tured assembly (structured properties).
The proposed framework is based on a modified version of
Ga¨rdenfors’ theory of conceptual spaces [4], the latter being well-
1 Laboratory for Applied Ontology, ISTC-CNR, Trento, Italy, email:
{masolo,sanfilippo}@loa.istc.cnr.it
2 Roughly, this is the distinction between realists and nominalists concerning
the metaphysics of properties.
suited to represent types as multi-dimensional properties, therefore as
being composed of other properties. The framework is also inspired
by studies on image schemas (e.g., [9, 11]). Even though the latter
are challenging to be captured in detail, there is a relative consensus
in understanding them as sorts of (very general) patterns. Johnson
claims that an image schema is “a dynamic pattern that functions
somewhat like the abstract structure of an image, and thereby con-
nects up a vast range of different experiences that manifest this same
recurring structure” [9, p.2]. According to Langacker, image schemas
are “schematized patterns of activity abstracted from everyday bod-
ily experience, especially pertaining to vision, space, motion, and
force” [11, p.42]. Recent approaches devoted to formal aspects de-
scribe image schemas as “patterns abstracting from spatio-temporal
experiences” [10, p.155], or “mental patterns [that] may be combined
with each other to generate more complex structures” [7, p.21]. We
find image schemas useful theoretical constructs to represent recur-
rent configurations and the way they apply, in different contexts and
with different modalities, to heterogeneous cases. The paper is not a
contribution to clarifying or formalising conceptual spaces or image
schemas; it rather proposes a way to re-elaborate some approaches in
cognitive studies to deal with some knowledge representation issues,
as done, e.g., in [10]. Hopefully, however, we can also shed some
light on the very notions (and limitations) of conceptual space and
image schema.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2 we introduce the main
motivations behind our work. Sect. 3 presents the overall framework
for the representation of qualities. Sect. 4 introduces the machinery
to represent image schemas, which are used in Sect. 5 to represent
patterns of qualities. Sect. 6 presents how patterns may be used to
classify the structural properties of objects according to either time or
space. Finally, Sect. 7 shows how structured properties and complex
types can be represented in the proposed framework.
2 Properties: Types and qualities
In conceptual modelling and knowledge engineering, one commonly
distinguishes between individuals and properties, including a predi-
cation or classification relationship holding between them. Recalling
the example mentioned in the introduction, John’s and Mary’s cars
are two individuals of the same type Fiat500, namely, they are both
classified by the same (complex) property.
Properties bear an intensional nature, i.e., differently from sets,
they do not reduce to their members (extensions). As a consequence,
different properties can classify the same individuals, e.g., being
triangular and being trilateral.3 We distinguish two main kinds of
3 The intensional characterisation of properties is relevant for different
domain-specific scenarios. For example, in the context of design, artefact
types (properties) are not usually specified by listing their instances but by
sets of constraints on relevant characteristics.
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properties, namely types and qualities. Types are compounds of sim-
pler properties. Among these properties there are the qualities that
are the simplest properties, i.e., they are not further decomposable.4
For example, the type Fiat500 is composed by qualities like colour,
shape and weight, among others, which constraint the holistic prop-
erties of Fiat500 cars.
Some types classify assemblies with a specific spatial structure.
Fiat500 cars, for instance, consist of disparate components properly
arranged, e.g., bodywork, engine and wheels. From this perspective,
types do not reduce to compounds of qualities; they are characterised
also in terms of what Armstrong calls structured properties. Simi-
larly, Fiorini and colleagues [21, 22] claim that objects recognition
and categorisation is not only based on the global (aka holistic) fea-
tures that objects manifest, but it is also achieved by identifying ob-
jects’ structures in terms of their parts and the way in which parts are
arranged. A theory of cognition has, therefore, to deal with concep-
tual structures about both holistic and structural information.
From a representational perspective, we propose to model the
type/quality distinction following the similarity space theory of con-
cepts [20] and, in particular, the theory of conceptual spaces intro-
duced by Ga¨rdenfors [4]. The latter theory provides the basic frame-
work to convey the intensional nature of properties, to characterise
the complex nature of types in opposition to qualities, as well as to
compare different types on the basis of their degree of similarity.
Ga¨rdenfors [4] represents concepts—e.g., car, apple, etc.—as re-
gions in a space obtained by composing a given number of do-
mains—e.g., colour, taste, etc. The main reason to decompose a
space into domains is the assumption that the properties in the do-
mains may be attributed to individuals independently of the proper-
ties in other domains; e.g., the weight of an individual is independent
of its temperature or colour.5 Additionally, conceptual spaces have
the peculiarity to be endowed with a distance relation representing
degrees of similarity: the closer are the properties (within a domain),
the more similar are the individuals that exhibit such properties.
The representation of structured properties has proven challenging
in conceptual spaces. In some studies, Fiorini and colleagues [21, 22]
propose a theory of part-whole relations with the purpose of ground-
ing structural relations in cognition. The authors extend Ga¨rdenfors’
theory with structural spaces, which allow for the representation of
the arrangements of the parts within a whole according to certain
configurations.6 However, the proposed framework has a mathemat-
ical and combinatorial nature, whereas the modality according to
which the general patterns apply to specific cases is missing. Further-
more, the spatial structure of objects is not only relevant to represent
how types (and the entities they classify) relate in a part-whole man-
ner. Indeed, it also plays a fundamental role in cases in which types
are characterised by distributional properties [18]. Consider, e.g., a
car-type whose bodywork-type is characterised by a colour lozenge
pattern distributed across the overall instances of the bodywork-type.
In a design perspective, there are no components of the bodywork-
type, each being coloured in a certain way. We consider these prop-
erties, called structural properties, in Sect. 6. It remains unclear how
Fiorini and colleagues would approach this case.
4 The distinction between types and qualities is reminiscent of the one, be-
tween classes and attributes assumed in the field of conceptual modelling,
as, e.g., in the UML class-diagram [17]. Furthermore, some qualities, e.g.,
colours, may be compound, too [4]; we do not consider this aspect here.
5 The domains are not totally independent, i.e., they may be correlated.
6 A point in a structural space represents also the particular configuration of
the parts of an object [21].
3 Qualities
We start by introducing two disjoint kinds of properties: QT(x)
stands for “x is a quality”, and TY(x) stands for “x is a type”. This
distinction roughly reflects the one between simple and compound
properties, i.e., in terms of conceptual spaces, the distinction between
properties (in a domain) and concepts. Qualities are partitioned into
a finite number η of domains Di, e.g., the domains of colour, shape
and weight. Axiom (Ax1) guarantees that all the qualities belong to at
least one domain, while (Ax2) assures that the domains are disjoint.
Ax1 QT(x)↔ ∨ηi=1 Di(x)
Ax2
∧η
i6=j=1(Di(x)→ ¬Dj(x))
For instance, Dcolour(red) states that the quality being red belongs
to the colour-domain, while Dweight(1506kg) that the quality being
1506kg heavy belongs to the weight-domain.7
Every quality domain has a top-quality, i.e., a quality that sub-
sumes all the qualities in the same domain (Ax3). The top-quality of
a domain is noted with the name of the domain, e.g., the top-quality
of Dweight is noted with weight.
Ax3
∧η
i=1 ∃d∀q(Di(q)→ qvd)
We include time and space among the quality domains repre-
sented, respectively, with TM and SP (rather than Dtime and Dspace).
This move is motivated by the fact that time and space are structured
similarly to other domains. However, we attribute them a peculiar
role in the classification relation, since they qualify the classification
(see Sect. 3.1). Recall that some philosophers advocate the ontolog-
ical primacy of time and space. In particular, spatial relations are
claimed to not be reducible to property-grounded relations [8]. We
do not however enter into this discussion; our choice is just aimed
at simplifying the formalisation. Proper qualities, noted as PQT and
simply called qualities, are the qualities that are neither times nor
spaces.
Domains contain comparable qualities. More generally, one can
think of domains as sets of intensionally interlinked qualities. We
introduce a (intensional) subsumption relation between qualities be-
longing to the same domain; see (Ax4), where x v y stands for
“the quality x is intensionally subsumed by the quality y”. Di-
qualities cannot be subsumed by Dj-qualities (with i 6= j). For ex-
ample, scarlet cannot be subsumed by any quality in Dweight; it
could be rather subsumed by red, i.e., scarletvred.
Ax4 xvy → ∨ηi=1(Di(x) ∧ Di(y))
Proper subsumption @ is defined in (Df1). Formally, v is a dis-
crete and atomic partial order: it is reflexive, antisymmetric, tran-
sitive, discrete, and atomic, i.e., every quality subsumes an atomic
quality, a quality that does not properly subsume any other quality
(Df2). Ontologically, atomic qualities represent how the world is;
epistemologically, they represent the maximal resolving power one
disposes of, e.g., the finest resolution of measurement devices.
Df1 x@y , xvy ∧ ¬yvx
Df2 ATQT(x) , QT(x) ∧ ¬∃y(y@x)
Quality domains may be structured according to further relations.
Images schemas often refer to topological or order structures. We
avoid to introduce a full metrics, as usually done for conceptual
spaces, by assuming all domains to be endowed with at least the con-
7 We note individual constants using the typewriter font.
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nection relation ./.8 Ordered domains, e.g., TM, Dweight, or Dlength,
are also (linearly) ordered by the precedence relation ≺. Both con-
nection and precedence hold only among qualities in the same do-
main (Ax5)-(Ax6).
Ax5 x ./ y → ∨ηi=1(Di(x) ∧ Di(y))
Ax6 x ≺ y → ∨ηi=1(Di(x) ∧ Di(y))
Notice that qualities may subsume different (atomic) qualities, there-
fore, times, weights, colors, shapes, etc. are more similar to regions
rather than to points, i.e., v could be interpreted mereologically. In
this perspective, precedence (≺) could be seen as the disjunction of
the relations of meet and before introduced in [1], while the RCC
calculus [23] may be considered for connection (./). The detailed
axiomatic treatment of ≺ and ./ is not relevant for our purposes; we
want just to highlight the possibility to have structural relations (in
addition to subsumption) that are defined in several (or all) quality
domains. As we will see, this aspect is fundamental to characterise
image schemas and patterns.
3.1 Classification
We analyse hereby how qualities can be attributed to individuals.
Since qualities are in the domain of quantification, the standard pred-
ication mechanism of FOL cannot be adopted. It is thus necessary to
introduce a new primitive relation, named classification, and to es-
tablish under what conditions individuals are classified by qualities.
Here we focus on the classification of physical objects (noted OB),
aka continuants or endurants, that are in, and can change through,
space and time, e.g., my car, Barack Obama, the earth, etc. The
framework can be however applied, with minimal tuning, also to
events, aka occurrents, perdurants.
We start from a local notion of direct classification under qualities:
dCFQT(q, x, s, t) stands for “the (proper) quality q directly classifies
the object x as it is at space s and time t”.9 Given the possibility for
objects to change through both time and space, the classification is
spatio-temporally qualified.10 For instance, John can decide to paint
his red volleyball half in orange and half in blue.
Ax7 dCFQT(q, x, s, t)→ PQT(q) ∧ OB(x) ∧ SP(s) ∧ TM(t)
One could interpret dCFQT taking a mereological stance: when
CFQT(q, x, s, t) holds, the entity that has the quality q is not x but a
different object, namely the part of x that, at t, is (exactly) located
at space s. We assume a weaker position that does not equate the
resolution of space with the one of objects, i.e., atomic objects can be
located in non-atomic spaces. We come back to this point in Sect. 7.
By relying on subsumption, (Df3) defines the relation of lo-
cal indirect classification: q indirectly classifies x as it is at space
s and time t when x is locally classified under a quality that
is (properly) subsumed by q. For example, if crimson @ red
and dCFQT(crimson, jball, s, t), then iCFQT(red, jball, s, t)
(jball stands for John’s volleyball).
Df3 iCFQT(q, x, s, t) , ∃z(dCFQT(z, x, s, t) ∧ z@q)
(Df3) captures a disjunctive reading of classification: it is enough
8 Some domains could have alternative topological organisations, e.g., the
colour spindle or the RGB colour wheel, see [4]. In the following we as-
sume domains to have a unique topological organisation.
9 Local classification is much more informative than holistic classification.
10 Classification could also be qualified with proper qualities. For instance,
dCFQT(10kg, x, red, t) would be read as “x weights 10kg as it is at
colour red and time t”. We leave this interesting extension to future work.
to be directly classified under one of the qualities that are sub-
sumed by q to be indirectly classified under q. For instance, suppose
crimson@red and scarlet@red. Both scarlet and crimson enti-
ties are indirectly classified under red. The difference between direct
and indirect classification is cognitively and empirically relevant. Di-
rect classification is the result of a direct observation or sensation
while indirect classification relies on an abstraction process. Objects
can be thus directly classified under non-atomic qualities, i.e., it is
possible to have partial or general information due to the resolution at
which the world is accessed. It is possible, for instance, to know that
John’s volleyball is red without knowing its exact shade. This means
that direct and indirect classification are not mutually exclusive. For
instance, in an empirical context, it is possible to have measurements
about the same object taken with devices that have different resolu-
tions. This is a departure from the Ga¨rdenfors’ theory of conceptual
spaces where an object is always represented by one single point in
a space.11 The general relation of local classification abstracts from
the direct vs. indirect distinction (Df4).
Df4 CFQT(q, x, s, t) , dCFQT(q, x, s, t) ∨ iCFQT(q, x, s, t)
To clarify what the qualification “at space s and time t” means we
introduce the primitive relation of being present: PRE(x, s, t) stands
for “the object x is present at the spatio-temporal region identified
by space s and time t”, i.e., “at t, x occupies s” (Ax8).12 As said, we
focus on spatio-temporal objects, i.e., objects that are present both
in time and space (Ax9). The local classification (at s and t) of an
object requires its presence (at s and t), see (Ax10).
Ax8 PRE(x, s, t)→ OB(x) ∧ SP(s) ∧ TM(t)
Ax9 OB(x)→ ∃st(PRE(x, s, t))
Ax10 CFQT(q, x, s, t)→ PRE(x, s, t)
First note that being present at s and t is not equivalent to being
present at s and being present at t. Second, and more importantly,
being present at s and t is not a disjunctive abstraction from being
present at some atomic subregions of s and t.13 For PRE we have a
sort of conjunctive reading: being present at s and t requires to be
present at every subregion (Ax11).14
Ax11 PRE(x, s, t) ∧ r@s ∧ u@ t→ PRE(x, r, u)
Spatial location (at t) is defined in (Df5).15 (Df6) introduces the
classification of an object as it is at its whole spatial location, i.e., it
determines the global (aka holistic) qualities of an object.
Df5 LSP(x, s, t),PRE(x, s, t) ∧ ¬∃r(PRE(x, r, t) ∧ s@r)
Df6 CFQT(q, x, t) , ∃s(LSP(x, s, t) ∧ CFQT(q, x, s, t))
Extensional relations between qualities can be introduced by rely-
ing on the global CFQT. By (Df7), x⊆y (read as “x is (extension-
ally) included in y”) holds when every entity globally classified at
11 See [5, 14] for some criticisms about this assumption.
12 Here we assume a sort of container-like notion of space. One could substi-
tute spaces with places, spatial entities that are more abstract than spaces
and that can be defined relatively to physical objects, e.g., the top, the in-
terior, etc., see [2]. Similarly for times.
13 As for the characterisation of types (see Sect. 7), approximate localisation
in space-time can be represented by means of rough sets (see [14]).
14 One could think to introduce a conjunctive classification primitive cCF
that behaves similarly to PRE. For instance, cCF(red, x, s, t) would im-
ply a classification by all the color-qualities subsumed by red, e.g.,
cCF(scarlet, x, s, t), cCF(crimson, x, s, t), etc. In Sect. 6 we introduce
structural properties, that, in our opinion, are stronger tools to characterise
properties that require an object to have different qualities of the same kind.
15 The location is unique only when specific constraints on SP hold.
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any time by the quality x is also globally classified, at the same time,
by y. For example, assume that all the red entities in the domain of
quantification also weigh 1kg, then we have red⊆1kg. (Th1) can be
trivially proved. However, the vice versa does not hold. This makes
explicit the intensional nature of v. Furthermore, different qualities
may have the same extensions, that is, x⊆y ∧ y⊆x does not imply
x = y. Finally, note that empty-qualities, i.e., qualities that classify
no object, are included in, but not subsumed by, all the qualities.
Df7 x⊆y , PQT(x) ∧ ∀zt(CFQT(x, z, t)→ CFQT(y, z, t))
Th1 xvy → x⊆y
4 Image schemas
As outlined in [16], images schemas are very abstract spatial struc-
tures with qualitative (topological) characteristics, i.e., they are not
precisely characterised in terms of (geometric) magnitude or shape.
This makes image schemas “highly flexible preconceptual and prim-
itive patterns” [16, p.217] that can be instantiated in different con-
texts. They are ‘malleable’ enough “to fit many similar, but different,
situations that manifest a recurring underlying structure” [9, p.30].
Our idea is to capture these abstract structures by relying on the
qualitative relations of connection (./) and order (≺) defined in the
quality domains, i.e., intuitively, an image schema classifies tupl s of
qualities satisfying structural constraints expressible via ./ and ≺.
Technically, image schemas are represented by higher-level quali-
ties, qualities of tuples of homogeneous qualities. As we will see, this
approach generalises the one in [4] where ‘patterns’ of locations of
objects along a quality domain are represented as higher-level prop-
erties (sets of tuples in product spaces).
Tuples, represented by TU, are introduced into the domain of quan-
tification. They are disjoint from objects, as well as from qualities
and types. Tuple variables and tuple constants are noted with u¯, v¯,
etc. Tuples are formally characterised by following the strategy usu-
ally exploited to reify relationships in FOL [6]. To cope with a first-
order formalisation, tuples are assumed to have a maximal length `.
We thus introduce ` primitive binary relations−◦i, where x−◦i u¯
refers to the ith element x of the tuple u¯, see (Ax12) and (Ax13).
Axioms (Ax14) and (Ax15) assure that tuples have at least two ele-
ments, and when tuples have the ith element, they also have all the
previous elements. (Ax16) establishes the identity criterion for tu-
ples, i.e., two tuples are identical if they have the same elements in
the same order. It is easy to prove the unicity of the tuple u¯ such that
x1. . . xn−◦ u¯ (with n≤`), see (Df8), that is noted 〈x1, . . . , xn〉. As
expected, the same element can appear in different positions of the
same tuple, e.g., 〈a, b〉, 〈a, b, a, a〉 or 〈a, a〉 are all valid and differ-
ent tuples. (Df9) establishes when two tuples have the same length,
while TU 6= identifies the tuples with all different elements (Df10).
The subsumption relation between tuples is defined in (Df11).
Df8 x1. . . xn−◦ u¯ , ∧ni=1(xi−◦i u¯) ∧∧`i=n+1¬∃x(x−◦i u¯)
Df9 u¯ ≡L v¯ , TU(u¯) ∧∧`i=1(∃x(x−◦i u¯)↔ ∃y(y−◦i v¯))
Df10 TU 6=(u¯) , TU(u¯)∧
∧`
i 6=j=1∀xy(x−◦iu¯ ∧ y−◦ju¯→ x 6=y)
Df11 u¯vTU v¯ , u¯ ≡L v¯∧∧`i=1∀xy(x−◦i u¯∧ y−◦i v¯ → xvy)
Ax12
∧`
i=1 ∀xu¯(x−◦i u¯→ TU(u¯))
Ax13
∧`
i=1 ∀xyu¯(x−◦i u¯ ∧ y−◦i u¯→ x=y)
Ax14 TU(u¯)→ ∨`i 6=j=1 ∃xy(x−◦i u¯ ∧ y−◦j u¯)
Ax15 TU(u¯)→ ∧`i=2(∃x(x−◦i u¯)→ ∃y(y−◦i-1 u¯))
Ax16 u¯= v¯ ↔ TU(u¯) ∧∧`i=1 ∀x(x−◦i u¯↔ x−◦i v¯)
For our purposes, it is important to individuate tuples of qualities
belonging to the same domain, i.e., [Di]TU-tuples (see (Df13) where
− is defined in (Df12)), e.g., [TM]TU-, [SP]TU-, or [Dcolor]TU-tuples.
DTU abstracts from the specific quality domain (Df14). Hedblom and
colleagues [7] define paths as “collection[s] of two or more sites,
which are connected by successor relationships” [7, p.27]. DTU-
tuples can be seen as paths where sites are qualities (locations of
objects) in a domain and the successor relation is captured by the or-
der of the elements in the tuple. For this reason, we will use the terms
path and DTU-tuple interchangeably.
Df12 x− u¯ , ∨`i=1 x−◦i u¯
Df13 [Di]TU(u¯) , TU(u¯) ∧ ∀x(x− u¯→ Di(x))
Df14 DTU(u¯) ,
∨η
i=1[Di]TU(u¯)
Image schemas, represented by IM, are disjoint from all the other
kinds of ntities, QT included, i.e., QT collects only the qualities
that directly classify objects. Image schema variables (constants) are
noted with ι, σ, etc. (using small caps). We assume (tuples of) qual-
ities to be static, i.e., the direct classification dCFIM between image
schemas and tuples of qualities does not need to be spatio-temporally
qualified. In addition, we assume image schemas to classify only ho-
mogeneous qualities (Ax17).
Ax17 dCFIM(σ, u¯)→ IM(σ) ∧ DTU(u¯)
Intuitively, image schemas capture general structural constraints.
This idea can be formalised by means of constraints like (Ax18)-
(Ax20), which characterise, respectively, the image schema 3MC of
triples of mutually connected qualities, the image schema PWC of
pairwise connected qualities, and the image schema INC of increas-
ing qualities. These constraints do not refer to specific quality do-
mains, they involve only shared structural relations. Image schemas
are thus cross-domains. For example, 〈1kg, 2kg, 4kg〉 and 〈1m, 7m〉
are both instances, with different length, of INC.
Ax18 dCFIM(3MC, u¯)↔ ∃xyz(xyz−◦ u¯∧x./y∧ y./z ∧ z ./x)
Ax19 dCFIM(PWC, u¯)↔ ∧`−1i=1∀xy(x−◦iu¯∧ y−◦i+1u¯→ x./y)
Ax20 dCFIM(INC, u¯)↔ ∧`−1i=1∀xy(x−◦iu¯ ∧ y−◦i+1u¯→ x≺y)
Note that the form of these constraints—for instance, the fact that
they involve only the ≺ and ./ primitives—can be regulated only
at the meta-level. The structural nature of image schemas is thus
only poorly captured by our FOL framework. A second problem con-
cerns the intensional nature of image schemas. Ga¨rdenfors builds pat-
terns in a purely mathematical manner as subsets of product spaces.
Accordingly, Ga¨rdenfors’ patterns have a purely extensional nature.
Vice versa one could think, for instance, that the 3-long patterns
being equidistant and forming the same angles defined on triples
of (punctual) spaces are co-extensional but different. In principle,
our framework is compatible with this intensional stance. However,
the formulas that characterise the being equidistant and forming the
same angles patterns are (in Euclidean geometry) logically equiv-
alent. One should then assume the way patterns are characterised
through axioms to impact the identity of patterns. The proper char-
acterisation of the intension of image schemas is left for future work.
Our image schemas are similar to predicates that apply to tuples
of qualities. In this sense they are close to the patterns of Ga¨rdenfors
[4]. There are however some important differences that show that our
image schemas are more abstract and more flexible than patterns.
First, in [4], all the instances of a pattern are tuples of a product
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space obtained from a given domain. For instance, following [4],
lighter and shorter are two different patterns. Vice versa, the
image schema INC is flexible enough to apply both to weights and
lengths. Sect. 5 shows how the relations being lighter than and be-
ing shorter than are obtainable by applying the image schema INC
to weights and lengths, respectively. Second, according to [4], all tu-
ples instantiating a pattern have the same length. We have already
shown that this does not hold for image schemas, which may be in-
deed cyclic (see, e.g., [7]) or—using the terminology of Galton [3]—
open, i.e., without a pre-established length.
5 Patterns
We introduce hereby patterns that result from the instantiation of im-
age schemas in given contexts. Intuitively, a context localises an im-
age schema in the sense that it constrains the qualities the schema can
apply to. We represent contexts by DTU-tuples and patterns (noted
with PT) by couples 〈σ, c¯〉 where IM(σ) and DTU(c¯), i.e., they are
image schemas together with contexts of application. Pattern vari-
ables and constants are noted pˆ, qˆ, etc. The context c¯ constrains the
schema σ in the sense that it filters out all the tuples classified by
σ that are not subsumed by c¯, see (Df15).16 Furthermore, c¯ sets the
length of the pattern, i.e., by (Df11), all the instances of 〈σ, c¯〉 have
the length of c¯. Patterns have then a fixed lenght.
Df15 dCFPT(〈σ, c¯〉, u¯) , PT(〈σ, c¯〉) ∧ dCFIM(σ, u¯) ∧ u¯vTU c¯
Following Ga¨rdenfors, our patterns can be used to classify tu-
ples of objects, i.e., to represent internal relations among ob-
jects (Df16).17 For instance, 〈INC, 〈weight, weight〉〉 represents be-
ing lighter than, while 〈INC, 〈lenght, lenght〉〉 represents being
shorter than.
Df16 dCF(〈σ, c¯〉, x¯, t) , PT(〈σ,c¯〉)∧ c¯≡Lx¯∧∃u¯(dCFPT(〈σ,c¯〉, u¯)∧∧`
i=1∀ux(u−◦i u¯ ∧ x−◦i x¯→ CFQT(u, x, t))
The subsumption relation between patterns is defined in (Df17).
Note that (Df17) requires the identity of image schemas, i.e., only in-
stances of the same schema are comparable. For instance, by requir-
ing tuples to have specific color-qualities, 〈PWC,〈red,blue,red〉〉 is
subsumed by 〈PW ,〈color,color,color〉〉.
Df17 〈σ1, c¯1〉vPT 〈σ2, c¯2〉 , σ1=σ2 ∧ c¯1vTU c¯2
To sum up, a pattern 〈σ, c¯〉 captures the same structure of an image
schema σ but it is less abstract than σ because (i) it has a fixed-length
(set by c¯); and (ii) it focuses on the (DTU-)tuples subsumed by c¯.
6 Structural properties
With the technical and conceptual machinery previously introduced,
we now approach the representation of structural properties of ob-
jects, i.e., properties that take into account the way a pattern of qual-
ities is exhibited by an object. Here we consider temporal and spatial
ways (aka modalities) of exhibiting patterns. Roughly, our idea is that
an object has a structural quality when it exhibits a pattern of qual-
ities temporally or spatially arranged according to a second pattern.
16 Note that dCFPT(〈σ, c¯〉, c¯) does not always hold.
17 An internal relation R is a relation such that the truth-value of R(a, b)
depends exclusively on similarity judgments along quality domains con-
cerning the objects a and b only. See [13] for more details. Note that, our
image schemas, through contexts and patterns, can apply to objects. This
seems to contrast with the position in [11, 7], where images schemas, in
particular the PATH schema, only apply to events or activities.
Structural properties, noted with SPR, are represented by couples of
patterns 〈qˆ, aˆ〉, where aˆ constrains the (temporal or spatial) arrange-
ment of the qualities constrained by qˆ. We assume the context of aˆ to
have the same length of the context of qˆ and to be (i) a [TM]TU-tuple
or (ii) a [SP]TU-tuple. Structural properties with a temporal arrange-
ment (case (i)) are called historical properties (see [15]), while the
ones with a spatial arrangement (case (ii)) are called distributional
properties (see [18]). (Df18) defines subsumption between structural
properties.
Df18 〈qˆ1, aˆ1〉vSPR 〈qˆ2, aˆ2〉 , SPR(〈qˆ1, aˆ1〉) ∧ SPR(〈qˆ2, aˆ2〉) ∧
qˆ1vPT qˆ2 ∧ aˆ1vPT aˆ2
The classification of an object under an historical property is de-
fined in (Df19): at t, the object x is classified by 〈qˆ, aˆ〉 (where aˆ is a
temporal arrangement) when, before t, following the time aˆ-path a¯,
the object x holistically follows the quality qˆ-path q¯.18According to
(Df19), historical properties hold in virtue of the temporal distribu-
tion of the qualities the classified object had in its past history.19
Df19 tCF(〈qˆ, aˆ〉, x, t) , SPR(〈qˆ, aˆ〉) ∧ [TM]PT(aˆ) ∧
∃q¯a¯(dCFPT(qˆ, q¯) ∧ dCFPT(aˆ, a¯) ∧ TU 6=(a¯) ∧∧`
i=1∀qa(q−◦i q¯ ∧ a−◦i a¯→ (CFQT(q, x, a) ∧ a≺ t)))
The classification of an object under a distributional property is
defined in (Df20): at t, the object x is classified under 〈qˆ, aˆ〉 (where
aˆ is a spatial arrangement) when, following the space aˆ-path a¯, the
object x locally follows the quality qˆ-path q¯. According to (Df20),
distributional properties hold in virtue of the spatial distribution of
the qualities of the classified object.
Df20 sCF(〈qˆ, aˆ〉, x, t) , SPR(〈qˆ, aˆ〉) ∧ [SP]PT(aˆ) ∧
∃q¯a¯(dCFPT(qˆ, q¯) ∧ dCFPT(sˆ, a¯) ∧ TU 6=(a¯) ∧∧`
i=1∀qa(q−◦i q¯ ∧ a−◦i a¯→ CFQT(q, x, a, t)))
Intuitively, the same object can be classified under a structural
property by following different (cognitive) procedures, i.e., by fol-
lowing different paths. For instance, consider the distributional prop-
erty 〈〈PWC, 〈color, color〉〉, 〈PWC, 〈space, space〉〉〉, i.e., having
two connected colors at connected spaces. Consider 〈red, orange〉,
〈orange, red〉, 〈s1, s2〉 and 〈s2, s1〉 (where these colors and these
spaces are assumed to be connected). If an object is (at t) red
at s1 and orange at s2 then, according to (Df20), we can follow
〈red, orange〉 according to 〈s1, s2〉, or 〈orange, red〉 according to
〈s2, s1〉. Thus, sCF concerns only how the object is at given spaces,
not how it is (cognitively) explored. However, assume now the ob-
ject is (at t) also yellow at space s3 (with s2 ./ s3). This object is
classified by the above distributional property by following the paths
〈red, orange〉 according to 〈s1, s2〉 or, alternatively, by following
the paths 〈orange, yellow〉 according to 〈s2, s3〉, i.e., the object ex-
hibits the same structural property at different spaces. To avoid that,
one could assure that the spatial location of the object (or its visible
surface) is wholly covered by the spatial path. Analogous considera-
tions hold for tCF.
7 Types
Ga¨rdenfors’s concepts are compounds of properties (belonging to
different domains), i.e., they are regions in the multi-dimensional
space composed by the domains. We extend this notion of concept
(and conceptual space) by characterising our types in terms of both
18 Where [Di]PT(〈σ, c¯〉) , [Di]TU(c¯).
19 Clearly these properties are relevant also to characterize events (even
though in this case the classification is not temporally qualified).
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qualities (QT-instances) and structural properties (SPR-instances).
The properties in the union of QT and SPR are called features. Notice
that, even though distributional properties depend on how a given
quality pattern is spatially arranged, they are still holistic, i.e., they
apply to the whole objects. At the end of the section, we add (i) struc-
tured properties (to be distinct from structural ones), i.e., following
Armstrong, properties that hold in virtue of the way the classified
object is mereologically structured into components of given types;
and (ii) relational properties, i.e., properties that hold in virtue of the
way the classified object connects with the environment.
Characterisation—CH(x, y) reads as “the type x is characterised
by the feature (quality or structural property) y”—represents the link
between types and features. Types have a multi-dimensional nature,
they are characterised in terms of at least two, but usually several,
domains (Ax21), where [Di]SPR(〈qˆ, aˆ〉) , [Di]PT(qˆ).20
Ax21 TY(x)→ ∃yz(CH(x, y) ∧ CH(x, z) ∧∨η
i=1((Di(y) ∨ [Di]SPR(y)) ∧ ¬Di(z) ∧ ¬[Di]SPR(z)))
The features of types are not ordered, types just cluster features
(belonging to different domains). Indeed, these features are not nec-
essarily atomic (see (Df2)), e.g., the Fiat500 type can be charac-
terised by the red colour even though the colour-domain could con-
tain more specific shades of red, like crimson, scarlet, etc.
Following the classical theory of types, one can assume that the
features of a type express necessary and sufficient conditions to be
classified by the type. In this classical perspective, the classification
of an object by a type reduces to its classification by all its features.
Structural qualities slightly complicate the scenario because depend-
ing on the kind of arrangement (temporal vs. spatial) one needs to
consider tCF or sCF. The definition of the classification of an object
under a type (CFTY) is given in (Df21).
Df21 CFTY(x, y, t) , TY(x) ∧
∀z(CH(x, z)→ ((QT(z)→ CFQT(z, y, t)) ∨
([TM]SPR(z)→ tCF(z, y, t)) ∨
([SP]SPR(z)→ sCF(z, y, t)))
There exist several possibilities to weaken the classical view on
classification under types. For instance, one may introduce two
characterisation-like relations to grasp the distinction between nec-
essary and optional features of types, or introduce a ‘weight’ for
each feature (as done for concepts in conceptual spaces). One may
also distinguish the set of features sufficient to be classified by a type
from the set of features sufficient to not be classified by a type.21
Classification could also rely on the metrics of the domains (and on
the metric of the overall space), i.e., one could see our notion of type
as an extension of the one of prototype (see [24]) and capture clas-
sification (categorisation) on the basis of the distance between the
qualities of the object and the features of the type.
Types can be organised by means of subsumption vTY (Df22).
Given the definition of vSPR (Df18), vTY is grounded in the sub-
sumption between qualities, i.e., following Ga¨rdenfors, the way types
are organised mainly depends on the organisation of qualities. Note
20 (Ax21) excludes the possibility to characterise a type in terms of both a Di-
quality and a [Di]SPR-property. This could be criticized. For instance, one
could assume that an object with a given colour pattern could also have an
holistic colour, i.e., the (conventional) colour of the whole object emerges
from the colour pattern. This situation could be represented by providing a
link between colour distributional properties and colour qualities, i.e., the
classification under a colour quality would be inferred by the one under the
corresponding strctural property. This is another interesting point that we
do not address here.
21 This approach can be represented by means of rough sets [19].
that a type characterised by a (structural) quality can subsume only
types characterised by (structural) qualities (in the same domain). It
is trivial to prove that CFTY is closed under vTY (Th2), i.e., indirect
classification under types is encapsulated into CFTY.
Df22 xvTY y , TY(y) ∧
∀z(CH(y, z)→ ∃w(CH(x,w) ∧ (wvz ∨ wvSPR z))
Th2 CFTY(x, y, t) ∧ xvTY z → CFTY(z, y, t)
As observed by Fiorini and colleagues [21], object recognition and
categorisation are grounded not only in holistic properties but also in
the identification of parts of the objects and the way these parts are
structured. The number, the types, and the arrangement of parts are
all essential aspects to found structural similarities between objects,
an idea very close to the one of structured properties of Armstrong.
We start to sketch the formalisation of structured properties by ex-
tending the notion of pattern’s context: patterns have the form 〈σ, c¯〉
where c¯ is now a DTU-tuple or a tuple of types. Structured proper-
ties, noted with TPR, have the same form of structural properties, i.e.,
〈pˆ, aˆ〉, but now pˆ is a pattern with a type-context.22 We then con-
sider a temporary parthood relation defined on objects: PART(x, y, t)
stands for “the object x is part of the object y at time t” (see [12]
for a FOL axiomatisation). Notice that, by excluding the possibility
to have spatially co-localised objects, PART can be reduced to spatial
inclusion.23 The local classification by the type p of the object x as
it is at space s and time t is the classification under p of the part of x
that, at t, is exactly located at s (Df23).24
Df23 CFTY(p, x, s, t) ,
∃y(PART(y, x, t) ∧ LSP(y, s, t) ∧ CFTY(p, y, t))
The classification of an object under a structured property is de-
fined in (Df24): at t, the object x is classified under 〈qˆ, aˆ〉 (where
aˆ is a spatial arrangement and qˆ a type-pattern) when, following the
space aˆ-path a¯, the object x mereologically follows the type qˆ-path
q¯, i.e., its components selected by the spaces in a¯ are instances of the
correspondent types in q¯.25
Df24 mCF(〈qˆ, aˆ〉, x, t) , TPR(〈qˆ, aˆ〉) ∧ [SP]PT(aˆ) ∧
∃q¯a¯(dCFPT(qˆ, q¯) ∧ dCFPT(aˆ, a¯) ∧ TU 6=(a¯) ∧∧`
i=1∀qa(q−◦i q¯ ∧ a−◦i a¯→ CFTY(q, x, a, t)))
Our approach differs from the one of Fiorini and colleagues
[21, 22] for two main reasons. First, in [21, 22] objects are always
though as completely specified, i.e., as already noticed, an object
is represented by a point in a conceptual space. By extending con-
ceptual spaces with structural spaces an object comes already with
all its parts (of given types) and the position of these parts with re-
spect to the whole. Vice versa our framework can represent partial
information, including mereological one, about objects. Second, and
more importantly, [21, 22] focus on the representation of structural
information in the framework of conceptual spaces where the similar-
22 Whether and how≺ or ./ can be defined on types is not taken into account
in this paper. The only image schema that applies to tuples of types is the
one that allows to built the paths.
23 E.g., PART(x, y, t) , ∃sr(LSP(x, s, t) ∧ LSP(y, r, t) ∧ svr).
24 CFTY(p, x, s, t) may also be introduced without reference to parts. The
case of types characterised only in terms of qualities is a straightfoward
generalisation of (Df20). The case of types characterised in terms of struc-
tural (and structured) properties requires to change (Df20) to assure the
spaces considered in the tuple a¯ to be included in s.
25 Similarly to what noticed about (Df20) at the end of Sect. 6, (Df24) does
not guarantee x to be an assembly of only the components selected by
a¯, i.e., x may have components not considered by the structured property
〈qˆ, aˆ〉.
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ity relation is central. The construction mechanism behind structural
spaces is purely mathematical, i.e., structural spaces are the mathe-
matical product of the spaces that represent the parts and the ones that
represent the whole-centered position of the parts. Our approach is
more explicative, since it makes explicit the dependence of structural
and structured properties from the instantiation of images schemas,
namely, it offers a basis to explain structural similarities in terms of
image schemas.
A relational property of an object x can be seen as a structured
property of an object (a system) y that has x among its components,
i.e., it represents the way x is linked to the other components of y.
The relational classification of objects under structured properties is
defined in (Df25).26
Df25 rCF(〈qˆ, aˆ〉, x, t) , TPR(〈qˆ, aˆ〉) ∧ [SP]PT(aˆ) ∧
∃yrq¯a¯(dCFPT(qˆ,q¯) ∧ dCFPT(aˆ,a¯) ∧ TU 6=(a¯) ∧
LSP(x,r,t) ∧ PART(x, y, t) ∧ r− a¯ ∧∧`
i=1∀qa(q−◦i q¯ ∧ a−◦i a¯→ CFTY(q, y, a, t)))
(Df21) and (Df22) can then be extended to include structured
and relational properties among the features that characterise types.
These properties are fundamental to model assembled artefacts.
8 Conclusions
We presented a formal approach for the representation of compound
types by modifying and extending Ga¨rdenfors’ theory of conceptual
spaces. This is done by considering the notion of image schema and
by generalising Ga¨rdenfors’ approach to patterns. In our framework,
image schemas represent abstract (topological) structures, whereas
patterns apply image schemas to specific quality-domains. Patterns
are then used to specify either the historical properties of objects,
namely constraints over their evolution in time, or objects’ distribu-
tional or structured properties.
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Symposium VII
The power of passion: Human
reason and its emotional
foundations
Emotions hold powerful sway over most people – on some accounts, even (or perhaps especially)
psychopaths. Otherwise “reasonable” people quit jobs, change careers, seek out affairs with much older or
much younger persons, leave seemingly contented and successful relationships, have mid-life crises, take
serious or even life-threatening risks, leap into the unknown, forswear their stable certainties: all on the basis
of their feelings. People are dependent on powerful emotions for their mental well being, and yet powerful
emotions are intimately bound up with – and one of the driving forces behind – most if not all mental health
disorders. Emotions provide the reasons for people to get out of bed each morning, and likewise the reasons
why some people take their own lives. Given the power they wield, it is little wonder that emotions sit so
uncomfortably with people’s view of themselves as “reasonable” creatures.
A long-standing tradition in philosophical rationalism holds that emotions and reason are quite different
things, if not in fact diametrically opposed. Such a view informs the attempt some would make to distinguish
emotions from motivations and to claim for example that AI systems need to take account only of the latter,
not the former. The empiricist tradition has long challenged the rationalist view, however, while recent work
in the enactive tradition has pushed the idea that, just as agent is ultimately inseparable from (or continuous
with) environment, so, too, are emotions inseparabl from reason. Indeed, many would claim that
evolutionarily ancient emotions provide the necessary foundations for modern reason and that reason
without emotions is not just unmotivated but no reason at all. Such a view has important consequences for
how one builds robots and other AI systems and whether one judges them to be reasoning or not. It has
implications for how cognitive science builds models of mind. And it suggests the outline of a path from
low-level neuroscience to high-level intellectual activity.
This symposium seeks both to encourage theoretical discussions about the consequences of giving
emotions and affect a more central role in the sciences of the mind and to report the available empirical work
to date, with equal weight to each. It seeks to address both the big questions of why people do the “crazy”
things they do and the small questions of what makes one model better than another.
Joel Parthemore, Department of Cognitive Neuroscience and Philosophy, University of Sko¨vde
Dean Petters, School of Social Sciences, Birmingham City University
David Moffat, School of Engineering and Built Environment, Glasgow Caledonian University
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The regress-stopping role of affective valence
Bryony Pierce 1
1
Abstract.  This paper argues that affective phenomenology plays
an essential role in reasoning, grounding reasons for action and
rendering  evaluative  concepts  subjectively  meaningful.
Experience of affective responses to commodities, situations and
anticipated  potential  outcomes  allows  goal-setting  to  track
changing physiological changes indicative of our current needs
so that behaviour can be flexible and adaptive.  Values attributed
as a result of affective responses are stored and relied upon in
subsequent  reasoning  until  updated  by  new  information
conveyed, again, through affective experience.  The qualitative
nature  of  affective  experience  grounds  reasons  for  action,
performing a regress-stopping role, that is,  stopping a possible
infinite regress of whys when justifying actions or decisions to
oneself.  This is a distinct type of grounding from the grounding
in biological  utility  Dickinson & Balleine’s Hedonic  Interface
Theory  claims  affective  experience  provides;  it  concerns  the
subjective sense one has of being justified in pursuing a course
of action, rather than offering an evolutionary explanation of the
origins of the motivation to act.  It is also distinct from the kind
of grounding discussed by Smithies or Chudnoff in relying on
affective  content  rather  than  perceptual  content  or  cognitive
phenomenology.  
1 GROUNDING REASONS FOR ACTION
We  think  of  our  reasons  as  grounded,  from  a  first-person
perspective and when contemplating other people’s reasons for
action.  That is to say that certain facts concerning reasons are
taken to obtain in virtue of something more fundamental, in a
relation of non-causally-dependent justification.  I will argue that
conscious  experience  of  affective  valence  plays  an  important
regress-stopping role in (human) action production.  
According  to  Dickinson  &  Balleine’s  Hedonic  Interface
Theory  (HIT),  the  function  of  consciousness  is  to  act  as  an
interface between cognition and emotion, enabling goal-directed
action [1,8].  Affective responses are key in their account.  They
continually  update  values,  enabling  goals  to  be  set  that  are
responsive  to  changing  physiological  needs  in  a  changing
environment,  so  that  behaviour  can  be  flexible  and  adaptive,
unlike stimulus-response behaviour.  HIT’s claim is,  however,
qualified  to  include  the  possibility  that  some  functional
equivalent  of  consciousness  could  have  enabled  goal-directed
action.  But the need for reasons for action to be grounded, from
a subjective point of view, so that they make sense to us, allows
a  stronger  claim  to  be  made:  that  consciousness  itself  is
necessary  for  goal-directed  action  that  can  be  judged
(subjectively)  to  be  performed  for  reasons,  by  those  able  to
explicitly  evaluate  goals.   This  claim  is  about  human  goal-
1 Dept. of Philosophy, Univ. of Bristol, BS, UK. Email: 
bryony.pierce@bristol.ac.uk.
directed  action,  though  I  do  not  rule  out  the  possibility  of  a
similar role for consciousness in some other animals.
 When speaking of a functional equivalent of HIT’s interface,
one  important  function  is  allowing  information  about  felt
emotional states to be accessible to reasoning.  It is not enough
for  action  production  to  be  considered  merely  in  behavioural
terms,  and  so  I  reject  the  idea  that  some  (non-conscious)
functional equivalent of consciousness, such as a non-conscious
transducer, could ground value during the reasoning process, as
Dickinson suggests could have been the case [8, p. 78].  This is
because, in humans, at least, consciousness performs a regress-
stopping function.  
 I  offer  two  arguments  in  support  of  my  claim  that  this
function cannot be fulfilled by a non-conscious transducer:
1. The way the interface would process information during
reasoning  would  render  the  functional  equivalent  of
consciousness  indistinguishable  from consciousness,  and
so it would qualify as consciousness.
2. A non-conscious transducer cannot confer meaningfulness
to information and thus lend perceptible motivational force
to (abstract) reasons.
 Argument  (1) relies  on the premise that,  were the functional
criteria  to  be  met,  those  for  being  a  subject  of  conscious
experience would also be satisfied.  The functional criteria, in
my account, include the requirement that subjects be capable of
recognising  reasons  as  meaningful  and  sufficient  to  justify
action.   Subjects  must  be  able  to  assess  different  courses  of
action on the basis of their value, so that they are able to form
preferences capable  of motivating action,  and,  in  my account,
possession  of  the  concept  of  value  requires  the  capacity  for
processing information about affective experience.  A functional
equivalent  of  consciousness  would  need  to  be  able  to  allow
judgements  about  relative  value  to  be  made  on  the  basis  of
affective experience, and emotions would need to be represented
in  abstract  form  in  order  to  be  able  to  feature  in  reasoning.
Subjects  would  both  possess  a  concept  of  relative  value  and
experience  affective  responses  with  motivational  force,  which
they  could  report,  so  it  would  seem  to  them  that  they  were
conscious: their mental states would be indistinguishable from
consciousness as we understand it.
From the first-person perspective, a functional equivalent of
consciousness,  as specified above,  would meet the criteria for
being  conscious  in  virtue  of  its  indistinguishability  from
consciousness simpliciter.  In this case, I argue that it would be
consciousness.   Dennett questions whether there seeming to be
phenomenology  is  sufficient  for  there  really  to  be
phenomenology [7,  p.  366],  but I  agree with Strawson [20,  p.
113] that, “for there to seem to be phenomenology is for there to
be phenomenology” and that in the case of experience, we “can’t
open up the is/seems gap”.  For there to seem to be experience of
affective responses with the relevant function is for there to be
something it is like from a first-person perspective that, since it
is  indistinguishable  from  conscious  experience  of  those
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responses, must qualify as conscious experience.  Anything less
than  seeming  to  experience  affective  responses  consciously
would fail  to be a functional equivalent of consciousness – it
would  be  mere  (ungrounded)  information  processing,  as  in  a
computer program that reported responses without access to the
underlying meaning.  From a third-person perspective, the two
cases (subjects with consciousness or a functional equivalent of
consciousness)  would  be  indistinguishable,  if  the  subject
reported having conscious affective experiences.  There would
be  scope  for  scepticism  about  whether  subjects  really  were
conscious, but no more so in the case of reports from those with
a functional equivalent of consciousness than from those who
were conscious, all other things being equal, as the phenomenal
character of affective experience has a function, so features in
either case.  I say more to defend this claim, and argument (2),
below. 
2 DIFFERENT WAYS OF GROUNDING 
REASONS 
I will now distinguish the regress-stopping sense of grounding
reasons from other ways of grounding reasons.  I want to start by
making a distinction between grounding in the sense of being
explicable  in  terms  of  a  biological  or  other  function  and
grounding in the sense of having meaning, as in Searle’s Chinese
room thought  experiment  [17].2  The  Chinese room argument
distinguishes  between  the  ability  to  manipulate  symbols
according to syntactic rules and the ability to understand their
meaning in the sense of their semantic content.  I make a further
distinction between semantic content in the sense of reference to
that which is external to the symbol system and the subjective
meaningfulness of information – its affective content.  The word
‘home’,  for  example,  can  simply  refer  to  the  building  that  is
one’s residence, or convey also the emotional relation in which
one stands to a place, a feeling of ease or attachment, perhaps.
Affective content plays an important role in my argument about
grounding reasons for action.
When we say that reasons or underlying desires are grounded
in biological  states,  we are  explaining their  function within a
biological system or telling an evolutionary story about why they
exist  or  are  useful.   In  HIT,  consciousness  is  necessary  to
communicate  information  about  physiological  states  to
cognition,  so  that  it  is  available  in  means-end  reasoning.
“desires must… be grounded in something that the agent cares
about’, the desires of any animal ‘must, ultimately, be grounded
in its biology” [1, p. 81], and agents only know what to desire
once  the  effects  of  events  on  physiological  states  are  made
explicit through conscious affective responses.  The role of these
responses is key, yet reasons are  grounded,  for Dickinson and
Balleine, in underlying biological functions.  This is one type of
grounding, but if we are to find reasons for action compelling,
another  type  of  grounding  is  necessary:  grounding  in  the
affective valence of subjective experience.
2 In Searle’s thought experiment, a monoglot English-speaking person
follows  instructions  in  English  to  manipulate  Chinese  symbols  to
produce correct responses to questions in Chinese, but Searle argues that
this does not show that the English-speaking person thereby understands
Chinese,  or,  by  analogy,  that  a  computer  understands  the  strings  of
symbols it manipulates, even if it can simulate understanding.
There  are  two main  problems in  Dickinson  and  Balleine’s
account that I will address specifically:
1. The problem  of  meaningfulness:  the  level  at  which
grounding takes place is in physiological states, and these
lack any intrinsic meaning.
2. The problem  of  circularity:  “conscious  experience”  is
presupposed, and although they address this by weakening
their  claim  so  that  it  is  only  consciousness or  some
functional equivalent that is said to be necessary for goal-
directed action, this solution is unsatisfactory.
 I will return to the problem of circularity after introducing and
discussing  the  problem  of  meaningfulness.   The  fact  that
conscious experience might have adaptive value for a biological
organism and the question of how symbols can refer to anything
external to the symbol system are only indirectly related to how
a person can justify reasons, from a subjective point of view.  I
will examine the role meaningfulness, in the sense of affective
content,  plays  in  grounding  reasons  for  action,  that  is,  its
significance when defending the claim that consciousness has a
regress-stopping function.
Harnad  takes  the  symbol  grounding  problem  to  be  the
problem  of  how  we  can  move  from  abstract  symbolic
representations,  such as  words describing objects,  to  the non-
symbolic (the objects described) in a way that stops the infinite
regress of explanations of the meaning of symbols in terms of
other intrinsically meaningless symbols [9].  Although concerned
with meaning, it is distinct from the problem of meaningfulness:
the  problem of  how symbols  can  have subjective  meaning  in
terms of incorporating motivational force.  Harnad proposed a
solution  to  the  symbol  grounding  problem  by  grounding
meaning in non-symbolic sensorimotor function  [10, 7.2]:
Hence grounding means sensorimotor grounding: Symbols 
must be grounded in the capacity to discriminate and identify 
the objects, events and states of affairs that they stand for, 
from their sensory projections
This solution provides information with a functional application,
and  makes  the  move  from a  symbolic  form to  some kind  of
physical  instantiation,  in  the  form  of  the  relation  between
sensorimotor activity and objects of perception.  An important
further question, in the context of the role of consciousness in
goal-directed  action,  is  how  information-carrying  strings  of
abstract  symbols  taken  to  be  reasons  for  action  acquire
meaningfulness to the agent, such that the agent deems them to
be  compelling  and  feels  justified  in  acting  upon  them.   This
meaningfulness is more than a relation to biological utility or to
something  external  to  the  system  of  symbols,  although  it
involves both.  It additionally provides compelling motivational
force in the form of goals that can be judged to have self-evident
value.  The meaningfulness of the goal, which depends on its
perceived  value,  in  a  particular  context,  provides  subjective
reasons for action, which I contend can have normative as well
as motivational force.
It  is  necessary  to  ground symbols,  in  the case of  symbols
representing  reasons,3 by  relating  them  to  objects  that  are
external  to  the  symbol  (or  other)  system,  to  stop  the  infinite
3 This  account applies when seeking to ground reasons regardless of
whether a symbolic or representational theory is presented – it could also
apply  to  dynamical  systems  that  are  taken  to  be  non-symbolic,  for
example,  as  the  need to  ground reasons  remains.   I  will  not  go  into
whether these might also be considered symbolic, as nothing important
to my claim rests upon the nature of the implementation.  
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regress created by using symbols to define symbols (or processes
to explain the value of other processes).  The problem is that
doing so fails to address the question of what halts the regress of
whys so as to justify action to the agent.  At some point we need
to be able to stop asking why we ought (prudentially or morally)
to do something, because it becomes self-evident that a reason
justifies  something,  non-inferentially,  without  further
explanation.  (This reason need not be entertained consciously at
the time of deliberation; it may be recognised tacitly.)
Harnad’s  solution  of  grounding  symbols  in  sensorimotor
activity is one type of grounding that aims to address Searle’s
concern [17], but it doesn’t go far enough if we want to justify
reasons to ourselves, within our reasoning, because sensorimotor
activity isn’t an end in itself.4  If we cannot proceed on the basis
of value-based premises, set goals, and judge our own reasons to
be justified, we cannot see them as good or compelling reasons
to pursue goals.  So, we need to be able to attach value to the
consequences of sensorimotor activity.  The proposal to ground
these consequences in biological utility, although consistent with
an  evolutionary  explanation  of  how we came to  have  certain
dispositions, doesn’t stop the regress of whys when reasoning.  It
is always possible to question why one’s biological survival (or
the replication of one’s genes) should be viewed as having value,
and the answer is not self-evident.  The futility of life is a theme
in the Arts (e.g. the Theatre of the Absurd) and there are many
groups that promote other values more highly than the biological
survival of oneself and one’s kin (e.g. religious, terrorist or other
political  organisations).   Societies  often  promote the value of
‘immortality’ through various achievements that live on beyond
the  individual  (e.g.  works  of  art;  acts  of  self-sacrifice;
philanthropic  acts),  which  may  do  nothing  to  further  that
individual’s interests biologically.
My  aim  is  to  identify  a  way  of  grounding  reasons
subjectively, to oneself, when making judgements, which I argue
is made possible by the representation of physiological states in
the form of affective responses.  Grounding occurs, not at the
physiological  level,  in  this  case,  but  at  the  level  of  abstract
representation of affect.  Feelings and emotions are intrinsically
value-laden; they have hedonic tone and a positive or negative
valence.  I claim that reasons for action, desires and subjective
meaning  are  grounded,  in  the  relevant  sense,  in  emotion:
affective  responses  lend  meaning  to  the  abstract  concepts  of
‘good’  and  ‘bad’,  and  make  evaluation  possible.   From  an
evolutionary perspective, affective experience can also be said to
be grounded in the biological utility of monitoring and adjusting
the  underlying  physiological  states  emotions  represent,  if  we
accept  something  like  the  James-Lange  theory  of  emotions
[13,14].5   Evolutionary accounts address the explanation of why
things are the way they are, but fail to address  the problem of
meaningfulness.  
I am not claiming that the phenomenal character of affective
responses  is  at  a  more  fundamental  level  than  biological
function, but that it is appropriate to ground reasons for action in
this  way, alongside  grounding  in  biology.   This  allows  us  to
4 Harnad has since acknowledged that “What makes the hard problem
hard  is  precisely  the  mysterious  difficulty  of  explaining  feelings
functionally. So the mind-body problem is actually the ‘feeling-function’
problem” [11].
5 Prinz, for example, defends a modified view, arguing that “emotions
are somatic, but they are also fundamentally semantic” [16].
address the need for reasons to have subjective meaningfulness,
in order to have motivational force and prompt action.  
Teleological theories, in philosophy [15], aim to explain how
mental representations can represent objects or states of affairs in
the external  world.   Mental  content  is  grounded in biological
functions selected by natural selection.  Teleosemantic theories
are  teleological  theories  that  seek  to  offer  a  naturalistic
explanation of the semantic properties of representations (ibid.).
Meaning, like mental content, within such a theory, is explicable
in terms of  (and so grounded in)  adaptive functions,  with the
understanding of meaning involving no more than having some
minimal knowledge of the referent of a word.  My account of
grounding  is  distinct  from  those  proposing  a  mapping  from
symbols to physical objects or states of affairs in the external
world.  In my account symbols are mapped onto abstract objects
(good, bad, beautiful, frightening, etc.),  which are inaccessible
via sensorimotor activity, and which are not intrinsic to adaptive
behaviour  (adaptive  behaviour  in  plants  does  not  require  the
representation of abstract objects).  
The  symbol  grounding  problem in  the  field  of  artificial
intelligence (AI), and in philosophy seeks to explain the related
problem of how abstract symbols can refer to anything external
to the symbol system.  An element common to many accounts of
grounding  (including  HIT, teleological  accounts  and  Harnad’s
account) is that there should be a causally efficacious realiser –
the information processed must have some means of acting upon
the external world.  HIT explicitly incorporates the motivation,
as well as the capacity, to act on the external world.  Whereas
teleological and teleosemantic theories propose explanations that
appeal  to  survival-  and  reproduction-related  purposes;  the
symbol  grounding  problem  focuses  on  how  reference  and
interaction could be possible.
Another approach to grounding reasons, in the philosophy of
action  literature,  examines  whether  reasons  for  action  are
grounded in desires,  beliefs or values (see [6]),  distinguishing
between motivating and normative reasons – between what we
desire  and  what  we  ought  to  do,  rationally  or  morally.  The
approach I take is differentiated from this one by its focus on
grounding in the sense of being able to justify reasons for action
to oneself.  
Turning to recent work in epistemology, Smithies says that
“the  problem  of  explaining  mental  representation  cannot  be
divorced  from  the  problem  of  explaining  phenomenal
consciousness”  [19,  p.  98].   Smithies  distinguishes  between
appeals  to  phenomenal  consciousness  and  to  functional  role,
arguing that phenomenal consciousness provides immediate non-
inferential  justification  for  beliefs.   In  contradistinction to  his
position, I argue that consciousness has a (compound) functional
role, and that conscious affective responses provide immediate
non-inferential justification for reasons for action.  He uses the
example of blindsight6 to illustrate how phenomenal rather than
functional  differences  play  a  crucial  role  in  epistemic
justification:  when  the  phenomenal  character  of  perceptual
experience  is  absent,  blindsighted  subjects  lack  epistemic
justification,  even  though  information  is  being  processed
unconsciously  and  they  may  reliably  distinguish  objects  and
orientations in forced-choice experimental situations.  Smithies
argues that phenomenal consciousness is the basis for epistemic
justification,  and  that  mental  representation that  plays  an
6 Blindsighted subjects can respond to visual stimuli, but lack conscious
visual experience (see [22]).
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epistemic  role is  grounded  in  phenomenal  consciousness.
Smithies restricts his claim to epistemic justification.  A further
significant difference between our accounts is that for Smithies
grounding  is  in  conscious  perceptual  content,  not  affective
content.  What our accounts have in common is that grounding is
in  conscious  experience.   Although  I  specify  that  it  is
consciousness of affective responses that plays a crucial role in
grounding, my claim encompasses consciousness in general, as
on my account no phenomenally conscious experience is entirely
devoid  of  affective  content.   This  is  a  consequence  of
consciousness’s  role  as  an  interface  between  emotion  and
cognition;  within  that  interactive  process,  affective  valence,
which is one important aspect of affective experience (affective
experiences  differ  in  ways  other  than  simply  in  terms  of
valence), is an ever-present integral part of conscious experience.
Chudnoff also addresses epistemic justification, arguing that
it  is  in  virtue  of  their  phenomenology  that  intuitions  justify
beliefs  [4].    For  Chudnoff,  the  phenomenology  described
(“presentational phenomenology”) has perceptual content, but it
can  also  have  intuition-based  content  [3,4].   The  basis  for
epistemic  justification  is  then  the  phenomenal  character  of
perceptual or intuition experience.  The justification provided by
perception is  prima facie – “it can be defeated or undermined”
[3, p. 315], just as reasons for action that seem to be justified can
be  overturned.   Perceptual  presentational  phenomenology
consists in there being perception of both a fact and an item in
virtue of which this fact is perceived to be the case.  In the case
of intuition experience, which may be imaginative or cognitive,
one fact-intuits  p and is intellectually aware of some item that
makes it the case that p.
Chudnoff  says  that  ‘presentational  phenomenology  can  be
found  in  cases  of  intuition,  introspection,  imagination,  and
recollection’, but makes no mention of emotion [5, p. 51].  But
his arguments do extend to emotion, and furthermore there is an
affective component in conscious perception and intuition, which
may also be involved in epistemic justification, and there is an
evaluative  component  in  the  processes,  for  which  affective
valence  is  necessary.   Reasons  for  action,  as  well  as  beliefs
relating  to  perceptual  content  and  logical  or  philosophical
intuitions,  can  have  presentational  phenomenology:  one  can
come to realise what one has reason to do, upon experiencing an
affective  response  in  virtue  of  which  a  reason  for  action  is
perceived to  be justified.   Chudnoff’s focus is  exclusively on
cognitive phenomenology, but affective responses have the same
kind  of  immediacy/non-inferential  status  as  intuitions,  as  he
describes  them,  and  intuitions  have  affective  as  well  as
presentational content.
3 HUMANS’ VERSUS ROBOTS’ REASONS
There is an interesting difference between the way we view a
person as capable of acting for reasons and the way we view a
machine or robot when it acts, and this, I argue, is not related to
whether human action is free, but to the way in which reasons
for action are grounded.
Whereas a  simple robot  performing a  fixed range of  tasks
could  follow  procedures  in  a  logical  way  to  achieve  set
objectives, with appropriate programming, there seems to be no
way that the robot could justify carrying out the necessary steps,
providing normative reasons, without appealing to the values or
objectives of the programmer or of other non-robots.  Any values
or rules it uses to guide its behaviour depend on the values and
objectives of those responsible for its initial programming (even
if this results in further programming and learning by the robot),
and the effectiveness of their implementation.  In taking anything
to be desirable, necessary or the correct thing to do, the robot
would  merely  be  carrying  out  instructions  set  for  reasons
grounded in something beyond its own programs or hardware.
These reasons would not be meaningful to the robot.  It has no
normative reason of its own to act, just as a washing machine
drum has  no  normative  reason of  its  own to spin.  It  has  no
affective responses to outcomes, and this is an important reason
for viewing robots and conscious entities as different (and not
just with regard to whether they are moral subjects).
A robot  devoid  of  felt  affective  responses7 would  have  no
normative reasons to act, let alone to perform one movement in
preference to another.  Any reason given, such as to help others
or to maintain its own functions, would lead ultimately, when
reasons were sought for each response, to the way it had been
programmed, so would be grounded in something extrinsic to the
robot and, being devoid of meaningfulness, would be beyond its
comprehension. Taking an apparently strong reason for action,
such as preventing the destruction of the planet, or any case in
which  failing  to  perform  an  action  would  cause  harm  or
suffering, the robot might be said to have reason to act to prevent
harm or suffering, whether self- or other-involving.  Yet it seems
to have no reason to prefer that nothing be harmed or that no one
suffer, and no way of judging harm or suffering to be bad or
undesirable that is not contingent upon a human or other entity’s
having  provided  it  with  that  information.   Although  its
representations  (or  systems)  may  enable  it  to  act  upon  the
external  world,  satisfying  the  need  for  a  causally  efficacious
realiser, as in Harnad’s grounding in sensorimotor function [10],
they  lack  meaningfulness  for  the  robot.   When  criteria  for
making  value  judgements  are  introduced  by  programmers,
instructions  may  be  followed  blindly,  as  in  Searle’s  Chinese
room thought experiment [17], but the robot has no capacity to
evaluate  the  criteria  and  no  way  of  judging  whether  the
information about value is  correct or  relevant  to its  interests.  
The robot’s reasons are grounded in the reasons and values of
others,  which  must  in  turn  be  grounded  in  their  affective
responses.
4 THE REGRESS-STOPPING ROLE OF 
AFFECTIVE VALENCE
Biological utility fails to stop the infinite regress of whys with
respect to rational justification, because we can still question the
value  of  our  own  survival  and  that  of  the  replication  of  our
genes.  Affective states, even those that are potential rather than
actual, succeed in stopping the regress of whys, when seeking to
justify our own actions, by presenting us with information about
value in a form that,  at  a subjective level,  requires no further
grounding – an immediate, non-inferential justification of action.
Although  we  may  sometimes  forgo  pleasure  or  endure  pain
willingly, to achieve some higher objective, our understanding of
value is derived directly from affective responses to actual and
7 Robots currently being developed to have or respond to emotions, such
as Softbank, Aldebaran and Yoshimoto Robotics Laboratory’s ‘Pepper’, 
which its developers claim has emotions, merely simulate [responses to] 
emotional behaviour with a view to satisfying consumer needs.     
SYMPOSIUM VII. THE POWER OF PASSION 258
Co
nfe
re
nc
e
ed
itio
n
potential states of affairs.  We cannot fail to believe that certain
affective  states  are  preferable  to  others,  as  it  is  part  of  their
nature to have a positive or negative valence (varying in degree
and quality).  The feature of affective states that grounds reasons
subjectively is not biological utility, though they may have it, but
the  valence  we  automatically  and  unquestioningly  attach  to
them, which is not only compelling (motivating action), but is
meaningful to  us as  thinking beings and capable of  justifying
reasons for action from a subjective perspective.
A human, even one convinced of the impossibility of freedom
of action, can be said to have reasons for preferring one course
of action over another.  This requires further explanation, within
a context aiming for consistency with hard determinism, as the
human being is just another physical object and/or process, like a
robot  or  washing-machine  spin  cycle.   The  ability  to  have
reasons  for  preferences  is  explicable,  to  a  conscious  being
(whether anything can be ‘explicable’ to a non-conscious entity
is questionable, but explicability to ourselves is what is relevant
here), only when we include the phenomenal quality of affective
experience  in  our  account.   This  is  how we stop  the  infinite
regress of whys.   A human can have reason to seek pleasure,
avoid pain, or act in a way that would be conducive to her own
or others’ wellbeing, which can be accounted for in terms of the
qualities of the resultant conscious affective experiences.  
   Beliefs, such as the belief that pain is bad/undesirable or
that eating when hungry is good/desirable, are not something we
need to learn from others; it is enough to experience pain or to
eat when hungry to acquire the motivation to make it a priority
to avoid pain and to eat when hungry.  There is something it is
like,  affectively,  with  a  positive  or  negative  valence,  to
experience these things.  When setting objectives, we are guided
by the anticipated positive or negative valence of the probable
outcomes,  and  Dickinson  and  Balleine’s  experimental  work
supports  the  hypothesis  that  we  update  values  ascribed  to
commodities  and  states  of  affairs  only  through  phenomenal
experience  of  them.8  Conscious  awareness  of  the  immediate
effects of actions enables perceived value to be adjusted, and the
apparent implications of actions, including their potential effects
on future conscious experience, guide reasoning.  These effects
can be judged good or bad, and desirable or undesirable, relative
to  the  individual’s  values  and  needs  (which  need  not  track
biological utility), and these judgements are grounded in regress-
stopping affective valence.  When they are judged good or bad in
a  more  abstract,  purportedly  objective,  moral  or  prudential
viewpoint, these judgements are, I claim, also grounded in the
individual’s conscious experience.   
Consciousness is equated here with the functional properties
of  an  interface  capable  of  processing  information  in  abstract
form in such a way that reasons for action can be perceived to
justify action.  It might be objected that this introduces a non-
physical feature, a kind of property that according to some is not
reducible to physical processes (see Chalmers’s property dualism
[2],  or  Jackson’s  knowledge  argument  [12]).   I  include
(meaningful) representations of information in abstract form and
subjectivity in my account, neither of which are readily reducible
to the physical.   But  it  is  not  inconsistent  with naturalism to
accept  that  abstract  information  is  represented  consciously  or
8 Experience of things that appear to be similar or to overlap in some 
way may also influence value judgements, if the anticipated outcome is 
expected to have some of the same properties, i.e. some generalisation 
occurs.
that  there is  a subjective,  qualitative aspect to  consciousness.9
Regardless of the precise ontological nature of consciousness, it
is widely accepted that humans have conscious experience.  
Whereas  the  grounding  of  abstract  symbols  must  be  in
something  extrinsic  to  the  symbol  system,  the  capacity  for
making judgements about value must be grounded in something
intrinsic to  the  decision-maker.   Reasons  relying  on  these
judgements  must  be  such  that  the  decision-maker  requires  no
further justification.  Reasons are grounded not only in concrete
biological  states,  but  in  actual  and  hypothetical  affective
responses to actual and potential states of affairs.  Awareness of
the  qualitative  nature  of  these  responses  is  necessary  for
information  about  valence  to  be  subjectively  meaningful.   A
person  cannot  judge  that  she  will  be  content  or  distressed
without any capacity for experiencing and representing what it is
like to be in a state of contentment or distress.  Whether or not it
might be possible (logically or otherwise) to replicate this in a
robot  or  other  inanimate  system  is  difficult  to  say,  but  it  is
uncontroversial to say that humans have this capacity.  
Torrance, summing up Shanahan’s view, said, “to talk about a
being  as  phenomenally  conscious  is  to  talk  about  things
mattering to that being in a way that they can’t to a creature that
lacks  phenomenal  consciousness”  [21]  (see  also  [18]).   The
capacity  to  perceive  things  as  mattering  (consciously
experienced affective valence)  provides  the  motivation  to  act,
but  it  also  enables  us  to  judge  some  behaviour  to  be  more
rational than other alternative courses of action, because of the
relative value of different  potential  outcomes.   The pursuit  of
that which matters, in the sense of being associated with positive
affective valence, is automatically endorsed as a motive, and that
which matters is recognised, in abstract form, when reasoning, as
a valid goal,  grounding reasons for action.   The grounding of
reasons and values in affective valence thus halts the otherwise
potentially  infinite  regress  of  whys,  when  deliberating  over
alternative courses of action that appear to be open to us.
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Emotions as evidence in the delusional experience
Rachel Gunn1
Abstract.1
1 INTRODUCTION
For those who have clinically significant delusions the symptom
is broadly defined in cognitivist  terms relating to false beliefs
held  with  conviction  [6].   Using  original  research  where  I
interview people with clinically significant delusions I call in to
question  the  assumptions  made  about  delusion  formation  and
maintenance  and  recast  delusion  as  emotional  or  perceptual,
occurring when affective framing breaks down.   
2 AFFECTIVE FRAMING 
The notion  of  affective  framing  is  used  to  understand  how a
person makes sense of her world [1].  A person has desires and
needs in relation to survival and procreation and makes decisions
about  action  in  the  world  based  her  response  to  positively
valenced  preferences  and  negatively  valenced  objects  or
situations to be avoided.
The person’s response is at first bodily and then cognitive.2  A
human  being  is  (perhaps  uniquely)  able  to  respond  to  her
situation at a number of different ‘levels’.  These ‘levels’ might
be  described  as  somatic  (or  bodily),  cognitive  and  meta-
cognitive.
Affectivity  impacts  a  person’s  actions  in  relation  to  the
affordance3 of any given situation.  If affordances as presented
are all the physical possibilities of a given situation how does a
person ever decide what action to take?  The possibilities are
extremely wide ranging.
It is clear that some kind of frame is needed to enable goal-
orientated decision-making.  This is where affective framing fits
in.
Antonio Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis holds that a
person’s affective capacities originate as somatic feelings (pre-
reflective bodily responses) or certain kinds of (emotion related)
brain responses4 at a sub personal level.  These somatic markers
facilitate  reasoning  by  enabling  relevant  salient  options  to
become available.
Without these somatic markers decision-making is impaired
[5]. 
1 Department  of  Philosophy,  Edgbaston,  University  of  Birmingham,
B15 2TT, email: RRG321@bham.ac.uk
2 Whilst he does not use the same terminology (and he also posits the 
existence of representational states, which may or may not be necessary 
for the enactivist) Antonio Damasio has written extensively on the 
different ‘states’ of this kind of experience: bodily (or somatic) emotion, 
feeling and feeling made conscious [2,3].
3 See [4].
4 Damasio would call these emotional representations.  I prefer to 
remain agnostic about any requirement for a representionalist 
conceptualization of mind.
3 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
Barbara  is  in  her  forties,  lives  alone,  has  a  diagnosis  of
schizophrenia and has active delusions.  Ultimately she came to
believe that she was literally the daughter of the Christian God,
the female equivalent of Jesus.  A delusion with this content (this
belief) is known as a delusion of grandeur.5
At the outset of her problems she described what is known as
delusional  mood  [7]  and  felt  that  something  strange  was
happening.  Soon afterwards things in the environment became
highly salient,  her  attention was drawn to certain song lyrics,
road signs, phrases and words.  These ideas of reference soon
became delusions of reference6 as she began to believe that the
environmental cues were giving her messages.  She found this
very difficult to explain.
Barbara was also experiencing strong emotions, such as fear,
love, anger and guilt, for which she had no obvious explanation.
Barbara’s initial experiences were attentional and emotional in
nature.  Barbara’s emotional and perceptual experience counts,
for her, as evidence that something supernatural is going on.  She
had no reason to question her feelings qua feelings - her aberrant
or  overwhelming  feelings  are  experienced  as  real  and
meaningful.   We  don’t  routinely  ask  ourselves  whether  our
experiences are real or not.  If, for example, I feel joyous I would
look  for  an  explanation  in  the  environment  or  in  my  lived
experience.  Indeed it would be most unusual for me to think that
I might be feeling this way because there was something wrong
with my brain. 
Barbara’s process  is  an  ordinary  process  that  philosophers,
scientists  and others  undertake  in  everyday life  to  understand
how the world works and how they relate to it.7  This process
works well when our experiences of the world are ordinary and
can be shared in common language.  The difference here is that
Barbara is hypothesis testing about her direct apperception of the
world, she has new emotional and perceptual data that no one
else has access to (which is increasing as time goes on) and there
are  no  ‘real  world’  explanations  available  to  her.   After  her
detective  like  analysis  of  her  experience  she  ultimately
5 An individual is said to have grandiose delusions when the delusion 
meets the general criteria for clinically significant delusion and “…when 
an individual believes that he or she has exceptional abilities, wealth, or 
fame [6, p. 87].
6 A delusion of reference is “The feeling that causal incidents and 
external events have a particular and unusual meaning that is specific to 
the person. An idea of reference is to be distinguished from a 
DELUSION OF REFERENCE, in which there is a belief that is held 
with delusional conviction” [6, p. 823].
7 This conceptualisation might be described as being in line with the so-
called one-factor model for delusion formation which holds that a person
with anomalous experience becomes delusional due to the direct private 
experience and no reasoning problem or cognitive deficit is required for 
this to occur see for example [9].  This can be contrasted with the two-
factor model which holds that a reasoning bias or cognitive deficit is also
required for delusion formation; see for example [10].
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concludes (like the (fictional) hyper-rational detective Sherlock
Holmes)  that  “…when  you  have  eliminated  all  which  is
impossible,  then whatever remains,  however improbable,  must
be the truth” [8, p. 93].
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Understanding empathy:
Metaphysical starting assumptions in
the modeling of empathy and emotions
Joel Parthemore 1
Abstract. This paper has three main purposes: to set out
the relationship between empathy and related phenomena,
including emotional contagion; to explain how metaphysical
starting assumptions regarding the nature of empathy pre-
dispose one toward one or another account of these phenom-
ena and toward different interpretations of the same empirical
data -- often radically different; and to use recent discussions
of empathy in the phenomenological and enactive communi-
ties (in particular their rejection of theory of mind accounts)
to put forward a radical proposal. In the paradigmatic cases,
one feels that one is feeling (at least some substantive portion
of) what another person is feeling: “I feel your pain”. But there
are certain intense experiences along with certain related but
less intense ones where there is, I claim, a single joint expe-
rience among two or more individuals. One could call these
experiences “extreme” empathy. This is how phenomenologists
should, I think, cash out the frequent claim that in many cir-
cumstances, one agent “directly” experiences the emotional
state of another without requiring the mediation of anything
like theory of mind.
1 INTRODUCTION
Empathy I will take to be the feeling that one is experiencing,
to some substantial extent, what another is feeling – often
facilitated by some corresponding experience(s) in one’s past
but without requirement to be in precisely the same emotional
state.2 How one understands it has a great deal to say about
what are often unstated assumptions on the nature of person-
hood: one of the key starting points from which we engage in
theoretical and computational modeling of affect and emotion
in general, and emotional states like empathy in particular.
Sympathy by contrast merely entails showing awareness of
and consideration for the mental/emotional states of another
(particularly when the person is going through strongly nega-
tively valenced times). It is often understood pejoratively, as
a kind of poor substitute for empathy: “I sympathize, but I
do not empathize”.
The question at hand in this paper is, must empathy be
accounted for in terms of so-called theory of mind, and are
breakdowns in empathy to be explained in terms of a theory-
1 University of Skövde, Sweden, email: joel.parthemore@his.se
2 . . . A point that Dan Zahavi [17] is keen to stress. Likewise he
challenges those accounts of empathy that attempt to connect it
to “mind reading” or telepathy [17, p. 295].
of-mind deficiency? If not, what is the alternative – or, if more
than one, what are the alternatives?
1.1 Metaphysical starting assumptions
Whether any of the standard positions in this area is ulti-
mately “right” – if that notion is even coherent – is ulti-
mately and almost certainly a metaphysical, not an empir-
ical, question. That is, it concerns initial axioms rather than
observations. Like any metaphysical claims, the value lies not
in knock-down proof but explanatory value: if one assumes
these things, then this is what follows. The consequent ex-
planations can be judged superior or inferior on the basis of
seeming simplicity, completeness, and consistency. Neverthe-
less, it will still be the case at the end of the day that one could
make a valid case for any of them – with the caveat that some
may prove easier to defend than others3 and the likelihood of
other alternatives that haven’t received due consideration or
yet been considered at all.
My interests here are pragmatic and (despite the possible
tone otherwise) pluralist, likewise more epistemological than
ontological. I am less concerned with the “actual” underlying
reality – insofar as it is knowable (my preference is toward
a Kantian view) – and more with how we currently do, and
how we most usefully can, model these things conceptually,
as lay persons and as researchers. Doing so requires, I think,
combining “top down” with “bottom up” approaches to mind
and cognition, and I continue to be mystified by those whose
focus seems exclusively on one or the other, as one finds with
certain “traditional” AI accounts on the one hand and some
connectionist/associationist approaches on the other.
Of course it is generally more practical to focus at any given
time on one or the other, as my own (limited) empirical work
has done. The mind-mapping software I wrote for my doctoral
thesis [11] as a direct translation of its theoretical content into
software form – specifically, of the Unified Conceptual Space
Theory [13] – very much takes a top-down approach in offering
3 The principle applies much more broadly. In principle, one could
defend an updated version of Tycho Brahe’s epicycle-based model
of the solar system taking into account all of our subsequent
explorations and observations. However, the consequent model
would be so complex as to put most people off even attempting
it. Most of the time people argue endless and, one might sus-
pect, fruitlessly over whether and how Ockham’s razour applies,
not least because there is no untendentious metric for simplic-
ity/complexity; it is, perhaps, only in the extreme cases that its
application is clear, if only for practical necessity.
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a specific algorithm that all concepts, regardless of what they
are concepts of4, are meant to follow. On the other hand, there
seems no reason in principle why the same algorithm could not
be used in a bottom-up, exploratory manner by, say, embed-
ding it in a robot. By contrast, the SEER-3 robotic platform
[2], which I developed in collaboration with Ron Chrisley to
model the non-conceptual content of visual experience, works
bottom up: the robot looks around and gradually assembles
a 2D model of its environment (albeit with a very much top-
down model imposed on it for foveal/non-foveal/peripheral
vision, memory fading, and motion detection, never mind of
what counts as “nonconceptual content of visual experience”
in the first place).
Like everyone, I do have ontological commitments, of
course: first of all, that emotions are evolutionarily ancient
and, as such, intimately tied up with our existence as liv-
ing organisms and our nature as that small subclass of living
agents who comprise rational conscious agents. They can be
and often are in tension with “high-level” reasoning but should
in no way, pace a number of familiar accounts from the ratio-
nalist tradition (and sympathetic voices from symbolic AI),
be seen as antagonistic toward it.
1.2 Empathy and its kin
To understand empathy, it is important to separate it from
related phenomena including sympathy, emotional contagion,
and emotional sharing5 and critically examine those cases
where empathy is said to be broken or missing altogether:
i.e., sociopathy/psychopathy and Asperger’s/autism. My core
claim is for an empathy-related phenomenon – call it “ex-
treme” empathy – best understood in terms of a single con-
scious experience involving two or more agents. This in turn
opens the way for the possibility that (at least as a passing
state, but conceivably on a more stable basis as well) con-
scious agents are individuals or parts of individuals on more
than one level.
Emotional contagion involves “catching” an emotional state
analogously to catching a cold. The “infected” person(s) is un-
der no requirement to understand what it is all about. The
source for the initial “infection” is irrelevant, for the emotional
state takes on a life of its own: e.g., one person starts laugh-
ing for the sole reason that someone else is laughing; if there
are more people in the room, pretty soon everyone may be
laughing.
Emotional sharing involves being in the same context per-
turbed by the same motivating forces toward the “same” emo-
tional states. Again, the individual source of the emotional
state – if there even is one to identify – is not relevant; one
even supposes emotional sharing to originate at the group
level. Stereotypical occasions include weddings, funerals, and
sporting events.
Empathy is different these phenomena in several key re-
spects:
• The source of the emotional state crucially does matter.
• A critical emotional connection is made between the source
and the one empathizing (note that the empathic relation
is asymmetrical).
4 . . . Including, of course, concepts of emotions.
5 I owe much of this discussion to [17].
• The one empathizing must feel some substantial part of
what the source is feeling emotionally, even if she is not
ultimately in the same emotional state.
1.3 Breakdowns in empathy
Supposed absences of empathy resulting from mental disorder
should be examined critically. Sociopaths and psychopaths6
are often cited as lacking empathy. Research reported in 2013
[6] suggests that, rather than lacking empathy, these people
can switch it on and off at will; the same research raises the
intriguing notion that empathy is both trainable and mis-
trainable. Furthermore, one cannot discount the possibility
that they have well-developed involuntary empathic responses
but that those responses are not the “right” (i.e., socially ac-
cepted/acceptable) ones: i.e., they feel some substantial part
of what the other person is feeling emotionally (recalling my
opening definition), but their further emotional response sug-
gests a kind of empathic misalignment.
The other group often cited for empathic deficiencies, ac-
cording to the “standard” position articulated most clearly
by Simon Baron-Cohen, are those diagnosed with Asperger’s
syndrome or autism spectrum disorder.7 As with the so-
ciopaths/psychopaths, they appear to be poorly attuned to
many if not most social cues. Again, however, recent research
(see e.g. [9]) suggests that Asperger’s persons and autists
may not be insensitive to others’ emotional states but in-
stead overly sensitive to them. The metaphor is of someone
shouting continuously in one’s ears; one places one’s hands
over one’s ears to dampen the sound.
1.4 The remainder of this paper
Section Two examines the “traditional” account of empathy
and the phenomenologists’ response, which I take to be es-
sentially in line with that of the enactivists. Section Three
then explains where, I think, the phenomenologists go wrong,
and why one needs to discuss another related phenomenon
that resembles empathy but that goes, in significant ways,
beyond it: i.e., “extreme” empathy.
2 THE “TRADITIONAL” ACCOUNT
AND ITS DETRACTORS
The theory-theory of mind and the simulation theory of
mind both deny that it is possible to experience other
minds, both presuppose the fundamental opacity or in-
visibility of other minds. . . . Both accounts consequently
share the view that the minds of others are concealed
and hidden, and they consider one of the main challenges
facing a theory of social cognition to be the question of
how and why we ascribe such hidden mental entities or
processes to certain publicly observable bodies. [17, p.
286]
6 I will not attempt to address the question of whether sociopathy
and psychopathy describe distinct phenomena or a single phe-
nomenon.
7 The DSM-V, of course, combines these into a single diagnosis.
Note that enactivists are inclined to view autists as exhibiting
cognitive diversity rather than intrinsic disorder; see [12].
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One of the key debates, when it comes both to empathy and
the wider field of emotion modeling, lies with the role of so-
called theory of mind, where “theory of mind” is the capacity
to attribute beliefs, desires, intentions, motivations, knowl-
edge, etc. to oneself and others – correctly, most of the time –
and to understand and anticipate that the perspective of oth-
ers will often differ from one’s own. It is attributed to young
children through the so-called false-belief task, which most
children are able to pass by the age of four, though children
diagnosed autistic are generally only able to do so much later
(in cases of “low-functioning” autism, perhaps not at all). The
implication is that one understands others through being able
to theorize – to form theories – about their minds. Proponents
of what has been called theory theory take that quite literally;
simulationists do not.8
Phenomenologists, including Dan Zahavi, Joel Krueger,
and others, like to talk about the “direct” experience of an-
other’s mental/emotional states, unmediated by any so-called
theory of mind. They wish to reject both the theory-theory
and simulationist accounts with their common assumptions
that the experience of conscious agents is opaque to all but
themselves and requires some kind of inferential leap to grasp.
They are not rejecting theory of mind outright (at least, most
of the time) but assigning it to a far more peripheral as
opposed to foundational role – where understanding others
emotionally and cognitively does not proceed from theory of
mind, for the most part, but vice versa. If that is the negative
claim, then the positive claim is that one finds experience of
the cognitive states of others that is direct, unmediated, and
non-inferential. It constitutes a perceptual modality, both like
and unlike other modalities. Most critically for my purposes
though, it generally (and ironically) retains a key assumption
with the theory-theory and simulationist accounts: namely,
that the nature of the individual is essentially isolated and
(fully) distinct from other individuals. In place of opacity one
finds, at most, occasional transparency, and otherwise translu-
cency.
The rejection of theory-of-mind language – except, perhaps,
with respect to certain narrow and well-defined applications
(when we are theorizing about what and how other people are
thinking) – is, I think, correct. Otherwise – echoing a familiar
point from the enactivists – such language risks greatly over-
intellectualizing processes that are largely intuitively, emo-
tionally, experientially, and pre-intellectually driven. We don’t
come to understand how other minds work by forming theo-
ries and testing hypotheses in some empirical-science-like way;
rather, we come to understand other minds by learning to
see the “us in them” and the “they in us”, and any theoriz-
ing comes only late in the day. We commonly think of other
people being like ourselves, and ourselves as being like other
people – with e.g. similar beliefs and motivations -- until es-
tablished otherwise. In other words, we come to understand
other people through understanding ourselves and ourselves
through understanding other people.
The retention of the isolated consciousness – a point which
I have discussed in person with Zahavi – is where I part com-
pany. The notion of “direct” experience is key. If one accepts
that talk of “direct” experience of another’s state of mind is
meant to be literal, not metaphorical, then how should one
8 cf. [17, pp. 285-286].
cash it out? Here, the phenomenologists grow suddenly very
cautious, if not in fact reticent.
3 BEYOND EMPATHY
I suggest that phenomenologists borrow a page from Andy
Clark and Dave Chalmers’ Extended Mind Hypothesis, with its
provocative opening gambit: “where does the mind stop and
the rest of the world begin?” [5, p. 7], along with Clark’s subse-
quent discussion of “profoundly embodied agents. . . able con-
stantly the negotiate and renegotiate the agent-world bound-
ary itself” [3, p. 34] – a world that is simultaneously a phys-
ical world and a social one (physically realized, but concep-
tually distinct and irreducible). Enactive philosophers – in
the tradition of Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela, Evan
Thompson, Dan Hutto and others – tend to see the Extended
Mind Hypothesis as too conservative, leaving much if not most
of cognition “inside the head”, with only occasional elements
leaking out into the surrounding social and physical environ-
ment. Cognition – and therefore mind – is not, they would
say, in the world or in the agent (they would say this creates
a false dichotomy) but rather, so far as it is located anywhere,
“in” the interaction between agent and e vironment. Rather
than world creating agent or agent creating world, agent and
world are co-created through interaction, each bringing the
other forth9; and agent is ultimately continuous with envi-
ronment. In this way enactivists reject both internalist and
externalist views on cognition. They leaves them open to the
possibility of not just extended mind but extended conscious-
ness: something that Chalmers has shown explicit willingness
to entertain10 and Clark has done his best to reject [4] (on
the argument that the available “bandwidth” is too “narrow”).
What I think that phenomenologists should say is that con-
sciousness is only ever relatively private and never absolutely
so; the view of human beings as isolated islands of conscious-
ness is a modern Western conceit (rather than unassailable
statement of fact or cultural/historical universal) and should
be recognized as such. Agents, as biological organisms, have
reasonably well-defined physical boundaries. Agents, as con-
scious cognitive entities, do not. (Yet these are not two dif-
ferent things – two different agents somehow! – but rather
two competing, complementary, yet ultimately irreconcilable
perspectives on one and the same agent in one and the same
world: a version of dual-aspect monism that I have referred
to as perspectival dualism (see e.g. [15]), to stress that it is, in
fact, a form of dualism (or rather, both dualism and monism).
To say that minds are physically instantiated – as surely they
are – is not necessarily to accept that they are neatly phys-
ically localized, as is all too commonly assumed – in which
case, they will have neither an “inside” nor an “outside” ex-
cept insofar as is convenient to imagine them doing so.
In a recent paper [14], I raised the possibility of a new the-
ory of personhood that would do away with the common – but
far from universally accepted (consider the perspective from
a number of Eastern cultures) – view of conscious minds as
strictly isolated islands. Rather, I suggested there, conscious-
9 “I have proposed using the term enactive to. . . evoke the idea
that what is known is brought forth, in contraposition to the
more classical views of either cognitivism or connectionism” [10,
p. 255]
10 See his introduction to [3, p. xiv].
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ness is only ever relatively private and never absolutely so.
As extended mind suggests, there is no clear line not only
where mind stops and world begins, but likewise where one
mind stops and the next begins. On such a view, minds “bleed
over” substantively into one another; people both are substan-
tively defined by, and help to define, the people around them.
Change the community, change the social environment, and –
in important ways – one changes who the person is. Consider
the “brain-bound” mind as the centre of a circle that expands
and contracts in changing circumstances.
So the way I think phenomenologists should cash out talk of
“direct experience” is not through talk of empathy but rather
by going beyond empathy and taking a much more radical
stance that I have been hinting at throughout this paper:
namely, that the line where one person stops and the next
begins is a flexible, pragmatic one and that, in certain con-
texts, that line drops out altogether. In such moments, there
is no “you” nor “I”, but only a “we”. There are not two distinct
experiences aligning with each other through some empathic
mechanism but one unified experience (albeit one that may
well start from empathy). Sometimes, when we see another
person crying or laughing – experiencing some intense emo-
tion – we do not feel that experience as our own. Rather, there
is a common experience distributed among two (or sometimes
more) people. For that moment at least, there are not two in-
dividuals, but one: for a single joint experience implies (for
the duration of that experience) a single individual. The up-
shot is that individuality is not a fixed quantity, and that –
at least part of the time – we constitute not individuals in
our own right (or not only individuals in our own right) but
rather parts of larger, collective individuals.
Of all phenomenologists with whom I am familiar, Krueger
comes closest in print, I think, to allowing such a possibil-
ity – particularly with his talk of certain emotional states
(the paradigmatic example for him involving perhaps infant
and caregiver) where the minimal unit is a dyad, not an in-
dividual. Consider: “from birth, some experiences are consti-
tutively [non-reductively] social in that certain phenomeno-
logical states, such as the positive emotions that arise within
these early exchanges, are jointly owned” [7, p. 509]. The in-
fant learns to experience certain feelings by first having them
as joint experiences with the caregiver. I would like however
to make explicit what I take Krueger to leave implicit: that
the joint experiences involve one unified experience for two (or
more) people; and furthermore allow that such shared states
extend throughout our lifetimes – albeit by becoming, over
time, more often than not the exception rather than the norm.
This includes many states that currently – and, I think, mis-
takenly – are understood in terms of “ordinary” empathy.11
What circumstances do I have in mind? One thinks of cer-
tain sexual encounters, where there is the experience of one
individual in two bodies; certain intense engaged conversa-
tions that mirror extended introspective consideration of some
subject or another; certain other moments of joint trauma, or
of joint pleasure or euphoria (reminiscent of Krueger’s early
bonding experiences), where the conventional lines of self and
other get blurred; certain other situations of intense engage-
11 Enactivist Tom Froese does, indeed, take up exactly this possibil-
ity in a draft chapter for the forthcoming 4E Cognition Handbook
from Oxford University Press. Unlike the position I have taken
here, he argues that the question can be addressed empirically.
ment with another person of a calmer and more extended na-
ture12: where e.g. each member of a long-term couple reliably
completes sentences for the other.
4 CONCLUSIONS
However it best should be understood, the dividing line be-
tween agent and environment, self and other cannot be taken
for granted as fixed and determinate. When Robert Rupert
[16] and Frederick Adams and Kenneth Aizawa [1] claim that
all the available empirical evidence points to mind (and there-
fore consciousness) being limited to the boundaries of brain
and skull, they are – it seems to me – begging the question,
precisely by what they accept for evidence. At the same time,
as others have argued (see e.g. [8]), Andy Clark has no clear
principled reason for allowing cognition into the world but
not any element of consciousness. In particular, certain cases
of empathic-like connection pass beyond anything that or-
dinarily passes as empathy, with its requirement (as Zahavi
correctly points out) that the self/other distinction be main-
tained. Instead of an alignment of experiences in each agent,
one has a single, joint experience that is carried away after-
wards by each agent., once again operating as individual expe-
riencers. The phenomenologists’ claim to “direct” experience
is on to something important – and correct in removing the-
ory of mind from its pedestal – but it should dare to be much
more bold.
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Computing emotions on discourse
Mauricio Iza1
Abstract.  Findings on the role that emotion plays on discourse
have transformed Artificial  Intelligence computations.  Modern
research explores how to simulate more intelligent and flexible
systems. Several studies focus on the role that emotion has in
order  to  establish values for  alternative decision and  decision
outcomes.  However,  emotional  concepts  in  these  theories  are
generally not defined formally and it is difficult to describe in
systematic detail how processes work. In this sense, structures
and processes cannot be explicitly implemented. This work tries
to unify emotion as interaction in order to explain the dynamic
role it plays in action and cognition.12
1 INTRODUCTION
Our  perception  of  the  world,  our  thoughts,  and  our  social
interactions  are  crucially  dependent  on  our  bodies  and  our
embodied  interaction  with  the  world.  This  is  the  idea  of
considering cognition as situated. Cognition does not only take
place “in the head”, based on internal models of the world, but
crucially depends on active situated interaction with the world
[12,14,33,6].
Within this framework, a main hypothesis is that emotional
mechanisms  play  a  critical  role  in  structuring  the  high-level
thought processes of cognitive systems. Some models of these
mechanisms  can  be  usefully  integrated  in  artificial  cognitive
systems architectures, which constitute a significant step towards
cognitive  systems  that  reason  and  behave,  externally  and
internally,  in  accordance  with  emotional  requirements
[19,35,31,32].
Most  current  human-computer  interaction  systems  do  not
account  for  the  fact  that  human-computer  communication  is
always socially situated and that we use emotion to enhance our
communication. Some systems can sense the affective states of
the human (e.g., stress, inattention, etc.) and are able of adapting
and  responding  to  these  affective  states.  Likely,  they  are
perceived as more natural and efficacious. This suggests that it
may be beneficial for computers to recognize the user’s emotions
and other related cognitive states and expressions [15, 16,29,30].
For instance,  interpreting the mix of audio-visual signals is
essential in human communication. Researchers have to take into
account the advances in the development of unimodal techniques
(e.g.,  speech  and  audio  processing,  computer  vision,  etc.).  In
traditional  human-computer  interaction,  the  user  faces  a
computer and interacts with it via a mouse or a keyboard. In the
new  applications  (e.g.,  multiple  agents,  intelligent  homes)
interactions are  not  explicit  commands.  Some of  the methods
include gesture, speech [27], eye movements [10], etc.
The work of [26] suggested several applications where it is
beneficial  for  computers  to  recognize  human  emotions.   For
1 Department  of  Psychology,  University  of  Malaga,  Spain.  Email:
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instance, knowing the user’s emotions, the computer can become
a  more effective  tutor. Synthetic  speech with  emotions in  the
voice  should  sound  more  pleasing  than  a  monotonous  voice.
Computer agents could learn the user’s preferences through the
user’s emotions. Another application is to help the human users
monitor  their  stress  level.  In  clinical  settings,  recognizing  a
person’s inability to express certain facial expressions may help
diagnose early psychological disorders.
In  relation  to  the  problem of  affective  communication,  [2]
identified three points in order to develop systems that takes into
account  affective  information:  (i)  embodiment:  experiencing
physical reality; (ii) dynamics: mapping the experience and the
emotional state onto a temporal process and a particular label;
and  (iii)  adaptive  interaction:  conveying  emotive  response,
responding to a recognized emotional state.
As  we  will  see,  some tutoring  systems have  explored  this
potential  to  inform  user  models.  Likewise,  dialogue  systems,
mixed-initiative  planning  systems,  or  systems  that  learn  from
observation could also benefit from such an approach [17]. That
is, considering emotion as interaction can be relevant in order to
explain the dynamic role it plays in action and cognition (see
[11]).
In  this  work,  we  will  provide  some  neuroscientific  and
psychological  insights  into  the  sensorimotor  grounding  of
conceptualization  and  language  use.  For  instance,  the  role  of
canonical and mirror neurons as underlying the use of nouns and
verbs,  in  order  to  develop  novel  approaches  to  grounding  of
robotic  conceptualization  and  language  use  (more  precisely,
verbal  labelling of objects and actions),  based on the insights
gained  under  richer  computational  and  robotic  models
[14,22,26].
2 COMPUTING FRAMEWORK 
In order to characterize a computational model of emotion, we
have  to  take  into  account  different  interdisciplinary  uses  to
which  computational  models  can  be  put,  such  as  improving
human-computer  interaction  or  enhancing  general  models  of
intelligence.
Starting  from  some  integrated  computational  models  have
tried to incorporate a variety of cognitive functions (e.g.,  [1]),
more recent cognitive systems in AI focus on the role of emotion
in order to address control choices by driving cognitive resources
on  problems  of  adaptive  significance  for  the  agent  [3].  For
example,  human  computer  interaction  attempts  to  recognize
user’s emotion including physiological indicators and facial and
vocal  expressions.  Similarly,  how  we  can  use  of  emotion  or
emotional  displays  in  avatars  that  interact  with  the  user,  for
instance, to increase student motivation in a tutoring system.
In this sense, computational models take different frameworks
in research and applications. On one hand, psychological models
emphasize on fidelity with respect to human emotion processes.
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On the other  hand,  AI  models  evaluate  how the modeling  of
emotion  impacts  reasoning  processes  or  improves  the  fitness
between agent and its environment. That is, the model improves
and makes more effective the human-computer interaction.
Several models have been proposed and developed. However,
some  fundamental  differences  arise  from  their  underlying
emotional constructs. For instance, as we will see below, some
discussions  on  if  emotion  precedes  or  follows  cognition
disappears if one adopts a dynamic system perspective. Here, we
will discuss two main approaches.
Researchers  in  AI  use  mainly  two  different  methods  to
analyze  emotions.  One method tries  to  classify  emotions  into
discrete categories (joy, fear, love, surprise, etc.) using different
modalities  as  inputs.  The  problem  is  that  the  stimulus  may
contain blended emotions and the ontological classification of
these categories may be too much restrictive.  Another method
tries  to  delineate  multiple  dimensions  or  scales  to  describe
emotions.  Two normally  used  scales  are  valence  and  arousal.
Valence describes pleasantness of the stimulus, with positive or
pleasant  on  one  hand  (happiness)  and  negative  on  the  other
(disgust). By contrast, arousal or activation goes from low level
(sadness) to high level (surprise). The different emotional labels
are plotted at various positions on a 2D plane spanned by these
two axes to construct a 2D emotion model.   
In this sense, expressions such as facial recognition or vocal
emotions are very important in this context. The case of facial
recognition  is  mainly  based  on  Ekman’s  [9]  Facial  Action
Coding  System.  Here  we  can  distinguish  two  kinds  of
classification  schemes.  Firstly,  static  classifiers  (Bayesian
networks)  classify each frame in a  video to  one of  the facial
expression categories based on the results of a particular video
frame.  Secondly, dynamic classifiers  use several video frames
and classify by analyzing  the  temporal  patterns  of  the region
analyzed  or  features  extracted.  Dynamic  classifiers  are  very
sensitive  to  appearance  changes  in  the  facial  expressions  of
different  individuals,  that  is,  they are  more suited for  person-
dependent experiments [5]. However, static classifiers are easier
to  train  and  need  less  training  data  but  when  used  on  a
continuous video sequence they can be unreliable.
Something similar happens in the case of vocal aspect of a
communicative message. If we only consider the textual content,
we  probably  miss  relevant  aspects  of  the  utterance  and  even
misunderstand  the  real  meaning  of  the  message  (pragmatic
inferences).  In  contrast  to  much  work  research  dedicated  to
spoken language processing, the processing of emotional speech
has been almost abandoned.
Quantitative  studies  of  vocal  emotions  use  prosodic
information (intonation, rhythm, lexical stress and other features
in  speech).  This  is  extracted  by  using  measures  like  pitch,
duration and intensity of a given utterance. But, [23] pointed out
some limitations of vocal-affect analyzers: (i) perform singular
classification  of  input  audio  signals  into  a  few  emotion
categories (e.g., irony, happiness); (ii) do not perform a context
sensitive analysis (context, agent) of the input audio signal; (iii)
do  not  analyze  extracted  vocal  expressions  information  on
different  time  scales:  proposed  inter-audio-frame  analyses  are
used for the detection of supra-segmental features  (pitch and
intensity over the duration of  a  syllable  or  word)  and for  the
detection of phonetic features; (iv) inferences about moods and
attitudes (longer time scales) are difficult to make based on the
current  vocal-affect  analyzers;  (v)  strong  assumptions  are
adopted (e.g., short sentences, delimited by pauses, etc.) and test
data  sets  used  are  small  containing  exaggerated  vocal
expressions of affective states.
In  resume,  studies  on  the  psychology  on  the  accuracy  of
predictions from observations of predictive behavior suggest that
the  combined  face  and  body  approaches  are  the  most
informative. But, research in facial expression recognition and
vocal affect recognition has been independently performed. The
developed  systems  have  most  of  the  drawbacks  of  unimodal
affect analyzers. Most works in facial expression recognition use
still photographs or video sequences without speech. Likewise,
works  on  vocal  emotion  detection  normally  use  only  audio
information.  So,  we  should  consider  how  we  can  integrate
different agents, contexts and processing sources of information
for a natural interaction.
3 EMOTIONAL APPROACHES
Models in language processing have researched how words are
interpreted  by  humans.  Many  models  presume  the  ability  to
correctly interpret the beliefs, motives and intentions underlying
words. The interest relies also on how emotion motivates certain
words  or  actions,  inferences,  and  communicates  information
about mental state (e.g., [13]).
Here, emotion has been often considered as another kind of
information. That is, discrete units or internal states that can be
transmitted  from subjects  to  robotic  systems and  back.  There
exists  broad  experimental  evidence  on  grounded  language
comprehension,  such as  action related speech activates  mirror
system or  action  Sentence  Compatibility  Effect,  where  verbal
description of spatially directional actions facilitates movements
in the same direction.
As  these  experimental  data  show,  activating  accessible
constructs or attitudes through one set of stimuli can facilitate
cognitive  processing  of  other  stimuli  under  certain
circumstances,  and  can  interfere  with  it  under  other
circumstances.  Some  of  the  results  support  and  converge  on
those  centered  on  the  constructs  of  current  concern  and
emotional arousal.
In  the  informational  approach,  one  subject  has  an  emotion
internally. Emotions are characterized as discrete units within the
system or  as  points  in  a  multidimensional space.  It  has  to  be
transmitted  through  a  process  of  encoding,  transmission  and
decoding.  Here,  emotion  is  considered  to  be  discrete,  well-
defined  and  transferable.  This  requires  designing  systems  to
model and transmit emotion. 
In  the interactional  approach,  communication of  emotion is
not only transmission. It is an active process of co-constructing
one’s emotional state; it does not require decoding process, only
active interpretation. Here, emotion is considered to be complex,
ambiguous,  adaptable  and  non-formalizable.  This  requires
designing  systems  that  support  social  settings  agents  in
producing, negotiating, experiencing and interpreting emotional
inferences.
Each approach requires different designing systems. Whereas
the informational approach seeks to bind truth into discrete and
often  sequential  units,  the  interactional  approach  allows  for
meaning to be enacted within the social setting. The issue of the
dynamic,  situated  interpretation  and  attribution  of  emotional
state  is  very  important  [25].  This  also  has  been  recently
considered within the idea of technology as sixth sense (e.g., [21,
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28].  Emotion is not formalized into the system; the emotional
meaning is supplied by the agents. Emotional meaning emerges
as in a situated way over the course of the interaction.
For  purpose  of  modeling  emotion  generation,  research  has
mainly centered on appraisal theories, which are the dominant
basis for that type of computational model.  Appraisal  theories
generally  argue  that  people  are  constantly  evaluating  their
environment, and that evaluations result in emotions such as fear
or anger. Each theory differs in its appraisal variables and the
way  in  which  appraisals  are  generated  (simultaneously  vs.
specific order).
Since  all  cognitive  processes  work  with  the  associative
network and emotional data is embedded within all the nodes,
any  process  can  use  emotion  data  to  model  emotional  effect.
EmoCog  [18]  is  designed  to  be  flexible,  so  that  further
dimensions  can  be  incorporated  into  both  the  associative
network  and  mechanisms  (arousal  and  valence).  It  tries  to
integrate emotions in a cognitive architecture with an associative
network  memory,  cognitive  attention  and  appraisal  following
cognition.  The  associative  network  allows  for  concepts  to
influence  each  other  emotionally,  also  hold  emotional
information for cognitive processes and emotion generation. The
cognitive  attention  subcomponent  allows  for  controlled
elaboration and emotional rise and decay. The last subcomponent
focus  on  how  appraisal  and  association  management  follow
cognition in the associative network, how cognition influences
emotional generation.
As  we  have  previously  seen,  many  design  decisions  on
affective interaction depends on the underlying assumptions and
techniques used in the interface. Some of them involve serious
limitations and result  in  a  too  much rigid  system.  A possible
solution relies on learning [17]. Instead of using a priori rules to
interpret words, we should potentially learn rules depending on
different applications, agents and contexts. There are algorithms
to  adapt  the  models  and  we  can  use  prior  knowledge  when
learning new models. For instance, a prior model of emotional
word recognition trained based on a certain agent can be used as
a starting point for learning models for other agents; or for the
same agent in different contexts. 
4 DISCUSSION 
Models in language processing have researched how words are
interpreted  by  humans.  Many  models  presume  the  ability  to
correctly interpret the beliefs, motives and intentions underlying
words. The interest relies also on how emotion motivates certain
words  or  actions,  inferences,  and  communicates  information
about  mental  state.  For  instance,  some tutoring  systems have
explored this potential to inform user models. Likewise, dialogue
systems, mixed-initiative planning systems, or systems that learn
from observation could also benefit from such an approach.
As  these  experimental  data  show,  activating  accessible
constructs or attitudes through one set of stimuli can facilitate
cognitive  processing  of  other  stimuli  under  certain
circumstances,  and  can  interfere  with  it  under  other
circumstances.  Some  of  the  results  support  and  converge  on
those  centered  on  the  constructs  of  current  concern  and
emotional arousal.
Future  research  has  to  take  seriously  into  account  this
question: how to develop models where emotion interacts with
cognitive processing.  One example could be the work of [26]
where  it  is  combined  speech-based  emotion  recognition  with
adaptive human-computer modeling. With the robust recognition
of  emotions  from  speech  signals  as  their  goal,  the  authors
analyze the effectiveness of using a plain emotion recognizer, a
speech-emotion  recognizer  combining  speech  and  emotion
recognition,  and  multiple  speech-emotion  recognizers  at  the
same time. The semi-stochastic dialogue model employed relates
user  emotion  management  to  the  corresponding  dialogue
interaction history and allows the device to adapt itself  to the
context, including altering the stylistic realization of its speech.
This  goal  involves system integration architectures  such as
Open Agent Architecture [20] and Adaptive Agent Architecture
[7].  These  multi-agent  architectures  provide  essential
infrastructure for integrating many complex modules needed to
implement  emotional  word  processing  and  perform  it  in  a
distributed  way. In  a  multiagent  architecture,  the  components
needed  (e.g.,  speech  recognition,  word  processing,  emotional
integration) can be written in different programming languages,
on  different  machines/agents,  and  with  different  operating
systems. Agent communication languages have been developed
to take account of asynchronous delivery, triggered responses,
multi-casting and other concepts from distributed systems.
In this kind of architecture, speech and gestures can arrive in
parallel or asynchronously via individual modality agents, where
results  are  transferred  to  a  facilitator.  Next,  these  results,
normally an n-best list of conjectured lexical items and related
time-stamp  information,  are  routed  to  appropriate  agents  for
further  language  processing.  Then,  sets  of  meaning fragments
derived  from  the  speech,  or  other  modality,  arrive  at  the
multimodal  integrator  which  decides  whether  and  how  long
(based on system’s temporal thresholds) to wait for recognition
results  from other  modalities.  It  fuses  the  meaning  fragments
into  a  semantically  and  temporally  compatible  whole
interpretation before passing the results back to the facilitator.
Here, the system’s final multimodal interpretation is confirmed
by the interface, delivered as multimedia feedback to the agent,
and executed by the relevant application.
Many studies in the literature analyse each subsystem (e.g.,
speech recognizers) but few applications take into account these
architectures.  A clear  example is  a  comprehensive analysis  of
human-computer interaction [8]. In the informational approach,
emotions are discrete and we evaluate how they are contained
and transmitted. In the interactional approach, we have to focus
on  evaluating  things  such  as  awareness,  different  kind  of
expressions and engagement between agents in a social setting or
action. 
5 FUTURE SOLUTIONS
Future solutions are mainly oriented to robot applications (e.g.,
[4, 34]). On the one hand, how robots can be used in cognitive
rehabilitation as compensatory technology (e.g., autism). On the
other hand, how robots can evolve or adapt to new situations or
contexts.  For  instance,  [15]  presented a  cognitive  architecture
that  tries  to  measure  the  effects  of  emotional  cognition  on
learning.  That  is,  it  uses  emotional  intelligence  to  learn  new
concepts from previously unknown kind of experiences.
We can  interpret  the  suggested  selection  mechanism as  an
information  filter.  This  information  filter  only  selects  the
measurement for the required features and passes them to the
memory  system.  Features  that  do  not  contribute  in  solving  a
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given  task  are  discarded.  This  also  requires  a  dynamical  and
flexible  system  architecture  that  allows  for  a  demand-driven
combination  of  processing  modules.  We have  proposed  such
architecture for the congruent emotion of word processing. To
acquire more complex information, the system needs to combine
those  procedures  in  a  suitable  way  within  memory
representation.  Beside  this,  the  system  has  to  decide  which
properties  it  has  to  measure for  solving the current  task.  The
resulting representation is demand related, as only the pieces of
information  to  solve  the  task  is  acquired.  This  task  driven
representation  can  serve  as  a  foundation  for  learning  new
relations  between  words  and  emotions  and  for  interpreting
current interactions.
[34] addressed the problem of the detection and revealing of
the  relevant  “context”  to  inform  affect  detection.  They
implemented  a  context-based  affect  detection  component
embedded in an improvisational virtual platform. The software
allows up to five human characters and one intelligent agent to
be  engaged  in  one  session  to  conduct  creative  improvisation
within  loose  scenarios.  Some  of  these  conversations  reveal
personal subjective opinions or feelings about situations, while
others are caused by social interactions and show opinions and
emotional responses to other participant characters. In order to
detect  affect  from  such  contexts,  first  of  all  a  naïve  Bayes
classifier is used to categorize these two types of conversations
based on linguistic cues. A semantic-based analysis is also used
to further derive the discussion themes and identify the target
audiences for the social interaction inputs. Then, two statistical
approaches have been developed to provide affect detection in
the social and personal emotion contexts. The emotional history
of each individual character is used in interpreting affect relating
to the personal contexts, while the social context affect detection
takes  account  of  interpersonal  relationships,  sentence  types,
emotions implied by the potential target audiences in their most
recent interactions and discussion themes. The new development
of context-based affect detection is integrated with the intelligent
agent.
In  this  context,  a  psychological  framework  of  emotional
language processing is needed to describe the steps humans take
when they interact with other computer systems or agents [24].
This framework can be used to help evaluate the efficiency and
naturalness of a user interface (e.g., design principles, emotional
inferences, etc.).
So,  the  key  question  is  to  represent,  reason,  and  exploit
various models of word processing to more effectively process
input,  generate  output,  and manage the dialog and interaction
between  different  agents.  The  input  data  (words)  should  be,
cognitive  and  emotionally,  processed  in  a  joint  feature  space
according to a context-dependent model.
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Reconciling Hot and Cold Cognition
in Persuasive Technologies
Marios Belk1 and Antonis Kakas1 and George Samaras1
Abstract. This paper is concerned with the study of persuasion
through a synthesis of cold, or rationally driven, and hot, or emotion-
ally driven, cognitive reasoning. We present a computational frame-
work for persuasion that is based on two principles: (a) argumen-
tation captures the natural form of human reasoning; and (b) per-
suasion of individual users can only be effective if it also takes into
account emotional arguments. We propose a general architecture for
persuasive systems that is based on a unified argumentation theory
for cold and hot reasoning. The architecture allows a full spectrum
on the relative strength of cold and hot arguments for taking deci-
sions and for persuasively supporting these decisions. This enables
us to design experiments to empirically calibrate the architecture, to
measure the interaction between hot and cold cognition/reasoning in
artificial cognitive systems and to compare this with human behavior.
Importantly, we can study how hot and cold cognition can mitigate
each others weaknesses in decision making and persuasiveness.
1 INTRODUCTION
Aristotle defined three persuasion methodologies, namely, ethos (ap-
peal to authority/honesty), pathos (appeal to emotions), and logos
(appeal to logic). Gorgias, the philosopher of rhetoric, turned persua-
sion into a ”science” by learning to use skillful arguments to support
a position (a thesis) or indeed to support the opposite position (the
anti-thesis) as the case may require. From these ancient works on
persuasion, one sees the importance of considering and playing with
the emotions of the people - hot reasoning/cognition - but also ad-
dressing their rational reasoning - cold reasoning/cognition - in order
to produce a persuasive effect on them. Persuasion is most effective
when people are ”seduced” through their pathos and reason into a
decision.
This paper is concerned with the study of computational persua-
sion through a synthesis of theory and methods from Artificial Intelli-
gence and Cognitive Psychology. We aim to develop experimental ar-
tificial systems, whose foundation rests on a synthesis of cold, or ra-
tionally driven, and hot, or emotionally driven, reasoning and through
which we can carry out empirical psychological experiments to ex-
amine various aspects of persuasion. The purpose is both to draw
from Cognitive Science in building and refining these systems but
also to use these systems to help us understand aspects of persua-
sion and in particular those aspects that would make these systems
naturally effective cognitive assistants to human users.
For example, consider a scenario where a user is depressed and he
may be reluctant to take his needed daily walk outside in the park. A
persuasive system based on cold cognition would lead to the decision
1 Department of Computer Science, University of Cyprus, Cyprus, email:
{belk,antonis,cssamara}@cs.ucy.ac.cy
to take a walk at the usual time, supported by arguments grounded
on the physiological and medical needs of the user. Hot cognition
under the emotional state of depression, will support arguments to
stay indoors and carry on watching TV.
What is a good decision for the user? To encourage him to go for
a walk or to let him calm down, thus missing the walk? Furthermore,
which decision can be best supported in the sense that it will have
a better chance to be persuasive to the user at the current situation?
In other words, what matters is not only the (objective) quality of
the decision but also the ability of the system to find and present
arguments to the user that would be persuasive. It is this concern of
convincing the user that would help a persuasive system find a useful
middle ground between the independent cold and hot decisions. The
challenge is: (a) to be able to take into consideration both sides of
cold and hot cognition; and (b) to be able to find decisions that are
persuasively supported.
Persuasive technologies—technologies that are designed to influ-
ence the behavior of users [9]—are widely deployed in everyday
interactive systems. Popular examples include persuasive technolo-
gies that augment and personalize the care of patients [8], motivate
healthier life styles [5], encourage social interaction [23], promote
safe driving behavior [3], promote global peace [15], and many more.
Research in persuasive technologies has shown that individuals
differ in their susceptibility to persuasion—how individuals respond
to certain persuasive strategies [14]. An important challenge for de-
signing effective persuasive technologies is to understand users and
their unique personal characteristics in order to choose the ”best-fit”
persuasive strategy to approach each individual. The idea is to take
a particular decision and personalize the delivery by taking into con-
sideration the users’ unique characteristics and context of use [13].
However, which characteristics are considered important in order to
make persuasive technologies effective through personalization and
adaptation?
Researchers and practitioners have exposed the importance of
emotional persuasion; effective persuasive technology should not
only appeal to the users’ practical needs but also to their emotional
self. Research works have studied the role of emotions in the design
of persuasive strategies; [19] examined the interplay between emo-
tional and non-emotional strategies, [1] investigated whether emo-
tions affect users’ trust towards persuasive technology, [7] suggested
that persuasion can be more successful when strategies are framed
with emotional overtones that match the emotional state of the user.
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2 UNIFYING COLD AND HOT COGNITION
THROUGH ARGUMENTATION
Guided by work in Cognitive Psychology (and Philosophy to some
extent), we present a computational framework for persuasion tech-
nologies that is based on two principles: (a) argumentation captures
the natural form of human reasoning; and (b) persuasion of individ-
ual users can only be effective if it also takes into account emotional
arguments. Persuasion is critically affected by emotional consider-
ations, depending on the general emotional character of a user, on
his emotional stability (or emotion regulation) and on his current
emotional state, that come to play along with cold arguments based
solely on rationality. In addition, bearing in mind that individual dif-
ferences in cognitive processing affect the way individuals control
their emotions, e.g. people with high working memory capacity con-
trol their emotions more naturally than those with a more limited
working memory capacity [22], such individual human characteris-
tics are also considered for the delivery of a more refined persuasion
strategy.
We propose a general architecture for persuasion systems that is
based on a unified argumentation theory for cold and hot reasoning.
Arguments are parameterized by needs, e.g. based on Maslow’s hier-
archy of needs [17], and emotions, e.g. based on HUMAINE’s emo-
tion annotation and representation language (EARL) [10]. Accord-
ingly, the architecture allows a full spectrum on the relative strength
of cold and hot arguments for taking decisions and for persuasively
supporting these decisions. Decisions in argumentation are taken by
building a case comprising of a set of arguments, S, that are dialec-
tically acceptable in the sense that the arguments in S are able to de-
fend against any counter-argument against S. Through this dialectical
semantics of argumentation we aim to capture the processes of cold
and hot reasoning that occur internally within the minds of people,
when they are considering how to decide on a particular dilemma.
Argumentation can form a formal and computational foundation
both for pure logical (deductive) reasoning but also for decision mak-
ing amongst (conflicting) options under personal preferences that are
also sensitive to the particular context in which we are taking the
decision. Such personal preferences may be driven by utility needs
and motivations or the high-level desires and emotional character
of the person. Uniformly, argumentation can capture and integrate
the whole spectrum of human reasoning from extreme rationality on
one side to extreme emotions or pathos driven on the other side of
the spectrum. Indeed, argumentation allows a description of human
reasoning that escapes from a pure logical form giving higher flex-
ibility in the process of decision making. For a review of the wider
computational links between Argument and Cognition see [12] and
[11]. More generally, the link between persuasion and argumentation
is supported through several works in Cognitive Psychology, e.g. in
[21, 20, 18].
The unified view of cold and hot cognition through argumenta-
tion helps to mitigate the dichotomy between these two forms of
human reasoning and to bring them together to argue their case or
possibly to unite in support of the same position in some decision
cases. Figure 1 presents a framework that brings together the afore-
mentioned aspects. The core of the framework is comprised of three
main processes: i) the decision taking process that initially chooses
a recommendation based on the needs of the user; ii) the persuasion
taking process that aims to support the recommendation based on
the emotional state of the user; and iii) the dialogue taking process
that is responsible to deliver the persuasion strategy by considering
the user’s unique characteristics. All three processes are highly inter-
related while setting up a persuasion strategy; from decision making
to delivering the decision. In particular, decision making can criti-
cally depend on the persuasion degree of an option, determined by
an evaluation on how convincing the arguments can be for the user.
These three processes are driven by three models that surround them;
what drives the decisions is on the one hand the high-level general
characteristics of the user (i.e. emotions and needs), and on the other
hand the situational input from the environment (that includes the
user).
Figure 1. Framework for delivering persuasion strategies based on a hot
and cold cognition model
3 COGNITIVE EXPERIMENTS FOR
PERSUASION
A series of user studies are planned with the aim to best realize the
proposed framework and empirically calibrate the architecture. We
primarily aim: i) to study how cold and hot cognition interact and
how they can mitigate each other’s weaknesses in decision making;
ii) investigate the interplay between decision making and persuasion
taking towards effective persuasive argumentation; and iii) investi-
gate the interplay between human factors, and cold/hot cognition ar-
guments towards persuasion effectiveness.
Initially, in order to test the appropriateness of our approach in
integrating cold and hot cognition, we plan to carry out a series of
experiments of the ”delayed gratification type” so as to examine the
sensitivity of our cognitive assistant systems with respect to the in-
cremental dependence on hot emotional cognition, i.e. where the rel-
ative strength of emotionally based arguments is gradually increased.
An important challenge of the experiments is ecological validity
which requires that the experimental design, procedure and setting
of the study must approximate the real-life context that is under in-
vestigation [4]. In order to address ecological validity, we will design
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a series of user studies in which real users will be performing real-life
tasks in their natural environment (home, work, etc.).
For each study design, we will set the objectives of the persua-
sion strategy and measure whether the objectives were met based on
a given decision making and persuasion strategy. In particular, we
are interested to measure the Persuasion Index of how effective the
systems were in persuading the users to adopt recommendations. Uti-
lizing a parametric cognitive assistant whose operation will be varied
from totally cold to totally hot decision and persuasion making, we
will investigate the interaction effect between cold and hot decision
making and user parameters, such as type of personal needs, current
emotional state, emotion regulation, etc., towards effectiveness of the
strategy. Figure 2 illustrates the experimental parameters that will in-
dicate the interplay between user parameters and the level of inte-
gration of cold and hot cognition, towards the degree of persuasion
effectiveness (Persuasion Index). In order to examine these effects,
we will follow grounded experimental methods utilized for the de-
sign and evaluation of user-adaptive interactive systems [2], such as
performing A-B evaluation methods by splitting the sample of the
user study into different groups, in which Group A will receive spe-
cific feedback from the cognitive assistant (e.g. based on pure cold
decision taking) vs. Group B that will receive different feedback (e.g.
based on hot decision taking). This will allow us to investigate the
interaction effects between various experimental parameters and the
decision making (Figure 2), towards the effectiveness of the persua-
sion strategy. For modelling the user parameters, these experiments
will use wearable technologies to monitor and analyze physiological
signals (e.g. heart rate, heart rate variability) for the recognition of
the emotional states of the users, and accredited psychometric instru-
ments and questionnaires for the recognition of human cognitive fac-
tors such as emotion regulation [16], working memory capacity [6],
etc. With the aim to support the quantitative measures and triangulate
the results, we will obtain qualitative measures through user feedback
on their perceptions regarding the interactions with the cognitive as-
sistant, their behavior and the decisions they have taken based on the
persuasive strategies.
Figure 2. Experimental setup: Isolating a particular parameter (e.g.
emotional state), we will split users into different groups according to their
emotional states such as stressed state vs. relaxed state, and further provide
various arguments to the users based on different levels of integration of cold
and hot cognition. Accordingly, we will compare the persuasion
effectiveness (measured through the Persuasion Index) between the different
groups of users with the aim to investigate the interaction effects between the
factor under investigation and the level of integration of cold and hot
cognition arguments. Similarly, we will investigate other factors (e.g.
emotion regulation, needs, environment, etc.) and their interactions with cold
and hot arguments towards persuasion effectiveness
4 CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this work is to bring together theory and methods from
Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Psychology to study the inter-
play between cold and hot cognition in persuasion. Using computa-
tional argumentation theory as a theoretical basis for building cog-
nitive assistants we aim to study the development of effective per-
suaders informed by systematic empirical psychological studies of
evaluating the quality of decisions and degree of persuasion of these
systems.
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Irrational Machines: Robots, humans and the monsters
of reason
Michael Szollosy 1
Abstract. Robots and AI exist — both in concrete terms and, most
especially, in the human imagination — at the contested intersection
of reason and emotion. On the one hand, our intelligent machines
are the epitome of reason — they are thinking machines without
the messy complication of emotions. They thus exist at the apex of
our rationalist aspirations. On the other hand, there is a great deal
of fear and even expectancy that we will soon as emotionally-aware
robots and AI. In the meantime, we relentlessly anthropomorphise
machines, attributing to robots and AI all sorts of motivations, and
they bear the burden of so many human anxieties and aspirations
about the future: from massive job losses to (trans)human enhance-
ment to human genocide. This paper asks, what are the consequences
of this situation of robots and AI at the intersection of reason and
emotion, rationality and irrationality? It is vital that we come to some
understanding of how robots and AI have come to occupy this posi-
tion, and not simply to dismiss the public imaginations as errors that
need to be corrected: the popular perception of robots tell us a great
deal about both our present human selves and our future with robots
and AI.
1 INTRODUCTION
When we talk about robots and artificial intelligence (AI), we need
to distinguish between robots and AI as they really exist, in the labs
(and factories and hospitals) of the twenty-first century, and those
that exist in the cultural imagination. These are very different, though
intricately related entities. However, it is a tragic mistake — truly, as
it is so often firmly rooted in hubris — to simply dismiss the public
perception of robots and AI as errors that can be, and need to be, cor-
rected. As I regularly remind people: robots were invented in the pub-
lic imagination long before they were ever built in laboratories, and
the legacy of those first robots — the robota of Karel Cˇapek’s play
R.U.R., the Maschinenmensch of Fritz Lang’s Metropolis, Televox,
Asimovs Robbie, Hal 9000, Roy Batty, T-800 Model 101 and the rest
— on both public perception and on roboticists actual efforts cannot
be underestimated. In many cases, the public’s imagination has influ-
enced or even dictated the design and implementation of robots and
AI (e.g.[15] [24] [23]).
We need to expect and prepare for the fact that the public’s imagi-
nation will play a crucial role in the development and implementation
of robots now and in the future. Consider, for example, the notori-
ous case of genetically modified foods or organisms (GMOs), which
should by now be an object lesson for all researchers in robotics and
AI: GMO technologies were expected by many researchers to bring
massive benefits to all ’stakeholders’, but since the 1980s GMOs
have been increasingly met with suspicion and hostility by those
1 University of Sheffield, UK, email: m.szollosy@sheffield.ac.uk
very groups, such as farmers and onsumers — i.e. the public— that
were meant to benefit from their introduction and mass application
[26]. Whatever the merits of GMOs, or the motivations of the sci-
entists and corporations that tried to bring this research to markets,
it is widely agreed that there were serious problems with the man-
ner in which GMOs were introduced to, or some might say foisted
on, the public. As we discused at length at the AISB conference in
Sheffield in 2016, the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research
Coucil (EPSRC) convened the retreat that lead to their ’Principles
of Robotics’ [2] precisely to prevent new developments in robotics
and AI foundering in the same way that GMOs had done [5]. It is
encouraging that the words ’responsible research’ are now so often
heard in or at least near engineering and computer science depart-
ments, though the depiction of robots and AI in films, video games
and, in particular, popular newspaper headlines show that we still
have a long way to go, and much to concerned about.
Robots and AI are situated at a very paradoxical place, at a
highly contested and anxiety-inducing intersection between reason
and emotion. By looking at how robots and AI exist in the cultural
imagination, we can learn a great deal about human beings, the way
in which we perceive and even construct ourselves as rational and
irrational beings; we can learn which domains we reserve for rea-
son and which for emotions, and how the contested spaces between
the two give rise to great anxiety, about who we are and what lays in
store in our future. Additionally, the cultural perception of robots and
AI has and will continue to shape and govern research into robotics
and AI. These perceptions may have negative impact upon research
and the future implementation and use of robots in our societies, and
only by examining in detail these perceptions can we prevent dam-
aging limitations on beneficial technological development, and create
robots and AI that are genuinely welcome and useful in society.
This paper begins with a short historical contextualisation of the
invention of robots in the cultural imagination, and explains how
this history still has a tremendous impact upon the public’s anxiety
that could undermine valuable robotics research. I will then consider
more specifically how these ideas about robots and AI have particu-
lar impacts on social robots and human-robot interactions, and play
an important role in shaping policy, looking at the EPSRC’s 2010
Principles of Robotics [2] and the more recent EU Committee on Le-
gal Affairs report with recommendations to the Commission on Civil
Law Rules on Robotics [9], which was accepted by the European
Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee in January 2017. Finally, I will
consider ways of approaching our confused emotional relationships
with robots, in an effort to avoid the worst pitfalls that these relations
threaten to drag us into: one from Sigmund Freud’s thinking on how
to confront the paradoxes of emotion and reason and, secondly, from
the very (science-)fictions that give voice to our anxieties.
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2 CONTEXTS
If we are to appreciate the importance of understanding what robots
and AI mean in the public imagination, we first need to understand
how these particular images of robots and AI have come to be lodged
there. Unfortunately, this entails nothing short of an overview of two
thousand years of Western history [16] and comparing the ideologies
of world religions [21]. A grasp of how both capitalist media and
political parties manipulate public fear and anxiety would certainly
help as well (e.g. [14]). However, a shorter version of this— covering
little more than two hundred and fifty years — can suffice for our
purposes here.
It is no accident that human beings began to fear rational mon-
sters such robots and AI at the point that we invented the very idea
of ’reason’ and decided to make ourselves more rational. As Min-
soo Kang [16] explains, the very idea of the automata underwent a
radical transformation in the Enlightenment: from being a marvel-
lous machine capable of independent action to a human being inca-
pable of independent thought and action. The ideal, rational man of
the early Enlightenment, which was enamoured with the mechanis-
tic view of the world, became the incomplete being, an emotionless,
unimaginative conformist in the later, more idealist Enlightenment
[16].2 We can thus in the eighteenth century already see the ground
being laid for our present tensions between robots and humans, be-
tween the rational and the emotional: should humanity aspire to em-
ulate the perfect reason of machines, to be governed by rationality
and science? or are the consequences of abandoning our emotion,
animalistic selves too great, and instead should we take as our ideal
the irrational passions of the individual genius?
These tensions and concerns continued in the nineteenth century
with increasing concern about the effects of the Industrial Revolu-
tion, manifested most famously in the Romantic movement, which
provided the prototype that even today dominates our popular con-
ception of robots with Mary Shelley’s 1818 novel, Frankenstein: A
Modern Prometheus [20]. It is important to remember, however, that
while Frankenstein’s monster has become the basis of so many mod-
ern robotic monsters — from the False Maria of Lang’s 1927 film
Metropolis [17] to Ava of Alex Garland’s 2015 film Ex Machina [13]
— it is actual Dr. Frankenstein, the archetypical ’mad scientist’, who
is the subject of Shelley’s novel. And while the Romantics were en-
amoured of the ’modern Prometheus’, the brave new superhumans
that stood above mere mortal man and would drag the human race
up from our barbarity, they were also ambivalent about such figures.
Shelley’s novel expresses fears about the effects of both rationality
and the ir/rational pursuits of the mad scientist. Thus in Dr. Franken-
stein we can see deep ambivalence and anxiety about what the pursuit
of science and reason are doing to human beings.
The fear that human beings are being de-humanised, resembling
the soulless automata capable of nothing more than executing a basic
programme, is shared by many important thinkers in the late nine-
teenth century (e.g. Marx [19]), and the concern that human beings
are forever condemned to suffer in an eternal struggle between ra-
tional demands and irrational desires is the fundamental assumption
made by Freud and his myriad of followers [3]. These ideas are car-
ried into the twentieth century, when we see the first robots invented
in Karl Cˇapek’s play R.U.R. [7], from where we get the word robot
itself, the Czech word robota meaning something akin to a forced
labourer or a slave. Though Cˇapek’s robots are not actually mechan-
ical in the way we understand robots today — they are more akin
2 In fact, Kang demonstrates how in some writers, such as Diderot, these two
conceptions of man and machine exist simultaneously.
to clones or genetically constructed humans — we see in his play a
continuation of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century fears and the
foundations of our own robot mythologies:
• reason and science are transforming human beings into machines,
i.e. something less than human, and missing some essential human
quality
• the transformation of work, turning people into nothing more than
cogs in an industrial machine, dehumanises humans
• at the same time, paradoxically, it is feared that robots (and later
AI) will take human jobs
• eventually, robots (and later AI), having made humans redundant,
will destroy human beings and take over the world
The last point may be the dystopian telos, though most commentators
today would accept the first three points as valid concerns. It is this
transformation of human beings into sub-human machines that has
given rise to our anxieties about robots and AI, more than anything
that real robots and AI themselves have done. This is why the psy-
chopathic, genocidal robots of science-fiction are so often indistin-
guishable from the humans they seek to destroy (e.g. Blade Runner,
Terminator, Battlestar Galactica, Ex Machina); these robots are just
a reflection of the rational monsters we ourselves are becoming. We
fear the blurring of that boundary; we fear not being able to tell what
is human and what is machine, where one starts and the other ends.
As versions of us, these machines are not merely reflections of hu-
man rationality: they also embody the most irrational, animalistic,
impulsive aspects of humanity. This makes robots all the more ter-
rifying, because they represent both these anxieties about the conse-
quences of reason — the inflexible doctrine of rationality, the preci-
sion and productivity of technology, the dispassionate methodology
of science — and our savage, animal impulses: the irrational vio-
lence, the impulsive desires for domination and control.
3 EMOTIONALLY ENGAGINGWITH
(SOCIAL) ROBOTS
The consequences of this situation of robots and AI at the intersec-
tion of reason and emotion, rationality and irrationality are manifold,
but perhaps nowhere are these fears about the vicissitudes of emo-
tion and reason more manifest in twenty-first century robotics than
in the case of social robots. While industrial robots and AI pose a
much more immediate and realistic threat to the structural stability
of human societies (e.g. [11]), the heaviest burden of popular fears
of robots are carried by the idea of social robots. Social robots such
as Paro and Zeno and Nao disarm and reassure members of the pub-
lic (and in Sheffield we often bring these robots to meet people at
public engagement events), but it is ultimately what these robots rep-
resent that strikes at the very heart of public fears about robots and AI
more generally: that one day robots will come to be undistinguish-
able from human beings, and that they will come to replace, or even
surpass, human beings completely.
The fear of social robots is also caused in part because of the
inevitability of humans anthropomorphising (e.g. [10] [31]), which
means that we will attribute more (general) intelligence and other
human attributes, such as emotional responses and motivations, to
robots that even slightly mimic human appearance or behaviours.
This is fed in part, too, because the over-inflated belief that near-
human robots are just around the corner (fed by popular science-
fictions such as Ex Machina and Humans). But these causes are not
independent of the historical basis for fears of robots and AI; science-
fiction representations of advanced humanoid robots are merely giv-
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ing voice to fears that already exist, and the tendency to anthropo-
morphise exacerbates our tendency to see ourselves in (in)animate
machines. And as social robots are built specifically to exploit hu-
mans’ tendency to anthropomorphise, it should come as no surprise
that such robots magnify our pre-existing expectations and anxieties.
Social robots have tremendous potential in teaching children (e.g.
[27] [6]) and care of the elderly (e.g. [8] [22]), but there is a great deal
of controversy surrounding their usage that is symptomatic of both
this debate and the anxieties they represent. I would like to present
two cases to illustrate this: The 2010 EPSRC Principles of Robotics
[2] and the EU Parliaments Legal Affairs Committee draft legislation
from January 2017 [9].
In 2010 the EPSRC brought together experts ’from the worlds of
technology, industry, the arts, law and social sciences’ to devise a
set of principles for responsible research into robotics. The shadow
looming over this meeting, as already discussed, was that of GMOs
[5]; the EPSRC was determined that robots and AI were vital to the
future of the British economy, and were working to prevent a repeat
of what happened with GMOs. Putting aside any judgements of the
Principles on the whole (e.g. Prescott, in press), Principle 4 is intrigu-
ing:
Robots are manufactured artefacts. They should not be de-
signed in a deceptive way to exploit vulnerable users; instead,
their machine nature should be transparent. [2]
This legal phrasing is translated to a general audience in the follow-
ing way:
Robots are manufactured artefacts: the illusion of emotions and
intent should not be used to exploit vulnerable users. [2]
There is perhaps nothing controversial in the principle that robots
should not be designed to deceive (despite the fact that a certain de-
gree of deception has always been at the heart of robotics and AI, cf.
[24] [10]), but the limitations on the ’illusion of emotions and intent’
requires more consideration. The wording of the Principle for gen-
eral audiences and the commentary make it clear that what is being
talked about is social robots: ’One of the great promises of robotics
is that robot toys may give pleasure, comfort and even a form of
companionship to people who are not able to care for pets, whether
due to rules of their homes, physical capacity, time or money’ [2].
The commentary further makes it clear that this Principle is meant
to protect ’consumers’, to prevent unscrupulous manufacturers from
eliciting more money from families who have become (emotionally)
attached to such a ’toy’ (and the EPSRC Principles seem to allow for
social robots to be little more than mere ’toys’). That the category of
’vulnerable users’ implicitly includes all consumers suggests that the
Principle’s authors do not see a terrific future for robots that present
the ’illusion of emotions’. And while the Principle allows that ’it is
permissible and even sometimes desirable for a robot to sometimes
give the impression of real intelligence’, there is a concern that the
’machine nature should be transparent’, meaning that it should not
be possible to confuse a robot with something that is not a robot, i.e.
something real.
There are some that are very keen to exploit our human, irrational,
emotional attachments and to use robots as a way of making con-
nections with consumers for reasons that might be best described as
less than entirely honourable; I accepted an invitation to speak last
year at a marketing ’huddle’ where there was a great deal of inter-
est in using social robots and exploiting the ’science of cute’ — i.e.
the human capacity to anthropomorphise — as a tool for marketing
products to potential customers. However, there are myriad of poten-
tial benefits of using the human tendency to anthropomorphise that
are legitimately being explored by researchers, e.g. robots as teach-
ing assistants, in elderly care, as companions. It is difficult not to
perceive that the EPSRC Principles are, in general, either denigrat-
ing or discouraging these possibilities.
It is helpful, too, to see how the question of social robots is treated
in the EU Parliaments Legal Affairs Committee draft legislation on
robotics and AI which were passed by an overwhelming majority of
MEPs in January of 2017. The first paragraph of the report’s Intro-
duction begins:
A. whereas from Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein’s Monster
to the classical myth of Pygmalion, through the story of
Prague’s Golem to the robot of Karel Cˇapek, who coined the
word, people have fantasised about the possibility of building
intelligent machines, more often than not androids with human
features;
B. whereas now that humankind stands on the threshold
of an era when ever more sophisticated robots, bots, androids
and other manifestations of artificial intelligence (”AI”) seem
poised to unleash a new industrial revolution, which is likely
to leave no stratum of society untouched, it is vitally important
for the legislature to consider all its implications; [9]
This introduction is important, because it tells us a great deal about
the origins of the assumptions underlying the report, what the re-
port’s authors see as the issues that need to be addressed, and its
overall context. This report is, clearly, firmly rooted in the historical
tradition of robots and AI that we can trace back to the Enlighten-
ment: Frankenstein and Cˇapek are named checked, and the threat of
a ’new industrial revolution’ is the once and future context of robots
in Europe. 3 The report re-enforces many of the familiar concerns
about robots, for example that ’the development of robotics and AI
may result in a large part of the work now done by humans being
taken over by robots’, and some new concerns, that could not have
been predicted by Shelley or Cˇapek, such as questions of data protec-
tion, but can be nevertheless be seen as part of the familiar contexts;
for example, in the case of data protection, we can observe the usual
fear that something uniquely human, i.e. the sense of privacy and a
unique sphere of interiority, is being lost in the blurring of boundaries
between the human and the technological.
On the question of social robots, however, the Legal Affairs Com-
mittee’s report has very little to say. There is the acknowledgement
that ’the ”soft impacts” on human dignity may be difficult to esti-
mate, but will still need to be considered if and when robots replace
human care and companionship’ [9]. Under the subheading of ’Care
Robots’, the report merely states: ’Points out that human contact is
one of the fundamental aspects of human care; believes that replacing
the human factor with robots could dehumanise caring practices’.
What this illustrates is a further, additional, articulation of our
long-standing fears of robots. Clearly, here is the fear that robots
will replace human labour, not just in the assembly lines but in the
caring professions. There is the fear articulated that the increased
contact with technology will dehumanise human beings, that we will
somehow become less human through our contact with machines.
Our dehumanisation reflects this anxiety that we are becoming the
3 The additional mention of the myths of Pygmalion and the golem illustrate
that this context is not limited to the history of Europe since the Enlighten-
ment, but these are outside the scope of this paper.
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machines that we fear. This transformation of the human is particu-
larly poignant in the case cited by the EU report, as the jobs that are
imagined to be filled by robots in this case are precisely those jobs
that are normally assumed to involve high degrees of emotional ties
between humans.
There are, of course, legitimate concerns that can and should le-
gitimately be raised regarding the use of social robots, particularly as
it relates to care. One may, of course, legitimately question whether
the lack of human contact can have adverse impacts on our emotional
and/or psychological well-being (e.g. [28] [25]). It is right not to con-
flate robots and AI that can imitate emotional responses with genuine
emotional responses, especially as such distinctions are important to
determining the sorts of rights and responsibilities we wish to bestow
upon robots and AI [4]. It is also right to wish to protect consumers,
though as long as robots and AI are nothing more than products, as
they will be for the foreseeable future, the rights of consumers will
be guaranteed with existing legislation and protections.
But it is impossible to separate these issues from their historical
contexts. By anchoring these discussions on the myths of Franken-
stein and Asimov, in speaking about dehumanising people and hu-
manising robots (e.g. [4]), we are engaging in a long-standing debate,
and these assessments of the role of robots and AI in our present and
future human societies are dominated by the familiar fears, barely re-
articulated, and the fundamental human questions that we have been
grappling with since the Enlightenment, namely, what are the conse-
quences of reason? How can we negotiate the vicissitudes of reason
and emotion, and what path is in our best interests, as individuals, as
a species?
In certain ways, therefore, perhaps too many, our debates and dis-
cussions about robots are just a symptom of a two-hundred-and-
fifty year debate about what it means to be human.4 We have cre-
ated robots in our imagination and cast them are characters in this
drama. We use them as containers for our anxieties and aspirations.
We doubt the authenticity of our relationships with robots (e.g. [28])
as if human emotions directed towards robots are less real, uniquely
inauthentic in a way that our relations with other non-human creature
or things are not. This is not to say that we can simply ignore these
contexts, or proceed as if, having understood this, we can all simply
correct these misunderstandings and move on. There are very real
dangers in misrepresenting robots and AI, but likewise there are very
real dangers in ignoring the complex human perceptions of robots,
and ignoring the ways robots and AI represent our own anxieties
about rationality and irrationality.
4 LESSONS FROM FREUD AND THE
TRANSFERENCES
How then are we to move forward? We seem to be trapped in a
paradox, or perhaps even more simply an inescapable contradiction,
where we absolutely must talk about robots and AI in the context of
this centuries-old attempt to locate the human on this map of reason
and emotion, but at the same time we must try to discuss robots and
AI in the context of their twenty-first century realities, understanding
how they will come to live with us. We need to heed public concerns,
but also construct a suitable ethics for the use of robots and AI that
are not simply proxy debates about how we define ourselves. This
can be done in part with a renewed commitment to education, infor-
mation and engagement, but the public must be listened to as well as
4 Bryson also acknowledges this fact, citing that at least part of the reason
robots are ’overly personified’ is because ’we are not certain what it means
to be human’ [4].
lectured at.
For a strategy to help us approach this problem, I would turn to
a thinker who’s ideas were shaped exactly in response to these ten-
sions between the rational and the irrational. Sigmund Freud’s psy-
choanalytic practice had to confront precisely this very problem of
how to come to a rational way of understanding irrational processes.
Freud’s challenge was to understand, explain and move beyond long-
held beliefs and emotions, the chaos of social and personal histo-
ries that seemed intractable, and to which both patient and therapist
were subject. Freud gave the name transference to this projection of
past fantasies onto new situations, the messy battlefield where the pa-
tient’s past conflicts re-engage. However, recognising that he himself
was not free of the impingements of the past, he identified the ther-
apist’s countertransference, which Freud originally saw as the pa-
tient’s influence on the analyst’s unconscious but has come to refer
more generally to the analyst’s own irrational baggage in approach-
ing the problems before him. [29] [30]
There are important lessons for all cultural studies, histories,
philosophies and psychologies in Freud’s recognition of the impor-
tance of the past in approaching present problems, and perhaps even
more so in his self-reflexive realisation that no discourse, no expla-
nation, is free of the influence of past struggles. And as the goal of
psychoanalysis is to ’make conscious what is unconscious’, or ’fill-
ing gaps in the memory’ [12], our goal must be the same: drawing the
hidden histories of imaginary robots and AI into the light, so that we
can rationally examine the irrational ways we have built robots and
AI in the cultural imagination, understanding the way they exist as
symptoms of our anxieties about humans as caught between reason
and emotion.
Freud’s conception of the transferences underwent three distinct
phases [18] [29] [30], all of which are relevant in different contexts to
our understanding of robots and AI. Freud first conceived the trans-
ferences as errors that needed correcting or eliminating altogether,
much as we might regard unfounded fears about robots as inaccu-
racies to be redressed or dismissed. However, Freud learned that it
was much better to listen to the transferences, to understand them so
as to exploit that knowledge when engaging with patients. Similarly,
we need to take seriously the public’s anxieties and aspirations about
robots and AI. We should not regard the public’s imagination as im-
pediment to clarity and rational discussion; instead, we must seek to
understand these transferences of imaginary robots onto those in the
real world and learn from them, so as to engage more effectively with
public perception and, ultimately, to build robots and AI that will be
more readily accepted by all stakeholders (public, consumers, indus-
tries). Finally, Freud and post-Freudian psychoanalysts came to ap-
preciate the transferences’ vital importance in enabling meaningful
and productive communication between patient and analyst. Like-
wise, we need to come to appreciate public perceptions of robots as
not just things that need to be understood and grappled with, but as
ideas that can be embraced, and with which we can engage.
5 CONCLUSION
Finally, there may also be lessons from the original master of science-
fictional robots, Isaac Asimov, who not only did so much to invent
robots in the public imagination but is still an important touchstone
in our contemporary discussions. (As already highlighted, both the
EPSRC Principles and a recent EU draft legislation begin by citing
Asimov’s famous ’Three Laws of Robotics’.) In his short story, ’The
Evitable Conflict’ [1], Asimov portrays a simmering, impending
global conflict between Machines and an anti-Machine movement,
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The Society for Humanity. In this world, the world Co-ordinator no-
tices that the artificial intelligences that, for all intents and purposes,
run the planet and human affairs seem to be acting irrationally. How-
ever, as robopsychologist Susan Calvin explains, it turns out that the
Machine is not malfunctioning, but merely pretending to be acting
irrationally in order to function more effectively, so as to appease hu-
mans for whom such a rationally perfect machine inspires not confi-
dence but increased anxiety. In other words, a perfectly rational ma-
chine acts irrationally to achieve the rational aim of appeasing the
irrationality of the human beings that it serves. More than merely
providing humorous irony, perhaps this story can offer some lessons
in how we should be looking to design robots and AI so that they
can better fit in with our noblest human rational aspirations and our
basest irrational impulses.
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Described robot functionality impacts emotion 
experience attributions
Xijing Wang and Eva G. Krumhuber1 
Abstract. This work tested whether attributions of emotional 
experience vary with the perceived functionality of robots. When 
robots were described in terms of their social value, participants 
assigned greater levels of emotional experience compared to 
when robots merely seemed to fulfil economic needs. However, 
increased perceptions of experience elicited more uncomfortable 
feelings in observers, apparently tapping into the uncanny valley. 
Implications for the use of social robots and human responses to 
feeling machines are discussed. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Research suggests that mind perception is necessary to explain 
differences in how we perceive and respond to humans and 
machines (e.g. [1]). Robots possess agency (i.e. memory, 
planning), but capacity to feel and sense is seen as uniquely 
human [2]. The purposes served by robots have been developed 
independently from these two dimensions of perceived mind [3]. 
Some are built to increase work efficiency and bring financial 
profits (i.e. fulfil economic functions), while others provide 
companionship and social support (i.e. fulfil social functions 
[4]). Although robots do not possess capacity for emotional 
experience as defined by biological principles, their perceived 
function could imply different types of mind. Given that social 
functions centre on traits such as caring, benevolence and 
communality, it was hypothesised that robots with ascribed 
social value will be attributed higher levels of experience and 
emotions than those with economic value. However, increased 
perceptions of experience (rather than agency) could lead to 
humans feeling unnerved and uneasy [5, 1].1 
2 EXPERIMENT 
Short text-based descriptions were developed that emphasised 
either the social value (i.e. social support and companionship 
that robots bring to human society) or the economic value (i.e. 
financial benefits and profits that robots bring to the corporate 
world) of robots. Pilot-testing (N = 36) revealed that robots that 
accomplish social goals were rated higher in social value (M = 
58.1 vs. M = 13.2) but lower in economic value (M = 34.7 vs. M 
= 78.5) than those that meet financial goals, ps < .0001.  
In the present study, participants (N = 107) evaluated robots 
that varied in described functionality (social vs. economic) with 
respect to their capacity for a) emotional experience (i.e. 
experience emotions, have feelings, and be emotional, αs ≥ .88) 
and b) agency (i.e., exercise self-control, think analytically, and 
                                                 
1 Dept. of Experimental Psychology, University College London, WC1H 
0AP, UK. Email: {xijig.wang.13, e.krumhuber}@ucl.ac.uk. 
be rational, αs ≥ .92). Participants also indicated the extent to 
which they felt uncomfortable towards robots of each type (i.e., 
uneasy and unnerved, αs ≥ .89). All responses were made on 
100-point scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much).  
3 RESULTS 
In general, robots were rated to possess more agency (M = 40.2, 
SD = 29.7) than emotional experience (M = 12.5, SD = 12.4), 
F(1, 106) = 113, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.515. Central to the claim of the 
current study, a significant interaction between the robot’s 
described functionality and the type of inferred mind was 
obtained, F(1, 106) = 91.5, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.463. As can be seen 
in Figure 1, participants attributed greater emotional experience 
to robots with apparent social than economic value, p < .001. In 
contrast, agency attributions were unaffected by perceived robot 
functionality, p = .210. 
     Robots with social value (M = 32.7, SD = 29.8) elicited more 
uncomfortable feelings in participants than those meeting 
economic needs (M = 6.80, SD = 12.8), F(1, 106) = 101, p < 
.001, ηp2 = 0.487. Further analysis revealed that feelings of 
discomfort were positively related to the perceived emotional 
experience of the robot, r(214) = .467, p < .001, but not inferred 
agency, r(214) = -.047, p = .495, thereby replicating the findings 
of Gray and Wegner [1]. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Mind attribution to robots of different functionality. Error 
bars represent ± 1 SE. 
4 CONCLUSION  
Although advances have been made in producing artificial 
entities with increasingly humanlike appearance and behaviour 
[4], robots are still not perceived and treated in the same manner 
as humans. This gap may result from the perception of lack of 
emotions and fundamental experiences, which are essential 
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human features [1, 6]. The current research showed that the 
described function of a robot, independent from physical 
appearance and prior interaction, drives users’ perception. 
Robots with apparent social value (capacity to provide social 
support and companionship) were seen to possess greater 
emotional experience than those with economic value. In theory, 
higher perceived emotional ability should make robots suitable 
for human interaction in social settings [7]. Interestingly, the 
present research demonstrated that increased perceptions of 
experience led to stronger feelings of discomfort, a finding 
consistent with work by Gray & Wegner [1]. Adding social 
value therefore appears to make robots subject to the uncanny 
valley [5], violating deep-rooted expectations about what type of 
mind robots should or should not possess. 
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Transhuman intelligences will be hyperemotional
Claudius Gros1
For real-world biological intelligences increasing cognitive capa-
bilities go hand in hand with rising complexity and predominance
of emotional states. We argue that this correlation between cognitive
and emotional complexity is not a coincidence, but an indispensable
feature of both biological and artificial advanced intelligences. Trans-
human superintelligences will hence be hyperemotional in the sense
that they will possess a hyper-complex emotional control system.
High intelligence comes with an exponentially increasing set of
options for actions. How can an agent then make optimal use of its
capability? Given a well defined goal, e.g. to play and to win a chess
game, the agent may decide to pursue this objective efficiently. On
medium to long time scale the agent however faces the problem to
select a sequence of life-defining goals.
Traditional artificial intelligence research proposes two strategies
for the selection of overarching goals, viz for solving the motiva-
tional problem [1]. The first one conjectures that AIs [2], even if of
transhuman intelligence, could be programmed to wait patiently for
a human operator to provide a task. In the second scenario an AI
would perform a search strategy for the optimal course to reach a
life-long overarching goal [3]. Life-long optimization seems how-
ever unlikely in an environment where chaotic phenomena, such as
the weather [4], abound and in which the actions of other intelli-
gences need to be taken into account. Two transhuman intelligences
cannot out-compute each other.
Biological intelligences solve the motivational problem, viz goal
selection, through a diffusive emotional control system acting indi-
rectly through the mostly non-specific release of neuromodulators
like Dopamine, Serotonin, Norepinephrine and Acetylcholine [5].
Neuromodulators do not interfere directly, by definition, with cog-
nitive information processing, i.e. with neural firing, modulating
however the processing pathways of the cell, synaptic transmission
and learning [6]. The mixture of active neuromodulators defines the
working regime of the targeted cognitive systems.
Emotions are sensed only when a concurrent activation of the neu-
romodulatory system has occurred [7, 8]. The vast majority of neuro-
modulators flowing through our brain is however neutral in the sense
that we do not directly note their effects. Emotions arise only when
neuromodulation has a secondary effect on the body, the James-
Lange conjecture, with the propio-sensory feedback from muscles
and viscera causing in turn the defining introspective awareness of
emotional states [9]. The fact that the right anterior insula (rAI),
which plays a central role in the neural circuitry mediating emotional
propioception, has evolved rapidly in the recent evolutionary history
of the human brain [10], indicates that the sensation of emotions,
especially that of higher social emotions like guilt, empathy and ex-
clusion, did become progressively more vivid over the course of our
phylogenetic development.
1 Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany, email: gros07–at–itp.uni-
frankfurt.de
Apart from a relative small fraction of emotional states connected
to basic drives like hunger and survival, emotions do not cause behav-
ior directly, acting instead indirectly through anticipation, reflection
and feedback [11]. Comparative evaluation of behavioral options is
consequently a core functionality of emotional states, which hence
play a central role in goal selection. In this view it is not a surprise
that a substantial part of human cultural production, such as novels
and movies, deals with people confronted with motivational prob-
lems in situations where our emotional weighting mechanisms offer
conflicting solutions. Advanced artificial intelligences will need like-
wise a net of emotional weighting qualia matching the complexity of
their behavioral options.
Even animals capable of only limited sets of behaviors dispose of
non-trivial neuromodulatory systems selecting active neural circuits
among the ones with are anatomically available [12]. On phyloge-
netic higher levels evolution has developed the James-Lange feed-
back mechanism, which we experience as emotions, allowing the
brain to become indirectly aware of the activation of a certain frac-
tion of its own neuromodulatory control system. The power of pas-
sion is therefore, in contrast to unconscious neuromodulation, that
neuromodulatory regulation may now be the subject of cognitive de-
liberations and hence also of cognitive control.
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Symposium VIII
Computational Architectures for
Animal Cognition (CAAC)
Animal behaviour has been studied by zoologists for longer than AI has existed as a research field; going all
the way back to Darwin. While AI has been inspired by the intelligence of animals, developing important new
algorithms (like ACO and ABC), it has not yet contributed equally back to biology. This symposium aims to
explore the potential for cross-disciplinary work to develop a new application domain for AI techniques and
philosophy, in the world of biology. We seek papers from biologists, ethologists, comparative psychologists,
developmental psychologists, cognitive scientists and AI researchers, and philosophers of science.
Biologists are well aware of the power of computer science to aid their research in genetics with
combinatorial analysis, and in molecular biology, with the new field of ”computational biology”, but this
symposium aims rather to apply computational models to simulate biological organisms in their
environments, but with a focus on cognition. Where Cognitive Science is concerned predominantly with
human cognition, there remains a gap for animal cognition. This is partly a result of the long overhang of
behaviourism, and a reluctance to run the risk of being accused of naive ”anthropomorphism.” It is time to
reassess such preoccupations and worries.
Recent developments in animal behaviour research are ripe for computational explication and rigour. At the
same time, AI has been developing better agents models, such as in robotics and MAS (multi-agent
systems). These are not related to animal cognition, although some do take into account the need to interact
with humans. In AI and cognitive science, there are models of cognitive components of animal behaviours;
but they ultimately need to be embedded into a larger architecture for multiple behaviours.
David Moffat, Dept. of Digital Design Technologies, Glasgow Caledonian University, UK
Joel Parthemore, Dept. of Cognitive Neuroscience and Philosophy, University of Sko¨vde, Sweden
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Old Actions in Novel Contexts — a Cognitive
Architecture for Safe Explorative Action Selection
Malte Schilling1
Abstract. When running into a problem for the first time a behav-
ior control system is supposed to come up with a sensible response.
Most importantly the selected action should be safe and not danger-
ous for the system. While adaptive behaviors can deal with broad
variations of contexts, for truly novel situations the system has to
explore which action might be suitable. In a cognitive system this
exploration can be realized in a safe way through internal simula-
tion. Internal simulation allows the exploration of the consequences
of possible actions without actually taking the risks. Here, a control
approach for six-legged walking is presented which is biologically
inspired by detailed work on the walking of stick insects. The un-
derlying biomimetic control architecture has been extended towards
a cognitive architecture that allows for planning ahead. In order to
exploit these predictive capabilities in novel situations, the behavior
selection part of the system has to be extended. The goal is to al-
low for trial-and-error testing of behaviors even though the current
sensed context is not encouraging the use of that particular behav-
ior. This article introduces a three layered neural network approach
that realizes explorative action selection. First, this neural network
selects step-by-step single behaviors, exploring the space of possible
actions from a given starting point. Second, it remembers which be-
haviors have been chosen already and should not be selected again.
This network is part of a cognitive expansion which allows the hexa-
pod robot to overcome novel problems during walking through plan-
ning ahead.
1 Introduction
The main tenet of embodied cognition is the idea that higher cogni-
tive capabilities are rooted in the sensorimotor functions and cannot
be understood separated from those [2, 3]. Following this approach,
the presented work aims at a minimal cognitive system which is con-
structed in a bottom-up fashion. First—and on the lowest level—this
system deals with motor control for a hexapod walker. The organi-
zation of the action selection scheme is biologically inspired and is
characterized by its decentralized nature [17] . Second, the control
structures of the behaviors as such which are in this case realized as
neural networks.
The central question of the presented research is how can such
a simple behavior-based system become a cognitive one and what
kind of mechanisms are required? One part of the answer involves
the notion of internal models which is crucial for higher level cog-
nition. But, from my perspective it is not the existence of internal
models which make a system a cognitive one [6]. Instead crucial for
1 Center of Excellence ’Cognitive Interaction Technology’ (CITEC), Biele-
feld University, P.O. Box 10 01 31, D-33501 Bielefeld, Germany Email:
mschilli@techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
a cognitive system is when existing internal models can be exploited
in planning ahead. One example for the case of a six-legged walk-
ing controller is the control of the stance movement which involves
multiple legs and their joints. This requires the coordination of all
the single joint movements which makes it a complex problem and
requires explicit coordination. An internal body model provides this
form of explicit coordination and such a model has been introduced
into the system. The internal body model is realized as a recurrent
neural network and has shown to be quite flexible and predictive.
For the minimal cognitive system approach the system has been
therefore extended in a way that exploits the underlying internal body
model [20]. As a main idea, the predictive capabilities of the internal
model are utilized in a decoupled mode [11, 24] to provide a form
of internal simulation which realizes planning ahead. Here, I follow
McFarland and Bo¨sser [12] who define a cognitive system as one that
is able to plan ahead. In the presented case, cognition is understood
as the ability to plan ahead [12] by a means of an internal simu-
lation [11] relying on an internal representation [23, 10]—starting
with a model describing the spatial and dynamic relations [1] of the
own body [7]—which is grounded in embodied experiences [9]. As a
consequence, it did not become necessary to introduce quite complex
internal models into the system in order to become cognitive. Instead,
crucial is the simple mechanism of decoupling and a trial-and-error
approach to action selection.
This article addresses the question how the selection of actions
can be broadened and not be restricted to the usual (programmed or
learnt) sensory contexts. I will explain how the exploration of the
action space can be realized through a simple three layered neural
network structure. For details on the subsequent safe internal simu-
lation of selected behaviors see [20]. The paper is structured in the
following way. The second section summarizes the behavior-based
approach and gives an overview of the cognitive expansion. In par-
ticular, the three layers required for explorative action selection are
explained in detail. The third section shows results for the activa-
tion of those three layers highlighting how these layers realize action
selection. Last, the discussion will connect with related work and
conclude on future work.
2 Control of Hexapod Walking
The control system for the hexapod walker is biologically inspired
by detailed work on the walking of stick insects [17]. There are two
general problems which have to be dealt with. First, the selection of
the appropriate movement for a given context. Second, the execu-
tion of the selected movements. Here, I will only deal with the first
problem and will not address the details on how the specific move-
ments might be carried out. In case of the stick insect there are mainly
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Figure 1. Decentralized control architecture. Each leg is controlled by an
individual controller (shown as a box) which selects the appropriate behavior
for the given context. The coordination influences are obtained from detailed
experiments on walking in stick insects. For details see [17].
two basic movements concerning a single leg. On the one hand, the
stance movement and on the other hand, the swing movement. De-
tails for the swing movement can be found in [22]. During the stance
movement multiple legs are connected through the ground in closed
kinematic chain making this a difficult control problem. It becomes
necessary to coordinate the movement of at least nine joints. This
requires some form of explicit coordination. A recurrent neural net-
work has been introduced as an internal body model which is me-
diating the movements of all participating joints [19, 14] . Impor-
tantly, while the model is solving the inverse kinematic task during
the stance movement, it is a flexible and predictive model as well
[15]. Therefore, it can be used for testing behaviors in internal sim-
ulation. Following Steels [23], the body model is grounded as it has
co-evolved in service of a particular behavior. As a next step it can
now be exploited for planning ahead by means of internal simulation
[20].
In the following, I will first introduce the underlying biologically-
inspired control system which selects the appropriate motor primi-
tive depending on the given context. Second, I will extend this sys-
tem towards a cognitive system which allows the testing of exist-
ing movements out of their original context which means that these
movements can be selected independently of the sensed state. As this
selection might potentially lead to a dangerous situation, the cogni-
tive part of the system is not applying chosen movements directly on
the real robot. Instead, an internal simulation is used as an estimate
of the consequences of the application of that movement which al-
lows the system to make an informed decision about the movement
chosen. Last, the main and novel focus of this article lies in the sim-
ple neural network structure that is driving the selection process of
the movements independent of the given sensory context.
2.1 Behavior-based walking controller
One main characteristic of the biologically inspired controller is its
decentralized nature. There is a single controller for each leg that se-
lects which action should be carried out. These controllers are only
loosely coupled through local coordination influences (Fig. 1). The
overall walking behavior emerges as a result from the individual con-
trollers [17].
The controller on the leg level is realized as a neural network con-
sisting of so called Motivation Units (Fig. 2, [18]). Motivation Units
are simple neuronal units which sum up the incoming inputs and have
a linear characteristic. As an output function, a Motivation Unit re-
stricts its activation value to be in the range between zero and one.
A Motivation Unit can be further associated with a movement which
should be carried out. In that case, the Motivation Unit represents if
the specific behavior is activated and to what extent. The connected
motor primitive allows the control of the motors of the walking sys-
tem. In this way, a Motivation Unit is representing an activation or
motivation of the specific motor program. Motivation Units can be
further organized into heterarchies. In the case of the hexapod walker,
there are mainly two different movements: the stance and the swing
movement (see Fig. 2, orange units in central part of the figure). Each
of the respective behaviors is represented by one Motivation Unit.
As only one of those behaviors should be active at the same time,
those two behaviors are mutually coupled through inhibitory neural
connections. As a consequence, when one of the neurons is active
it suppresses the other one and in consequence only one of the two
behaviors can be active at any given time. The walking system has
been extended to allow for forward as well as backward walking. As
a consequence, there are two swing and stance Motivation Units, one
for both directions.
In order to further stabilize the ongoing behavior, there are recur-
rent connections (not shown) enforcing the currently active behav-
ior. Therefore, sensory events are required to switch between behav-
iors and these define the contexts of the motor behaviors. On the one
hand, while a leg is in swing mode it is lifted off the ground and mov-
ing to the front of the working range (in the case of forward walking).
When moved to the anterior part of the working range the movement
produced leads the leg downwards until it touches the ground. The
sensed touchdown enforces the stance movement and in this way in-
vokes a switch to the stance movement. On the other hand, in forward
walking during the stance movement the leg is supporting the body
and moves backward until the leg reaches its posterior extreme po-
sition (PEP). When the leg reaches the PEP the stance motivation is
inhibited and the swing movement is activated (Fig. 2, ∆-PEP Moti-
vation Unit). The variable PEP can be influenced by the neighboring
legs through the coordination rules. For example, the first rule simply
states that while a posterior leg is in swing mode and therefore in the
air, for the anterior leg the PEP is shifted backwards which prolongs
the stance movement of that leg providing stability until the other leg
touches down (Fig. 1).
This control system has been termed Walknet and is a behavior-
based control system which has been demonstrated multiple times in
dynamic simulation [16, 4] as well as on different robots [13, 21] to
produce adaptive stable walking in all kind of challenging scenarios.
2.2 Overview Cognitive Expansion
The Walknet control approach is an embodied approach and the ac-
tivation of behaviors is driven by sensory influences. As a conse-
quence, the sensory states define contexts in which behaviors should
and could be activated. The Motivation Unit network provides an ex-
tendable architecture to further incorporate additional behaviors (as
already done for the case of backward walking). Importantly, usually
when designing such a system one is interested in, first, that only
one behavior is active for each leg at any given time. Second, that
a behavior becomes only active in a quite well-defined situation for
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Figure 2. A single leg controller (left middle leg) is shown. The main control structure for the left middle leg is given (center, upper part). There is each a
stance and swing movement for forward and backward walking. Stance and swing Motivation Units are connected through mutual inhibitory connections. On
the right, the cognitive expansion is shown which allows for the selection of a behavior out of context. On the left, the body and the internal model are shown.
In normal walking the motor primitives send signals directly to the body (switch is in position one). When a problem is detected (see red problem detector), the
current behavior is stopped and the search for an alternative behavior is started in the cognitive expansion on the right. The problem detector induces activity in
the cognitive expansion structure as it also provides information where to start the search. Secondly, the problem detector flips the switch to position two and as
a consequence the motor commands are not routed to the body, but instead are routed to the body model which provides predicted consequences of the selected
motor program. This predictive internal simulation can be utilized to decide if the selected behavior causes any further problems or could be safely selected for
application on the real robot. For details see [20].
which it is appropriate. This has allowed Walknet to deal with quite
diverse and challenging scenarios. But, when running into a novel sit-
uation this approach might be too restrictive and no behavior might
become active.
As one such example it is possible to disturb walking by adjusting
the leg positions during the swing movement (for details see [20]).
When a right hind leg and the contralateral middle leg are moved
far to the front, the whole system can become unstable as soon as
the left hind leg starts a swing movement. The system might topple
over (Fig. 3, in contrast to the robot, this case does not pose a threat
for the insects as the insects are using their tarsi to hold on to the
ground which prevents toppling over). In the robot case, where there
are no adhesive structures at the leg tips, a problem detector has been
implemented which recognizes such instabilities and stops walking
any further. In the behavior-based approach the activated behaviors
run the system into an impasse. The system gets stuck.
But a solution to such a case might be quite simple, for exam-
ple through repositioning a single leg. Therefore, the behavior-based
system has been extended in such a way that when the system runs
c)
x
1. 2.
a) b)
planning
ahead execution
Figure 3. Awkward posture: when the middle left and right hind leg are
moved further to the front, the hind left leg cannot be lifted anymore without
the system toppling over (see subfigure c) where the x is marking the center
of mass).
into an impasse it loosens it restrictions on which behavior to select.
But, importantly, simply choosing any behavior might be dangerous.
It is therefore not a good idea to just execute any randomly selected
behavior. Therefore, the control system is extended towards a cogni-
tive system as it allows for planning ahead. As part of the cognitive
expansion a behavior is selected (possibly out of context), but it is
not immediately applied to the real robot. Instead, the predictive ca-
pabilities of the walking system are exploited and for that particular
selected behavior the continuation of the overall movement is pre-
dicted over time in internal simulation. The internal simulation pro-
vides a prediction of what would happen if that particular behavior
would be selected and makes an informed decision on whether the
system would become unstable or not.
For the chosen example, one possible solution would be to repo-
sition the middle left or hind right leg in order to provide support
when lifting the hind left leg. Details for this example case have been
described in detail in [20]. Fig. 2 provides an overview of the over-
all system and how the cognitive extension is build on top of the
behavior-based system. In brief, the problem detector, first, flips the
switch. As a consequence, motor control signals are now rerouted
towards the internal body model which is run in a loop and provides
a prediction of what would happen if that particular behavior would
be chosen. As the internal body model reflects the real robot, it also
contains a problem detector (not shown in the figure). Therefore, in-
stabilities in the internal simulation can be detected, too. Second, in
internal simulation different motor programs should be tested one af-
ter another until a solution is found. Importantly, the selection of the
motor programs should not be restricted to the original intended con-
text of these behaviors. This article focusses on how this selection is
performed through the three additional layers shown on the right in
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Figure 4. The three layers during different processing phases are shown. a)
shows how activation (strength of activation is given as a filled unit) is
induced in the SAL layer and spreads through neighboring units (weights of
the connections are shown). In b) the selection of a single unit inside the
WTA layer is shown. This selection, on the one hand, activates the
corresponding Motivation Unit on the left and, on the other hand, the RTB
unit on the right which stores that the unit became already active (c). Dashed
connections are modulated, i.e. only active during the corresponding phase.
Fig. 2. For further details on the internal simulation, the timing of the
overall system during the different processing stages as well as the
problem detectors see [20].
2.3 Explorative Action Selection
The cognitive expansion introduces three additional layers of Moti-
vation Units. For each Motivation Unit representing a behavior one
corresponding unit is introduced in each of the three layers (Fig. 4).
The overall task of the action selection part of the cognitive expan-
sion is to select one single behavior at a time which should be tested
in internal simulation. First, there is the spreading of activation layer
(SAL net) which drives the exploration. Second, the winner-take-all
network (WTA net) guarantees that only a single unit becomes ac-
tive. The third layer (remember-tested-behavior or RTB net) keeps
track of which behaviors already became active and should not be
selected a second time.
The exploration of the available action space requires these three
additional layers and the explorative selection is accomplished in two
phases (the timing of the these phases is addressed in [20]). When
the system runs into a problem this is detected by a problem detec-
tor, e.g. the system becomes unstable when trying to start a swing
movement with the left hind leg. This information on the cause of
the problem is exploited as a heuristic where to start the exploration.
In the SAL layer (Fig. 4, a) an activation is induced in the Motiva-
tion Unit connected to the Motivation Unit of the swing movement
of the left hind leg. This is used as a starting point for the exploration
which is realized as a simple spreading of activation. In the simple
approach presented, the spreading of activation follows the structure
of the controller and the animal. All Motivation Units in the SAL net
are stringed together and each one has two neighbors. There is no
hierarchy assumed here, but in future work this could be exploited.
Right now the only assumption is that when a problem is caused
in the left hind leg movements of legs close by should be considered
first. Fig. 4, a) shows how the activation spreads inside the SAL layer
during this phase. There is a small stochastic portion in the activation
of the units in the SAL layer as noise is added (std. dev. ±0.10) to
the SAL units.
In the second phase (Fig. 4, b), the selection should be narrowed
down to a single Motivation Unit as only a single behavior should be
tested in the internal simulation later-on. This is realized inside the
WTA layer. Each unit gets activated by the corresponding unit in the
SAL layer. Inside the WTA net, the units are inhibiting each other.
As a consequence from this winner-take-all structure only the activa-
tion of one unit will survive over time. The winner-take-all net gets
two additional inhibitory influences. On the one hand, it is not nec-
essary to select the already active behaviors as those have caused the
problem. On the other hand, the corresponding RTB units are mem-
ory units which store when a unit has been selected. For an earlier
selected unit the activation of the RTB unit effectively excludes the
corresponding unit in the WTA layer from taking part in the compe-
tition. When the WTA net has settled and a single activation is left,
the winner-take-all stage is completed.
Last, after a single Motivation Unit has been selected the corre-
sponding Motivation Unit representing the behavior as such will be
activated and the behavior will in this way be tested in internal sim-
ulation (Fig. 4, c), orange unit on the left side becomes active).
3 Results
The previous section has sketched out the general idea of the explo-
rative action selection. This section will provide example runs show-
ing how the simple three layered expansion is sufficient to drive ac-
tion selection. I will concentrate on the three layers only and use eight
units in each of the layers as an example. There is an activation in-
duced in the third unit (counted from the top) which indicates where
the problem has occurred and where to start with the spreading of
activation.
The results will be presented in three steps. First, the spreading of
activation will be explained. Second, for one row of units the acti-
vation over time will be shown in detail. At last, the activation and
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Figure 5. Spreading Activation Layer. Shown are eight units and the
connections to the neighboring units. These connections are modulated and
only active during the spreading activation phase. An activation is induced in
the third unit from the top (input from a problem detector). On the right, the
activation of each unit over time is shown. The red parts of the graphs show
the spreading of activation phase. The activation spreads from the unit
activated first (marked red) to both sides
selection over time will be shown for the complete example.
Fig. 5 shows how the induced activation is spreading from one unit
to the neighboring units. On the right hand of the figure the activa-
tions are shown in red. The focus is on the spreading phases and not
on the time between two of those phases (like the following winner-
take-all phase and the internal simulation itself). The other phases
are cut out and summarized by the dashed grey lines in between. Im-
portantly, the spreading of activation is modulated only during the
spreading phase (for details on the overall timing see [20]).
As a second perspective I want to focus on the activations of three
corresponding units spanning the three layers. One such row is shown
in Fig. 6. The row corresponds to the second row shown in Fig. 5
which is directly next to the row in which an activation is induced
during the spreading of activation. For the different units the activa-
tion is highlighted by solid lines showing when these units are ac-
tive. First, the unit in the SAL layer gets activated by the neighboring
unit. In the second phase—the selection phase—the corresponding
(green) unit becomes activated and takes part in the winner-take-all
competition, but loses during the first run. In the following spread-
ing of activation phase the unit in the SAL layer gets activated even
more (the selection and testing of the behavior in internal simulation
is left out). As a consequence, the unit wins during the next selection
phase. After the selection phase the winning unit also activates the
corresponding unit in the RTB layer (this connection is also modu-
lated). In following selection phases this activation of the RTB unit
effectively excludes the unit from taking part (through the inhibitory
connection).
Last, Fig. 7 shows the whole network structure and how this al-
lows the successive selection of one behavior after another. The dif-
ferent phases are clearly visible. First, activation is spread (shown as
the continuous red line). Second, from the active units one is chosen
WTA
net
SAL
net
RTB
net
Figure 6. Activation of the three layers for a single row which is connected
to a single Motivation Unit representing a specific behavior. Here, the second
unit of Fig. 5 is shown. The top panel shows the activation of the SAL unit,
the middle panel shows the WTA unit and the bottom panel shows the RTB
unit. In the top and middle panels the continuous line parts illustrate when
the respective phase is ongoing.
through WTA competition (shown as the continuous green line). Af-
terwards, the process continues as the activation is spread even wider
and the next unit is selected. The figure shows how step-by-step one
unit after the other is selected beginning with the units close to where
activation was induced. After a unit in the WTA layer has been se-
lected, the corresponding RTB unit becomes active (indicated by the
shaded blue area). As this activation is inhibiti g the WTA competi-
tion, in this way the corresponding unit is excluded from the selection
process.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
This article proposed how explorative action selection can be real-
ized in a simple, three layered neural network structure. The neu-
ral network structure is part of a cognitive expansion which allows
a hexapod walking system to plan ahead in novel and problematic
situations [20]. Planning ahead is realized as an internal simulation
exploiting the predictive capabilities of an already present internal
body model. Initially, the body model is required for the control of
the stance movements and coordinates the joint movements of all par-
ticipating legs. In planning ahead, the internal body model is used as
a simulator in internal simulation. This allows the testing of different
behaviors and the prediction of consequences of the application of
a single behavior which realizes a form of detailed motor planning.
When such a cognitive system runs into a novel problem for which
there is no suitable behavior that becomes activated by the sensed
state, it can safely try to broaden the scope of the already present
behaviors and test a behavior out of its original context safely in an
internal simulation. The internal simulation provides an assessment
if the selected behavior is helpful and in particular non dangerous.
Here, I presented how this behavior selection can be driven in an ex-
plorative manner using a simple three layered neural network struc-
ture. This cognitive expansion starts to search for behaviors which
are—in this case morphologically—close by and ensures that only a
single one is selected and that each behavior is selected only once.
The idea of internal simulation in robots has been applied already
successfully by Bongard and colleagues [5] . The goal of their ap-
proach was to evolve a walking behavior for a quadruped robot. The
evolutionary approach consisted of two stages. First, through “mo-
tor babbling” an internal body model was evolved. Second, the body
model was used to evolve in internal simulation a walking behavior.
As both stages alternated, this approach allowed the robot, on the one
hand, to come up with a successful walking behavior; on the other
hand, the system was able to adapt its body model to morphological
changes. In contrast to the approach presented here, their approach
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Figure 7. Explorative selection. For each triplet of units the activations are shown on the right. SAL units are drawn in red and WTA units in green. The
activation of the RTB unit is marked by the light blue area which indicates that this set of units has already been selected once.
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did not start from a biological perspective and did not take into ac-
count the decentralized nature of such systems. Second, they only
dealt with adapting a single behavior while the presented approach is
explicitly dealing with the question of behavior selection.
More recently, Cully et al. [8] presented an exciting approach to
locomotion in a hexapod robot. The model also uses a trial-and-error
mechanism to test new behaviors. In contrast to the approach pre-
sented here, these behaviors are tested on the real robot and not in
internal simulation. This becomes possible as they are not focussing
on the question of action selection. Instead, their approach is based
on a behavioral parametrization which describes the current behav-
ior in a low-dimensional space. During trial-and-error the parameters
are adapted. The mapping from the parameters to the very high di-
mensional space of possible controllers as such is solved through a
previous offline optimization which guarantees to lead to non dan-
gerous behaviors. Again, this differs from the reaCog approach as
it is not considering the question of behavior selection or taking the
organization of action selection into account.
For the future it is one goal to incorporate influences from the
mentioned approaches. The current system is dealing with the ques-
tion of action selection and could be extended in a similar way to
also address how existing behaviors could be successfully adapted in
specific situations. Another aspect is the organization of the action
selection scheme. Currently, the Motivation Units are organized sim-
ply on a string just reflecting the basic morphology of the animal. The
main idea is that when a problem occurs in a specific leg, it seems
reasonable to start testing movements in legs close-by. But this struc-
ture could be extended and could incorporate quite diverse heuristics.
Third, learning of successful selected behaviors and ideally the pos-
sibility to transfer such learned knowledge is another goal.
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Individual differences in cognitive performance as a
consequence of natural selection, constraints and 
trade-offs
Joah R. Madden1
Abstract.  The causes and consequences of individual 
differences in cognitive performances of non-human animals 
have attracted little attention. This ignorance precludes taking an 
individual-level, Darwinian, perspective on how natural 
selection sifts the fitness outcomes of inter-individual variation. 
Consequently, we do not fully understand the evolutionary 
trajectory of cognitive performance. Cognition is unusual 
amongst traits such as morphology or particular behaviours in 
that it is still commonly considered that more extreme examples 
are ‘better’, with a focus on ‘genius’ taxa or individuals. In this 
paper, I review what is known about the fitness consequences of 
individual variation in cognitive performance and explore the 
constraints and trade-offs that operate. These constraining factors
include the costs of producing and maintaining costly neural 
tissue, the allocation of such tissue to particular cognitive 
domains, the effect that domain-general or domain-specific 
cognitive abilities may have on individual’s performance, and 
the role of the environment (physical, ecological and social). 
Understanding these factors can help appreciate why particular 
individuals or species exhibit apparently less extreme examples 
of cognitive performance. For AI researchers, an understanding 
of such constraints and trade-offs faced in animal cognition may 
provide novel examples to stimulate solutions in which an 
optimality approach is taken rather than simply increased 
exaggeration. 
1  INTRODUCTION
The study of cognition in animals has traditionally taken one of 
three (non-exclusive) forms. First, particular model species (e.g. 
pigeons or rats) have been used to investigate the mechanisms 
underpinning specific cognitive processes. This has typically 
utilized laboratory paradigms involving prolonged training of 
batches of individuals whose learning, memory or executive 
control are tested with tasks often adopted from tests of human 
cognition. Individual animals who fail to participate, complete 
extended runs of trials or learn the affordances of the tasks are 
commonly discarded. Second, a comparative approach is taken 
in which species, or populations of the same species, are tested 
with the same, or purportedly similar, tasks in order to 
understand when particular cognitive processes may have 
emerged and what ecological or social conditions may provoke 
or facilitate these processes. This has involved both laboratory 
and field studies, and typically the performances of a sample of 
individuals within a population or species are pooled and 
considered representative of the species or population as a 
whole. Finally, within a species, the performances of particular, 
often highly enculturated, ‘genius’ individuals are explored in 
great detail, and inferences drawn about the adaptive benefits of 
possessing such cognitive abilities for the species, based on its 
ecology and social behavior. These three approaches commonly 
ignore inter and intra-individual variation in cognitive 
performance. This precludes a Darwinian approach to 
understanding how natural selection may sift individual 
differences and their attendant fitness consequences, leading to 
optimal expression of cognitive performance.
Different types of cognitive processes are expected to 
have different effects on individual fitness. For example, the 
ability to acquire an association between a cue and a reward 
could provide a selective advantage to individuals if it enhances 
their foraging or reproductive success [1, 2]. The speed with 
which individuals learn may also confer associated fitness 
advantages [3, 4]. Alternatively, the ability to inhibit previously 
learned responses when they become no longer rewarded, may 
also influence an individual’s fitness [5] with more behaviourally
flexible individuals having improved invasion success [6] or a 
better ability to track fluctuating social groups [7].
A Darwinian perspective on understanding how 
cognitive processes and performances have evolved may be 
instructive for the development of AI. Such a perspective 
acknowledges that ever more extreme examples of cognitive 
performance may not always be optimal, but rather optimality is 
the product of trade-offs. Extreme examples of performance may
include improvements in memory retention to the point when 
information is never forgotten or degraded; improvements in 
learning speed to the point that affordances are updated and 
decisions established following a single rewarded experience; or 
improvements in executive control to the point that decisions are
only made when a lifetime’s accumulated information has been 
weighed and considered. While all these examples may provide 
benefits under certain circumstances, they likely also impose 
costs on the individual. Perfect retention of information may 
require increased physical/neural storage capacity, it may slow 
subsequent recall of any one piece of information, or obsolete 
information may continue to exert influence on decision making.
Rapid learning may be susceptible to natural fluctuations in 
reward probabilities and lead to long-term misattribution of cue 
reliability. The demand for perfect information to inform a 
controlled decision may slow the execution of an action with 
potentially fatal consequences. An optimal solution may depend 
on the cognitive performance of others in the population such 
that optimality is frequency dependent. Therefore, the expression
of cognitive performance in each domain is likely the result of 
resolving these trade-offs in response to the pressure of natural 
selection. The acknowledgement of trade-offs in cognitive 
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performance in naturally evolved populations, and indeed the 
active search for their occurrence and resolution, may provide 
novel and counter-intuitive instances that AI developers could 
benefit from. This paper will describe what is known about how 
individual differences in cognitive performance in non-human 
animals may be subjected to natural selection and critically, how 
optimal performance may arise because of constraints imposed 
by intra-individual physiological or cognitive factors, fluctuating
external environmental factors, inter-individual interactions and 
competition, or the cognitive performance of peers.
2  HOW IS NATURAL SELECTION ON 
COGNITIVE PERFORMANCE USUALLY 
STUDIED?
Few studies have explored how individual differences in 
cognitive performance relate to fitness differences. One 
approach, arising from the field of behavioural ecology, 
measures the cognitive performance of individuals in a particular
domain, and then explores how their performance correlates with
a (proxy) fitness measure (reviewed by [8, 9]). This is achieved 
by deploying explicit psychometric tasks targeting specific, 
defined cognitive processes [10, 11]. The majority of such 
studies have reported positive relationships with individuals who
exhibit faster or more accurate learning, better memory, or 
stronger executive control also having greater (proxy) measures 
of fitness, although the causal effect has not been demonstrated, 
so the relationships are inferred. Ants Lasus niger that were fast 
at route learning had higher colony level foraging success [12]; 
male African striped mice Rhabdomys pumilio that rapidly 
learned to escape from a Barnes maze had improved survival to 
the breeding season [13]; male guppies Poecilia reticulata that 
quickly learned a simple maze were preferred by females [14]; 
male bitterling Rhodeus amarus that exhibited better spatial 
memory had higher reproductive success [15]; male starlings 
Sturnus vulgaris with better spatial learning had longer song 
bouts [16]; male song sparrows Melospiza melodia that were 
faster at acquisition and reversal learning tasks and better at a 
detour reach task had larger song repertoires [17]. Positive 
relationships are not ubiquitous. No relationships were found 
between performance in discrimination, reversal or spatial 
memory tasks and male mating success in spotted bowerbirds 
Ptilonorhynchus maculatus [18]. There was a negative 
relationship between the speed of spatial learning and the size of 
a male’s song repertoire in song sparrows [19]. Several other 
studies have adopted a problem-solving or innovation paradigm 
in which cognitive performance is inferred from the speed by 
which an individual typically extracts food (or may access other 
resources such as offspring or decorative objects) from a puzzle 
apparatus. Such an approach relies on the assumption that 
performance in such tasks reveals some unspecified facet of 
cognition such as learning speed, generalization, flexibility or 
insight. However, an individual’s performance may also be 
strongly influenced by non-cognitive factors such as age, prior 
experience, strength, persistence or luck [20]. Therefore, I 
concentrate on studies that deploy psychometric tasks that target 
specific cognitive domains.  
A second, even rarer approach, grounded in 
evolutionary ecology, uses artificial selection experiments in 
which cognitive performance is selected for. In two cases, such 
selection for improved learning appears to have negative fitness 
consequences for individuals. Selection for learning ability in 
fruit flies Drosophila melanogaster resulted in shorter life span 
and lower competitive ability in larvae [21, 22], while cabbage 
white butterflies Pieris rapae with higher learning ability 
suffered from a delay in reproduction [23]. In a third case, the 
fitness consequences were more equivocal. Male worms 
Caenorhabiditis remanei from lines selected for improved 
olfactory learning performance were less active and survived for 
less time than those from lines selected for low learning 
performance, but they did sire more offspring [24].
Therefore, in general, a behavioural ecological 
approach typically executed under field conditions in which an 
individual’s performance in a cognitive task is correlated with 
their (proxy) fitness suggests that increasingly extreme cognitive
performance is favoured by natural selection. In contrast, an 
artificial s lection approach typically executed in the laboratory 
suggests that selection for high performance in a cognitive task 
usually results in fitness costs in reproductive success and/or 
lifespan. Few, if any, studies consider the costs of, or constraints 
on, the exaggeration of cognitive performance and thus fail to 
consider the trade-offs necessary to determine what an optimal 
level might be for performance in any particular cognitive 
domain or more generally across cognitive domains. I suggest 
that accounting for costs of expressing extreme levels of 
cognitive performance and understanding the mechanisms by 
which these constraints may operate, and hence the details of the
trade-offs that must be resolved, is profitable for our 
understanding of the evolution and exaggeration of cognitive 
performance both in natural populations and, by extension, in AI 
situations.
3  PHYSIOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS
Cognitive performance in humans is positively, albeit somewhat 
weakly (r = 0.40), related to whole brain size [25]. This 
relationship is assumed in non-human animals, but is not well 
established [26] and is likely confounded by additional social 
and ecological factors. Female guppies from lines selected for 
large brain size outperformed females from lines selected for 
small brains in a numerical ability task [27]. Males from the 
same selection lines for large brains were faster at learning to 
find a female in a maze [28]. There is stronger evidence that 
cognitive performance is related to the size of particular regions 
of the brain.
This positive relationship between brain (region) size 
and cognition imposes costs on the individual if they are 
subjected to selection for enhanced cognitive performance. First,
the brain itself is an energetically expensive organ and thus its 
production and maintenance must be traded off against other 
organs within an individual. In humans, there is likely a 
relationship with the size of the digestive system and the diet of 
the individual [29]. In male bats, brain size is negatively related 
to testes size, another energetically expensive tissue [30]. When 
guppies were artificially selected for large brain size, males 
developed smaller guts and produced fewer offspring [27]. 
Second, there is a metabolic cost of encoding and transmitting 
information [31], so cognitive improvement that relies on simply
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utilizing more information, rather than processing it more 
effectively, is likely to incur increased energetic costs. 
These costs may be mediated by plasticity in brain 
(region) size, with large, expensive tissue only being produced 
when necessary and allowed to degenerate when not needed. In 
brood-parasitic cowbirds, the volume of the hippocampus, 
involved in spatial memory, is enlarged relative to the 
telencephalon during the breeding season, but declines when the 
season is over [32]. Likewise, in food-hoarding black capped 
chickadees Poecile atricapillus the hippocampus is enlarged 
relative to other brain regions [33] and shows increased 
neurogenesis specifically during the caching period [34]. 
4  COMPETITION BETWEEN COGNITIVE 
DOMAINS
Once the resolution to the trade-off between an individual’s 
investment in neural and other tissue has been resolved, the 
question of how much of the limited brain tissue should be 
allocated to particular processes. Different cognitive processes 
appear to utilize different neuronal mechanisms or circuits and 
brain regions [e.g. 35, 36]. This may explain why increased 
performance in one domain may be matched by decreased 
performance in a second, different domain. Individuals that 
rapidly learn to discriminate cues are usually correspondingly 
slow to inhibit their responses when previously rewarded 
contingencies are no longer rewarded. Such inverse relationships
are seen between acquisition and reversal learning performances 
in birds, such as Florida scrub-jays Aphelocoma coerulescens 
[37], Indian mynas Sturnus tristis [3] and black-capped 
chickadees [38]. However, this negative relationship is not 
inevitable. Acquisition and reversal learning performances 
correlate positively in song sparrows and bumblebees [17, 39]. A
negative relationship was also seen in Carib grackles Quiscalus 
lugubris where individuals that were fast at solving novel 
extractive foraging problems also made more errors in a colour 
discrimination task [40].
A second broad trade-off in cognitive performance that
may be required is that between the speed and accuracy of 
making a decision. Individuals may be selected to continue to 
collect further information, or spend longer assessing and 
weighing information already in their possession before making 
a final, more accurate, decision rather than relying on simple 
heuristics. However, such deferrals impose a cost in both time 
and energy to collect and process information and costs of 
indecision. In extreme cases, one could imagine an individual 
becoming a ‘rational fool’; continually deferring a decision in 
the quest for perfect information but dying of starvation or 
predation because of their inactivity. More usually, there is a 
trade-off between the speed and accuracy of an animal’s decision
making (reviewed by [41]). For example, in zebrafish, Danio 
rerio, some individuals consistently made ‘careful’, slow but 
accurate decisions in colour discrimination tasks, while others 
made swift but less accurate choices [42].
5  GENERALITY OR SPECIFICITY?
It may be that there is much less of a trade-off between 
performance in different cognitive domains than we might 
expect, especially if individuals exhibit a general intelligence 
which governs their performance across a range of domains. In 
humans, this is referred to as g and typically explains around 
40% of variation in an individual’s performance across a battery 
of psychometric tasks [43]. A few studies have started to explore 
whether non-human animals also possess a broader domain-
general ability where an individual’s performance in one domain 
is related to their performance in other, unrelated domain even 
when the tests used to probe the domains appear to have little in 
common with one another in what cognitive 
processes/mechanisms they may reveal [44]. A g factor has been 
reported in mammals: non-human primates [45-47], mice, Mus 
musculus [48-53] and dogs [54]. It has also been reported in 
some studies of birds [18, 55]. As for humans, these studies tend 
to find that a single factor, construed as being equivalent to g, 
accounts for ~40% of an individual’s variation in task 
performance. Only a single study [18] has tested whether a 
single factor derived from performance in a battery of 
psychometric tasks relates to a (proxy) fitness measure. 
However, the mating rate of male bowerbirds was not predicted 
by their single factor score. 
It may be that although the cognitive performance of 
animals can be summarized by a single measure, that measure 
does not reflect the same processes as inferred in humans [56]. 
In humans, g is considered synonymous with intelligence [44]; 
knowing how to behave in a novel situation, based on previous 
experiences and information acquired elsewhere. In animals, g 
may instead indicate overarching performance in basal cognitive 
processes that operate in multiple different domains. One 
candidate basal cognitive process is associative learning. 
Therefore, in animals, a unifying factor may better reflect 
learning than knowing [56].
If there is a general cognitive ability, whether based on
learning or knowing, that governs performance across a range of 
specific domains then this could constrain the optimal 
performance in any one of them. For example, if a number of 
different cognitive domains such as predator recognition and 
food item search image were governed by a single overarching 
learning ability then mechanisms of learning in one domain that 
bring benefits may be detrimental in a different domain. While 
highly precise, inflexible learning of predator’s identity may be 
beneficial if the cues for the predator remain constant, the same 
highly precise, inflexible learning of an ephemeral food item 
may incur costs of misplaced search effort and reduced foraging 
success when that food item becomes rare. It remains unclear to 
what extent such general cognitive abilities exist outside humans
[44].
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6  EFFECTS OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Optimal cognitive performance is likely to depend on the 
environment in which it is exhibited. Therefore the relationship 
between fitness and cognitive performance is likely to differ 
when tested in different environments. The physical environment
may differ in stability/changeability, predictability or physical 
complexity. Sticklebacks Gasterosteus aculeatus from ponds 
relied more heavily on visual landmarks as cues in spatial 
learning tasks than did fish from rivers where flow and 
turbulence render such cues less informative [57]. Cichlids 
Simochromis pleurospilus that were reared with an unpredictable
food supply outperformed fish reared under constant food 
conditions when tested later in life in a learning task [58]. 
Pheasants Phasianus colchicus [59] and zebrafish Danio rerio 
[60] expressed better spatial memory or faster spatial learning if 
they had been reared in spatially complex as opposed to spatially
simple environments. This may be because the early rearing 
environment affects brain size, with salmon Oncorhynchus 
mykiss reared in complex environments growing larger brain 
(regions) than those reared in simple environments [61].
The environment may also differ in its ecological 
composition, with variation in resource density or distribution, or
the prevalence of predators. For example, chickadees that 
experience greater climatic extremes also possess enhanced 
cognitive adaptations for spatial memory, compared to 
individuals that reside in milder environments, possibly because 
they are more dependent on locating externally stored food items
[62, 63]. The relationship between an ant’s route-learning 
performance and their foraging success was only seen in 
artificially rich environments and that the relationship was lost 
when ants were tested in a nutritionally poor environment [12]. 
Fish Brachyraphis episcopi from high- and low-predation 
pressure streams differed in how rapidly they learned to detect 
foraging patches using spatial cues, with fish from low-predation
pressure streams having shorter foraging latencies, entering 
fewer compartments before discovering the reward patch and 
navigating more actively within the maze [64]. In a second 
study, guppies from high-predation pressure streams tended to 
take longer to make the decision about which maze chamber to 
enter than low-predation guppies which were more willing to 
make quick and potentially inaccurate decisions [65]. These 
‘hasty’ guppies from low-predation pressure streams also tended 
to have smaller telencephalons, the brain region most responsible
for spatial memory [65].
The environment may change over the lifetime of an 
individual either because of ecological or climatic processes, 
anthropogenic effects or because the individual moves from one 
environment to another. Cognitive performance that has been 
developed and selected under one set of environmental 
conditions may prove to be sub-optimal when faced with a novel
set of environmental conditions. For example, Indian mynas that 
were fast innovators and able to access food rapidly were slower 
to change their behavior when the significance of food cues 
changes compared to individuals who initially learned slowly, 
but could be flexible and so cope with a changing environment 
[3].
7  FREQUENCY DEPENDENCE
The resolution of optimal solutions within populations of 
individuals which interact can be achieved by using a game 
theory approach in which the best individual solution depends on
the behaviour of others in the population [66]. While there has 
been work looking at optimal decision-making for individuals 
within interacting populations and even at the neural 
mechanisms underpinning such decision making [67], I am not 
aware of research that has explored how individuals should 
exhibit differential cognitive performance such as levels of 
memory, learning speed or executive control depending on the 
behavior of others. Individual variation in response to the 
cognitive performance of others may be expected. For example, 
in an environment where resources are patchy, ephemeral and 
unpredictable, an individual has to decide whether to rapidly 
learn that a location where they have received one reward are 
likely to provide a reward on a later occasion, or whether it is 
better to be cognitively flexible and ‘forget’ or fail to learn any 
single location and rather roam randomly in the hope of 
encountering a new site each time. If the majority of individuals 
‘chose’ not to learn locations but rather roam randomly then a 
mutant population fragment may benefit from learning reward 
locations and returning to them. If too high a proportion of the 
population adopted this learning strategy then the rewarded 
locations would be rapidly depleted and learning would become 
a cost with individuals expending time and energy returning to 
locations with low probabilities of obtaining rewards. Although 
individual differences in cognitive performance are frequently 
reported in non-human animals [68], these have not been 
explained as results of frequency dependent selection with 
different optima depending on the population composition. This 
would appear to be a fruitful area for further research utilizing 
both empirical and modelling approaches.
8  CONCLUSION AND IMPLICTIONS FOR 
COLLABORATION BETWEEN AI AND 
ANIMAL COGNITION RESEARCHERS
A Darwinian approach to the evolution of all aspects of life, 
including cognitive performance, provides both a powerful 
explanatory framework for why exaggerated variants of 
particular morphological, behavioural and now cognitive 
features are seen in some species or populations and not others. 
Crucially, it also helps explain why intuitively beneficial features
may not be exaggerated because selection acts on net fitness 
gains and some apparent benefits may incur unexpected costs. In
non-human animals, continued exaggeration of cognitive 
performance may be constrained by physiological costs of 
growing and maintaining energetically expensive neural tissue; 
or constrained by the need to execute a range of different 
cognitive processes within a limited mass of neural tissue. 
Exaggeration of performance in specific cognitive domains may 
also be constrained if there exist overarching domain-general 
cognitive processes which regulate them and the direction of 
exaggeration in the different domains differs. Alternatively, if 
exaggeration is favoured in the same direction across a range of 
specific domains then exaggeration of the overarching domain-
general performance may be increased further. The optimal 
cognitive performance of an individual is dependent on their 
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physical, ecological and social environment, with optimal 
performances differing as the environment changes or the 
behaviour of conspecifics alters. Such constraints and tradeoffs 
help explain why the cognitive performances of some species 
remain ‘worse’ that is, with slower learning, more limited in 
memory or less flexibility than others. Cognitive performance 
still seems to be viewed differently from other morphological or 
behavioural traits, with efforts to construct a scala naturae 
placing humans at one extreme, followed by a hotly contested 
suite of other species, in a way that would be ridiculous if 
applied to, say, body size or speed of motion. An understanding 
that more extreme is not always better, and that the cognitive 
performance of a species is the result of natural selection 
necessitating trade-offs under a series of constraints, allows us to
look at animal cognition in a different light. This somewhat 
novel perspective may also benefit developers of AI, prompting 
them to search for optimal solutions within a given set of 
constraints. Examples of natural resolutions of trade-offs, such as
flexible brain (region) sizes in times of greatest cognitive 
demand, or the expression of particular cognitive performances 
only under specific environmental conditions may provide novel 
solutions to AI problems. Pitting individual AI agents against 
one another may also reveal frequency dependent optimal 
solutions. Conversely, synthetic agent-based models in which 
agents with different cognitive performance levels or mixes of 
cognitive processes compete within a population, or where 
agents experience various environmental conditions, may help 
animal cognition researchers identify circumstances that allow, 
or drive, variation in individual performances to persist.
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Perceived Simplicity and Complexity in Nature
Mohammad Majid al-Rifaie 1
Abstract. The world of swarm intelligence and evolutionary com-
putation has been witnessing an “explosion” in the number of new
algorithms proposed, sometimes with noticeable contributions and at
times very little to offer. These algorithms are often described as be-
ing nature-inspired, the validity of which should be judged on a one-
to-one basis. In this work, an existing swarm intelligence algorithm,
Dispersive Flies Optimisation or DFO, is presented as a case study
along with some insights and structure comparison with some other
swarm and evolutionary techniques, such as: particle swarm optimi-
sation, genetic algorithm, evolutionary computation, ant colony opti-
misation, stochastic diffusion search and firefly algorithms. Despite
recent attacks, this paper aims to shed light on the significance of
nature-inspired observations and their contributions to the scientific
communities of swarm intelligence and evolutionary computation,
emphasising on the importance of offering sufficient analyses which
justify the reason behind proposing new metaheuristics.
1 Background
There are many optimisation problems surrounding us in our every-
day activities, ranging from negligible and trivial to vital and more
complex. These problems have been often addressed using popula-
tion based swarm intelligence and evolutionary computation tech-
niques. Nature has been one of the main sources of inspiration for
the creation of techniques applicable to complex search spaces and
optimisation problems.
Arguably, throughout the history of mankind, nature has never
stopped offering, at times, unsolicited inspirations to scientists, re-
searchers and the curious. Observations, many of which made unin-
tentionally, have been triggering the inquisitive minds for thousands
of years. The drive for resolving problems and their often present
state in the minds of scientists boost the impact of these observa-
tions, which in cases led to discoveries. Among others, researchers
in mathematics, physics and natural sciences have had their fair share
of ‘observations-leading-to-discoveries’.
In the worlds of swarm intelligence and evolutionary computation,
observing the magnificently choreographed movements of birds, be-
haviour of ants foraging, convergence of honey bees in search for
food source and so forth has led several researchers to propose
(inspired vs. identical) models used to solve various optimisation
problems. Genetic Algorithm, Particle Swarm Optimisation and Ant
Colony Optimisation are only few such techniques belonging to the
broader category of swarm intelligence and evolutionary computa-
tion; these processes investigate collective intelligence and aim at
modelling intelligence by looking at individuals in a social context
and monitoring their interactions.
1 Goldsmiths, University of London, London SE14 6NW, United Kingdom.
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A multi-agent approach to artificial intelligence was born in the
90s, when cooperation between agents became essential to having
an emerging intelligence resulting from the interaction of a group
of individuals [29]. It was time for sociologists, biologists and an-
thropologists to play their rules in helping AI with their models and
social views on intelligence [43].
From the design of helicopters inspired by the behaviour of
grasshoppers to the erection of sustainable buildings influenced by
termites’ construction skills, nature has been exhibiting an undeni-
able role in many of the greatest human inventions. Scientists, in
search for methods to solve persistent problems, refer to nature and
what it offers from inspiration to ideas and hints.
Swarm intelligence and evolutionary computation techniques are
no exceptions in this regard; many of the most well known evolution-
ary and swarm intelligence algorithms exhibit clear links to nature.
Natural examples of swarm intelligence that demonstrate these forms
of interaction include fish schooling, birds flocking, ant colonies in
nesting and foraging, bacterial growth, animal herding, brood sorting
by ants, etc. Therefore, swarm intelligence can be characterised as
the communications between agents as well as the communication
of agents with the environment while expecting an emergent phe-
nomenon (intelligence).
Communication – social interaction or information exchange – ob-
served in social insects and animals is important in swarm intelli-
gence. In real social interactions, not just the syntactical information
is exchanged between individuals but also semantic rules, tips and
beliefs about how to process this information; in typical population
based algorithms, however, only the syntactical exchange of informa-
tion is considered, without necessarily changing the thinking process
(e.g. rules and beliefs) of the participants.
In the study of interaction of social insects, two important ele-
ments are the individuals and the environment, which lead to two
integration schemes: the first one is the way in which individuals
interact amongst themselves and the second one is the interaction
of the individuals with the environment [14] (stigmergy). Interac-
tion amongst individuals is carried out through recruitment. These
recruitment strategies are used to attract other members of the soci-
ety to gather around one or more desired areas, either for foraging
purposes or for moving to a new nest site. In animals like fish or
birds, interactions help benefiting from discoveries and previous ex-
perience of all other members of the school or flock during search for
food [41]. There are different forms of recruitment in social insects;
it may take the form of local or global; one-to-one or one-to-many;
and deploy stochastic or deterministic mechanisms. The nature of in-
formation exchange also varies in different environments and with
different types of social insects and animals. Sometimes the infor-
mation exchange is more complex where, for example, it might carry
data about the direction, suitability of the target and the distance; or
sometimes the information sharing is simply a stimulation forcing a
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certain triggered action. What all these recruitment and information
exchange strategies have in common is distributing useful informa-
tion in their community.
In this paper, initially a simple swarm intelligence algorithm, Dis-
persive Flies Optimisation is presented, followed by six other swarm
intelligence and evolutionary computation techniques. The aim is to
emphasise the extent in which these algorithms rely on their inven-
tors’ observations in nature as well as a discussion on the simplicity
and complexity of the algorithms’ nature-inspired structure, based on
the number of tunable parameters and other configurations.
2 Dispersive Flies Optimisation
Flies are insects of the order Diptera, which comprises a large or-
der, containing an estimated 240, 000 species of mosquitoes, gnats,
midges and others [40]. Flies exist in various types each exhibiting
distinctive behaviour in different environments. What most flies have
in common is their swarming behaviour which depends on several
factors. Swarming have been described in [17] where a difference of
shape between low swarms over dung and high swarms over other
markers have been logged. High swarms fluctuated in height; verti-
cal movements of the swarms of Anopheles franciscanus (Culicidae)
are said to be correlated with female presence at swarms [9]. Height
change in mosquito swarm induced by a clarinet note [31] and the
human voice [27] may have evolved as responses to the flight tone of
female mosquitoes [33].
Swarms of flies are associated with visual markers ranging in size
from cowpies and stones to church steeples [37]. The criteria used by
insects to select markers may be quite subtle; it was noted in [26] that
certain objects are used repeatedly by the mosquito Aedes cataphylla
while similar objects nearby are neglected.
As explained in [19], various swarms of flies usually “flying in
relation to a more or less conspicuous element of the landscape, a
lakeshore, a road, a treetop, below the tip of a branch, in an opening
in the forest canopy, above a cow, an outstanding leaf”, and so on ac-
cording to species (e.g. [18, 13]). Depending on the species, the size
of the swarm may consist of a single individual or tens or thousands,
related to a discrete swarm marker; or even countless millions in the
zonal swarms of lake shores.
Several elements play a role in disturbing the swarms of flies; for
instance, the presence of a threat causes the swarms to disperse, leav-
ing their current marker; they return to the marker immediately after
the threat is over. However, during this period if they discover an-
other marker which matches their criteria closer, they adopt the new
marker.
Dispersive Flies Optimisation (DFO) – first introduced in [1] – is
an algorithm inspired by the swarming behaviour of flies hovering
over food sources. The swarming behaviour of flies is determined
by several factors including the presence of threat which disturbs
their convergence on the marker (or the optimum value). Therefore,
having considered the formation of the swarms over the marker, the
breaking or weakening of the swarms is also noted in the proposed
algorithm.
In other words, the swarming behaviour of the flies, in DFO con-
sists of two tightly connected mechanisms, one is the formation of
the swarms and the other is its breaking or weakening. The algo-
rithm and the mathematical formulation of the update equations are
introduced below. The position vectors of the population are defined
as:
~xti =
[
xti1, x
t
i2, ..., x
t
iD
]
, i = 1, 2, ...,N (1)
where t is the current time step, D is the dimension of the problem
space and N is the number of flies (population size).
In the first generation, when t = 0, the ith vector’s dth component
is initialised as:
x0id = xmin,d + r (xmax,d − xmin,d) (2)
where r is a random number drawn from a uniform distribution on
the unit interval U (0, 1); xmin and xmax are the lower and upper ini-
tialisation bounds of the dth dimension, respectively. Therefore, a
population of flies are randomly initialised with a position for each
flies in the search space.
On each iteration, the components of the position vectors are in-
dependently updated, taking into account the component’s value, the
corresponding value of the best neighbouring fly with the best fitness
(consider ring topology), and the value of the best fly in the whole
swarm:
xtid = x
t−1
ind
+ U (0, 1)× (xt−1sd − xt−1id ) (3)
where xt−1ind is the position value of ~x
t−1
i ’s best neighbouring fly in
the dth dimension at time step t−1; xt−1sd is the value of the swarm’s
best fly in the dth dimension at time step t − 1; and U (0, 1) is the
uniform distribution between 0 and 1.
The algorithm is characterised by two main components: a dy-
namic rule for updating flies position (assisted by a social neigh-
bouring network that informs this update), and communication of
the results of the best found fly to ther flies.
As stated earlier, the swarm is disturbed for various reasons; one
of the impacts of such disturbances is the displacement of flies which
may lead to discovering better positions. To consider this eventuality,
an element of stochasticity is introduced to the update process. Based
on this, individual components of flies’ position vectors are reset if a
random number, r, generated from a uniform distribution on the unit
interval U (0, 1) is less than the disturbance threshold or dt. This
guarantees a disturbance to the otherwise permanent stagnation over
a likely local minima. Algorithm 1 summarises the DFO algorithm2.
Algorithm 1 Dispersive Flies Optimisation
1: while Function Evalutions < Evaluations Allowed do
2: for i = 1→ N do
3: ~xi.fitness← f(~xi)
4: end for
5: ~xs = arg∗ min [f(~xi)]
6: ~xin = arg
∗ min [f(~xileft), f(~xiright)]*
7: for i = 1→ N do
8: for d = 1→ D do
9: τd ← xt−1ind + U (0, 1)× (xt−1sd − xt−1id )
10: if (r < dt) then
11: τd ← xmin,d + r (xmax,d − xmin,d)
12: end if
13: end for
14: ~xi ← ~τ
15: end for
16: end while
* ~xileft = ~xi−1 and ~xiright = ~xi+1
In summary, DFO is a simple numerical optimiser over continu-
ous search spaces. DFO is a population based stochastic algorithm,
2 The source code can be downloaded from the following page:
http://doc.gold.ac.uk/mohammad/DFO/
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originally proposed to search for an optimum value in the feasible
solution space. Despite the algorithm’s simplicity, it is shown that
DFO outperforms the standard versions of the well-known Particle
Swarm Optimisation, Genetic Algorithm (GA) as well as Differen-
tial Evolution (DE) algorithms on an extended set of benchmarks
over three performance measures of error, efficiency and reliabil-
ity [1]. It is shown that DFO is more efficient in 84.62% and more
reliable in 90% of the 28 standard optimisation benchmarks used;
furthermore, when there exists a statistically significant difference,
DFO converges to better solutions in 71.05% of problem set. Further
analysis is also conducted to explore the diversity of the algorithm
throughout the optimisation process, a measure that potentially pro-
vide more understanding on algorithm’s ability to escape local min-
ima. In addition to theoretical research on this algorithm, DFO has
recently been applied to medical imaging [3]; furthermore, ongoing
and current research are being conducted in the fields of image anal-
ysis, simulation and gaming [25], computational aesthetic measure-
ments [2], (digital) arts [6, 10], protein folding, etc.
3 Population-based algorithms
In this section, six population-based nature-inspired algorithms are
presented along with parameters and the associated configuration of
each of the these algorithms. The presented algorithms are: particle
swarm optimisation (PSO), differential evolution algorithm (DE), ge-
netic algorithm (GA), ant colony optimisation (ACO), stochastic dif-
fusion search (SDS) and firefly algorithm (FA).
3.1 Particle Swarm Optimisation
Particle swarm optimisation (PSO) is a population based optimisa-
tion technique developed in 1995 by Kennedy and Eberhart [24, 20].
It came about as a result of an attempt to graphically simulate the
choreography of fish schooling or birds flying (e.g. pigeons, starlings,
and shorebirds) in coordinated flocks that show strong synchronisa-
tion in turning, initiation of flights and landing, despite the fact that
experimental researches to find leaders in such flocks failed [21]. In
particle swarms, although members of the swarm neither have knowl-
edge about the global behaviour of the swarm nor a global informa-
tion about the environment, the local interactions of the swarms result
in complex collective behaviour, such as flocking, herding, school-
ing, exploration and foraging behaviour [32, 30, 8, 22].
A swarm in PSO algorithm comprises of a number of particles
and each particle represents a point in a multi-dimensional problem
space. Particles in the swarm explore the problem space searching
for the optimal position, which is defined by a fitness function. The
position of each particle, ~x, is thus dependent on the particle’s own
experience and those of its neighbours. Each particle has a memory,
containing the best position found so far during the course of the opti-
misation, which is called personal best (~p). Whereas the best position
so far found throughout the population, or the local neighbourhood,
is called neighbourhood best (or global best, ~g).
The standard PSO algorithm defines the position of each particle
by adding a velocity to the current position. Here is the equation for
updating the velocity of each particle:
vtid = wv
t−1
id + c1r1
(
pid − xt−1id
)
+ c2r2
(
gid − xt−1id
)
(4)
xtid = v
t
id + x
t−1
id (5)
where w is the inertia weight whose optimal value is problem depen-
dent [34]; ~vt−1id is the velocity of particle i in dimension d at time
step t − 1; c1,2 are the learning factors (also referred to as accelera-
tion constants) for personal best and neighbourhood best respectively
(they are constant); r1,2 are random numbers adding stochasticity to
the algorithm and they are drawn from a uniform distribution on the
unit interval U (0, 1); pid is the personal best position of particle ~xi
in dimension d; and gid is neighbourhood best at dimension d.
Therefore, PSO optimisation is based on particles’ individual expe-
rience and their social interaction with the particle swarms. After
updating particles’ velocities, their new positions are determined.
3.2 Genetic Algorithm
In this work, a real-valued GA which has previously shown to work
well on real-world problems [38, 39] in explained. The underlying
process is similar to when GA is applied to combinatorial problems,
where individuals are first randomly initialised and their fitness is
evaluated through an objective function. Afterwards, in a iterative
process, each individual has a probability of being exposed to recom-
bination or mutation (or both). These probabilities are pc and pm re-
spectively. One such recombination operator is arithmetic crossover
and one such mutation operator is Cauchy mutation using an anneal-
ing scheme. At the end, in order to comb out the least fit individual,
tournament selection [7] is utilised.
For the arithmetic crossover, the offspring is generated as a
weighted mean of each gene of the two parents:
offspringi = r × parent1i + (1− r)× parent2i (6)
where offspringi is the i’th gene of the offspring, and parent1i and
parent2i refer to the i’th gene of the two parents, respectively. The
weight r is drawn from a uniform distribution on the unit interval
U (0, 1).
Therefore, the algorithm needs the probabilities of crossover and
mutation of the individuals, pc and pm respectively, the tournament
size of the tournament selection, and elitism with a certain elite size
is deployed to maintain the best found solution in the population.
3.3 Differential Evolution Algorithm
Differential evolution (DE), an evolutionary algorithms (EAs), is a
simple global numerical optimiser over continuous search spaces
which was first introduced by Storn and Price [35, 36].
DE is a population based stochastic algorithm, proposed to search
for an optimum value in the feasible solution space. The parameter
vectors of the population are defined as follows:
xgi =
[
xgi,1, x
g
i,2, ..., x
g
i,D
]
, i = 1, 2, ..., N (7)
where g is the current generation, D is the dimension of the prob-
lem space andN is the population size. In the first generation, (when
g = 0), the ith vector’s jth component could be initialised as:
x0i,j = xmin,j + r (xmax,j − xmin,j) (8)
where r is a random number drawn from a uniform distribution on
the unit interval U (0, 1), and xmin, xmax are the lower and upper
bounds of the jth dimension, respectively. The evolutionary process
(mutation, crossover and selection) starts after the initialisation of the
population.
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3.3.1 Mutation
At each generation g, the mutation operation is applied to each mem-
ber of the population xgi (target vector) resulting in the correspond-
ing vector vgi (mutant vector). In this work, out of many variants,
DE/best/1 variation of mutation approaches is provided as a sample:
vgi = x
g
best + F (x
g
r1 − xgr2) (9)
where r1 and r2 are different from i and are distinct random in-
tegers drawn from the range [1, N ]; In generation g, the vector with
the best fitness value is xgbest; and F is a positive control parameter
for constricting the difference vectors.
3.3.2 Crossover
Crossover operation, improves population diversity through ex-
changing some components of vgi (mutant vector) with x
g
i (target
vector) to generate ugi (trial vector). This process is led as follows:
ugi,j =

vgi,j , if r ≤ pc or j = rd
xgi,j , otherwise
(10)
where r is a uniformly distributed random number drawn from
the unit interval U (0, 1), rd is randomly generated integer from the
range [1, D]; this value guarantees that at least one component of the
trial vector is different from the target vector. The value of pc, which
is another control parameter, specifies the level of inheritance from
vgi (mutant vector).
3.3.3 Selection
The selection operation decides whether xgi (target vector) or u
g
i
(trial vector) would be able to to pass to the next generation (g + 1).
In case of a minimisation problem, the vector with a smaller fitness
value is admitted to the next generation:
xg+1i =

ugi , if f (u
g
i ) ≤ f (xgi )
xgi , otherwise
(11)
where f (x) is the fitness function.
3.4 Ant Colony Optimisation
Another well-known swarm intelligence algorithm is Ant Colony
Optimisation (ACO) [16], which is a metaheuristic for solving com-
binatorial optimisation problems. The driving inspiration for this al-
gorithm stems from the pheromone trail laying and following be-
haviour of real ants using pheromones as a mean for communica-
tion. This algorithm is one of the existing techniques in the literature
which uses the indirect mode of communication, where no two ants
exchange information directly, instead they use pheromone trails to
guide the process and thus probabilistically construct solutions for
the problem being solved. In other words, the artificial ants’ search
experience is shaped and evolved through the encounter with the
pheromone trails.
Due to the popularity of the algorithm (and as it is often the
case with swarm intelligence and evolutionary techniques) there have
been several flavours of algorithms starting from the early 90s, in-
cluding but not limited to: Ant System, Elitist AS, Ant-Q, ANTS,
Population-based ACO, Beam-ACO, and so forth.
As detailed in [15], ACO’s artificial ants are described to be
stochastic solution construction procedures which are in charge of
probabilistically building a solution by iteratively adding solution
components to partial solutions. This process is facilitated by taking
into account the following:
• heuristic information about the problem being addressed, if such
information exists
• and the dynamically changing pheromone trails which reflect the
ants’ search experience
While the heuristic information / equation is problem dependant,
here are some of the generic parameters of the algorithm when deal-
ing with the classical Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP). Note that
the following reflects on one instance of using an ACO algorithm on
a certain problem:
• T (r, s): the mount of pheromone on the edge connecting r to s.
• H(r, s): heuristic value of the edge.
In TSP, the shorter the distance between the nodes, the higher the
heuristics. Therefore, for instance: H(r, s) = 1distance(r,s)
• pk(r, s): probability that ant, k, travels from node r to node s.
• β: heuristic strength
• α: greediness
pk(r, s) =
T (r, s)α ×H(r, s)β∑
Unvisited cities c T (r, c)
α ×H(r, c)β
Using the global pheromone update, once a tour is complete,
pheromones are updated along the edges using the following:
• Ak(r, s): the mount of pheromone added by ant k on the edge
connecting r to s.
• m: number of ants (population size)
• ρ: pheromone decay rate
• Lk: length of route complete by ant k
The amount of pheromone on the edge (r,s) is calculated using the
following equation:
T (r, s) = ρ× T (r, s) +
m∑
k=1
Ak(r, s)
where Ak(r, s) = 1/Lk
3.5 Stochastic Diffusion Search
This section introduces Stochastic Diffusion Search (SDS) [11], a
swarm intelligence algorithm whose performance is based on simple
interaction of agents. The SDS algorithm commences a search or
optimisation by initialising its population and then iterating through
two phases of test and diffusion.
In the test phase, SDS checks whether the agent hypothesis is suc-
cessful or not by performing a hypothesis evaluation which returns
a Boolean value. Later in the iteration, contingent on the precise re-
cruitment strategy employed (in the diffusion phase), successful hy-
potheses diffuse across the population and in this way information
on potentially good solutions spreads throughout the entire popula-
tion of agents. In other words, each agent recruits another agent for
interaction and potential communication of hypothesis.
In standard SDS, passive recruitment mode is employed. In this
mode, if the agent is inactive, a second agent is randomly selected
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for diffusion; if the second agent is active, its hypothesis is commu-
nicated (diffused) to the inactive one. Otherwise there is no flow of
information between agents, instead a completely new hypothesis is
generated for the first inactive agent at random. Therefore, recruit-
ment is not the responsibility of the active agents.
The activity of agents are often determined by specifying a thresh-
old for the fitness of the agents, based on which agents are labelled
as active or inaction. Alternatively, in another approach, the activ-
ity of each agent is decided when its fitness is compared against
a random agent (which is different from the selecting one); if the
selecting agent has a better fitness (e.g. smaller value in minimisa-
tion problems) than the randomly selected agent, it will be flagged
as active, otherwise inactive. Higher rate of inactivity boosts explo-
ration, whereas a lower rate biases the performance towards exploita-
tion. SDS algorithm has been explained using the ‘mining game’
metaphor in [4].
One of the main and inherent processes in SDS is partial function
evaluation. This feature is helpful with many fitness functions which
are decomposable to components that can be evaluated separately
during the test phase of SDS. In partial function evaluation pFE is
some function of the agent’s hypothesis, where pFE = f(h), and
the evaluation of one or more of the components may provide partial
information to guide the subsequent optimisation process.
3.6 Firefly algorithm
Firefly algorithm, first introduced in 2008 [44], is another new swarm
intelligence algorithm which takes its inspiration from nature, and is
more specifically based on the “idealised” flashing characteristics of
the fireflies. The behaviour of the algorithm can be explained using
the following assumptions derived from nature:
• fireflies are unisex and are attracted to each other
• attractiveness is proportional to brightness; therefore a less bright
firefly would be attracted to and subsequently move towards the
brighter one. If the brightness is the same, the fireflies move ran-
domly. If the distance between fireflies increases, the brightness
decreases which results in less attraction.
• the landscape of the objective function impacts the brightness of
the fireflies
In FA, brightness is determined based on the fitness function, how-
ever attractiveness β is considered relative to the distance between
two fireflies and the absorption of the light in the media. The light
intensity I is determined using the following:
I = I0e
−γr (12)
where I0 represents the light intensity at the starting point, γ is the
light absorption coefficient, and r is the distance. And the attractive-
ness of a firefly is determined by the following:
β = β0e
−γr2 (13)
where β0 is the attractiveness at r = 0.
Using FA, each firefly i is paired with every other firefly, j, in the
population and a decision is made as to whether to move i towards
j and how far. The distance between fireflies are calculated using
the Cartesian distance rij = ||~xi − ~xj ||2, considering `2, and the
following update equation:
~xi = ~xi + β0e
−γrm(~xj − ~xi) + α~i (14)
where the second term represents attraction (while m is usually set
to 2, it could take other values with m > 0), and the third term
is randomisation with the vector of random variable ~i being drawn
from a Gaussian distribution.
4 Discussion and Opinion
Looking at the algorithms presented in the sections above, commu-
nication is seen as a key element shared by all population-based al-
gorithms with varying flavours. Communication, at times one-to-one,
one-to-many or many-to-many, mostly adapts to the problem domain
and the related restrictions. The aim of the communication in the al-
gorithms is the diffusion of ‘good’ information and therefore the in-
vestigation of promising areas. Given the unknown search space, and
not to mention noisy environment, this task cannot be achieved with-
out a degree of ‘stochasticity’ which allows for extra exploration of
perhaps previously ‘unnoticed’ regions of the search space. There-
fore, while communication is at the heart of population-based nature
inspired algorithms, acknowledging the lack of “complete knowl-
edge” about the search space, it becomes evident that ‘guided com-
munication’ or a deterministic approach cannot be the only method.
Most of the deterministic algorithms are local searches which are
efficient at converging to a local minima and given a fixed starting
point, the solution returned is always the same. Despite the efficiency
of such algorithms (and their good performance when dealing with
unimodal problems), they are prone to being trapped in local minima,
incapable of escaping towards global optima. Therefore, identifying
the right balance between guided and stochastic communication is
one of the primary challenges in introducing new algorithms or fine-
tuning the existing ones.
Looking from a different perspective, a common aspect of
population-based nature-inspired computation is adjusting the de-
gree of “trust” at various stages in which the algorithms return so-
lutions. This trust impacts the algorithms’ follow-up resource alloca-
tion as to whether to be biased towards detailed exploitation of the
currently found solution/s or instead boosting the exploration of the
search space with the hope of identifying better solutions. Albeit dif-
ferent for various nature-inspired algorithms, the infamous trade-off
between exploration and exploitation remains to be a key challenge.
Therefore, all the population-based algorithms are proposed with
the goal of “striking” the right balance in defining the interwoven
concepts of guided/stochastic communications and identifying the
degree of trust in the solutions found at various stages of the optimi-
sation process. With these in mind, researchers embark on a journey
to find the “holy grail” which, with an optimistic view, would ulti-
mately exhibit the ability to address a certain class of problems and
not all (see No Free Lunch Theorem for a detailed discussion on this
matter [42]). In this endeavour, researchers and scientists seek help
from nature, which many view as a “stable” form of intelligence that
has been evolving and surviving for millions of years.
An important question raised here is whether introducing a new
algorithm which is not radically dissimilar to other algorithms con-
tribute to the existing literature in swarm and evolutionary computa-
tion. There is a number of active researchers who are renouncing this
trend as “threatening” and “away from scientific rigour”. There are
many reasons, and sometimes, valid arguments to disseminate this
message in the community that merely “tweaking” some parameters
and achieving an ever so slightly better performance on a certain set
of problems could hardy be seen as an outstanding contribution. On
the other hand, merely recommending to “put a lid” on the nature-
inspired observations is an equally questionable argument.
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In order to discuss this further, it is worth mentioning that one of
the common features noticed in the development of algorithms, in
general, and swarm intelligence and evolutionary computation algo-
rithms, in particular, is the presence of many variants of the same
techniques. The reason behind this persistent pattern could be asso-
ciated with the flexibility of the algorithms in changing the update
equations (i.e. altering the deterministic aspects of the algorithm),
or injecting further stochasticity by introducing more complex dis-
turbance mechanism or evolutionary operators. While the possibility
of “extending” and “revising” an algorithm is welcome, it is equally
important to be able to provide concrete analyses as to why the “new
versions” are important contributions to the literature beyond the re-
sults on some “standard” benchmarks.
Having the above arguments in mind, it is equally vital to allow
and respect scientists, researchers and students to observe the nature,
animals and insects with the goal of finding ways to deal with the
above challenges. It is important to encourage researchers to provide
analysis as to why their proposed algorithms outperform or compete
with others with the goal of identifying insights to the complex be-
haviour of the population in swarm and evolutionary computation
techniques. The complexity of the algorithms could perhaps lead to
better performance on some problems at the expense of even more
complex task of understanding the behaviour of the algorithms. Of-
ten the number of components (e.g. various vectors) in the algorithms
and the tunable parameters are good indicators of an algorithm’s
complexity. This inherent complexity results in both the hindrance
of analysing the behaviour of the agents as well as the difficulty in
finding the optimal parameter values.
Following on the above discussion, one of the principal reasons
behind proposing Dispersive Flies Optimisation (DFO) has been in-
troducing an algorithm that is simple but competitive enough com-
pared to other more complex algorithms. Further theoretical analysis
is ongoing to provide detailed explanation on the algorithm’s optimi-
sation behaviour. Other than the population size, DFO has one tun-
able parameter (disturbance threshold or dt). Additionally, other than
the index of the best fly (s in ~xs), each fly i consists of merely its po-
sition vector (~xi) along with the index of the best neighbouring fly
(n in ~xin ). To emphasis DFO’s simplicity, a comparison is provided
with some of the algorithms mentioned in this work. For instance,
PSO, in many of the proposed variants commonly uses the following
parameters:
• population size
• c1, controlling the impact of cognitive component
• c2, controlling the impact of social component
• χ or w, depending on the update equation
In addition to the position of the particles i, ~xi, each particle has
an associated velocity ~vi and memory, ~pi, vectors. Other variants of
PSO, including barebone PSOs are also introduced by researchers,
trying to simply the algorithm, with the goal of offering insight into
the underlying behaviour of the algorithm. In one such cases, one of
the inventor of the PSO algorithm, Kennedy, describes the process
as “strip[ing] away some traditional features” with the hope of re-
vealing the mysteries of the algorithm [23]. In this particular model
the velocity vector is elegantly removed with the algorithm still ben-
efiting from the memory vectors, a work that indeed shed light on
the behaviour of the algorithm. Other contributions have tried to fur-
ther explore the simplified version and add more to enhance its per-
formance demonstrating the capability of the simplified version in
contracts with the original model [12, 28, 5].
Other than PSO, the parameters and adjustable configurations of
other aforementioned well-known algorithms are listed below.
• GA
1. population size
2. pc: crossover rate
3. pm: mutation rate
4. tournament size
5. elite size
• DE
– population size
– pc: crossover rate
– equation used to calculate the mutation vector
– F: constricting factor
• ACO
– m: number of ants (population size)
– β: heuristic strength
– α: greediness
– ρ: pheromone decay rate
• SDS 3
– population size
– threshold for determining an agent’s activity
– the choice in using various recruitment modes (passive, active,
dual)
– the choice of increasing exploration by using context-sensitive
or context-free mechanisms
– the percentage of decomposable function using in partial func-
tion evaluation
• FA
– population size
– m: impact of distance on attractiveness
– α which could be replaced with αSk in cases where scales vary
significantly in different dimensions, d. Therefore, given d di-
mensions (k = 1, ..., d), adding d extra parameters
– γ determining the speed of convergence, in theory γ ∈ [0,∞)
with γ = 0 maintaining a constant attractiveness of β = β0
Similar to other swarm intelligence and evolutionary computation
techniques, the above algorithms couple the stochasticity and deter-
minism to both follow the “concrete instructions” of the algorithm as
to where a good solution is likely to be, and a stochastic component,
making sure that the often large search space is not left unexplored.
Therefore, while it is useful to propose powerful algorithms, with
the potential drawback of analysis complexity, it is equally impor-
tant to notice the elegance witnessed in nature, in social animals and
insects. Key questions to ask here are: whether proposing simple al-
gorithms with few tunable parameters, paves the way for more com-
prehensive analyses (thus a deeper understanding) and whether this
would guide us closer to the sought after concept of “communica-
tion of agents with simple rules leading to the complex emergence of
intelligence”.
3 It is important to note that the parameters required for the “standard” SDS
are the population size and the threshold for determining the activity of the
agents.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, several swarm intelligence and evolutionary algorithms
are presented and the process through which they lead the optimisa-
tion is explained. Dispersive Flies Optimisation (DFO) is presented
as a case study representing a simple algorithm which other than the
population size, only has one tunable parameter providing the means
for the flies to further their exploration of the search space.
Discussing the pros and cons of introducing new algorithms, this
work highlights the need for giving importance to diligent nature-
inspired observations which could lead to the enrichment of swarm
intelligence and evolutionary computation communities with the pro-
visos that such observations allow in-depth analyses leading to better
understanding of the complex formation of solutions and the “emer-
gence of intelligence” by following simple rules.
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Abstract
Numerous social structures exist in the animal kingdom, all of which fill a niche in which the
organisms find themselves. The various levels of aggregation and hierarchy within the majority of
these social structures can be explained by selective pressures such as predation avoidance, resource
exploitation and mating opportunity. The necessity and affordance of acquiring social and ecological
information has been proposed as another possible factor in the evolution of certain colonial structures,
such as those of ravens and ospreys. We explore the conditions under which the use of socially
acquired information benefits individuals within a colony using an agent-based model. The agents
are simple finite-state automata following a forage-and-return behaviour in which they can also breed
and die. The model allows agents to socially acquire information by determining whether foragers have
been successful. The agents can then decide whether to follow other agents or forage on their own.
Increased competition at foraging sites is the cost for following but environments in which resources
are patchily distributed and/or ephemeral in time provide a challenge to individual foragers. The
preference for the use socially over personally acquired information, in the model, is a heritable trait
and allowed to vary across generations. We demonstrate that more sociality in groups evolves in
challenging environments. Although the model is an abstract representation of colonial species, it
can provide a platform for understanding the behaviour of real animals.
Introduction
Several types of social structure are exhibited in the animal kingdom; from solitary individuals through
to eusocial groups and even ‘colonial organisms’ such as the Portuguese man o’ war. Group living imparts
a cost on the individuals through increased competition for resources, increased likelihood of detection
by predators and increased spread of parasites and pathogens [15]. However, there are obvious benefits
such as better predator detection, increased mating opportunity, reduced thermo-regulation and increased
information acquisition opportunity [10, 6].
One standard conception of information is anything that reduces uncertainty [4]. However, when
concerned with behavioural and evolutionary ecology it is also important that it be useful [3]. Information
can be acquired personally, by exploring and interacting with one’s environment. One can also gain
information through observation of conspecifics and, in some cases, heterospecifics [8]. This socially
acquired information can be through purposeful signals such as the waggle dance of honey bees [13]
or through ‘inadvertent social information’ [3]. Social cues are a discrete form of inadvertent social
information such as vultures dropping their legs indicating hey have spotted a carcass to feed on [5].
These cues can create cascades of information spread, drawing in individuals from vast distances, but,
due to the limited detail of the information, can lead to sub-optimal behaviour [7]. More graded public
∗Corresponding author: alexander.fedorec.13@ucl.ac.uk
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information can lead to more intelligent decision making such as that by ospreys determining foraging
strategy based on the types of fish with which other ospreys return to the roost [9]. The affordance of
being able to socially acquire information greatly reduces the cost to individuals of acquisition but for
those individuals that excel at personally acquiring information, the cost of information parasitism may
be greater than the benefit.
The purpose of information acquisition is to inform the decision making process. Whether it be
information regarding which females are in oestrus guiding mating decisions or information about resource
locations directing foraging paths, the informed individual has an advantage over uninformed conspecifics.
When modelling movement decisions in simple organisms, random walk models have dominated the
literature [2]. However, many examples of exist of informed route making in species such as gibbons
[1] and spider monkeys [16]. When an individual is also a member of a group, there is the necessity
to integrate personal and socially acquired information. For groups that remain together, some species
follow high social status individuals, others show voting behaviours [12]. Other groups don’t remain
together, forming dynamic social structures such as fission-fusion in which subgroups split off to forage
and return to the larger group at after a period of time. Studies such as that by Kerth et al. [11] suggest
that fission-fusion species show a hierarchy of reliance on information:
negative personal > socially acquired > positive personal
One hypothesis proposed to explain aggregation into colonies is the information centre hypothesis, in
which the pressure to gather information, particularly regarding sparse resources, is the main aggregation
pressure [17]. Here we explore how variations in the environment affect the information acquisition
strategy of colonial individuals.
Experiments
We use agent-based modelling (ABM), in which individuals follow a simple set of rules which can produce
complex macro-level patterns. ABM has been used in a variety of fields including behavioural ecology,
for example to model baboon group decision making [14]. In our model individuals are able to gather
information about resources within the environment through searching. They can also choose to follow
other agents that are leaving the roost to feed at known resource locations. The state diagram for the
agent behaviours is shown in figure 1. Each agent has a level of preference for using one behaviour over
the other and this preference is passed on to their offspring. There are costs associated with each strategy,
whether it be the possibility of not finding food when searching or increased competition for food when
following.
We simulated groups of agents in environments in which resources are more or less patchily distributed
and/or more or less ephemeral. The total amount of food within the environment is the same regardless
of patchiness, so if there are fewer resource patches, each one will hold more food. Figure 2 shows that,
when resources are more difficult to find by searching alone, there are a greater range of conditions where
groups of agents can only survive when they can socially acquire information. Further, the population
sizes achievable are related to the level of social information acquisition as well as the ease of finding
resources. The usefulness of information regarding resources is increased in patchy environments as one
is less likely to find resources by searching and there is more likely to be food left at a patch even if one
follows another agent to it.
In order to explore how a preference for socially acquired information would evolve, we ran the
simulation over a range of patchiness levels and allowed the inherited information acquisition preference
to vary by a random normally-distributed amount. As such, there will be a spread of information
acquisition strategies within a group. Those individuals with an information acquisition preference most
suited to the environment will have a fitness advantage over other agents and will produce fitter offspring.
We observe the change in information preference over 500 generations, from a starting preference of 0.5
i.e equally likely to choose personal or social information acquisition. In very patchy environments, with
fewer than 20 resource patches, populations were unable to survive for 500 generations. Figure 3 shows
that the number of resources within the environment, and therefore the probability of finding resources
through searching, is positively correlated to the preference that agents have for following as opposed to
searching alone. Even in environments in which there are many locations to feed from, and therefore
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Figure 1: A state machine describing the behaviour of each agent. When an agent decides to socially
acquire information (or use “public information”) they leave the roost following another agent, if there
is one to follow. If the agent decides to use “personal information” they leave the roost and perform a
search. If they know about a resource location, they head directly for it. Individuals die if their energy
falls to 0 or their age reaches a threshold. Agents also produce offspring when at the roost, if their energy
level is over a given threshold.
Figure 2: A) When an agent leaves the roost to search for food, the likelihood of successfully finding a
patch corresponds to the number of resource patches in the environment. B) After 50 generations, when
the number of resource locations is low, groups of agents that don’t have the ability to socially acquire
information aren’t able to survive. C) However, if the agents are allowed to socially acquire information,
rather than rely just on their own personal information, groups are able to survive. (The bars show the
range, of the last 5 generations, for each replicate and the black circles show the mean of the replicates.)
3
SYMPOSIUM VIII. COMPUTATIONAL ARCHITECTURES FOR ANIMAL COGNITION (CAAC)308
Co
nfe
re
nc
e
ed
itio
nFigure 3: Over 500 generations the preference for socially acquired information over personal informationis allowed to adapt. A) When resources are very patchily distributed, individuals that take greateradvantage of socially acquired information have a fitness advantage leading to a change in the population’sinformation preference. B) The size of the population that an environment is able to sustain, even after500 generations of adaptation, follows an exponential trend with the number of resources within it. (Thebars show the range, of the last 10 generations, across 8 replicates and the black circles show the mean
of the replicates.)
limited food at each resource patch, there is no drive towards preferring personal information acquisition.
This is likely due to the fact that, in such environments, even if an agent follows another and the resource
patch becomes exhausted there is likely to be another patch close by at which the agent can feed. We
do see that the number of agents that the environment is capable of maintaining is also correlated to the
resource patchiness.
Further, we looked at how ephemerality of resources affects the information acquisition strategies of
agents. We varied how long each resource patch existed in the environment before disappearing. When
a resource disappeared or was exhausted a new patch was created. Again, we ran the simulation for 500
generations and recorded the preferences of each agent for socially or personally acquiring information.
The results can be seen in figure 4. Ephemerality of resources leads to a clear preference for socially
acquiring information over foraging alone. Interestingly, it also leads to higher sustainable population
levels. This may be due to depleted resource patches being replaced by those with greater quantities
of food. If a large number of agents follow to a single patch, the newly created patch will be able to
feed many more than the depleted one. However, when the number of resource locations is very low (25
patches and below), a long resource lifetime is required for a population to have a chance of survival.
Unexpectedly, even when the resource lifetime is at its lowest, and all information is redundant as agents
don’t have time to return to resources before they disappear, agents still have a clear preference for
following as opposed to searching alone.
Conclusion
Pressures and costs to aggregating in to groups vary depending on context. The information centre
hypothesis proposed that aggregation in to social groups is driven by the affordance of sharing information
regarding sparse resources. We built an agent based model in which individuals could have a weighted
preference for foraging alone by randomly searching for resources or following knowledgeable individuals.
Simulations showed that, when resources were sparsely distributed, groups that had a preference for
social information acquisition were able to survive where non-sharing groups were not. By allowing
the information acquisition preference to vary across generations, we showed that socially acquiring
information in patchy environments provides a fitness advantage which leads to a “more social” group.
Finally, we demonstrated that ephemerality has an impact on preference for socially acquiring information,
though surprisingly also enables larger groups to survive.
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Figure 4: A) In environments with the most patchy and ephemeral resources, the agents favour following
other agents over foraging on their own. B) Very ephemeral resources can sustain larger populations than
longer lived resources. However, with the number of resource locations as low as 25, a population can
only be sustained when there is a long resource lifetime. (The data points show the means of the last 10
generations of 8 replicates.)
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Using agent based modelling techniques to investigate the
effectiveness of the honeybee Waggle dance
Chris MacNeil and David C. Moffat1
Abstract.
Computational models of animal cognition may help us to under-
stand the complexities of animal behaviours. Agent based models
(ABM) allow us to model individuals that may quite simple in them-
selves, but who interact in ways that produce coherent behaviours at
scale. Animal communication is a key example of a behaviour pat-
tern that can only be understood as a group phenomonon.
In this study we model the famous waggle dance of the honeybee.
The software platform Netlogo is used to see how helpful it can be
to biologists who may not be expert in computer science. Bees are
modeled as finite-state machines, and there can be hundreds of them
in the colony. They leave the hive to search for food sources (flowers)
and return to communicate their direction and distance to other bees.
In order to check the value of the waggle dance, it can be turned on
or off in the artificial bee population.
We find that the communication is indeed valuable to helping the
bees locate food more quickly, and especially when it is not plen-
tiful. We find that the component of direction is more useful to the
bees than distance, although honeybees use both in real life. Netlogo
system is shown to be a good platform for such research, allowing
biologists to make artificial experiments that can help to clarify the
roles and mechanisms of animal cognition.
1 Honey Bee foraging and a role for ABM
Honeybees are simple creatures with tiny brains, but they achieve
very clever things with them, by working together. In particular they
communicate by gestures — the "waggle dance" — where the richest
food sources are. We used agent based modelling (ABM) techniques
to create a virtual honeybee colony and surrounding habitat. The bees
followed a foraging algorithm to find and collect food around the
habitat before returning to the hive to store their resources. In the
model that was built, it is possible to control how much the bees
are able to communicate with each other, as well as various other
control variables. This allows us to conduct virtual experiments to
test hypotheses about which factors or bee characteristics are most
important for producing their adaptive behaviours. We describe the
concept of ABM, and the development of the honeybee model. Then
we apply the model to test our hypothesis that the waggle dance of a
returning bee will be witnessed by more observer bees, if the habitat
is a richer environment for the bees. The model shows itself able to
answer such questions, and is moreover usable by scientists of all
types, and not only computer scientists. It suggests that such ABM
methodology should play a more central role in future, and would be
a big help to researchers into animal cognition.
1 Department of Computing, Glasgow Caledonian University, UK. email:
D.C.Moffat@gcu.ac.uk
Honey bee recruitment to food sources has been the centre of won-
der for a long time. Gould & Gould [2] summarises how Aristotle
first noticed that once a honey bee had discovered a food source, be-
fore long she had recruited more of her sisters to that location. Gould
follows up by explaining how Reverend Ernst Spitzner used a glass
hive in 1788 to inspect the work of a honey bee colony inside the
hive and noticed that on return from a successful foraging trip a hon-
ey bee would twirl round in the hive almost to let the other bees know
of her discovery, possibly to spread the scent of the food source they
had just visited to get other bees’ attention. Leadbeater & Chittka
[5] confirm this initial assumption stating that it was assumed that
the bees witnessing the dance would simply follow the dancing bee
to the food source. As they quoted Spitzner: "Full of joy, they twirl
in circles about those in the hive . . . in a few minutes, after these
had made it known to the others, they came in great numbers to the
place!"
However Gould & Gould (ibid p55) clarify it was Maurice Maeter-
linck who concluded this wasn’t the case when he acquired a bee
from its hive and marked it with paint before releasing the bee at a
feeding station. Once the bee had fed from the station and embarked
on its journey home, Maurice returned to the hive and waited for the
bee that he had marked with paint to exit from its home. When Mau-
rice spotted the bee departing he captured it before it was able to
lead any other bees to the feeding station. He then ran to the feeding
station and saw other bees had arrived at the station without having
followed the bee that knew of the location.
It wasn’t until 1944 when Austrian zoologist Karl Von Frisch dis-
covered a more detailed explanation of the dance (ibid p55). He
found that the twirling that Reverend Ernst Spitzner had discovered
was part of the process of communicating with the other bees. He
established that as the distance to a food source increased, so did the
waggle duration of the bees dance. Karl von Frisch also discovered
that the angle of the dance performed on a vertical comb translated
as the direction required to navigate to the food source.
Throughout this long period of time the theory behind the dance
has changed significantly. This highlights the need for further testing
to ensure that the hypotheses that are understood at present are cor-
rect and are not missing any finer details that would be of important
scientific discovery. Gould & Gould (ibid p61) highlights this issue
stating that there has long been an element of controversy related to
the honey bee waggle dance which has included a series of paper-
s that were published in 1967 that challenged the legitimacy of the
dance language as well as a university press that refused to publish a
book written by Karl von Frisch that documented his theory behind
the waggle dance.
Replicating the work of a Honey bee colony in a computational
model Agent based modelling (ABM) is a technique that recreates an
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environment in which agents are given a set of instructions to follow,
and has even been proposed as a way to pursue research questions
in archaeology [1] This approach would suit modelling a colony of
bees that forage using the waggle dance as each bee could be pro-
grammed to perform a waggle dance on return from discovering a
profitable food source. Any bees that witness the dance (within a
specified radius of the bee) could use this information to forage. Due
to the size of bee colonies consisting of tens of thousands of bees
they are very hard to keep track of. Using a computer to simulate
the behaviour would make the process of studying the bee behaviour
much simpler.
In the following we apply ABM techniques to answer a simple re-
search question. Using agent based modelling techniques; how much
does the waggle dance behaviour of a honey bee increase the honey
yield of its colony in a computational model? The aim is to test the
applicability and feasibility of ABM as a research technique in this
field of insect cognition.
2 The Netlogo system and methods for ABM
As a case-study applying AMB methods to the domain of bees, we
selected the Netlogo system, and we followed a methodical approach
to the software development process that has been recommended for
ABM, and which we also outline here.
In order to make a computational model of the waggle dance ef-
ficacy, we chose the widely used NetLogo simulation tool [11]. It is
a software tool that has been predominantly used for teaching social
and biological concepts, and has many small models to illustrate bi-
ological phenomena in its library. For example, there is a model of
a 2D world in which wolves hunt sheep, which eat grass [10]. The
student can vary the population sizes and other variables, and can see
their consequences for the relative population dynamics [13], [12].
The system has also been used for research purposes in its own
right. In the fields of the social sciences, for example, it has become
one of the most popular systems, especially since it recently wen-
t open-source [9]. Some applications there have included models of
worker protest, in times of economic inequality [3], showing that a
simple us-and-them categorisation of other workers can be enough to
account for observed protesting behaviour. Another example is Sim-
Drink [7], in which young male binge-drinkers and their verbally
violent behaviours can bring other troubles in consequence, such as
coming to harm in attempting to get home on public transport after
heavy drinking in town. Whether such models will be seen as helpful
to public policy decision makers remains to be seen, but they repre-
sent an interesting development in the social sciences.
In this work, we follow the methodical approach recommended by
Railsback & Grimm [6]. It is quite common in AI for researchers
to develop their own methods as they go, heading towards a model
that they aim to build, but without having much concern to follow a
standard method that other researchers in the field have or will also
follow. In order to be more methodical, and thus make such research
more scientifically comparable, and valuable to the field, we adopt
the methods set out by these experienced ABM researchers.
They explain (pp4-7) how a model is generally used to represent
real systems, using variables to describe the state of the whole sys-
tem. An agent based model (ABM) differs in one particular and sig-
nificant aspect: rather than model the state of the whole system, the
state of the individual agents within the system are modelled. They
further explain how the agents represent objects such as organisms
and animals and explains how they can interact with each other and
the computational world they reside in.
Klügl [4] illustrate this view with their own application, detailing
how an ABM can simulate agents within their environment, provid-
ing an example of using an ABM to determine how long it would
take commuters to evacuate an airport terminal during an emergency
whilst taking into account commuters travelling in groups or with re-
stricted mobility. Although commuters evacuating an airport is com-
pletely unrelated to honey bee foraging, an ABM could be used to
model honey bee foraging by simply changing the rules that each
agent would follow as well as the surrounding environment. The en-
vironment would be changed to simulate a honey bee habitat and
rather than having agents of commuters following rules to evacuate
an airport the agents would now consist of the foraging behaviour of
a honey bee.
Before attempting to write an ABMs code, it is important to i-
dentify the ideas, data and problems the developer will need to take
into account. Railsback & Grimm (ibid pp35-45) emphasise that this
is the first step of full model formulation, and until all of the com-
ponents and interactions of the model have been written down, it is
improbable that a comprehensive design of the ABM will be com-
pleted. For us, this would involve noting down all of the relevant bee
behaviours and interactions with their habitat including how they be-
have when they have found a food source. The second step of formu-
lating an ABM is for the designer to discuss the work completed in
step one with their colleagues or domain experts; and the third step
is to formalise the model by writing out simplified (pseudo-)code.
These steps are essentially good general practice in software engi-
neering. We did not discuss the models’ development directly with
entomologists or other domain experts (as we are in a computer sci-
ence department); but instead relied on their published research. This
is a clear issue in all kinds of inter-disciplinary research, and will help
to test the feasibility of this research approach in general.
On completion of an AMB’s design process, Railsback & Grimm
(ibid pp47-59) provide advice for beginning to implement the design
work into a working model. The first phase of implementation should
involve modelling a version of the planned ABM in its simplest form
by excluding many of the components and behaviours with a view
to completing these elements later in the development. The second
phase is to develop the ABM in a hierarchical procedure. This would
include ensuring that the general characteristics and structures of the
ABM are performing as they should. Once these rules have been im-
plemented correctly, the program will have a solid base and then finer
detailed instructions can be included. Their third recommendation is
to implement the ABM initially with a simple environment. This is
particularly important if the project is intended to be of a realistic
nature, consisting of complex interactions. As the first environment
will be simpler, this will allow development to focus on the agents
and their interactions and, without a complex environment, should
allow for easier debugging. The environment can then be developed
and tested with each iteration to ensure that the algorithms are work-
ing correctly. If an algorithm begins to fail then the developer will
know that the development on the last iteration has probably caused
this, which will allow for easier identification of what has caused the
error. Finally, they emphasise the importance of formatting code cor-
rectly and providing informative comments that document the code’s
intended purpose. This extra time invested in producing an easy to
read code segment should reap benefits for reasons such as debug-
ging. It will also be a lot easier to debug when you can determine
what functionality is failing in the program and then locate it quickly
and easily in the code section.
Again, this advice amounts to good software engineering practice;
but it is surprising how often it is ignored, even when people start
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out their projects with the best of intentions. The great quantities of
broken, badly written software in the world, that we have come to
accept, or at least tolerate, is testament to the dangers here; but in
a scientific research project we agree with Railsback & Grimm that
a stricter emphasis on software quality is needed, if one is to draw
credible conclusions from the computer experiment.
There is more advice on how to test the ABM model, that Rails-
back & Grimm have to offer, but to save space we do not relate it
here, and moreover, we have indeed only summarised their method-
ology so far above. Interested readers are directed to their book which
is a manual and proposal for their approach (ibid).
3 The ABM system design
As our chief source for what is known about honeybees, we took the
fairly recent book by Seeley, one of the world’s leading authorities on
the subject [8]. That provided us with sufficient information on hon-
eybee characteristics and behaviours, the honeybee waggle dance,
and honeybee habitats. For example, honeybees are able to differen-
tiate between colour and scent. They take these senses into account
when foraging for food. Honeybees are also known to use the sun
when navigating to and from their hive. In this work, we do not mod-
el such details as the sun’s passage across the sky during the bee’s
workday, because we wish to focus only on the waggle dance that
bees use for communication, so that we can try to ascertain how use-
ful (or vital) it must be to the honeybees.
On discovery of a profitable food source a honeybee will perform
a waggle dance on return to the hive to inform her sisters of the find.
The direction of the waggle dance translates as the direction required
to reach the food source. It has also been suggested that the duration
of the dance conveys the distance of the food source from the hive.
The longer the duration of the waggle dance, the further the distance
required to reach the location. Research has also provided the au-
thor with information Regarding the habitat of honeybees, it has been
found that they prefer to nest in high trees in woodland so they are
safe from ground predators, and sheltered from rain and wind. They
also prefer to build their nests in habitats that are surrounded by a
steady supply of nourishment.
3.1 The representation of a single honeybee
In order to model a single bee, to be placed within the simulated habi-
tat, we chose to use a simple agent-modeling technique that is often
used in robotics, say, or in video games: namely, the FSM (finite state
machine).
It has the advantage that a visual sketch of it conveys all the es-
sential points, even to people who do not understand computer code.
An FSM is only suitable for relatively simple systems, but as bees
are generally assumed to be simple it is a good idea to at least start
the attempt to model them with an FSM. As can be seen from Figure
1, the simplified FSM already has nine states, which makes for some
complexity in code, but it is still manageable.
To illustrate how the FSM can then be converted into computer
code, in this case into the Netlogo language, here is what an artificial
bee does to collect nectar from a flower. When the bee lands on a
flower it makes a transition to the feed state. This corresponds to
arrow 14 in Figure 1. State changes are signified by the bees changing
colour, so that the experimenter can see which bees are in which state
at any time.
to feed
Figure 1. The Finite State machine for a simple honeybee
ifelse pollen > 20
[ set color blue
return-to-hive ]
[ set pollen pollen + 1
ask flowers-on patch-here
[set pollen pollen - 1] ]
end
The algorithm checks if the energy of the bee (representing pollen
collected) is above 20, and if so its colour changes to signifiy the
change to another state, corresponding to arrow 16 in Figure 1. The
bee in its new state will then return to the hive. If however the ener-
gy isn’t yet high enough, the bee takes one unit of energy from the
flower, and remains in the same state so that it will continue feeding
in the next time step.
When the bee returns to the hive later it may dance to show other
bees the way to this flower, making transition 12 in Figure 1. Here
is how the state Observe allows a bee to watch a dance and pick up
the direction and distance information. As we use colours to reveal
what state a bee is in, observing bees are green when they execute
this piece of code.
to check-for-dance
ifelse distance-to-travel > 1
[ set color orange
set time 0]
[set time time + 1]
if time > time-to-wait-for-dance
[ set color red
set time 0]
end
While in the Observe state, a bee can be directed by any danc-
ing bee on the dancefloor in the hive, to adopt the communicated
information about a food source. In the syntax of Netlogo, a proce-
dure is defined by the to keyword. A Boolean logic branch is giv-
en by the ifelse keyword, which is followed first by the Boolean
test, then a branch to execute if the test proves true (in [square
brackets]), and then the branch to follow if the test proved false.
This procedure would observe any dance by placing itself in a
state that would allow a dancing bee to pass the relevant infor-
mation across to it. It does this by monitoring a variable named
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distance-to-travel. If this variable changed then the pro-
gram would know that the bee had received the set of instructions.
The algorithm would then change the colour of the bee to orange
and reset the time to 0 for the next procedure. Changing the colour
to orange would allow the go procedure to change the state of the
bee to Follow. If however the bee had not witnessed a dance then
the time would increment per frame and if this time became high-
er than the variable time-to-wait-for-dance defined by the
user / experimenter in the user interface, then the bee would change
colour to red in order to return to the Search state. The time would
also be reset to 0 for future procedures. In order for this procedure
to work there would need to be bees that performed the dance. This
was accomplished with the following procedure.
to dance
ifelse time > time-to-dance
[deposit]
[ set time time + 1
ask turtles with [color = green]
in-radius 5
[ set heading
[heading - 180] of myself
set distance-to-travel
[travelled-distance] of myself
]
]
end
Bees immediately perform a dance before depositing any of their
resources in the hive. The model accommodates this by ensuring that
the dance procedure occurs before the deposit procedure.
The implemented timer would increment every frame where the
time was less than the user defined variable time-to-dance.
This would allow the bee to perform the dance for a user
defined set amount of time. Once the desired time had been
reached the bee would then move to the deposit state to de-
posit its collected resources. If the desired time had not been
reached then the bee would ask any green bees (as mentioned
before bees in the observe state would change to colour green)
to set their heading to the reversed heading of the asking bee
and also to set their distance-to-travel variable to the
travelled-distance of the dancing bee. This would effec-
tively allow the observing bee to receive the heading and distance
required to travel to the food source from the dancing bee. Note that
we do not simulate the waggle dance itself, in this model; but only
the theoretical communicative value of it.
We have also approximated real honeybee behaviour in other
ways. Tyically honeybees will try to deposit their payload (of nectar,
pollen or water) on arriving at the hive, and only then will they dance.
This would be important for modeling the likelihood that bees will
communicate their foodsources, but is beyond the scope of the cur-
rent model. The code here then simplifies by having the bees dance
first, and without choice, so that the model can focus on the efficacy
of the dance to any observer bees then thence to the entire colony.
In fact honeybee behaviour is fairly richly known, and there is a lot
more scope for modeling than we have explored so far.
3.2 Running the model for many bees
Once the behaviour patterns and variables of a single bee are speci-
fied in code, as above, then it becomes a simple matter to create the
artificial world in which there are a number of food sources, and a
number of bees in the hive. The model can then be run at a conve-
nient simulation speed, showing the states and movement of all the
bees, as in Figure 2, to give a good impression of how the bees are
behaving collectively. Charts such as the one in the Figure are also
drawn in real time as the simulation run progresses.
The sliders and other controls in the int rface allow the experi-
menter to play with the3 values of the various control variables, and
see what effects they may have on the bees, in their individual be-
haviours and also in the global, collective behaviour patters of the
whole colony.
When the model is working as desired, the simulations can be run
at full speed, end even with the display turned off, so that the results
can be collected from many runs with variables set at different val-
ues. In the end it is the differences in behaviour patterns, that result
from different variable settings, that yield the scientific value from
the "artificial experiment."
4 Results
The model is shown with its user-interface in Figure 2.
In the central area is the 2D view of the bees’ world. Each little
bee is run by the same code as outlined above, but bees can be in
different states, as shown by their colour at the time. The hive is in
the centre, and bees can be seen out foraging, fetching nectar from
the flowers that they have so far discovered. The bees are shown as
little arrows moving around the space. They are red when searching
for new flower sources, and so they are pointing in all directions. But
when they know where to go they head out directly from the hive,
shown in the Figure as a black colour; and when returning to the hive
laden with nextar they are blue.
In the simulated environment, the bees can inhabit one of three
habitats; where the food sources are "few" (with only two flowers),
or "intermediate" with four flowers, or "most" with eight flowers (as
in Figure 2).
There are other key variables to specify the bee behaviours, as
the program code concults their values at various points. The ex-
perimenter can manipulate these control variables, using the slider
controls at the side. These include the variables time-to-dance
and time-to-wait-for-dance that appear in the code above.
There are many other variables that the experimenter can use to
change the characteristics of the bees and habitat, such as how fast
they eat, how much energy the flowers have, and how many there are
at different locations, and so on, but we have not varied those for this
experiment.
One crucial variable is the Boolean variable for waggle? which
controls whether the bees are able to communicate using the waggle
dance or not. The controls for distance? and for direction?
allow the experimenter to specify what kind of information the bees
are able to convey with the waggle dance.
A convenience of the netlogo system is that it allows charts to be
drawn in real-time as the simulation progresses. The total energy the
bees have accumulated in the hive is shown in the Figure. In this
example, the bees expended a lot of energy until they found some
flowers and were able to start collecting nectar.
4.1 Testing the hypothesis
Our hypothesis envisaged that the effectiveness of the waggle dance
would differ over varying habitats consisting of different quantities
of flowers, particularly with environments containing small amounts
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Figure 2. The model as seen by the experimenter
of food. We expected to see a reduced effectiveness for the waggle
dance in habitats that contain a large supply of food. The reasoning
behind this hypothesis was that as long as there were enough bees
foraging, there would be a higher probability of bees finding flowers
on their own, even if not told about them. We had originally planned
to test this theory by using the net food content of the hive as a mea-
surement. However it became apparent that the foraging success of
the hive would not determine the effectiveness of the waggle dance
as the food in the hive could have been contributed by bees that were
not relying on the dance to find their food. A method had to be creat-
ed that allowed the system to calculate the percentage of unsuccess-
ful foraging bees that witnessed a dance on returning to the hive to
feed. This was done by adapting the method check-for-dance
to keep track of every time a bee had successfully witnessed a dance
and every time it was unsuccessful (through incrementing respective
variables). This allowed a value to be calculated that represented the
percentage chance that observing bees were witnessing a dance. This
was displayed through a monitor in the ABM to provide instant feed-
back to the user.
In order to evaluate the hypothesis, three separate experiments
were then set up with the waggle dance switch activated. Each ex-
periment would differ through the habitat selected by the habitat
selector in the user interface. It was important that all of the slider
variables remained the same throughout each experiment otherwise
they could have had an effect that would have invalidated the results.
Each experiment was executed for 1000 ticks (time units) before the
result was recorded, in order to allow sufficient time for the bees to
forage and improve the legitimacy of the experiment, as experiments
running for different times would not have produced a fair compar-
ison. We also increased validity by repeating each experiment three
times to achieve an average result. This decreased the chance of an
improbable result occurring that would provide a false representation
of how the model behaves.
Table 1. The chance that a bee will see a waggle dance
in poorer and richer habitats
Habitat Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Average increase
few 48% 60% 57% 55%
intermediate 69% 56% 67% 64% 9%
most 78% 89% 81% 83% 19%
Table 1 displays the results that were recorded during the experi-
ments. The column on the left indicates the habitat that was being
tested (“few” was the habitat containing the least flowers and in-
creasing through “intermediate” to “most” having the most flowers
in the habitat) and the first, second and third columns represent the
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test number for that habitat before the final column calculates the
average value over each habitat.
The results show that the chance of a bee witnessing a dance in-
creases as the number of flowers increases. Another point to note is
that this percentage chance seems to grow as the number of flow-
ers increases. This is highlighted by an increase of only 9% from
the “few” habitat to the “intermediate” habitat. However the increase
from “intermediate” to “most” more than doubles to 19% supporting
the hypothesis that the success of the waggle dance increases as the
number of flowers increases. If we had come up with mathematical e-
quations to model all this bee behaviour with some analytic solution,
then it would be possible to prove such hypotheses mathematically,
and with precision limited only by the modeling assumptions. How-
ever, the computational approach has its own advantages, which are
illustrated in this example of an agent based model (ABM).
4.2 Testing the waggle dance direction
In order to investigate the efficacy of the waggle dance, we ran the
simulation with it turned on or off; and with the direction component
on or off. Bees can communicate both direction and distance to the
food sources, but in a simulation we can control which information
the artificial bees can communicate to each other. We experimented
with this by allowing the bees to communicate both direction and di-
tance (so full waggle dance on); just direction; just distance; and nei-
ther direction nor distance (so equivalent to having no waggle dance
at all).
Without the waggle dance the hive should clearly perform less ef-
fectively, as we know it is useful to real honeybees in the wild. Where
a real colonoy could well die however, in this simulation we show the
efficacy of the dance by measuring time to break even. As the bees
expend energy while out searching and foraging, they need to eat
honey when they return to the hive. therefore the energy level of the
hive starts to fall soon after the simulation begins; and continutes to
fall until enough flowers have been found by enough bees to be able
to replenish the food stocks faster than they were being depleted. As
the energy level starts at zero, by our convention, this means the the
hive goes into netagive energy, or an energy debt. We do not "kill" the
hive, but let it continue in a state of deepening negative energy until
it manages to repay the debt. We take the time required in simulation
"steps" to bring the hive back up to its original zero energy level, plus
a small value of 100 energy units, as the measure of its success, and
then stop the simulation. The quicker the hive can recover its energy
then, the more successful it is.
Table 2. The time steps needed before the colony manages to earn energy
to take it above its starting level
waggling on distance direction off
habitat
few 1793 3818 6445 9131
intermediate 1031 1665 2889 3430
most 726 758 1109 988
In Table 2 the effectiveness of the different components of the
waggle dance are shown in the simulation. Each cell in the table re-
sults from three runs that were averaged, as the simulations are all
slightly different every time they run. It can be seen that the wag-
gle dance is indeed effective in the simulator, as the hive repays its
energy debt sooner when it is on. Of the two components, it is ap-
parent that direction is more important information to convey than
distance. But even with the waggle dance turned off, the colony can
still recover its debt eventually. This is because the flowers are not
depleted in the simulations, and so eventually anough bees will find
them on their own, and then all bees are earning more eergy than they
consume.
When the environment provides rich food resources, the experi-
ment shows that the waggle dance brings less benefit to the colony.
This is understandable as the bees can find the flowers more easily
even if they have no help. This suggests that the waggle dance may
have developed as a solution to help colonies that fell on hard times,
such as having to face harsh environmental conditiouns brought
about by drought. We make no further comment on evolution, save
to say that modeling approaches such as the present one may well of-
fer helpful paths to investigation that would not be open to biologists
working with real creatures in the wild.
In reality a colony would not start with unlimited energy resources
of course, and could fail to survive long enough for the bees to find
the flowers. The artificial bees here do not die either; but in reality
honeybees can forage effectively for only a few weeks, before their
flight muscles give out, and they fall to earth where they are, to be eat-
en by birds, or die of exhaustion. Furthermore, the waggle dance for
real bees doe not precisely convey the information about distance and
direction; but is rather approximate. The simulator does demonstrate
however, within its scope of simulation, and with its assumtpions of
relatively precise information transfer, that the potential benefit to the
colony of the waggle dance is great.
5 Conclusion
We have shown how the ABM (agent based modelling) research
method can be applied to biological systems in which the individual
agents are simple enough. Whether the artificial results are generally
useful remains to be seen. In this case, honeybees could be mod-
elled as FSMs (finite state machines), at least for the present simu-
lation purposes. In reality, honeybees have more intelligence that is
simulated here, and their behaviours would in principle be simulated
with more complex FSMs, but beyond a certain level of complexity
some other techniques would be more appropriate. While FSMs can
in principle simulate anything, they are not so convenient for more
complex systems. Their suitability for this level of description, how-
ever, has been shown to be good.
The scientific interest of the model comes in the way that the a-
gents then interact with each other, producing much greater com-
plexity, and emergent behaviour patterns that would not be obvious
from consideration of the structure of an individual agent herself.
Such complexity precludes any premature mathematical treatment,
and we suggest that the first approach these days should be with a
computational model, and any precise analytical solutions can be de-
veloped later, once the main ideas are explored and established.
While it is understood that many phenomena in the natural world
are "emergent" and especially so in biology, it remains a struggle to
understand the nature of this emergence in any given case. It is to fill
this kind of conceptual gap that we feel ABM is suited. The exper-
imental approach that is encouraged by the system developed here
allows the experimenter to develop intuitions about how the whole
system behaves. Then any apparent lawlike behaviour that emerges
may be modeled mathematically, with analytical precision, and to
that extent may be confirmed by other means. Even if such formal-
isation is not achieved however, the ABM approach will still have
provided a good if rough-and-ready understanding; and it will still
allow predictions to be made that can be tested in principle with real
world systems.
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To show how experimentation can proceed, we ran several exper-
imental runs, placing the artificial bees in richer and poorer envi-
ronments. The hypothesis that richer environments would make the
waggle dance more effective was borne out in these experiments, al-
though more comprehensive runs would been to be done to see how
far the effect would go before reaching saturation.
Other experiments are also clearly possible using the developed
model, but we have only sought to make the case for doing this kind
of ABM work in general for animal cognition, and not only for bees.
ABM can be applied to anything from slime moulds to great apes,
and we may expect it to give us some insights during development
as well as when the model is tested under different conditions. The
Netlogo system used here has proved to be a capable platform which
could feasibly be used by biologists say, without deep programming
knowledge. The emphasis in the user interface is on interactive con-
trols, allowing the experimenter to play around with the variables and
develop intuitions, before going on to conduct more formal computer
experiments.
There remains a final question as to the scientific status of such
ABM models in biology. They are not traditional, as are systems of
mathematical equations; but we hope to have shown that is only be-
cause the technology to make such a research path more negotiable
for anybody but computer scientists has taken a long time coming.
But now that it has arrived we can look forward to a bright future
for zoology in general and especially for animal cognition, with this
additional research method. The ABM model may take its place in
the general scientific method, alongside the observation, the natu-
ral experiment, the hypothesis, the laboratory controlled experiment,
the statistical analysis technique, and the mathematical equation. We
may one day start to talk of "artificial experiments" to emphasise the
similar role that ABM methods have in animal and other cognition,
as we have done here. While it might be controversial to speak in
such a way for some time, there will proobably be some researchers
in AI and zoology that find it quite a comfortable way to think of
what this kind of work does.
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Symposium IX
AISB Symposium on AI & Games
The AI & Games Symposium acts as a meeting place for researchers and practitioners from academia,
education and industry who are involved with the design, development and evaluation of AI in the context of
games.
Computer games now form an important sector of the computing and entertainment industries, but the need
for better artificial intelligence in games is deeply felt and recognised by the industry. Conversely, games
offer new challenges and excellent application domains for AI technology and research. Games are
increasingly used for education, serious games or game-based learning, where AI techniques can create a
believable, engaging experience for learners. The AI & Games Symposium focuses on the application of
artificial intelligence techniques, frameworks and theories to the creation of engaging intelligent games, and
will address the following areas of research and practice:
• The use of AI techniques (planning, learning, evolution etc.) in games and the game design process
• The design and engineering of AI components in commercial games
• Automatic or semi-automatic procedural content generation
• AI for serious games and gamification
• Intelligent or adaptive player interaction
• AI for player analytics and modelling player behaviour or experience
• Agent pathfinding and decision-making in games
• Using games or simulations as a platform for building intelligent agents
• Environmental simulations for games
• Interactive narrative generation
• Player perceptions of game AI
Daniela Romana Organizers
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Studying human problem solving using citizen science games. 
Jacob F. Sherson and www.scienceathome.org team 
Center for Community Driven Research (CODER) at department of Physics and Astronomy, Aarhus 
University, Denmark 
Abstract: 
In the following we explain initial steps in turning the www.scienceathome.org (S@H) citizen science 
platform into a massive online laboratory for the systematic study of human cognition and behavior with 
the intention of better understanding the general principles underlying human problem solving (HPS). First, 
we point out that in our opinion natural science research games such as our Quantum Moves game 
constitute a so‐far unexplored resource for the investigation of HPS. Next, we explain our ongoing efforts to 
implement reinforcement machine learning methods in order to explicitly highlight the differences 
between human and state‐of‐the‐art machine problem solving strategies. Next, we describe first work on a 
cognitive science inspired Quantum Minds game based on the dynamics of Quantum Moves but carefully 
designed in order to be able to extract information about the human learning process while searching for 
optimal strategies. Finally, we describe the work to create a palette of HPS games with similar 
mathematical framework but gradually increasing complexity with the aim to understand how HPS changes 
with game dimensionality. 
 
Background: 
The disciplines focusing on the study of processes of problem solving have traditionally influenced each other 
and e.g. have shared assumptions about the mind as an information processor [1] or symbolic AI [2].   
Machine  learning  and  AI  strategies  utilizing  big  data  have  recently  drawn  attention  with  remarkable 
achievements in e.g. Go [3], Arcade games [4], as well as outstanding progress regarding speech or image 
recognition [5]. These successes have been won by brute force machine learning and specialized  learning 
mechanisms [6]. But in order to develop more general intelligence based on reinforcement learning, leading 
AI scholars demand a “return to the roots”, i.e. finding further inspiration in cognitive sciences and work on 
human problem solving (HPS) processes [7]. 
In  the  last  few  decades  research  on  HPS  has  identified  error‐prone  heuristics  [8,9]  and  simple 
adaptive heuristic algorithms [10]. Recent developments in this field offer a new theoretical foundation for 
understanding how humans select between two distinct modes of action: goal‐directed (model‐based) and 
habitual (model‐free) learning  [11].This perspective addresses how humans develop and select alternative 
problem representations [12] and explains how humans are able to abstract from past knowledge [13] to 
extrapolate  to  novel  domains  [14]  as  well  as  what  is  the  role  of  perceptual  learning  (i.e.  long‐term 
performance  increase  due  to  perceptual  experience)  in  constructing  these  models  [15].    Despite  these 
advances many fundamental questions remain: 
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a) Can human behavior in artificial, simplified laboratory tasks be generalized to more complex and 
natural settings? [16] 
b) Do people recruit categorically different decision making mechanisms for perceptual/motoric tasks 
versus cognitive tasks and is the resulting performance systematically different? [17,18] 
c) What is the relative contribution to complex problem solving skills of crystalline and fluid 
intelligence [19] and model‐based vs model‐free search strategies [11]? 
d) Are there different basic decision processes in different domains of behavior/culture, or is there 
one evolutionarily selected fundamental decision module? [20] 
e) How do cognitive constraints on an individual level hamper or aid the choice of problem solving 
strategies? 
The current fault line between artificial and HPS is continually probed by the emerging field of citizen science 
[21]. It actively seeks out hard scientific problems and utilizes the process of gamification ‐ the use of game 
design elements in non‐game contexts [22] – to build games enabling ordinary citizens to contribute to the 
solution. This has led to scientific contributions in e.g. the study of protein [23] and RNA [24] folding, neuron 
mapping  [25],  cancer  research  [26],  astronomy  [27],  and  quantum  physics  [28].  The  massive  user 
engagement provides an excellent but so far largely unexploited platform for the systematic study of HPS 
processes.  
The scienceathome.org HPS project 
In the following we explain initial steps in turning the www.scienceathome.org (S@H) citizen science 
platform into a massive online laboratory for the systematic study of human cognition and behavior with 
the intention of better understanding the general principles underlying HPS. First, we point out that in our 
opinion natural science research games such as our Quantum Moves game constitute a so‐far unexplored 
resource for the investigation of HPS. Next, we explain our ongoing efforts to implement reinforcement 
machine learning methods in order to explicitly highlight the differences between human and state‐of‐the‐
art machine problem solving strategies. Next, we describe first work on a cognitive science inspired 
Quantum Minds game based on the dynamics of Quantum Moves but carefully designed in order to be able 
to extract information about the human learning process while searching for optimal strategies. Finally, we 
describe the work to create a palette of HPS games with similar mathematical framework but gradually 
increasing complexity with the aim to understand how HPS changes with game dimensionality. 
Shared mathematical framework: The games, or the underlying quantum optimal control problem, and the 
social science analyses can be formulated using the framework of fitness landscapes [29‐31] in which the 
coordinates of the landscape are formed by the input variables and the height is determined by the quality 
of the solution for any given set of input variables. This framework quantifying e.g. the choice between 
“exploitation” of acquired knowledge and “exploration” of new potentials is also common in computer 
science fields such as numerical optimization and AI [32,33]. This shared mathematical language allows for 
an interdisciplinary approach where insights from the fields can seamlessly be interchanged. 
The Quantum Moves game: The first major citizen science game from S@H is Quantum Moves (available on 
mobile platforms and for PC download on S@H) optimizing the manipulation of a single ultra‐cold atom 
using a trap realized by an ultra‐focused laser beam of relevance for the creation of a quantum computer. 
In the game, which has so far been played by 200,000 citizen scientists from around the world. The player 
sees a liquid‐like representation of the quantum state of an atom in the dynamically controlled potential 
landscape. The goal is to quickly move the atom into the target area without having any residual sloshing of 
the atom. The state of the atom is updated live using the quantum physical equation of motion, the time‐
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dependent Schrödinger equation, in response to the actions of the players and at the end a score based on 
the overlap with the desired state is calculated and shown. Citizen science and social science games 
exploring HPS are quite often puzzles or involve pattern recognition. Quantum Moves is different, since it is 
a dynamic game that requires quick responses and proficient hand‐eye coordination. In [28] we 
demonstrated that the players found solutions outcompeting those obtained by standard quantum optimal 
control algorithms. Moreover, the player solutions were used as seeds for a human‐computer hybrid 
optimization scheme in which the players intuitively explored the vast 1000‐dimensional landscape and the 
computer algorithm performed efficient local optimization. This combined strategy thoroughly 
outcompeted the previously best results. It is interesting that a very large fraction of the player results 
were situated in the very small subregion of the vast optimization space leading to optimal solutions. It thus 
seems that the players were able to combine their normal everyday intuition for manipulating regular 
liquids with the characteristic quantum features in the game to form a highly efficient, heuristic quantum 
intuition. In general games very often introduce unfamiliar rules of physics into the game play as challenges 
and thereby represent unique opportunities for the systematic study of the emergence of these domain 
specific intuitions. In particular, in Quantum Moves the players have to get accustomed to a weird quantum 
property called quantum tunneling, which is the ability of quantum particles to tunnel through energy 
barriers  despite classically not having sufficient kinetic energy to make it over the top. In the game, this 
phenomenon manifests itself as the liquid flowing uphill under certain circumstances. The successful player 
therefore automatically recalls his or her everyday experience of carrying water glasses and coffee cups and 
intuitively accepts that in this particular game water can in fact flow uphill. 
The quantum Minds game: in order to systematically investigate the dynamical process of the formation of 
the choice of strategy we developed the cognitive science game, Quantum Minds (available for PC download 
on S@H). The game mechanics is very similar except that it has four levels of increasing difficulty and in order 
to win the game a certain threshold score has to be surpassed three times in a row on any given level. The 
basic hypothesis is to use this as a proxy for true learning of the level as opposed to simply finding the good 
solution once by chance. One interesting feature of this game is the introduction in the advanced levels of 
(slightly unphysical) zones of death in which the players looses the particular gameplay if a small fraction of 
the atom enters. The advanced level are sufficiently difficult that no player will solve the challenge in the first 
trial.  The  fact  that  a  score  of  zero  is  output  until  successful  poses  an  extreme  challenge  for  computer 
optimization because no gradient information of the fitness function can be formed between iteration. In 
contrast,  in humans we can  study  the multi‐dimensional processing going  into  formulating a meaning of 
“nearly making it” or “almost not dying” and how this is translated into game hypothesis or heuristics to be 
tested in subsequent game play. The plan is then to use machine learning feature extraction in order to i) 
extract  the features characteristic of good solutions and  ii)  identify  the  influence of  learning style on the 
speed  and  likelihood  of  growth  of  these  good  features  as  the  player  progresses.  In  a  step  towards  the 
benchmarking of online social and cognitive science we aim to study this process in three distinct settings: a) 
“in‐the‐wild” by a few thousand users of S@H, b) in a semi‐structured class‐room setting involving roughly 
200 students, and 3) in small‐scale controlled laboratory studies.  
Machine learning on the Quantum Moves game: as more and more human behavioral data is collected, it 
becomes increasingly important to benchmark the human performance with the newest reinforcement 
learning technique in order to be able to realistically assess any potential for the useful generalization of 
the identified HPS strategies. Currently, we are investigating Trust Region Policy Optimization (TRPO) for 
the Quantum Moves game. For state parametrization, we consider the surface and the liquid on top as two 
functions, resolved into 128 linearly spaced points along the horizontal axis. Concatenating the two lists 
leaves us with 256 points for a frame. To account for the sloshing of the liquid multiple frames (i.e. 4 
frames) are necessary to capture the state, leaving us with a total of 1024 points. Finally, we have 
represented the target area as a step function which is 0 outside of the area, and 1 inside. By resolving this 
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function into 128 points, and appending it to the rest of the state, we end up with a dimensionality of 1152. 
The target area is only included in the state once, because it does not change over time. The 1024 points 
representing the liquid and the surface can take any value from [0;1]. For action characterization, we 
implement an agent with continuous actions along two dimensions to mimick the freedom of the players to 
take a wide variety of different step sizes and directions. Initial results of the TRPO algorithm do exhibit 
learning from initially completely failed attempt to scores representing non‐zero transport of the atom. 
However, the score is still fairly low (~10% of the max score) and in addition the algorithm at present does 
not succeed in maintaining this score but “unlearns it”. Despite not being competitive with the best player 
generated scores at present, these first exploratory results do reveal the ability of the reinforcement 
learning algorithm to exhibit some learning from scratch and we expect further work to improve the overall 
score dramatically. 
Creating a ladder of increasingly complex HPS games: Finally, we turn to the ambition of the S@H project to 
study HPS systematically in a number of mathematically well defined problems with gradually increasing 
complexity. The first game is the Alien Game (available for PC download at S@H) in which an 8 bit puzzle 
representing fixed underlying landscapes is presented to the player in the form of a puzzle posed by an 
alien visitor to our planet [34]. The player has 25 trials and in each trial an arbitrary number of bits can be 
flipped. The main research question is to investigate the distribution among three canonical move types: 
random, locally optimizing and distant model‐based moves. Then, the likelihood for a given player to 
change strategy based on game feedback and advice from other players is studied. Two game variants have 
so far been studied. In the first one, the player could freely flip the bits at each choice. This made the 
identification of the move type very complicated since in practice it can be very hard to distinguish 
between random and model‐based moves when one does not have any information of the particular model 
currently being considered by the player. Instead, a second game mode was developed in which the player 
actively presses a button for one of the three general strategies and thereafter is presented with the 
possible moves within this category. While this resolves the problem of identifying the type of search mode 
being pursued it remains to be investigated if this representation invokes a large bias in the search 
behavior. The second game is the Crystal Crop Fever (CCF), which has been tested in two different design 
iterations by roughly 100 participants, and will be available for public download within a few months. 
Whereas the Alien Game had an implicit 8‐dimensional landscape, the game play in CCF is constructed 
directly around the landscape metaphor by having a 2D landscape with 80x80 tiles. It is a multiplayer game 
accommodating up to 16 simultaneous players. Again there are 25 game rounds and in each round each 
player selects a previously unexplored tile to be investigated and then the scores of all player selections is 
revealed. In the Alien Game, the player advice was built in as a static simulated advice, whereas CCF 
features true collaborative problem solving [35]. In both Alien Game and CCF landscapes of varying 
complexity can be implemented and the human response studied. We believe that this systematic low, 
dimensional HPS study will then inform subsequent studies on the much more high dimensional and 
realistic natural science research challenges such as Quantum Moves. For these studies it will be crucial to 
convince the same players to  all three games in order to be able to cross correlated behavior as efficiently 
as possible. With a firm understanding of HPS processes across an increasing dimensionality scale, we hope 
to be able to extrapolate more confidently to truly complex social interaction dynamics than is possible 
today. 
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PRESTO Script: scripting for serious games
Paolo Busetta 1 and Marco Robol 2 and Paolo Calanca 3 and Paolo Giorgini 4
Abstract. PRESTO, a recently concluded R&D project, has devel-
oped a tool suite for the creation of behavioral AI for serious games,
with a focus on 3D games for emergency training. This paper fo-
cuses on its scripting language, meant to ease development of games
by instructional designers and to enable run-time control by trainers
supervising a training session. The purpose of the scripting language
is to control the choreography of NPCs in the game according to the
situations occurring in the game and the trainer’s decisions. Scripts
describe graphs of potential stories, whose progress and ramifications
are determined by events occurring in the game, including trainer’s
choices. We provide an overview of PRESTO Script, its semantics
and its implementation, and compare it with a few commercial and
research languages with similar purposes for games and other uses.
1 Introduction
Serious Games based on Virtual Reality (VR) are gaining more and
more interest as an effective training alternative to real-life emer-
gency simulations, as demonstrated by the number of products ap-
pearing on the market. However, they need to be easily adapted to
specific training purposes, possibly by the trainers themselves or by
domain experts and so-called instructional designers. This require-
ment of continuous and rapid customization, negligible (if not even
considered harmful from a business perspective) in entertainment
video games, complicates the development of serious games, thus
limiting their diffusion.
PRESTO (Plausible Representation of Emergency Scenarios for
Training Operations) [3, 5] was an industrial R&D project,5 led by
Delta Informatica Spa, based in Trento (Italy), and involving the lo-
cal University and other research centers. The idea at its basis was to
create a game-independent all-round development environment for
NPC (Non-Player Character)’s behaviors. To ease the diffusion of
serious games in non-military domains, PRESTO proposes to reduce
their development cost by enabling NPC’s model reusability and cre-
ating an efficient modeling environment designed for instructional
designers and trainers rather than software engineers.
One of the most important developments of PRESTO has been its
game-level scripting language, called PRESTO Script. As described
later, PRESTO Script is best suited to describe a choreography of
behaviors of entities within the game. This is done by describing sto-
ries as graphs of scenes that replace each other with the unfolding
1 Delta Informatica Spa, Italy, email: paolo.busetta@deltainformatica.eu
2 University of Trento, Italy, email: marco.robol@unitn.it
3 Delta Informatica Spa, Italy, email: paolo.calanca@deltainformatica.eu
4 University of Trento, Italy, email: paolo.giorgini@unitn.it
This research has received funding from the European Unions Horizon 2020
research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 699306 -
SESAR Joint Undertaking, and under agreement No 653642 - VisiOn.
5 PRESTO was partially funded by a grant of the Provincia Autonoma di
Trento (PAT), Italy.
of events within the game, and by allowing an arbitrary number of
scripts to run in parallel. Scenes simply give goals to NPCs and per-
form limited manipulations of the virtual environment. The scripting
system allows an end-user (supposed to be a game supervisor, in par-
ticular a trainer overlooking a training session where one or more
trainees play with a PRESTO-enhanced serious game) to take deci-
sions in real-time, in particular about how to let the game proceed
at critical points and to restore a previous state of the game e.g. to
experience alternative stories from a common beginning. PRESTO
Script is currently used by Delta Informatica for emergency training
as a commercial service.6
This article shortly describes the PRESTO environment, which
provides the foundations for its scripting language, focusing on its se-
mantic data (Sec. 2) and the framework for NPC behaviors (Sec. 3).
PRESTO Script is discussed in detail in Sec. 4. Sec. 5 identifies a
few comparable commercial and research languages and highlights
the specificities of PRESTO Script.
2 Virtual environment semantics
To agents controlling NPCs’ behaviors and to scripts overseeing parts
of the entire game, PRESTO offers abstractions of the virtual envi-
ronment that are enriched with data that include (but exceed) graphic
appearance, instantaneous movements in space, physics and other
properties managed by the game engine. Further, these abstraction
are meant to be understandable both by domain experts, including
trainers, and by developers.
PRESTO distinguishes entities, representing physical objects or
phenomena in the game and typically corresponding to individual or
groups of graphical entities, from locations, which are geometrical
areas of relevance to reasoning. Differently from entities, locations
do not have any representation in the 3D world; they are configured
and known only within PRESTO. Even if they are not forced to coin-
cide with anything in the game, the locations should identify seman-
tically meaningful spaces of the 3D world (such as places, rooms,
navigation areas...) required by models and scripts to take decisions;
e.g., a hospital’s “bedroom” and a “operating theater” are both rooms
but with well distinguished functionality; a “safe zone” for a fire pro-
cedure may simply be a nondescript corner of a parking area.
PRESTO supports three forms of semantic information, referring
to specific entities or locations or overall states of the game. These
are: (i) classifications, (ii) qualities, (iii) situations.
Entities and locations are classified with respect to an ontology
[7, 2], defined with W3C’s OWL. A game-independent top-level
classification exists but it can be extended per game. Association of
game objects to ontological classes is typically done at game’s boot-
strap: the PRESTO integration layer scans all entities and builds a
6 See the videos at http://lab.deltainformatica.eu/Video for examples (Dec.
2016).
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classification table. This classification information is then provided
to agents as part of perception data, together with geometrical ones.
[7] discusses the facilities that have been built to semi-automatically
classify the objects in the rich XVR library for emergency training,
while a trivial hand-made procedure has been followed for PUG,
which has a limited variety of objects. Ontological queries are sup-
ported at run-time, so it is possible to write conditions such as “is
entity type E a human character?” or “is location type L an office?”.
In addition to being classified and having a limited set of universal
properties (mostly geometrical, e.g. position, size, rotation), entities
and locations can have ontological properties called qualities, con-
taining any form of data needed by agents for their reasoning. Qual-
ities are defined in the ontology (using the owl:ObjectProperty and
owl:DataProperty types) and are assigned to entities and locations at
run-time. They include states (such as posture of avatars, open/close
position of doors), attributes enabling actions (such as “crossable” for
doors and any object that needs to be opened during navigation), re-
lationships between entities and locations, for example spatial (“isIn-
side” or “hasInside”), and coordination information (such as “engag-
ing” entities [16]). Qualities are also exploited, by DICE (described
later) and the PRESTO integration layer, to reduce the need for inten-
tion recognition, by publishing selected goals and on-going actions
in the “isPerforming” quality of the related NPC.
Situations represent high level information about the state of the
virtual world shared among all PRESTO components; see [11] for
a detailed discussion. Technically, a situation is a tuple representing
a predicate, i.e. “name (parameters)”, whose truth value can be as-
serted by any PRESTO component or automatically monitored by
the so-called situation engine while the game evolves. Further, the
situation engine makes all true situations visible to all components,
thus implementing a form of blackboard system [6]. Situations can
be used to simplify reasoning within the agents (e.g. “Fire-In-Room
(Room-3)” may represent an accident situation without the need for
agents to infer it from perception), to maintain shared cognitive in-
formation (e.g. “Firefighter-team-engaged (Team-1, Room-3)” may
represent who is doing what and where), and to support the overall
game’s choreography by coordinating concurrently running scripts
(e.g. “Fire-Handling-Procedure-Active()” may represent which sec-
tion of a training script is currently in progress).
Automatic monitoring requires an expression associated to the
situation. The situation language allows to write boolean expres-
sions that contain symbols, parameters names, ontological classes
and qualities (see [11] for details). A symbol is defined by specify-
ing filtering criteria used to match entities or locations at run-time,
similarly to script symbols described later. The boolean expression
is composed by predicates, which allow the comparison between en-
tities or locations properties and base values, e.g.: fire//intensity >
3.5f , where the // operator reads the quality “intensity” associated
with the symbol “fire”. A predicate can also test a relation among en-
tities or locations using a relational quality and the operator contains
as in the following: fire//isInside contains (reception). In addition to
usual boolean operators, the language supports quantifiers (existen-
tial, universal and counting), but their application is restricted to sin-
gle predicates and refers to entities or locations. For example:
(all firefighter) //isInside contains (any firefighter truck)
AND count(firefighter) > 0 AND count(firefighter truck) > 0
Counting quantifiers can also be used to count how many entities or
locations have a specific relation with a specific one, for example:
count ( reception//hasInside ) >= 1
At run-time, agents and scripts invoke the situation engine to as-
sert or retract a situation or to ask to monitor its truth, specifying
the values of its parameters. The engine notifies its subscribers of
changes to any situation and to its associated symbols. The engine
adopts efficient, game-specific algorithms to decide when to eval-
uate the expressions of monitored situations, e.g., by installing lis-
teners on the objects specified as parameters that are invoked when
their qualities change. Automatically monitored situations are suited
to capture dynamic configurations of the virtual world, while assert-
ing or retracting situation from code is appropriate for coordinating
agents and game-controlling scripts.
3 Virtual actors
PRESTO relies on autonomous agents to animate NPCs and other
entities requiring some form of behavior. This section provides an
overview of PRESTO’s most complex framework, sufficient to un-
derstand how PRESTO Script interfaces NPCs via their meta-data
(most importantly, agent types and roles), which are supported also
by other, simpler agent frameworks, and to appreciate the rich be-
haviors that may be obtained by exploiting all capabilities offered by
PRESTO.
DICE [7, 3] is a BDI (Belief-Desire-Intention) [1, 14] agent frame-
work built on top of JACK7 [4] for controlling NPCs of a game
encapsulated by PRESTO, which offers services such as situation
awareness and game-independent action execution. DICE has been
inspired by another JACK extension, CoJACK [15, 8], specifically
addressing cognitive simulation and in particular variability of be-
haviors.
Typically, a DICE agent controls one NPC. DICE supports the
needs of game-level scripting done with PRESTO Script. Ideally,
DICE models (by their BDI nature) should look after agent-specific
tactics to achieve goals, while scripting should represent multi-agent
strategies. In practice, things are rarely so clear-cut; nothing prevents
the development of fully autonomous strategical agents as well as of
scripts that implement detailed procedures at the tactical level.
DICE adopts a simplistic cognitive model in which an agent pur-
sues at most one high-level goal at the time (which may have been
forced by a game script) and urgently deals with at most one inter-
ruption (such as an alarming situation) that must be fully handled
before continuing with the high-level goal. With respect to JACK,
DICE greatly simplifies changing goals, which is required to sup-
port sudden changes of mind (possibly in reaction to events) and to
promptly act when receiving commands from the outside world, in-
cluding scripts.
DICE provides various types of meta-data and introspection facil-
ities on top of JACK that enable model composition, plan interpre-
tation, emotional influences, and game-level scripting. Introspection
is available as an API for user-written meta-level models. Further,
goals and plans can be annotated with one or more ontological class,
which are automatically published as qualities of a NPC when its
controlling agent activates an instance (i.e. it starts pursuing a certain
goal or intends to execute a certain plan) and unpublished when de-
activated. This specific meta-data is exploited, among other things,
for recognition of activities by other agents, by the situation engine,
to support multi-agent coordination, all in a model-neutral way since
the ontology is written from the perspective of an external observer
with no knowledge of the inner workings of the different types of
agents (e.g., a generic “operating device D” class may be used to an-
7 http://www.aosgrp.com/products/jack/, last accessed Jan. 2017
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notate very different plans or goals applied by different agent models
when performing any task that requires using a device of type D).
DICE supports two interpreted languages aimed at end-user de-
velopment for the rapid creation of ad-hoc procedures rather than for
complex, reusable modeling, which is better left to native JACK pro-
gramming. The first one is a very simple textual language that allows
the concatenation of goals to be achieved in sequence, with optional
duration and non-conditional loops. It allows writing simple linear
procedures such as (using a simplified syntax for readability) “go to
place P; repeat (do something for 5 secs; say hello)” as a single string
that can be given to an agent e.g. by a PRESTO Script.
The second language is called DICE Part, where “part” is a term
taken from theater to refer to the text that an actor has to interpret
in a play. A DICE Part file, syntactically represented in XML but
more easily edited with an ad-hoc GUI designed for end-users [12],
implements a complete behavioral model.
4 Game-level Scripting
PRESTO Script is, in a sense, the tip of the PRESTO iceberg, since
it provides end-users with an efficient way to develop parts of game
logic (or even the entire logic in open-world virtual realities or sim-
ulations, as in the case of XVR) and multi-agent strategies. It ex-
ploits all PRESTO and DICE metadata, including roles, situations
and ontologies. Scripts, possibly custom-made for specific training
objectives, have to be executed within an existing virtual environ-
ment, exploiting available NPC models (which themselves may have
been customized with DICE Parts, described previously) as well as
any pre-built script handling e.g. common cases or team strategies.
The PRESTO Script suite includes a high-level language, a visual
editor, an engine, and a controller. The engine and the controller are
tools conceived to be used only at run-time; the engine interfaces
with PRESTO and interprets the scripts, while the controller pro-
vides a UI to a supervisor that allows to start and stop scripts and to
take choices interactively. The editor is an off-line tool that supports a
specialist in the development of scripts. Editor and controller can run
on different machines than those with the game engine, the PRESTO
Script Engine and the rest of PRESTO, enabling distributed develop-
ment and remote game control. The scripting language permits the
description of a possible story as a graph of scenes where goals are
delegated to agents and commands are submitted to the virtual reality
engine; a walk in the graph identifies the unfolding of a story, which
happens according to the situations occurring in the game (Sec. 2)
as well as interactive choices and timers, independently of the execu-
tion and outcomes of the commands and goals delegated at each step.
Thus, the engine acts as the director of a choreography performed by
entities in the game (which includes the human player acting within
the environment) rather than a mere executor of a workflow; further,
by means of the controller UI, it allows a supervisor (e.g. a trainer)
to run an arbitrary number of scripts concurrently, to terminate any
of them at any time and, if supported by the underlying graphical
engine, to restore the state of the virtual environment as it was at
predefined points of the scripts. The ability of choosing scripts, se-
lecting alternative paths and returning to previous states gives full
control on training sessions and enables the interactive exploration
of alternative stories within a single virtual environment.8
8 One of the videos at http://lab.deltainformatica.eu/Video illustrates a full
example of script editing and execution (Dec. 2016).
4.1 Overview of the language
Technically, PRESTO Script is a simple event-driven language for
submitting goals to NPCs, asserting situations or changing properties
of game entities according to progresses in the game or choices of a
director (typically an instructor). Its syntax is XML-based (similarly
to the DICE Part language). A script contains a set of prerequisites
and a directed graph of scenes connected by events; the graph admits
arbitrary connections, including cycles.
The prerequisite section has the double purpose of (i) checking
that the virtual environment contains the objects (entities and loca-
tions) expected by the script and (ii) binding these objects to sym-
bols usable from scenes. Similarly to situation language (Sec. 2), a
symbol contains the criteria to be matched against objects (name,
classification, agent role and agent type as well as position relative to
the items bound to other symbols); further, it can impose cardinality
constraints (none, one, n, at least or no more than n) and a boolean
expression on the qualities of the bound entities At run-time, a fail-
ure in binding a symbol (i.e. in finding the required number of entities
matching its criteria and satisfying its expression) implies that a pre-
requisite is not satisfied, so the engine will report an error and will
not run the script. This version of the language does not support user
defined variables other than symbols.
Scenes, i.e. the nodes of a script’s graph, can be of different types.
There are two command-executing scene types. The first is called
“plain” and contains one or more commands to be applied when the
node is reached. A command can be a property change (which is
assumed to happen instantaneously), a goal delegated to an agent
(without waiting for the latter to process it), the creation or removal
of entities, the assertion of the truth value of situations. The symbols
declared in the prerequisite section are used to specify the perform-
ers and parameters of commands. The second command-executing
scene type, called “subscript”, invokes another script. Parameters can
be passed; their names correspond to the subscript’s symbols, whose
matching criteria and constraints are used to check the values passed
as input rather than to search objects in the virtual environment. Sub-
scripts can be invoked synchronously, i.e. as if they conceptually ex-
panded the calling graph, or asynchronously, i.e. to run concurrently
with the caller. A script execution terminates when reaching a scene
of type “success” or “fail”; when reached within a synchronous sub-
script, these nodes generate an event to be handled by the caller to
continue its own execution.
Events label the edges between scenes. They include the expira-
tion of timers, the conclusion of goals submitted by the originating
nodes, the truth value of situations (true or false), and user choices.
At run-time, the engine examines each edge outgoing from a node
that has just been processed and registers appropriate event-catching
listeners. In the case of situations, the situation engine is invoked to
query their current truth values and, if they do not match what is re-
quired by the events, to subscribe to change notifications. Choices
are delegated to the controller UI, which will show their destination
scenes to the user and will notify the engine when one is selected.
The way multiple edges originating from a node are treated at
run-time when one of their events occur depend on the node’s type.
Those from a command-executing scene (plain and subscript, dis-
cussed above) are considered as the start of alternative branches of
a story (similarly to Finite State Machines). This means that, at run-
time, a walk in the graph will follow the edge whose event is captured
first by the engine, discarding all other paths; if the latter include a
choice edge, the controller UI is notified to remove its destination
among those allowed.
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Parallel walks are supported by “fork” scenes. Forks do not sub-
mit commands; simply, they visually represent a point from where
concurrent paths start. At run-time, all edges from a fork will be fol-
lowed in the order their respective events occur; this means that all
their destination nodes will eventually be processed, possibly at very
different times. The opposite of a fork is a “join” scene, of which
there are two specializations. Also this type of scene does not sub-
mit commands; it is considered ready for processing when reached
by any of its incoming edges (“join-any”) or by all of them, possibly
at very different times (“join-all”). Processing consists of blocking
walks on all still active paths (if any) that started from the fork spec-
ified in the join itself. The edges outgoing from a join are treated as
alternatives, as in command-executing scenes. Observe that a paral-
lel walk started by a fork and closed by a join-any can be used to
implement activities such as parallel searches to be stopped as soon
as a result is found, while a fork closed by a join-all is appropriate
e.g. for the distribution of equally important tasks among members
of a team and the synchronization on their conclusion.
As an example, the left side of Figure 1 shows a snapshot of the
graph view of an example of PRESTO Script as shown by the script
editor. A fork node (yellow square, fork symbol downward) is the
starting point of three parallel paths: the rightmost one starts a sub-
script “firefighter control” when the situation “started fire” becomes
true, the central one starts the subscript “fire control” immediately
(0-seconds timeout), the leftmost one is followed if and when the
director decides to do so, in which case a goal (not visible from
the diagram) is given to an NPC by the orange scene. The join-all
point (green square, fork symbol upward) allows further progress
only when all its incoming paths have been traversed; as an alter-
native option, not shown here, a join-any would be satisfied by the
first path traversed, causing the others to be immediately abandoned.
It is worth highlighting that symbols and sub-scripting within the
language, in addition to the PRESTO abstractions represented by
roles and qualities, enable the development of scripts that can be
reused multiple times and in different environments. Script-asserted
situations can be used to coordinate scripts running in parallel, in ad-
dition to abstract them from the specificity of the environment and
game state.
Scenes can be marked as “checkpoints”. When a checkpoint scene
is reached, if supported by the virtual environment, the engine takes
a snapshot of the state of the world (including goals being performed
by the agents) and the controller UI is notified, allowing the user to
ask to restore the state of the environment and of the running scripts
at a later time.
4.2 Language Semantics
A preliminary formal semantics for PRESTO Script is described
in [11]. Importantly, scripts should not be analyzed in isolation but
– since they can be arranged in hierarchies of scripts and subscripts
and coordinated via shared situations – as a set of cooperating proce-
dures.
Operationally, the algorithm at the core of the script engine main-
tains a queue of incoming events and the list of instances of edges
from all currently active scripts waiting for events to occur and ma-
nipulates the tuple space of situations (maintained by the situation
engine described in Sec. 2). Note that the same script may be running
in more than one instance simultaneously, e.g. as subscript invoked
by two other scripts; script instances may have different bindings of
their symbols, and their edges are differentiated accordingly.
The following is a simplified outline of the algorithm. Initializa-
tion (not shown) happens when the first script is started, e.g. inter-
actively (see the discussion on implementation later). When a script
is started, the engine binds its symbols and immediately processes
its root node, thus adding its outgoing edges to waitingEdges. The
algorithm is an infinite loop that takes an event out of the input even-
tQueue, takes the matching edges out of the waiting set as well
as their alternatives in case they have been queued by a command-
executing scene or a join node, and processes the destination nodes of
the matching edges. Processing (not shown) may queue new edges as
well as changing situations, giving commands or starting subscripts
as discussed above. Observe that this algorithm allows to easily cap-
ture (“checkpoint”) and restore the state of the script engine before
processing the event queue.
1: var waitingEdges = set of edges;
2: var eventQueue = FIFO list of events;
3: while true do
4: wait UNTIL eventQueue NOT empty
5: for all evt IN eventQueue do
6: for all edge IN edgeList MATCHING evt do
7: remove edge FROM waitingEdges
8: remove alternatives FROM waitingEdges
9: process edge’s destination node
10: end for
11: remove evt FROM eventQueue
12: end for
13: end while
4.3 Implementation: editor, engine, controllers
The PRESTO Script editor, developed for Windows, is a GUI that
supports the editing of scripts as well as of situation templates and
includes browsers on PRESTO’s metadata, including the ontology in
use by the destination game for classification and qualities, the avail-
able agent roles and agent types of the NPCs, and so on. The editor
integrates a cross-referencing facility that shows how scripts invoke
each other, which situations they share, and other details useful for
analyzing dependencies.
The PRESTO Script Engine implements the logic described above
and offers APIs that can be called from anywhere to start scripts; this
may include a player’s UI or an agent, if desired. Further, it offers
a network protocol that allows to start and terminate scripts, to be
notified of the scenes that have been processed and of those that are
waiting to be processed as soon as an appropriate event occurs, to
know which choices are currently available and to select one, to be
notified of available checkpoints and to restore state to one of them.
The network interface is used by two kind of controller programs,
which can run on different devices from where the virtual environ-
ment is executing. Both controllers allow to start any number of
scripts at any time and to decide which path to follow when a run-
ning script allows a choice, as well as checking the current state of
the engine and restore it to a past checkpoint scene. The right side
of Figure 1 is a snapshot of the Windows-based controller GUI for
the end-user, designed to be easily used by a trainer. The snapshot
has been taken just after traversing the fork point of the graph on the
left: the Timeline box (bottom left) shows the scenes crossed so far,
those marked as checkpoints contains a button that can be clicked to
return back to that scene; the Automatic Scenes box (top right) shows
which scenes will be crossed next as soon as specific events happen
or timers expire; the Activable Scenes (top left) are waiting for the
director to decide whether to reach them by clicking on the appro-
priate button. The information box (bottom right) shows information
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Figure 1. Example of script for EMT training (left) and snapshot of the controller (right)
about a scene selected from the other boxes.
The second controller is meant for command-line use. It was de-
signed mainly to automate the invocation of scripts, which is useful
e.g. to execute test suites and to run PRESTO as an unsupervised se-
rious game or even as a simulation without players when scripts do
not contain interactive choices.
5 Comparisons
A full usability study would be required to check if PRESTO Script
achieved its goal of being an environment for end-user develop-
ment, namely for instructional designers building serious games to
achieve specific training objectives. Some feedback was collected
during a laboratory with some 30 Computer Science students, part
of the Agent Oriented Software Engineering course at the University
of Trento in 2016. Students were given a Unity 3D-based simula-
tion game, controlled by PRESTO, and had to develop their own sto-
ries by means of PRESTO Script. While this laboratory experience,
which involved a captive and technically well versed audience, was
extremely useful to improve the language, it was not set up to be a
proper study. At the moment, PRESTO Script is used only by Delta
Informatica and its partners for course development and there is no
opportunity for a large scale study. Missing that, to provide a proper
perspective we briefly mention here a few languages and systems
that have been of inspiration for PRESTO Script, then we pinpoint
its unique features.
Commercial, built-in game languages. Unreal Engine
Blueprints,9 for the Unreal Engine, is based on graphs and
supports events, variables, if switches, loops, and behavioral trees.
Custom events with common type parameters can be defined, but
they must be triggered from code and are not automatically detected.
Of course, there is no layer of abstraction above the underlying
engine, nor ontological classifications.
CryENGINE’s Flow Graph10 is also based on graphs but events are
simple signals without parameters. It is XML-based and interpreted,
differently from all other languages in this category that need to be
compiled to be used within a game.
9 https://docs.unrealengine.com/latest/INT/Engine/Blueprints/; this URL and
all the following ones have been checked during December 2016
10 http://docs.cryengine.com/display/CEMANUAL/Flow+Graph
Unity uScript11 and Unity PlayMaker12 are two products for Unity
3D. The first is graph based (with events, if switches and variables);
paths can be followed in parallel. The second adopts FSMs; parallels
actions can be executed only within a single state.
Blender is a well known 3D modeling environment that supports
scripting functionalities by means of BlenderLogic.13 This is a game
logic tool based on graphs with three types of nodes: actuators (to
perform action in the VR), sensors (event listeners), and controllers
(to evaluate logical expressions).
Visual programming for education. Two well known examples
are Microsoft’s Kodu14 and MIT’s Scratch.15 They offer all classic
imperative languages constructs, such as loops and if switches, and
variables (in Scratch only). Declarative event-action rules allow to
launch scripts, also in parallel, when prerequisites are verified. The
focus of these languages is on simplifying the interaction and maxi-
mizing the enjoyment of programming for non-technical users rather
than maximizing efficiency and flexibility.
Game research. DSVL [10] allows the fast development of elec-
tronic adventure text games. An adventure is described as a FSM,
able to execute parallel actions e.g. to show messages on the screen.
Sketch’ndo [13] is a framework based on the Blender Game En-
gine for the creation of task-based serious games, with a player-
centered story. A narrative editor allows a domain expert to write
tasks as trees of sequential and parallel action blocks. The language
supports also pre-conditions and consequent actions, represented as
FSMs.
CANVAS [9] empowers non-trained authors to create their own
animated stories, without having to write all single details. Each story
consists in a sequence of blocks, where each block can contain a
set of actions that run in parallel. Pre-conditions and post-conditions
can be specified, allowing partial stories that can be completed by an
automatic planner.
Simulation. Simulink Stateflow,16 based on MathWorks, is a
scripting language that can generate C code, starting from the def-
inition of a hierarchical FSM.
11 http://www.uscript.net/home/
12 http://www.hutonggames.com/
13 https://www.blender.org/manual/game engine/logic/introduction.html
14 http://www.kodugamelab.com/
15 https://scratch.mit.edu/
16 https://it.mathworks.com/products/stateflow/
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LabView,17 by National Instruments, supports data flow charts to
describe logical circuits where a source signal flows through wires
and blocks to reach an output.
General purpose. A number of workflow languages, with visual
and textual syntax, represent procedures involving multiple actors,
even if only a few are executable. The closest to PRESTO Script’s
approach is BPEL,18 an XML-based Web Service orchestration lan-
guage standardized by OASIS.
Discussion. For lack of space, unfortunately it is not possible to
provide a detailed comparison with the languages and environments
mentioned above nor a full discussion. Here, we highlight some of
the specificities of PRESTO Script that stand out:
• PRESTO Script is not a visual language, even if its editor adopts
a graphical representation of the graph of scenes. The prerequi-
site section and many details of scenes are edited via plain forms.
While this approach may seems incomplete in terms of usability,
having a XML syntax opens the way to alternative editors, plan-
ners and other code generation techniques;
• PRESTO Script is fully interpreted. Scripts can be edited while the
game is running. The engine always loads the latest version from
the file system whenever a script is invoked. Note that this may
enable the introduction of script generators that act on-the-fly;
• game evolution is determined by the interplay of multiple scripts,
especially as asynchronous subscripts. The language semantics
enables the analysis of sets of scripts, as well as checkpointing
and restoring the state of all running scripts at specific times;
• the language supports a specific user role, a game master (typi-
cally, a trainer), allowing him to control the script execution;
• scripting is game- and model- independent, thanks to the use of
semantically rich meta-data (i.e., agent roles and types, ontologi-
cally defined qualities and classifications of entities and locations,
situations) to access the underlying engine. To put it in another
way, any game-specific capability is automatically supported by
PRESTO Script as long as it is captured by meta-data;
• among the event types supported in PRESTO Script, two of them
concern situations, which can be defined with a powerful language
that supports parameters and quantifiers;
• PRESTO Script is suitable to represent coordination among NPCs,
while individual behaviors are delegated to the latter’s own mod-
els. PRESTO supports any NPC modeling technique as long as it
has an appropriate meta-data representation. If DICE is used, then
the developer can access to two other interpreted languages for
NPC-specific modeling (see Sec. 3);
• scenes do not have a duration, so by definition they are not inter-
ruptible. An important consequence is that goals given to NPCs
by a scene are not affected when an event causes the next scene to
run. Thus, evolution of a story requiring changes of behavior must
either be managed by the script itself or by NPC models. Con-
cerning the latter, worth noting is that DICE supports two-level
decision-making intentions (reactive and planned) whose goals
can be changed instantly, so context-sensitive adaptable behaviors
can easily be developed.
A few future research directions for PRESTO Script clearly emerge:
• improving and completing its graphical representation, including
full integration with DICE Parts;
• supporting the interaction between scripts and players / trainees,
in addition to the trainer;
17 http://www.ni.com/labview/
18 http://docs.oasis-open.org/wsbpel/2.0/OS/wsbpel-v2.0-OS.html
• supporting situations representing the players’ state, e.g. reflecting
their current performance or emotional state.
6 Conclusion
PRESTO covered a lot of ground in the area between training con-
ception and serious game development. PRESTO Script is an envi-
ronment that includes a language, a visual editor, an engine and an
interactive controller that have been conceived for instructional de-
signers and trainers. Some of its characteristics make it unique in the
current landscape of scripting languages. Further research is required
both to verify its usability outside the current captive user base and
to extend it, especially to take in account the player’s state.
References
[1] Michael E. Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Harvard
University Press, November 1987.
[2] P Busetta, M Fruet, P Consolati, M Dragoni, and C Ghidini, ‘De-
veloping an ontology for autonomous entities in a virtual reality:
the PRESTO experience’, in Proceedings of MESAS 2015 workshop,
Prague (CZ), (2015). Springer LNCS.
[3] P Busetta, C Ghidini, M Pedrotti, AD Angeli, and Z Menestrina, ‘Brief-
ing virtual actors: a first report on the presto project’, in Proceedings of
the AI and Games Symposium at AISB, London, (2014).
[4] Paolo Busetta, Nicholas Howden, Ralph Ro¨nnquist, and Andrew Hodg-
son, ‘Structuring BDI Agents In Functional Clusters’, in Proceedings of
the Workshop on Agent Theories Architectures and Languages (ATAL-
99), volume 1757 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, Orlando,
Florida, (15-17th July 1999). Springer Verlag.
[5] Paolo Calanca and Paolo Busetta, ‘Cognitive Navigation in PRESTO’,
in AI&Games workshop @ AISB 2015, Canterbury (UK), (2015).
[6] Daniel D. Corkill, ‘Blackboard systems’, (1991).
[7] M Dragoni, C Ghidini, P Busetta, M Fruet, and M Pedrotti, ‘Using
Ontologies For Modeling Virtual Reality Scenarios’, in Proceedings of
ESWC 2015. Springer, (2015).
[8] Rick Evertsz, Frank E. Ritter, Paolo Busetta, Matteo Pedrotti, and Jen-
nifer L. Bittner, ‘CoJACK – Achieving Principled Behaviour Variation
in a Moderated Cognitive Architecture’, in Proceedings of the 17th con-
ference on behavior representation in modeling and simulation, pp. 80–
89, (2008).
[9] Mubbasir Kapadia, Seth Frey, Alexander Shoulson, Robert W. Sum-
ner, and Markus Gross, ‘Canvas: Computer-assisted narrative animation
synthesis’, in Proceedings of the ACM SIGGRAPH/Eurographics Sym-
posium on Computer Animation, SCA ’16, pp. 199–209, Aire-la-Ville,
Switzerland, Switzerland, (2016). Eurographics Association.
[10] Eugenio J. Marchiori, A´ngel del Blanco, Javier Torrente, Iva´n
Martinez-Ortiz, and Baltasar Ferna´ndez-Manjo´n, ‘A visual language
for the creation of narrative educational games’, Journal of Visual Lan-
guages & Computing, 22(6), 443 – 452, (2011).
[11] Paolo Busetta Marco Robol, Paolo Calanca, ‘Applying bdi to serious
games: The presto experience’, Technical Report DISI-16-011, Univer-
sity of Trento, http://hdl.handle.net/11572/154697, (2016).
[12] Z Menestrina, A De Angeli, A De Angeli, and P Busetta, ‘APE: End
User Development for Emergency Management Training’, 6th Interna-
tional Conference on Games and Virtual Worlds for Serious Applica-
tions VS-GAMES 2014, (2014).
[13] Sergio Moya, Dani Tost, Sergi Grau, Ariel von Barnekow, and Eloy
Felix, ‘Sketch’ndo: A framework for the creation of task-based seri-
ous games’, Journal of Visual Languages & Computing, 34–35, 1 – 10,
(2016).
[14] AS Rao and MP Georgeff, ‘BDI agents: From theory to practice.’,
in Proceedings of the 1st international conference on multi-agents-
systems (ICMAS), pp. 312–319, Menlo (CA), (1995). AAAI Press.
[15] FE Ritter, JL Bittner, SE Kase, and R Evertsz, ‘CoJACK: A high-level
cognitive architecture with demonstrations of moderators, variability,
and implications for situation awareness’, Biologically Inspired Cogni-
tive Architectures, 1, 2–13, (2012).
[16] Marco Robol, Paolo Giorgini, and Paolo Busetta, ‘Applying social
norms to implicit negotiation among Non-Player Characters in serious
games’, in Proceedings of WOA 2016, Catania, (2016).
SYMPOSIUM IX. AISB SYMPOSIUM ON AI & GAMES 331
Co
nfe
re
nc
e
ed
itio
n
Comparing question asking strategies for Cluedo
John Kingston1 
Abstract  1The game of Cluedo – also known as Clue – requires 
working out a ‘murder’ scene by elimination. Beginners 
typically rely only on cards in their hand and cards they have 
seen; experts also use propositional logic about cards they have 
not seen, based on questions asked and answers given.  
A game-playing program has been written to test the value of 
using deductions to guide question-asking. This paper describes 
how the program has been designed and presents results for five 
strategies (including a ‘no intelligence’ strategy) for three player 
games and six player games. The program has been written using 
JESS (the Java Expert System Shell).  
The results were not quite as expected. Using propositional logic 
did indeed allow the game to be solved in fewer turns, but there 
were times when adding extra information to the logical 
deductions made things worse, not better. There is also a strong 
effect from the mechanics of the game – specifically, which 
room is chosen as the ‘guilty’ location – on the number of turns 
required to solve the problem.  
It is suggested that strategies might benefit from occasionally 
breaking away from their highly focussed approach to inject 
variety into the questioning 
The test cases used are listed in an appendix. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Winning a game of Cluedo – r ‘Clue’ as it is known in North 
America – relies on propositional logic. Each player holds some 
of the twenty-one game cards; in each turn they are allowed to 
ask for three named cards, and will be shown one of these cards 
by the next player – or, if the next player has none of the three, 
by the player after next, and so on. The task is to work out which 
three cards were put aside at the start of the game and so are not 
held by any player. 
Beginners typically use exhaustive elimination: they keep 
playing until they have seen (or possess) eighteen of the twenty-
one cards that represent possible suspects, murder weapons, or 
murder locations. Experienced players will also reason about 
cards they have not seen based on information gathered from 
questions asked by others. 
A game-playing program has been written to test the value of 
using deductions to guide question-asking. The research 
hypothesis is that questioning guided by deductions will lead to a 
solution more quickly than exhaustive elimination; the research 
question is whether some strategies based on deduced 
information are more powerful than others in reaching solutions 
quickly. Three strategies are tested which focus on: 
1. Confirming possible deductions;  
2. Reducing opponents’ options; or  
3. Shrinking the search space.  
                                                 
1 School of Computing, Engineering and Mathematics, Univ. of 
Brighton, BN2 4GJ, UK. Email: j.k.kingston@brighton.ac.uk. 
This paper describes how the program has been designed and 
presents results for five strategies (including a ‘no intelligence’ 
strategy) for three player games and six player games. The 
program is based on the ‘Speed Clue’ variant [2] in which 
movement between rooms is eliminated – players may enquire 
about any room at any stage of the game. 
The program has been written using JESS (the Java Expert 
System Shell) [1]. Expert system shells are among the earliest AI 
programming tools and offer a wide variety of programming 
approaches, especially if the shell offers and combines rule-
based and object-oriented programming, as JESS does. 
 
2 STRATEGIES 
The game of Cluedo is played with six ‘suspects’, six ‘weapons’ 
and nine ‘rooms’. These are recorded on twenty-one cards. At 
the beginning of the game, one card from each of the three 
categories is set aside: these represent the murderer, the weapon 
used and the location of the murder. The remaining cards are 
dealt out to the players, in equal numbers as far as possible. 
On each turn a player can ask the next player if s/he holds any 
one suspect, any one weapon or any one room card. If that player 
holds one or more of those cards, s/he must show one of those 
cards to the first player. If s/he holds none of those cards, they 
must declare this, and the following player must answer or pass 
instead.  
Players are given a sheet to record their findings. The sheet 
merely lists the twenty-one cards with a space next to each; it 
therefore implicitly encourages the belief that all that needs to be 
recorded is simple information such as whether a card is held by 
a player, and perhaps who holds it. 
The players’ goal is to work out which are the ‘murder’ cards 
either by exhaustive elimination or by asking for a card which 
they do not have in their hand and discovering that no-one else 
possesses it either. The minimum number of turns in which the 
game can be completed is therefore one turn if someone asks for 
all three murder cards in their first turn. The probability of such a 
guess varies between 0.5% and 1% depending on the number of 
players. 
Expert players make use of various sources of information apart 
from the cards that they are shown on their turn. Such sources 
include logical information such as: 
• Possible cards. If player X asks player Y whether s/he has 
cards A, B or C and player Y shows a card to player X, then 
every player can deduce that player Y holds at least one of 
A, B and C. 
• Absent cards. If player X asks player Y for cards D, E and F 
and player Y passes, then player Y does not have cards D, E 
or F. 
• Full hand known. If player X has seen or deduced every 
card in player Y’s hand, then player X knows that player Y 
does not have any of the remaining cards. 
It is also possible to use ‘human’ information such as: 
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• Assuming that a beginner will always ask for three cards 
that are not in his hand. 
• Assuming that a  player who asked for cards A, B and C on 
turn 1 and D, B and C on turn 2 was shown card A on turn 
1. 
Finally, expert players will often manage the information that 
they share: 
• If they receive a request for which they have two or more 
cards, they will prefer to show a card they have already 
shown to someone else 
• If they receive a request for which they have two or more 
cards, they will prefer to show a suspect or a weapon 
because rooms are the hardest to deduce. 
The system described in this paper uses only the ‘logical’ 
information listed above. It offers five different strategies: 
1. No intelligence: Choose cards to ask for at random, 
excluding only cards in the player’s hand and cards already 
seen. (In practice, the order is not random; it depends on the 
order in which the list of cards is uploaded into the system. 
This allows the creation of a diverse set of test deals which 
use cards from the beginning, middle or end of each of the 
three lists).  
2. Deduction only. The system records each player’s 
knowledge of ‘possible’ cards held by other players, and 
also of cards that other players do not hold. If there is a set 
of three ‘possible’ cards and a player knows that two of 
them belong to somebody else, or are on the ‘not held’ list, 
for a player, it can deduce that a player must hold the third 
of those three cards. Its question asking strategy is not to 
ask for cards in hand, cards seen, or cards deduced. 
3. Next–possible: If a ‘possible cards’ list is available for the 
next player, choose one of those (excluding cards in hand, 
cards seen, cards not held and cards deduced) along with 
two other cards to ask about. Preference is given to asking 
about the room. The goal of this strategy is to confirm the 
cards held by the next player. 
4. Previous–possible: If a ‘possible cards’ list is available for 
the previous player, choose one of those (excluding cards in 
hand, cards seen, cards not held and cards deduced) along 
with two other cards. Preference is given to asking about 
the room. The goal of this strategy is to reduce the options 
for opponents to hide cards; since all but one are likely not 
to have the ‘possible card’, they will find it more difficult to 
conceal either of the other two requested cards. 
5. Next–not–held. If some cards are known to be absent from 
the next player’s hand, ask about one or two of these (with 
the same exclusions as for strategies 2-4). The preferred 
strategy is to choose two cards not held by the next player, 
along with one card not held by the player after next; failing 
that, the system chooses two cards not held by the next 
player and one other; failing that, it chooses one card not 
held by the next player and two others. The goal is to search 
for a possible solution by finding cards that no other players 
hold; asking about cards that some players are known not to 
hold shrinks the search space.  
 
For strategies 2-5, if there are no cards that fit into the 
strategy’s rules, the fallback is to use the ‘no intelligence’ 
strategy. 
3 RESULTS 
The strategies were run on six different test ‘deals’ between 
three players and the same ‘deals’ split in half for six players. 
Every player used the same strategy in any one game. The full 
‘test deals’ (for 3 player games) are listed in Appendix 1 in case 
anyone wants to repeat the experiments described in this paper. 
Then, for completeness, a generator was used to run the 
strategies on every possible deal (or to be precise, on every 
possible combination of ‘guilty’ cards, swapping cards in and 
out of existing hands as needed). 
The test deals were designed to vary the position in the list of 
cards of the ‘murder’ cards. The ‘murder cards’ for the six deals 
were: 
1. Professor Plum, Lead Pipe, Hall. Plum is the 6th and final 
person in the list of suspects; Lead Pipe is listed fourth in 
the list of six weapons; Hall is listed as the first of the nine 
rooms. This will be represented as [6, 4, 1]. 
2. Professor Plum, Spanner, Kitchen [6, 6, 9] 
3. Mrs White, Rope, Ballroom [3, 3, 5] 
4. Miss Scarlett, Rope, Kitchen [1, 3, 9] 
5. Mrs Peacock, Spanner, Dining Room [2, 6, 2] 
6. Miss Scarlett, Revolver, Hall [1, 1, 1] 
Because JESS tends to work sequentially down a list when 
pattern matching, the following predictions can be made: 
• Deal 2 will take the longest to solve 
• Deal 6 should be solvable in 1 turn 
• The other four deals should take approximately the same 
time to solve, with deal 5 perhaps marginally the fastest and 
deal 4 marginally the slowest. 
Predictions can also be made about the strategies: 
• Since the intelligent’ strategies fall back to the No-
Intelligence strategy when they have no legal move, it is 
very unlikely they will do any worse than the No-
Intelligence strategy 
• The Deduction strategy should perform the least well of the 
four ‘intelligent’ strategies since it uses the least 
information. 
• The other strategies should have a bigger advantage over 
the first two strategies in longer games, since more and 
more information becomes available as games go on. 
The total number of rounds required to find a solution is shown 
in Table 1, excluding Deal 6 which was always solved in 1 turn 
as predicted.  
 
 Deal 
1 
Deal 
2 
Deal 
3 
Deal 
4 
Deal 
5 
All 
3 players:       
No intelligence 6 12 6 7 4 6.88 
Deductions 6 12 6 7 4 6.07 
Next-possible 6 13 5 11 3 6.55 
Previous-
possible 
3 11 5 7 4 5.80 
Next-not-held 5 13 4 6 4 5.25 
6 players:       
No intelligence 7 16 7 9 5 8.33 
Deduction 7 16 7 9 5 8.27 
Next-possible 6 4 9 10 4 6.62 
Previous-
possible 
10 6 8 13 6 8.35 
Next-not-held 3 8 5 8 5 6.69 
 
Table 1. Number of turns for any player to reach a solution 
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The results are not exactly as predicted. Some comments 
regarding the predictions: 
• Deal 2 took the longest to solve for the less intelligent 
strategies, partially fulfilling the prediction. 
• Deal 5 was the fastest to solve of the other deals and deal 4 
the slowest, but the differences cannot be described as 
marginal.  
Regarding the strategies: 
• The deduction strategy performed hardly any better than the 
no-intelligence strategy. This was despite the fact that an 
average of 15 deductions per player had been made by the 
end of Deal 2 in the 6 player game. 
• The Next-Not-Held strategy seems to be the best strategy 
overall, and the most consistent of the intelligent strategies. 
• The two strategies that focus on possible cards that other 
players might hold showed very variable performance, 
sometimes being the best strategy by far, and on other 
occasions performing worse than the no-intelligence 
strategy. Next-Possible seems to be the better of the two. 
It appears that focussing on cards that other players may hold is 
a lottery; sometimes it leads to excellent performance, at other 
times it leads a player to waste turns on a red herring. It may 
well depend on whether the random choice picks a card that the 
next player actually holds; choosing one the player does not hold 
seems to lead to better performance. Consider the following 
trace for deal 5, 6 players, Next-Possible strategy: 
 
Figure 1: 6-D5-NP trace, part1 
 
By the time player6’s turn comes up, he knows that player 1 has 
one of Miss Scarlett, the Dagger or the Hall; and one of Colonel 
Mustard, the Spanner or the Study. Two of these six cards are 
actually ‘murder cards’ (in this deal, Mrs Peacock did it with the 
spanner in the dining room) but player6 decides to focus on 
Colonel Mustard, and is ‘rewarded’ by having player1 show him 
that card. 
The same thing happened on the second round – player6 
focussed on Miss Scarlett and was shown that card by player1. 
By the third round of the same game (Figure 2), with no further 
‘possible’ information available, player6 has switched to 
focussing on the Spanner, but his query is answered by player4 
who has the Hall. On the fourth turn, player6 focusses on the 
Dining Room and adds it to his previously unanswered Person 
and Weapon queries, and arrives at the right answer. 
Some interim conclusions that can be drawn are: 
• Using propositional logic about present and absent cards to 
guide questioning does improve performance. 
• Deducing the correct room is the hardest task, so it is a 
good idea to focus questions on finding the room. 
• Asking for cards that are known to be absent from the next 
player’s hand (focussing on a possible solution) is usually a 
better approach than asking for cards that might be in that 
hand (focussing on information collection). 
• There are times when logical deduction makes performance 
worse than using no intelligence at all. 
 
 
Figure 2: 6-D5-NP trace, part2 
4 RELATED WORK 
There have been more than one Clue/Cluedo competition where 
human players write their own artificially intelligent agent that 
competes against other agents. Hansen et al. [3] developed the 
Glomus server to help teach undergraduates Prolog; [4] ran a 
competition that simulated over 25,000 games between different 
agents. However, neither of these references say much about the 
strategies used, although [3] describes how smarter students used 
‘human’ information about the less intelligent agents written by 
their fellow students! 
There is also a Cluedo agent written in Prolog freely 
downloadable from GitHub [5]. However, the only ‘intelligence’ 
it has is in deducing what cards other players hold; it does not 
appear to have any question-asking strategies.  
A free software Cluedo game written in C# can be downloaded 
from [6]. It attempts to simulate the board game closely but its 
note-taking pad is different; it allows marking of players who are 
known to have cards, and of players who are known not to have 
cards. There is no method provided for marking possible cards 
that a player may hold, nor for recording other information such 
as which AI players have been shown which cards from the 
human’s hand.  
5 FUTURE WORK 
 
There are multiple possible avenues for future work: 
• Create a strategy that combines reasoning about ‘possible’ 
cards and ‘not held’ cards. 
• Test the strategies against each other (have different players 
use different strategies in a single game). 
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• Extend the ‘intelligent’ strategies to deal with information 
about all other players, not just the next or previous player. 
• Add probabilistic inference. If a player is asked for cards 
P1, W1 and R1 and shows a card, then is later asked for P2, 
W1 and R2 and shows a card again, it seems intuitive to 
assume that there is a higher probability that the player has 
W1 than any of the other pairs of cards. How much higher? 
If the player is asked for W1 a third time, how does that 
affect the probability? 
• Introduce deductions based on ‘human’ information. This 
may well be the most powerful extension to the program to 
make it a stronger Cluedo player. The reasons are: 
o Correctly guessing an opponent’s strategy  
provides a significant extra information source; it 
is now possible to reason about why they chose 
the cards they asked about as well as about the 
cards they showed to other players. 
o Any strategy based on probabilistic inference (see 
above) must take opponents’ strategies into 
account, because there are some strategies in 
which an opponent will avoid showing certain 
cards. A statistical approach based on belief and 
uncertainty modelling that does not take such 
strategies information into account is unlikely to 
perform well. 
o It opens the possibility for using Monte Carlo 
simulation to hypothecate various strategies that 
the other players might be following and to 
choose the best questions to ask accordingly. 
• Introduce strategies that include asking for cards that are 
already present in a player’s hand. This is sometimes done 
in the board game for misdirection but may also be done in 
an attempt to confirm whether one unknown card is held by 
any player. 
• Switch from Speed Clue to Cluedo and introduce planning 
algorithms to move from room to room efficiently. 
• Modify those planning algorithms to move other players to 
a player’s current location during a turn (this is part of the 
requesting process in the board game) not for the sake of 
logical deduction but to keep that player away from another 
location. 
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APPENDIX 
This appendix shows the full contents of each deal in the 3-
player version of the game. The 6-player version split each 
player’s holding in half, assigning half of player1’s holding to 
player4 and so on.  
Master lists of cards: 
Suspects: miss-scarlett mrs-peacock mrs-white col-mustard rev-green 
prof-plum 
Weapons: revolver dagger rope lead-pipe candlestick spanner 
Rooms: hall dining-room lounge billiard-room ballroom library study 
conservatory kitchen 
 
Test deals for 3 player game: 
Deal 1: (guilty game1 prof-plum lead-pipe hall)  
(cards game1  player1 miss-scarlett col-mustard rope spanner ballroom 
library) 
(cards game1  player2 mrs-peacock rev-green dining-room lounge study 
revolver) 
(cards game1  player3 mrs-white dagger candlestick billiard-room 
conservatory kitchen) 
 
Deal 2: (guilty game2  prof-plum spanner kitchen) 
(cards game2   player1 miss-scarlett study library rope lead-pipe rev-
green) 
(cards game2  player2 lounge hall  revolver mrs-peacock ballroom 
dining-room) 
(cards game2  player3 col-mustard dagger  billiard-room mrs-white 
conservatory candlestick) 
 
Deal 3: (guilty game3  mrs-white rope ballroom) 
(cards game3  player1 rev-green col-mustard revolver lead-pipe hall 
library) 
(cards game3  player2 mrs-peacock prof-plum dining-room lounge study 
spanner) 
(cards game3  player3 miss-scarlett dagger candlestick billiard-room 
conservatory kitchen) 
 
Deal 4: (guilty game4  miss-scarlett rope kitchen)  
(cards game4  player1 rev-green col-mustard revolver lead-pipe hall 
library) 
(cards game4  player2 mrs-peacock prof-plum dining-room lounge study 
spanner) 
(cards game4  player3 mrs-white dagger candlestick billiard-room 
conservatory ballroom) 
 
Deal 5: (guilty game5  mrs-peacock spanner dining-room)  
(cards game5  player1 miss-scarlett col-mustard rope lead-pipe hall 
library) 
(cards game5  player2 rev-green prof-plum kitchen lounge study 
revolver) 
(cards game5 player3 mrs-white dagger candlestick billiard-room 
conservatory ballroom) 
 
Deal 6: (guilty game6  miss-scarlett revolver hall) 
(cards game6  player1 rev-green col-mustard rope lead-pipe ballroom 
library) 
(cards game6  player2 mrs-peacock prof-plum dining-room lounge study 
spanner) 
(cards game6  player3 mrs-white dagger candlestick billiard-room 
conservatory kitchen) 
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Building Simple Non-identical Organic Structures with
Dispersive Flies Optimisation and A* Path-finding
Michael King 1 and Mohammad Majid Al-Rifaie 2
Abstract. The use of natural based algorithms within films, tele-
vision programs and games is becoming increasingly prominent and
keeping the consumers interested and immersed in the world they are
being exposed to is becoming a pre-requisite. This paper proposes
a new method of generating unique structures based upon a simple
hybrid model through the use of A* Path-finding and a swarm intel-
ligence algorithm, Dispersive Flies Optimisation. Every time a struc-
ture is built, this hybrid method generates a unique form which is
non-identical to structures created in different runs. Within the game
industry, these structures could potentially assist providing users with
unique environments presenting different feels, despite staying loyal
to designers’ overall structure.
1 INTRODUCTION
The use of algorithms which take inspiration from the natural world
grows in popularity[3] as the technology and hardware have up-
graded to such a degree where complex algorithms are now acces-
sibly by many. This results in games becoming more realistic, thus
producing more natural environments which aid in immersing the
user into the world that they are being shown[4]. To build on the
existing techniques, new and innovative algorithms are required to
match the expectations of the user and to ensure that more powerful
hardware is being used to its full potential.
This paper proposes a novel hybrid algorithm to help aid in gen-
erating naturally looking, “organic” structures. The two adapted al-
gorithms used in this work will be described in the next section, fol-
lowed by details in which the hybrid algorithm is tasked to create
the “organic” non-identical structures. The rationale behind using
swarm intelligence techniques in such work lies behind their non-
deterministic behaviour, which mounts to the creation of different
structures with every individual run of the system. The choice of
Dispersive Flies Optimisation (DFO) as one such technique is made
due to the fact that DFO, in addition to its simple and minimalistic
structure [2], does not suffer from having several tunable parameters,
therefore paving the way to focus on other areas of interest. Addi-
tionally the outperformance of DFO in comparison with other well-
known optimiser offers an additional reason to utilise DFO (more
details are provided later in this work). Therefore, the this swarm
intelligence technique is coupled with the well established A* tech-
nique which is adapted for the purpose of this work. To the best of
the author’s knowledge, these two algorithms have not been explored
together before.
1 Corresponding author. Goldsmiths University of London, United Kingdom,
email: mking038@gold.ac.uk
2 Goldsmiths University of London, United Kingdom, email:
m.majid@gold.ac.uk
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, the two algorithms used in this paper – Dispersive
Flies Optimisation and A* path-finding – are briefly explained. The
use of Dispersive Flies Optimisation within a game/film environment
has not been done before due to the relatively new introduction of the
algorithm. Whilst A* Path-finding is a commonly used path-finding
algorithm in various domains including games, however to the best of
the authors’ knowledge, it has not been adapted in the way described
in this paper.
2.1 DISPERSIVE FLIES OPTIMISATION
Dispersive Flies Optimisation [1] (DFO) is population based, global
optimiser which has been introduced in 2014. It takes inspiration
from the observation of flies and their behaviour when swarming
around a food source. In summary, DFO is a simple numerical op-
timiser over continuous search spaces. Despite the algorithm’s sim-
plicity with only two tunable parameters, it is shown that DFO out-
performs the standard versions of the well-known Particle Swarm
Optimisation [8], Genetic Algorithm (GA) [6] as well as Differen-
tial Evolution (DE) algorithms [9] on an extended set of benchmarks
over three performance measures of error, efficiency and reliability.
It is shown that DFO is more efficient in 84.62% and more reliable
in 90% of the 28 standard optimisation benchmarks used; further-
more, when there exists a statistically significant difference, DFO
converges to better solutions in 71.05% of problem set. In addition
to theoretical research on this algorithm, DFO has recently been ap-
plied to medical imaging, the study of aesthetic evaluation of digital
images, as well as its use in philosophical discussion in the area of
computational creativity.
To describe the algorithm, it is important to know that the swarm-
ing behaviour of the flies in DFO consists of two tightly connected
mechanisms, one is the formation of the swarms and the other is its
breaking or weakening. The algorithm and the mathematical formu-
lation of the update equations are introduced below.
The position vectors of the population are defined as:
~xti =
[
xti1, x
t
i2, ..., x
t
iD
]
, i = 1, 2, ...,NP (1)
where t is the current time step, D is the dimension of the problem
space and NP is the number of flies (population size).
In the first generation, when t = 0, the ith vector’s dth component
is initialised as:
x0id = xmin,d + r (xmax,d − xmin,d) (2)
where r is a random number drawn from a uniform distribution on
the unit interval U (0, 1); xmin and xmax are the lower and upper ini-
tialisation bounds of the dth dimension, respectively. Therefore, a
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population of flies are randomly initialised with a position for each
flies in the search space.
On each iteration, the components of the position vectors are in-
dependently updated, taking into account the component’s value,
the corresponding value of the best neighbouring fly (consider ring
topology) with the best fitness, and the value of the best fly in the
whole swarm:
xtid = x
t−1
nbi,d
+ U (0, 1)× (xt−1sb,d − xt−1id ) (3)
where xt−1nbi,d is the value of the neighbour’s best fly of ~xi in the d
th
dimension at time step t−1; xt−1sb,d is the value of the swarm’s best fly
in the dth dimension at time step t − 1; and U (0, 1) is the uniform
distribution between 0 and 1.
The algorithm is characterised by two main components: a dy-
namic rule for updating flies position (assisted by a social neigh-
bouring network that informs this update), and communication of
the results of the best found fly to other flies.
As stated earlier, the swarm is disturbed for various reasons; one
of the positive impacts of such disturbances is the displacement of
the disturbed flies which may lead to discovering a better position.
To consider this eventuality, an element of stochasticity is introduced
to the update process. Based on this, individual components of flies’
position vectors are reset if the random number, r, generated from a
uniform distribution on the unit interval U (0, 1) is less than the dis-
turbance threshold or dt. This guarantees a proportionate disturbance
to the otherwise permanent stagnation over a likely local minima. Al-
gorithm 1 summarises the DFO algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Dispersive Flies Optimisation
1: while Function Evalutions < Evaluations Allowed do
2: for i = 1→ NP do
3: ~xi.fitness← f(~xi)
4: end for
5: sb← {sb, ∀ f(~xsb) = min (f(~x1), f(~x2), ..., f(~xNP))}
6: for i = 1→ NP do
7: nbi ←
{
nbi, ∀ f(~xnbi) = min
(
f(~xlefti), f(~xrighti)
)}
*
8: end for
9: for i = 1→ NP do
10: for d = 1→ D do
11: τd ← xt−1nbi,d + U (0, 1)× (xt−1sb,d − xt−1id )
12: if (r < dt) then
13: τd ← xmin,d + r (xmax,d − xmin,d)
14: end if
15: end for
16: ~xi ← ~τ
17: end for
18: end while
* ~xlefti = ~xi−1 and ~xrighti = ~xi+1
This algorithm allows the agents to search the space they are
within whilst maintaining a natural ascetic.
2.2 A* PATH-FINDING
A* path-finding algorithm, first introduced by Hart in 1968 [7], is a
well known algorithm that is renowned for being quicker than most
other path-finding algorithms when put into a situation in which the
origin and target location are already defined on a graph that is com-
pletely known to the agent [11].
A* Path-finding algorithm, which is an extension of Dijkstra’s
1959 algorithm [5], works by first building a graph of nodes and
weighted edges. The nodes all represent a location within the search
space and the weighted edges connect these nodes together with a
given weight for how much it costs to go from one node to the other.
The agent can then traverse this graph by searching all the nodes that
have an edge to the current node that the agent is located. It scans
through the graph to find the target node and will create the path that
is the shortest (path with the least amount of weight). It scans through
the graph by having a heuristic function which returns a cost value
that is then added to an overall count on how expensive it is to get
to that node. The algorithm then uses a priority queue to keep the
lowest weight path on top which ensures that the amount of time the
algorithm takes to scan a path for the target is reduced, thus saving
precious processing time.
3 ADAPTED A* AND DFO
This section summarises the process through which the two afore-
mentioned algorithms are adapted in order to obtain the functionality
required for the purpose of this work.
Minor changes are introduced to DFO before applying the algo-
rithm to the problem in hand. DFO requires a fitness function which
would allow each individual fly to evaluate the suitability of its cur-
rent position. For this work, the fitness function is the distance from
the food object thus giving a relatively simple but effective fitness
yet ensuring that the problem is kept as a minimisation problem.
The only other modification made is for the search phase in which
the Y co-ordinate was clamped to the diameter of the flies to pre-
vent early building in sub-optimal locations. In other words, the flies
are grounded during the search/convergence phase to avoid multi-
layered structures from being built before the actual building phase
commences. The purpose for this modification is due to the fact
that this system is intended for multiple targets. It should also be
noted that this is all within a 3D environment which is governed by
“physics” so each fly has a ‘body’ which can collide with the world
and other flies (this process is illustrated in the figures provided later
in the paper). The relevance of this modification will be highlighted
further in the next section.
Further changes are applied to A* path-finding algorithm in order
to utilise its capabilities for the work presented. In one such changes,
the nodes are made to be the agents that can also traverse the graph.
The edges connecting the nodes are also set to be dynamic as they
were added and removed dependent on whether the two relevant
agents were touching or not. This allows a dynamic graph of nodes
and edges that agents could refer to when needed. This modification
is crucial if agents are required to climb a structure as they can iden-
tify a path to the other agent i.e. the target agent they want to get to
by accessing the graph. To facilitate this kind of mapping, the cost
between two nodes is increased dependent on how many edges those
nodes have in total, this stops a path being made in the centre of the
structure.
Acknowledging the No Free Lunch Theorem [10], and the fact that
A* algorithm is not suited for all situations, it is decided that the A*
path-finding algorithm is better placed in dealing with the scenario
of this work; this is due to the agents’ global knowledge of the entire
graph whilst also always having a known start and an end goal.
The collaboration between these two algorithms ensures creating
a structure that both touches the ground and leads to the target. As
mentioned before, by first clamping the Y co-ordinate within the
search phase it is ensured that the agents do not attempt to begin
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building in a location that is not the best (this is more relevant when
the swarm has multiple food sources to choose from). This allows
the swarm to then focus on the absolute best base position for the
structure (the best position is determined by storing the swarm’s best
fitness and the relevant position during the search phase). Once the
search phase is over the clamp on the Y co-ordinate is removed. The
swarm then begins to build upwards towards the designated food
source. At regular intervals, A* is then used to create a path from the
best agent to the ground (the best agent is the agent with the lowest
fitness within the swarm which is different to the best position as the
best position is a fixed location that is found from the search phase
where as the best agent is constantly changing during the building
phase). The agents along this path are first given the target of their
current position and then set to “inactive” meaning they would not
be seeking a new target. This ensures that the structure maintains
stability3.
4 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In the experiment reported in this work, one food source (seen as the
yellow sphere in Figs. 2, and 4) in is created and agents are set to get
to. The food source is located at position (0, 5, 0) or 5 units above the
ground. All agents are scattered (initialised) across the search space
randomly. Ring topology is used for this work and the population
size is set to 1,000. The search phase lasts for 5000 frames whilst
evaluation and update happens every 2 seconds.
Figure 1. Forming small communities
Once started, the agents first drop to the floor and begin to move
around to their first target. Over time, it is observed that small com-
munities of agents form in different areas (see Fig. 1). Over time
these communities slowly move towards the optimal location where
the base is highlighted a transparent box as shown in Figs. 2(a,b).
As anticipated, it can be observed that communities which are not on
the optimal location shrink over time and merge with communities
possessing best fitness. Although the agents have clamping on their
target Y co-ordinate they still manage to get on top of a group of other
agents. This is due to the way in which each agent moves around. As
they hit another agent their own velocity launches them upwards, as
they come back down they land on top of a group. When this happens
the agent get dispersed away from the group and is moved away to
search another area. By the end of the search phase there is a large
community surrounding the best position whilst there are small com-
munities/individual agents not connected to this due to the dispersion
aspect of DFO (see Fig. 2(c)).
Following the search phase, the building phase commences. The
agents immediately climb on top of one another and every time the
3 In this work, the algorithms were developed in Unity and written in C Sharp.
Figure 2. Search and convergence phase
(a) Moving towards the base # 1
(b) Moving towards the base # 2
(c) End of the search phase
evaluation and update takes place, they begin to create a mound sur-
rounding the base position. During this time, an A* path find nor-
mally takes place and, with the help of a visual guide, agents are
selected to become the path to the best agent thus creating a struc-
ture.
If the A* algorithm is using the heuristic function which increases
the cost of moving from one agent to another depending on the
amount of agents in question. Then the path is seen being made from
the base of the structure to the outside of the mound and then to the
top of the mound around the outside.
Otherwise it would just create a path to the best agent going rela-
tively straight upwards. After a certain height the very stable mound
stops growing. Following this point, a more unstable structure of
agents jumping around is created. However, this does not stop the
A* from finding a path to the ground from the agent. When a path is
valid it is seen to generally produce an entirely new branch from the
current path. This creates some interesting visual. If the program is
allowed to continually run, it is seen to have a large amount of inac-
tive agents (agents who are in the best path at one point) within the
SYMPOSIUM IX. AISB SYMPOSIUM ON AI & GAMES 338
Co
nfe
re
nc
e
ed
itio
n
Figure 3. Hybrid A*DFO Flowchart
unstable section of the structure whilst the more stable mound sec-
tion has a path of agents that tends to increase in thickness as it gets
closer to the unstable section. Eventually the entire unstable section
becomes inactive.4.
The process through which the hybrid model functions is shown as
a flowchart in Fig. 3, where the two arrows from the ‘Start’ indicate
concurrency.
5 CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this work demonstrates the use of A* Path-finding
and Dispersive Flies Optimisation in generating “organic” structures
which are unique each time the program is run whilst exhibiting a
‘natural’ feel (see the images in Fig. 4). The natural aesthetics of
these structures are shown through the different twists and turns that
the path of inactive agents show, much like how plants such as vines
grow. While there are many nature-inspired techniques which could
be investigated in this work, the simplicity of DFO and its mini-
4 A video of a sample run of the program can be accessed here:
https://youtu.be/FyHFnvGkPRA
Figure 4. Sample unique structures
mal parameter tuning, offered a attractive advantage over other algo-
rithms leading to is deployment for this work. Other features of the
algorithm is currently being investigated in context of the presented
work.
Amongst the topics for future work is the introduction of multiple
food sources in order to cater for the generation of more complex
structure. The use of spring joints to join the inactive agents together
could also vastly improve the stability of the overall structure but
would also increase processing power required.
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Another potential scenario for future use of the proposed method is
when a user draws structures, shapes or designs in a 3D environment
that are fed into the system, which will subsequently “replicate” the
user’s design in a more “organic and natural” way.
In summary, this work shows the viability of the method for gen-
erating unique, “naturally looking” structures. This entails when a
user plays a game or watches a film, the environment they see could
be formed in front of their eyes; this environment could dynamically
change depending on the requirements. Investigating and optimising
the speed of this process is a topic of an ongoing research.
Acknowledging the need to apply further changes to “firm up” the
overall stability of the structures which would allow a wider range
of potential for this method, the presented approach demonstrates its
potential. Further experiments will be conducted to add to the com-
plexity of the structures built while maintaining the simple principles
behind the process of generating the structures.
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A Genetic Programming Framework for 2D Platform AI
Swen E. Gaudl1
Abstract. There currently exists a wide range of techniques to
model and evolve artificial players for games. Existing techniques
range from black box neural networks to entirely hand-designed so-
lutions. In this paper, we demonstrate the feasibility of a genetic pro-
gramming framework using human controller input to derive mean-
ingful artificial players which can, later on, be optimised by hand.
The current state of the art in game character design relies heavily
on human designers to manually create and edit scripts and rules for
game characters. To address this manual editing bottleneck, current
computational intelligence techniques approach the issue with fully
autonomous character generators, replacing most of the design pro-
cess using black box solutions such as neural networks or the like.
Our GP approach to this problem creates character controllers which
can be further authored and developed by a designer it also offers de-
signers to included their play style without the need to use a program-
ming language. This keeps the designer in the loop while reducing
repetitive manual labour. Our system also provides insights into how
players express themselves in games and into deriving appropriate
models for representing those insights. We present our framework,
supporting findings and open challenges.
1 Introduction
The design of intelligent systems is a complex task which in itself
can benefit from the application of AI techniques. Here we present a
system that offers the developer the option to mine human behaviour
and include it into the system to create better Game AI. We detail a
genetic programming (GP) system that generalises from and improve
upon human game play. More importantly, the resulting representa-
tions are amenable to further authoring and development. We discuss
our GP system for evolving game characters by utilising recorded
human play. The system uses the platformerAI toolkit, detailed in
section 3, and the JAVA genetic algorithm and genetic programming
package (JGAP) [7]. JGAP provides a system to evolve computer
programs and their representations as decision tree when given a set
of command genes, a fitness function, a genetic selector and an in-
terface to the target application. Once the system it set up by includ-
ing those components, it generates artificial players by creating and
evolving JAVA program code which is fed into the PLATFORMERAI
toolkit and evaluated using our fitness function which is detailed in
[4].
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we de-
scribe how our system derives from and improves upon the start of
the art. Section 4 describes our system and its core components, in-
cluding details on our the design of fitness functions. We conclude
our work by describing our findings and possible open challenges.
1 MetaMakers Institute, UK, email: swen.gaudl@gmail.com
2 Background & Related Work
In practice, making a good game is achieved by a good concept and
long iterative cycles in refining mechanics and visuals, a process
which is resource consuming. It requires a large number of human
testers to evaluate the qualities of a game. Thus, analysing tester
feedback and incrementally adapting games to achieve better play
experience is tedious and time-consuming. Reducing some part of
the laborious work is where our approach comes into play by trying
to minimise development, manual adaptation and testing time, yet
allow the developer to remain in full control.
Agent Design was initially no more than creating 2D shapes on
the screen, e.g. the aliens in SPACEINVADERS. Due to early hard-
ware limitations, more complex approaches were not feasible. With
more powerful computers it became feasible to integrate more com-
plex approaches such as finite state machines (FSMs). In 2002 Isla
introduced the BEHAVIOURTREE (BT) for the game Halo, later elab-
orated by Champandard [2]. BT uses a directed acyclic graph to rep-
resent the reasoning process within the game logic. It integrates hi-
erarchical structures as well offering the system to scale based on
the requirements but does not have the same disadvantages of FSMs,
namely the exponential amount if transition checks required to verify
the functionality of the FSM. BT has become the dominant approach
in the industry. BTs can be represented as a combination of a decision
tree (DT) using a pre-defined set of node types. A related academic
predecessor of the BT were the POSH dynamic plans of BOD [1, 3].
Generative Approaches build models to create better and more ap-
pealing agents. To achieve their goal, a generative agent uses ma-
chine learning techniques to increase its capabilities by testing and
updating its components. Using data derived from human interaction
with a game—referred to as human play traces—can allow the game
to act on or re-act to input created by the player. By training on such
data, it is possible to derive models able to mimic certain character-
istics of players [5, 8] . One obvious disadvantage of this approach
is that the generated model only learns from the behaviour exhib-
ited in the data provided to it. Thus, interesting behaviours are not
accessible because they were never exhibited by a player.
In contrast to other generative agent approaches [9, 15, 8] our sys-
tem combines features which allow the generation and development
of truly novel agents. Thus, the system presents the first use of un-
authored recorded player input as direct input into our fitness func-
tion. It allows the specification of agents only by playing. The second
feature of the system is that our agents are actual programs in the
form of either JAVA code or decision tree representations which can
be altered and modified after evolving into a desired state, creating
a white box solution. While [13] use neural networks (NN) to create
better agents and enhance games using Neuroevolution, we utilise
genetic programming [10] for the creation and evolution of artificial
players in human readable and modifiable form. The most compa-
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rable approach is that of [9] which use grammar based evolution to
derive BTs given an initial set and structure of subtrees. In contrast,
we start with a clean slate to evolve our agents as directly executable
programs.
3 Setting and Environment
Evolutionary algorithms have the potential to solve problems in vast
search spaces, especially if the problems require multi-parameter op-
timisation [11, p.2]. For those problems, humans are generally out-
performed by programs [12]. Our GP approach uses a pool of pro-
gram chromosomes P and evolves those in the form of decision trees
(DTs) exploring the possible solution space. For our experiments the
PLATFORMERAI toolkit (http://www.platformersai.com)
was used which is entirely written in Java and freely available. It con-
sists of a 2D platformer game, similar to existing commercial prod-
ucts and contains modules for recording a player, controlling agents
and modifying the environment and rules of the game.
The Problem Space is defined by all actions an agent can perform.
Within the game, agent A has to solve the complex task of select-
ing the appropriate action each given frame. The game consists of A
traversing a level which is not fully observable. A level is 256 spatial
units long, and A should traverse it left to right. Each level contains
objects which act in a deterministic way. Some of those objects can
alter the player’s score, e.g. coins. Those bonus objects present a sec-
ondary objective. The goal of the game, move from start to finish, is
augmented with the objective of gaining points. A can get points by
collecting objects or jumping onto enemies. To make it comparable
to the experience of similar commercial products we use a realistic
time frame in which a human would need to solve a level, 200 time
units. The level observability is limited to a 6×6 grid centred around
the player, cf. [9]. The restriction to a smaller grid is only necessary
to reduce the number of generations the system needs to converge
towards good results as the grid size has an exponential affect on the
convergence time.
Figure 1: A visual representation of the PLATFORMERSAI toolkit
with the vision grid around the agent.
Agent Control within the platformersAI toolkit is handled through
a 6-bit vector C: left, right, up, down, jump and shoot|run. The
vector is required each frame, simulating an input device to control
the agent in Figure1. However, some actions span more than one
frame. This is a simple task for a human but quite complex to learn
for an agent. One such example, the high jump, requires the player
to press the jump button for multiple frames. Those long action se-
quences mean that the agent needs to anticipate future events and
actions to trigger actions spanning multiple reasoning cycles. Our
system has genes for each of the elements of C plus 14 additional
genes formed of five gene types: sensory information about the level
or agent, executable actions, logical operators, numbers and struc-
tural genes. All those are combined at execution time into a chromo-
some represented as a DT using the grammar underlying the JAVA
language. Structural genes allow the execution of n genes in a fixed
sequence, reducing the combinatorial freedom provided by JAVA.
Our system uses the JGAP framework, which allows us to add new
genes to enrich the search space and the agent capabilities by writ-
ing self-contained JAVA methods and adding them to the Agent class.
However, adding more genes increases the search space resulting po-
tentially in longer conversion times.
Parameter Value
Initial Population Size 100
Selection Weighted Roulette Wheel
Genetic Operators Branch Typing CrossOver and
Single Point Mutation
Initial Operator probabilities 0.6 crossover, 0.2 new chro-
mosomes, 0.01 mutation, fixed
Survival Elitism
Function Set ifelse, not, &&, ||, sub,
IsCoinAt, IsEnemyAt,
IsBreakAbleAt, . . .
Terminal Set Integers [-6,6], ←, →, ↓,
IsTall, Jump, Shoot,
Run Wait, CanJump,
CanShoot, . . .
Table 1: GP parameters used in our system.
4 Fitness Evaluation
The evaluation is done in our system using the Gamalyzer-based
play trace metric which determines the fitness of individual chro-
mosomes based on human traces as an evaluation criterion, see [4].
For finding optimal solutions to a problem, statistical fitness func-
tions offer near-optimal results when optimality can be defined. A
near-best solution for the problem space of finding the optimal way
through a level in the platformersAI toolkit was given by Baumgarten
[14] using the A∗ algorithm. This approach produces agents who are
extremely good at winning the level within a minimum amount of
time but at the same time are clearly distinguishable from actual hu-
man players. Contrasting the goal of finding optimal solutions, we
are interested in understanding and modelling human-like or human-
believable behaviour in games. Thus, using statistical functions is
difficult, as there currently is no known algorithm for measuring how
human-like behaviour is; identifying this may even be computation-
ally intractable. For games and game designers a less distinguishable
approach is normally more appealing—based on our initial assump-
tions. Additionally, having an approach which produces readable and
amenable representations of the behaviour might not just aid its un-
derstanding but might offer different insights into the design of the
game as well.
Based on the biological concept of selection, all evolutionary sys-
tems require some form of judgement about the quality of a specific
individual—the fitness value of the entity. Within our framework,
agents are evaluated after each run of an entire level of the game
as intermittent evaluation of games where actions can span multiple
cycles is difficult to evaluate. Within the original JGAP framework
evaluation can be done at arbitrary times but it an important consid-
eration that the evaluation (running the program to receive a result)
is normally the most expensive cost within a GP.
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In table 1 the settings we use for GP within our framework are
given. As a selection mechanism, the weighted roulette wheel is
used which attributes each chromosome a position and then weights
all chromosomes according to their fitness giving fitter individuals
slightly more space. We additionally preserve the fittest individual
of a generation. Preserving the best individual is crucial as muta-
tion can be destructive to the chromosome We use single point tree
branch crossover on two selected parent chromosomes and expose
the resulting child to a single point mutation before it is put into the
new generation. We also add 20% new randomly generated chromo-
somes to the pool to bring in some ”fresh blood” or to be more precise
keep the pool from stopping in a homogeneous state. Even through
mutation is potentially destructive, it helps exploring the vast gene
space better than relying entirely on the cross-over operation. How-
ever, within our experiments [4], using the more stable cross-over as
the main driving force for the evolution gave better and more reliant
results than switching entirely to random exploration using a stronger
mutation coefficient.
Figure 2: An evolved agent after 694 generations, represented as de-
cision tree by our system.
In Figure 2 one of the resulting agents is presented in its DT
form. The visual representation was generated by the system us-
ing GRAPHVIZ (http://www.graphviz.org/). As the aim of
our approach was to derive meaningful representations of agent be-
haviour, visual representation of the result is of utmost importance.
Using the rendered DT allows a designer to either alter the agent or
to understand why it behaved in a certain way.
5 Findings & Open Challenges
Using our experimental configuration and the PBF fitness function
[4] we are now able to execute, evaluate and compare platformerAI
agents against human traces. Using human play traces to drive the
evolution resulted in agents which are able to beat some but not all of
the test levels. However, there is still potential using different ways to
integration human knowledge into the evaluation. The JGAP frame-
work proved to a useful and easy to use and robust framework for
developing genetic programs, even though it has some weaknesses
compared to other frameworks. If you care for running the GP on
a cluster you might decide to use a different framework which of-
fers better support for spitting up both the evaluation of chromo-
somes and the handling large data structures. Most of the GP systems
let you also run or communicate external libraries. In our case, we
included the PLATFORMERSAI toolkit to evaluate our agents. This
toolkit does not support parallel instantiations of multiple levels well
but can be tweaked easily and offers also support for using a genetic
approach to evolve levels. A next step would be to investigate the
generated modifiable programs further and analyse their benefit in
understanding players better. However, our current solution already
offers a way to design agents for a game by simply playing it and
creating learning agents from those traces. Other possible directions
could be the comparison of different fitness functions and how differ-
ent interpretations of human play input might affect the convergence
rate of agents within our framework. Our current agent model con-
sists of an unweighted tree representation containing program genes.
Currently subtrees are not taken into consideration when calculat-
ing the fitness of an individual. By including those weights it would
be possible to narrow down the search space of good solutions for
game characters dramatically, also potentially reducing the bloat of
the DT. So, to enhance the quality of our reproduction component
we believe it might be interesting to investigate the applicability of
behavior-programming for GP (BPGP) [6] into our system.
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Exploring Novel Game Spaces with Fluidic Games
Swen E. Gaudl, Mark J. Nelson, Simon Colton, Rob Saunders,
Edward J. Powley, Peter Ivey, Blanca Pe´rez Ferrer, Michael Cook 1
Abstract. With the growing integration of smartphones into our
daily lives, and their increased ease of use, mobile games have be-
come highly popular across all demographics. People listen to music,
play games or read the news while in transit or bridging gap times.
While mobile gaming is gaining popularity, mobile expression of cre-
ativity is still in its early stages. We present here a new type of mobile
app – fluidic games – and illustrate our iterative approach to their de-
sign. This new type of app seamlessly integrates exploration of the
design space into the actual user experience of playing the game, and
aims to enrich the user experience. To better illustrate the game do-
main and our approach, we discuss one specific fluidic game, which
is available as a commercial product. We also briefly discuss open
challenges such as player support and how generative techniques can
aid the exploration of the game space further.
1 INTRODUCTION
Mobile games have become a large sub-market of the global games
industry to the extent that many companies specialise in developing
mobile apps. This large market share is due to the pervasive nature of
smartphones and the low technical hurdle of obtaining mobile apps
from app stores. Mobile games are ever-present and are consumed
by nearly all demographic groups, including many not reached by
traditional desktop or console games. However, designing games is
still dominated by desktop applications and commercial production
tools such as Unity or Unreal, which have a steep learning curve and
require software development skills. While there have been introduc-
tory tools developed to teach foundations of programming and game
design to novices and to support STEM education, including pro-
grams such as Kodu or Scratch, these are still desktop-centric and re-
quire serious time investment to develop games. Separate from game
creation tools, there is also a category of apps dubbed casual creators
[2], which allow users to design digital toys. Casual creators differ
from game design tools as they are more centred around creative per-
sonal expression than the design of a consistent game.
We present here a new type of mobile application which positions
itself between a mobile game, a game design tool and a casual cre-
ator. We call these apps fluidic games [4]. The rest of the paper is
organised as follows. We first introduce the notion of fluidic games
and how they differ from current games and game design tools. We
will then more closely examine one fluidic game that we have pro-
duced, and discuss the process of developing it. Having introduced
and elaborated our game, we will present open research questions
and future directions.
1 MetaMakers Institute, Falmouth University, Cornwall, UK, website:
http://metamakersinstitute.com
2 FLUIDIC GAMES
Fluidic games, in contrast to games as normally conceived, contain
a subspace of different games that can be designed within the app
itself. Thus, a fluidic game is not just one game, which is a sin-
gle point in game-design space, but an entire design space of games
through which the player can move and explore. This concept of ex-
panding a single game into a game design space offers an increase
in replayability beyond the state of art in commercial games and is
intended to also foster more creative expression of the player, who
both plays and creates games. Currently, focusing on apps used di-
rectly on hand-held devices, casual creation for games is limited to
skinning games, designing levels in an existing game world, and/or
programming through products like Scratch Jnr. On other platforms,
players came “mod” software to modify the game logic [3] which is
both limiting and complicated.
The idea we present here was developed through continuous de-
signer and user feedback and driven by research in computational
creativity [1] to expand a single game into a game subspace which
contains a coherent set of attributes uniting games in that subspace.
As a starting point, we built a larger game-design space, to be nav-
igated via software called Gamika Technologies [4, 5], and looked
at restricting it to more cohesive subspaces, which share common
dimensions of the Gamika space and thus reduce the individual on-
device design spaces by focusing on specialised interfaces and au-
tomating generative aspects to navigate the desired subspace.
Despite all games being 2D and physics-based, the Gamika space
is heterogeneous, with very different kinds of games available within
its parameters; some puzzle-like, others meditative, others arcade-
style action, etc. Within this heterogenous design space, there are
cohesive subspaces. Games within such a cohesive subspace have
a larger overlap in common features which renders the navigating
within the design subspace closer to transitioning between game
variants, with more understandable relationships between the im-
pact of their parameters on gameplay behaviour (though often still
with unexpected and emergent aspects). Once such a design subspace
is identified, the research question shifts towards understanding the
variation in games is affords well enough to build user-interface and
generative components that match with its salient features, and em-
ploying those to build an enjoyable, mixed-initiative app for design-
ing (and playing) games or levels in that subspace. We describe
below a subspace and the corresponding mobile game-design app,
Wevva.
2.1 Development of a Fluidic Game
As an anchor point for our fluidic game, we started with a single
point in the design subspace and picked one single concept to cre-
ate a stand-alone product. This product is the Let It Snow app, our
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first commercial game developed using Cillr, our in-house mobile
design app to navigate the full Gamika space, and the centrepoint
around which our new fluidic game Wevva unfolds. After arriving
at a finished game, we expanded the space around Let It Snow sim-
ilar to a sculptor working with clay, by adding and shaping mate-
rial in an iterative process. By doing so, we opened up more and
more of the Gamika space around that single point. This process was
driven by user testing and design sessions, focusing and expanding
the space towards areas of interest to the designers and users. As part
of this process, we carried our multiple game jams and design ses-
sions which we detail below.
One key aspect of fluidic games is to focus on the possibility of
extremely short game design sessions and what information the user
needs to navigate the game space effectively. With the Wevva, app,
for instance, it is possible to design a new game in ten minutes or less.
Thus, navigating the cohesive subspace and arriving at an interesting
game in a short amount of time is key to a fluidic game.
2.2 Let It Snow
Let It Snow is the first game from the MetaMakers Institute and avail-
able for iOS. The game, which is a regular game (not a fluidic game),
was developed using Cillr, our in-house tool to navigate the Gamika
design space. It was entirely designed on a mobile device; after the
design phase, it was exported from Cillr and polished to be publicly
released in Apple’s App Store in under two weeks of development.
Although superficially a casual game requiring simple tap and swipe
interactions, it is designed as an easy to play but hard to master game
requiring the player to discover and employ different strategies.
Figure 1. Let It Snow game interface showing the score of the player in the
top left and the elapsed time in the top right.
The rules are very simple, but getting good at it takes some ef-
fort. Additionally, if the players want to do well in a particular game,
they require both high concentration for the duration of the game
and some degree of luck, due to random spawning of game elements
and emergent properties of the physics simulation making each game
different. In Figure 1 you can see the main screen of the game.
The game rules are as follows. Snow and rain pour down from the
top of the screen (as white and blue balls respectively). When four or
more white balls cluster together, they burst, and the player gains a
point for each in the cluster. Each white ball that explodes is replaced
by a new one spawned at the top, with a maximum of 20 on screen
at any one time. Likewise with blue balls, except the player loses a
point for each that explodes. Players can interact with the game by
tapping blue balls to explode them, losing one point in doing so.
While the game rules are straightforward, we have found it to be
difficult and require puzzle-solving strategies as well as quick re-
actions. There is a grid structure which collates the balls into bins,
and the best way to play the game involves trapping the blue balls in
groups of twos and threes at the bottom, while the whites are exposed
and are continually refreshed through cluster explosions. Occasion-
ally, when all blues are trapped in small clusters, only whites will
spawn, which is akin to snowing (hence the games name) and is a
particularly pleasing moment to aim for.
After having released Let It Snow, we expanded the design space
to offer players a way to explore parts of the Gamika desgn space
around Let It Snow. To do so, we exposed parameters to user modifi-
cation, opening up a controlled subspace around Let It Snow without
venturing too far from this anchor point. Focusing in this way of-
fers the player the possibility to not only create entirely new games,
but also to alter and modify Let It Snow, making it harder or eas-
ier as they see fit. This controlled exploration of the space around
Let It Snow should lower the cognitive load compared to allowing
free-form design within the full Gamika design space, as the games
within the subspace all share a large set of commonalities.
2.3 Wevva
Again using Cillr to navigate the full Gamika space, we produced
three variations of Let It Snow called Rain Rain, Jack Frost and Slush
Slosh, each requiring different tactics and skills.
Figure 2. The Wevva interface showing the different rules of all four
included games which form the foundation of the game space.
Those four games populated the initial subspace forming the base
of our fluidic game. They will be released as part of our iOS game
entitled Wevva (Figure 2). This app further includes two aspects that
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are not common in casual games: (a) an AI player for each game that
can assist novice players, and (b) a design screen enabling players
to navigate to game variants within the fluidic subspace in a semi-
random way, and tweak them to get balanced variations. This is more
extensive than a level-design screen (which is somewhat more com-
mon in existing games), as not only the physical layout of levels can
be changed, but the various game rules and mechanics, including as-
pects such as physics and scoring.
The AI player is tuned differently for all four games and appears
on-screen as a gloved hand to support the player by tapping balls
which would reduce the score in the individual game (Figure 3, bot-
tom right). With full support of the AI player, players can concen-
trate on higher level strategies, resulting in a reduced difficulty of
the game as the player do not need to switch their focus. To offer a
more rewarding and demanding gameplay the app provides a slider
to change the level of AI assistance. At 50%, the support should feel
like having an in-game partner helping out. At 0%, the game plays
quite different, as the AI player is not helping any more. At this set-
ting, the player has to continuously switch between stopping clusters
of unwanted balls from forming and also pursuing a high-level strat-
egy and connecting scoring clusters; this is also the hardest way to
play the four included games without making other adjustments such
as increasing the speed.
Figure 3. The Wevva interface showing the different rules of all four
included games which form the foundation of the game space.
The design screen (Figure 4 top left) exposes the following nine
facets of the game design space to the player: (a) the cluster sizes
at which balls explode, (b) the scores attached to clusters exploding
and the player tapping, (c) the ball sizes, (d) the allowed maximum
number of balls of each type, (e) the grid design, (f) physical proper-
ties of the environment, namely bounciness and noise, (g) spawning
regions for both ball types, (h) scoring regions for balls exiting the
screen, and (i) what happens when the player taps the balls – both
actions and scoring consequences. In Figure 4 in the top right, the
Figure 4. Wevva design interface
score panel for the previous facet (a) is shown and in the bottom left
the grid choices, to illustrate the depth of the design space. There is
a random generation button which will set these parameters in a var-
ied way, but designed so that the clustering explosion are balanced in
terms of their expected impact on the score. We achieved this by run-
ning online simulations of novice players and recording the number
of times that clusters of each size and type occurred. Initial experi-
ments with the design screen have indicated that the space exposed
by the above parameters, while vast, does not contain hugely varied
game types, hence the space seems manageable. However, we have
used it to make games which differ substantially from the four preset
games, e.g., involving juggling balls, or trapping and tapping them,
etc.
3 GAME JAMS, DESIGN SESSIONS AND
OPEN CHALLENGES
While expanding upon the initial Let It Snow app to a coherent fluidic
game, we conducted a number of internal brainstorming and design
sessions. During those sessions, we discussed which aspects of the
subspace would be of more interest to users. During this process, we
also focused on the ability to create games quickly. With a coherent
design subspace, we could limit the number of parameters exposed
to players which reduce the design time of new games significantly.
Because Wevva focuses on users who are not necessarily in an office
or at home, it must be possible to quickly design games.
Having designed the initial version of the app through in-house
playtesting, we conducted a first external user test with 65 members
of Girlguiding Cornwall’s Brownie programme (girls aged 5-9), who
visited Falmouth University as part of a larger Girls Can Code event
on 18th February 2017. We conducted two sessions, with 35 users in
the first and 30 in the second, with groups of 2 to 3 children sharing
an iPad. The first part was consisted of a conventional playtest, where
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we demonstrated Let It Snow and the other three included games to
give them a starting point. As a next step, we asked them to play those
games for about ten minutes. Subsequently, we introduced them to
the design interface and gave them about an hour to explore the de-
sign space and design their own games and share them with other par-
ticipants. It is worth noting that the app was not designed with young
children as the target audience. However, we found that the girls had
no problem using the app and they navigated the game space without
having to read or understand complex instructions.
The playtest of the four built-in games produced largely negative
results. These games are puzzle-oriented, requiring the player to be
patient and come up with a winning strategy; but here, very few were
able to discover a winning strategy. On the other hand, the design
experience was more successful. Observations during those two ses-
sions showed that the participants had no problems navigating and
using the app and were able to navigate the fluidic design game. We
are currently evaluating the gathered data, but a first result is that all
participants were able to design their own games using the app. Most
of those games were focused on simpler mechanics such as rapid tap-
ping or using the controller to remove balls from the screen quickly.
Still, bearing in mind that the participants were very young, we be-
lieve that these initial results demonstrate how easy to use the app is,
and the low barriers to entry.
We conducted two further game jams with 40 members of Girl-
guiding Cornwall’s Guides programme (i.e., girls aged 10-14), who
visited Falmouth University on 23rd February 2017 as part of a larger
Girls Can Code event. We repeated the same structure as in the first
game jams, starting with an introduction to the four included games
and a ten-minute game playing session to familiarise them with the
game, its controls and mechanics. In contrast to the younger par-
ticipants from the first two sessions, the participants in these ses-
sions spent more time playing the four included games. They also
approached them more closely to our expectations, probing and try-
ing out different strategies. They were then given an introduction to
the design space, and, as with the first group, given the possibility to
explore the design space by creating and sharing their own games.
Initial observations showed that the designed games sometimes still
focused on fast tapping game mechanics, but we also saw a wider
range of games which required more sophisticated strategies. Thus,
more advanced games were developed. The older participants also
focused on games which could not be beaten instantly and ventured
further into the fluidic design space.
Following this set of four user test sessions, we adjusted menu
structures and support texts in response to observations of where
players had difficulty, and comments they made on a feedback form.
We also found bugs within the app which we were unaware of. Due
to the complex nature of the design space and the way a designer can
approach the same point in the game space from different angles, it
is quite difficult to conduct bullet proof tests. Thus, user testing ses-
sions not only give meaningful feedback about the game, but also
help identity less obvious issues.
3.1 Open Challenges
When the initial app Let It Snow was released, it came without an AI
support system embedded to aid the user. The game does look like a
typical casual game but requires a lot of focus and determination to
achieve mastery. The requirement was by design but makes it hard
for new users to understand the game mechanics or keep motivated
to play the game. With the new fluidic game Wevva, we shipped a
different AI support system for each of the four original games. The
AI can be adjusted by scaling the support from not helping the user
at all to near perfect help. The AI was included for two purposes.
Firstly, to reduce the number of quick reflex-like actions the players
have to perform, so they are put in charge of controlling the difficulty.
Secondly, to help the generator play and test new games while it is
exploring the space to see if those games are playable.
During our game jams with the younger participants, we observed
that, since they did not fully understand the hidden game mechanics,
the AI system was misunderstood. The participants believed that the
AI was not aiding but playing against the user, since its immediate
effect was to explode bubbles that caused a loss of a point. This led
to some initial frustration. With the older participants, the AI assis-
tant’s behaviour was better understood. Overall, we found that the AI
support needs to introduce its intention in some way to the user to be
correctly conceptualised.
The second purpose of the AI, to aid the generator, proved to be
more difficult and is still an open challenge. The game space of our
fluidic game is coherent and less open than the full Gamika space but
still requires the AI to employ different techniques and sometimes
employ unconventional strategies. As the AI has to run within the re-
quirements of the mobile device, classical learning approaches such
as neural networks or large scale simulation are harder to employ.
We are currently investigation more general AI player approaches or
offering an interface so that players can develop automated players.
4 CONCLUSIONS
We presented our approach for exploring coherent game spaces to
achieve a new type of mobile application, namely fluidic games, in
which players can not only play included games, but modify them
and design wholly new games nearby in the design space. We de-
scribe our approach and the process of carving out the suitable sub-
space around a specific initial game, Let It Snow, to reach the first flu-
idic game, Wevva. We also describe our design approach, integrating
participants through game james, and discussed open challenges for
fluidic games such as player support, and AI players for traversing
the game space. We believe that fluidic games offer enormous poten-
tial to open up game design to large numbers of people, and also to
highlight many interesting research challenges.
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Blame in Autonomous Vehicle Collisions
Geoff Keeling1 
 
Abstract.  Drivers sometimes encounter Catch-22 Collisions, 
where they are faced with n ≥ 2 decision-alternatives, and on 
each alternative, death or serious harm to at least one person is 
highly probable. In the near future, we can expect fully-
autonomous driverless cars to be on our roads. It is plausible that 
driverless cars will, on occasion, face Catch-22 Collisions. How 
should manufacturers programme driverless cars respond to 
these collisions? And under what conditions are manufacturers 
blameworthy for harm caused in these collisions? In this paper, I 
articulate these two questions, and provide a partial answer to the 
second question.1  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Drivers sometimes face ethical decisions. We can imagine a 
driver who must choose between exposing herself to a risk of 
death, or exposing another road-user to a risk of death. We can 
also imagine a driver who must choose between hitting five 
children at a crossing, or swerving and hitting one pedestrian on 
the pavement. In both cases, the driver must choose between n≥2 
decision-alternatives, and on each alternative, at least one person 
is likely to suffer death or serious harm. I call these decisions 
Catch-22 Collisions. 
We can expect driverless cars to populate our roads in the 
near future, perhaps as soon as 10 to 15 years. There is no good 
reason to assume that driverless cars will never encounter Catch-
22 Collisions. We must therefore address the following ethical 
questions: 
The Decision Problem: How should driverless car 
manufacturers programme driverless cars to respond to Catch-22 
Collisions? 
The Blame Problem: Under what conditions, if any, are 
driverless car manufacturers blameworthy for harm caused by 
driverless cars in Catch-22 Collisions? 
In this paper, I articulate the Decision Problem and the 
Blame Problem. I then provide a partial answer to the Blame 
Problem. In Section 2, I explain the two problems and the 
difficulties we shall face in answering them. I then argue that we 
have good methodological reason to focus our initial efforts on 
the Blame Problem. In Section 3, I provide a partial answer to 
the Blame Problem. I argue that the conditions under which 
manufacturers are blameworthy in Catch-22 Collisions are 
different, in at least one respect, to the analogous blame-
conditions for drivers in non-autonomous vehicles. Whilst 
drivers can be excused from blame in some cases because it is 
not reasonable to expect a driver to expose themselves to a 
significant risk of death to save another, manufacturers cannot be 
excused for this same reason. In Section 4, I consider the 
                                                 
1 Dept. of Philosophy, Univ. of Bristol, BS8 1TH, UK. Email: 
geoff.keeling.2016@my.bristol.ac.uk. 
practical implications of this argument for driverless car 
regulators and manufacturers. In Section 5, I conclude. 
 
2 TWO ETHICAL QUESTIONS 
2.1 Assumptions 
 
This paper is written conditional on some assumptions about 
driverless cars. Let us make these explicit. 
 I use the term ‘driverless car’ to mean either SAE Level 4 or 
Level 5 vehicles [1]. Level 4 vehicles are capable of full-
automation in some locations, which means the car can drive in 
at least some areas without the need for human intervention or 
supervision. Level 5 vehicles are fully-autonomous, such that the 
car does not require human intervention or supervision in any 
location. In principle, Level 5 vehicles do not require human 
controls such as a steering wheel or brake-pedal. 
 Given the intentions of several manufacturers to produce 
driverless cars within the next 10 to 15 years,2 we are justified in 
assuming 
(A) Driverless cars will be on our roads soon.  
 Because the passengers in driverless cars will not be required, 
or in some cases be unable, to take control of the vehicle when 
Catch-22 Collisions arise, we are also justified in assuming 
(B) Driverless cars must be programmed to respond to 
Catch-22 Collisions. 
 These assumptions have been defended elsewhere [2, 3, 4]. I 
shall take them for granted. Conditional on (A) and (B), we have 
good reason to ask how driverless cars should be programmed to 
respond to Catch-22 Collisions, and the conditions under which 
driverless car manufacturers are blameworthy for harm caused in 
these cases. I address each question in turn. 
 
2.2 The Decision Problem 
 
How should driverless cars be programmed to respond to 
collisions where harm to someone is inevitable? I believe there 
are, at least, three core difficulties that we shall face when 
providing an adequate answer to the Decision Problem. I 
consider each in turn. First, 
(C) Proposed solutions to the Decision Problem are 
vulnerable to the same objections as the moral principles 
in which they are grounded. 
 I shall illustrate this point by example. Some philosophers 
have proposed utilitarian solutions to the Decision Problem [5].  
There is also some empirical evidence purporting to show that 
                                                 
2 See Google (Waymo Project); Ford (Smart Mobility Project); Volvo 
(Drive-Me Programme); Mercedes Benz (Model F 015); Nissan 
(ProPILOT 3.0 software); Rolls Royce (Model 103 EX); Tesla 
(Autopilot); Kia (Urban Autonomous Driving project) and BMW (Model 
iNext). 
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the public favours a utilitarian solution [6].  Let us suppose that a 
solution to the Decision Problem, S, is utilitarian just in case S 
mandates that manufacturers are morally required to programme 
driverless cars to minimise loss-of-life in token collisions; or to 
programme driverless cars to follow some rules that, overall, 
minimise loss-of-life in Catch-22 Collisions. 
 If a utilitarian solution is correct, then manufacturers are 
morally required to programme driverless cars to kill their 
passengers if doing so means minimising loss-of-life under 
certain conditions. We might object that utilitarian solutions 
place an unreasonable demand on manufacturers to give equal 
weight to the lives of their passengers and to the lives of other 
road-users. Manufacturers, after all, have a vested interest in 
their passengers’ safety. It might also be objected that utilitarian 
solutions fail to respect the separateness of persons, insofar as 
they mandate aggregating human lives in a cost-benefit sum, 
which some argue is morally inappropriate.  
 Both these objections are special cases of complaints raised 
against utilitarianism simpliciter [7, 8]. However, these 
objections serve to illustrate the more general point: For any 
solution to the Decision Problem, the solution is vulnerable to at 
least the same objections as the moral principle(s) in which the 
solution is grounded. It therefore seems that a compelling answer 
to the Decision Problem requires engagement with current 
discussions in normative ethics, and plausibly further progress in 
these discussions. 
 It would be a mistake to think, however, that normative 
ethical considerations are the only considerations relevant to the 
Decision Problem. Consider, 
(D) The solution to the Decision Problem must be action-
guiding. 
 Though the Decision Problem is related to the question of 
which moral principle(s), if any, are correct, these problems are 
not identical [9, 10].  Driverless car decision-making is 
constrained by, at least, imperfect information and limited 
computational power. It is unclear, for example, that driverless 
cars will have the relevant technical capabilities to minimise 
loss-of-life in collisions, or to process complex moral 
distinctions like the difference between killing and letting-die. 
Given these limitations, we must not get caught up with idealised 
solutions to the Decision Problem, where we assume driverless 
cars to have unrestricted technical capabilities. Our solution must 
be action-guiding, insofar as it provides implementable advice to 
manufacturers on how to programme their cars to respond to 
Catch-22 Collisions. 
 Sceptics might respond that (D) presents no problem. We find 
the ideal solution and implement it as best we can. But this 
response fails to consider the following problem of 
underdetermination: Suppose ‘minimise loss-of-life in token 
collisions’ is the correct solution to the idealised Decision 
Problem. There are different implementable decision-rules that 
respect this ideal solution. Should manufacturers programme 
driverless cars to minimise expected loss-of-life conditional on 
the information available? Or should manufacturers programme 
the cars to minimise loss-of-life using a minimax or least-regret 
decision-rule? Clearly, idealised solutions do little to restrict the 
set of implementable action-guiding solutions to the Decision 
Problem. 
 Given (C) and (D), the Decision Problem presents a difficult 
conundrum. It would be misguided to focus exclusively on the 
normative ethical part of the problem. But it would also be 
misguided to focus our efforts on developing implementable 
solutions to the Decision Problem at the expense of serious 
normative ethical theorising. A defensible solution to the 
Decision Problem requires engagement on both fronts. 
 I believe the Decision Problem presents at least one further 
difficulty. Consider, 
(E) The solution to the Decision Problem ought to be 
justifiable to each affected party.  
 There is a concern that condition (E) reflects my own 
normative ethical bias, as opposed to (C) and (D) which hold 
irrespective of our first-order normative ethical stance. However, 
it seems to me that if our proposed solution to the Decision 
Problem mandates killing someone under certain conditions, 
then we owe that person a justification for the decision to kill 
them. It is worth making explicit an important asymmetry in our 
ability to justify killing affected parties. 
 Suppose, in purchasing a driverless car, I agree to be killed 
under some conditions. If I am then killed under the correct 
conditions, then I have no straightforward moral complaint, 
because I consented to being killed under those conditions. But 
our solution to the Decision Problem is likely to mandate killing 
pedestrians and passengers under some conditions too; and it is 
much harder to provide a justification for killing these parties, 
because they will not have consented to being killed under the 
relevant conditions. 
 In short, the task of justifying our solution to the Decision 
Problem is not resolved by consent. This might be sufficient to 
cover the owners of driverless cars, but the scope of moral 
patients in Catch-22 Collisions is broader than the set of 
driverless car owners. 
 To summarise the discussion of the Decision Problem, I have 
presented three obstacles that stand in the way of our finding a 
solution. These obstacles are not insurmountable. But it should 
nevertheless be clear that finding a solution to the Decision 
Problem requires serious normative ethical theorising, in 
addition to considerations about what driverless cars are capable 
of, and the kind of justification required for killing people in 
Catch-22 Collisions. 
 
2.3 The Blame Problem 
 
Under what conditions, if any, are manufacturers blameworthy 
for harm caused by driverless cars in Catch-22 Collisions? The 
Blame Problem requires some clarification before we can 
explore its difficulties. 
 First, it might be assumed that the conditions under which 
manufacturers are blameworthy for harm caused in Catch-22 
Collisions follow straightforwardly from the correct solution to 
the Decision Problem. For example, if the solution to the 
Decision Problem is ‘minimise loss-of-life in token collisions’, 
then manufacturers are blameworthy in all cases where the 
driverless car fails to minimise loss-of-life in token collisions. I 
find this response to the Blame Problem unconvincing. It relies 
on a commitment to the following principle: 
Blame-Wrongdoing Equivalence: If some moral requirement, 
M, is the correct normative standard for some agent, A, in a 
scenario, S, then A is blameworthy just in case A fails to 
perform actions mandated by M in S. 
 We cannot take for granted the plausibility of this principle, 
for at least the reason that it commits us to the claim that there is 
no such thing as blameless wrongdoing. Thus, whilst we cannot 
reject outright the possibility that the solution to the Blame 
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Problem follows straightforwardly from the solution to the 
Decision Problem, there is good reason to avoid committing 
ourselves to this claim at present. 
 Second, to make clear exactly what the Blame Problem is 
asking, consider the same question asked of a human driver in a 
non-autonomous vehicle. Consider, 
Necessarily Fatal Collision: Jane is driving in icy conditions. 
There is a cyclist in front, who skids on the ice, falls, and 
lands in the middle of the road. Jane can (1) swerve off the 
road, saving the cyclist but killing herself; or (2) hit the 
cyclist, killing them, but saving herself. 
 We can ask the conditions under which Jane is blameworthy 
for harm caused in this scenario. This question has, at least, three 
components. First, which actions are morally wrong? Candidate 
actions include, (1), (2), and the actions Jane might have 
performed which caused Necessarily Fatal Collision in the first 
place (such as driving too fast given the weather conditions). 
Second, in performing any of these actions, did Jane fall short of 
her obligations to other road-users? Obligations here include 
following the legal rules of the road, paying attention, not 
performing reckless manoeuvres, and so on. Third, if Jane fell 
short of any obligation(s), can Jane be excused from blame for 
failing to meet the relevant obligation(s)? 
 To illustrate: Suppose that Jane was driving too fast for the 
weather conditions. Let us grant that this action is wrong, in a 
moral sense. We might then blame Jane for this action, in virtue 
of the fact that she fell short of her obligation not to perform 
reckless manoeuvres, and there is no reason to think that Jane 
could be excused from blame (such as Jane having a heart attack 
at the time of the action). I do not think that (1), sacrificing 
oneself to save a stranger, is wrong in a moral sense. So, this is 
not the kind of action that could incur blame. Last, even if (2) is 
wrong, and Jane fell short of an obligation not to put other road 
users in danger, we might excuse Jane from blame because she 
cannot reasonably be expected to sacrifice her own life to save a 
stranger. 
 The Blame Problem asks these same questions, where the 
manufacturer is taken to be the moral agent in a Catch-22 
Collision involving a driverless car.3  Consider, 
Necessarily Fatal Auto-Collision: A driverless car is driving 
in icy conditions with one passenger on board. There is a 
cyclist in front. The cyclist skids on the ice, falls, and lands in 
the middle of the road. The car can (1) swerve to avoid the 
cyclist, saving the cyclist but exposing the passenger to a risk 
of death; or (2) hit the cyclist, exposing them to a risk of 
death, but saving the passenger. 
 The solution to the Blame Problem should therefore provide 
answers to the following: First, are any of the actions in 
Necessarily Fatal Auto-Collision wrong? Second, did the 
manufacturer fall short of their obligations to other road-users? 
Third, if the manufacturer fell short of their obligations to other 
road-users, can the manufacturer be excused from blame for 
some reason? 
 I hope that the Blame Problem is now clear. I shall now turn 
to the difficulties it faces. I consider three naïve responses to the 
Blame Problem, and show that each of these faces at least one 
serious objection. First consider the 
                                                 
3 This assumption might be contested. But none of the arguments here 
are invalidated by substituting the manufacturer for a more specific set of 
people involved in programming the car to respond to Catch-22 
Collisions in a particular way. 
No Blame Thesis: Manufacturers are never blameworthy 
when driverless cars cause harm in Catch-22 Collisions. 
 It might be argued that because someone will be harmed 
whatever the car is programmed to do, manufacturers cannot be 
blamed for harm caused in these collisions. But suppose that in 
Necessarily Fatal Auto-Collision, the reason that the driverless 
car ended up having to choose (1) or (2) is that its software had 
misread the weather conditions and the car was driving too fast. 
It seems the manufacturer could, at least, be blamed for this 
software failure and the deaths that occur in consequence. 
Intuitively, the manufacturer’s omission to ensure that such 
software failures of this kind could not happen is wrong. In 
failing to take sufficient precaution when testing their software, 
the manufacturer might be blameworthy for falling sort of their 
obligation to, where possible, prevent harm to road-users. And it 
seems there is no obvious reason why the manufacturer can be 
excused from blame here. Next consider the: 
 Restricted Blame Thesis: Manufacturers are blameworthy for 
harm caused in Catch-22 Collisions where this harm is the causal 
consequence of at least one software error. But manufacturers 
are not blameworthy for harm caused in Catch-22 Collisions 
where the harm caused is not the causal consequence of a 
software error. 
 The counterexample to the No Blame Thesis relied on a 
software error which the manufacturers could be blamed for. It 
might be argued that, provided no software error occurs, the 
manufacturer cannot be blamed for harm caused in necessarily 
fatal collisions. However, the Restricted Blame Thesis implies 
either: (i) It is impossible for manufacturers to make the wrong 
decision in Catch-22 Collisions; (ii) The manufacturers have no 
obligations to other road-users when driverless cars are faced 
with Catch-22 Collisions; or (iii) The manufacturer can always 
be excused from blame for wrongdoing in Catch-22 Collisions. 
 I believe that (i), (ii) and (iii) are false. Consider, 
Crossing Calamity: The driverless car’s brakes fail. The car 
must either kill its passenger and 10 schoolchildren at a 
crossing, or swerve off the road, killing its passenger and no 
schoolchildren.  
 If the driverless car were programmed to kill the passenger 
and the schoolchildren, this would be the wrong decision. The 
deaths of the schoolchildren are preventable, and the passenger 
would die on either decision-alternative. Intuitively, the 
manufacturer is obliged to save lives where possible. In killing 
11 rather than 1, the manufacturer falls short of this obligation. 
And there is no obvious reason to think that the manufacturer 
could be excused for this wrongdoing. 
 The final naïve response to the Blame Problem is the: 
Equivalent Blame Thesis: The conditions under which a 
driverless car manufacturer is blameworthy for causing harm 
in Catch-22 Collisions are the same as the conditions under 
which a human driver is blameworthy for causing harm in 
Catch-22 Collisions. 
 The Equivalent Blame Thesis faces at least two major 
objections. First, 
(F) The obligations that manufacturers have towards road-
users are plausibly different to the obligations that 
drivers have towards road-users.  
 There are, at least, two arguments for (F) First, driverless cars 
have different, if not superior, sensory apparatus and decision-
making abilities compared to human drivers. For example, 
driverless cars can detect stimuli using radar and cameras 360-
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degrees around the vehicle, whereas human drivers have a ‘blind 
spot’. Likewise, driverless cars can make decision-theoretic 
calculations under risk and uncertainty, whereas humans are 
unable to do this in collisions. Second, manufacturers make 
decisions about the outcomes of Catch-22 Collisions in advance 
of the collision occurring. Human drivers make the decision in 
the moment. Thus, it seems at least plausible that manufacturers 
can reasonably be expected to make a justifiable moral decision 
in Catch-22 Collisions, whereas it is unclear whether human 
drivers can reasonably be expected to make a justifiable moral 
decision in such collisions.  
 If either of these arguments hold, then we have reason to 
think that the obligations that driverless car manufacturers have 
towards road-users are stronger than the obligations that human 
drivers have towards other road-users. By extension, it seems at 
least plausible that the conditions under which manufacturers 
can fall short of their obligations to road-users are a superset of 
the conditions under which human drivers can fall short of their 
obligations to other road-users. Given this, it follows that the 
conditions under which manufacturers are blameworthy in 
Catch-22 Collisions are plausibly non-equivalent to the 
conditions under which human drivers are blameworthy. Hence, 
the Equivalent Blame Thesis is plausibly false. Next consider, 
(G) The conditions under which manufacturers can be 
excused from blame in Catch-22 Collisions are plausibly 
different to the conditions under which human drivers 
can be excused from blame in Catch-22 Collisions. 
 I shall consider this point in detail in Section 3. The crux of 
the claim is that, in Necessarily Fatal Collision, we can excuse 
Jane for killing the cyclist on the grounds that she cannot 
reasonably be expected to sacrifice her life to save a stranger. 
This excuse is not straightforwardly relevant to the manufacturer 
of the driverless car in Necessarily Fatal Auto-Collision, because 
the manufacturer is not liable to die in the collision. If there 
exists at least one condition whereby human drivers can be 
excused from blame and manufacturers cannot, it follows that 
the Equivalent Blame Thesis is false. 
 To summarise the discussion of the Blame Problem, I have 
shown that three naïve answers to the Blame Problem are 
plausibly false. We therefore have good reason to consider 
carefully the conditions under which manufacturers are 
blameworthy for harm caused by driverless cars in collisions 
where death or serious harm is inevitable.  
 
2.4 Methodological Priorities 
 
I believe we have good methodological reason to focus our 
initial efforts on the Blame Problem, as opposed to the Decision 
Problem. This is for two reasons. 
 First, we must solve both problems in a short timeframe. Our 
intuitions about the Blame Problem are plausibly clearer than our 
intuitions about the Decision Problem. Whilst we can provide 
examples of situations where manufacturers are 
straightforwardly blameworthy, our intuitions about the moral 
principles that should guide driverless car decision-making in 
Catch-22 Collisions are less clear. This is, in part, because our 
intuitions about first-order normative ethical theories are 
conflicting, whereas our ability to identify situations where 
moral agents fall short of certain obligations (and the reasons 
why agents might be excused for doing so) are clearer. Given 
this, I think we have a reasonable chance of providing, at least, a 
partial answer to the Blame Problem in the relevant timeframe, 
whereas I am less hopeful for the Decision Problem. 
 Second, the Blame Problem might help us answer the 
Decision Problem. My claim is not that the Blame Problem is 
prior to the Decision Problem in a metaphysical sense, i.e. the 
conditions under which an agent is blam worthy for actions 
determine the moral standards by which an agent should act. But 
I think there is some coherence between what an agent ought to 
do and the conditions under which an agent is blameworthy. If 
we have good reason to think that manufacturers are 
blameworthy if they fail to save their passengers at all costs, then 
we also have reason to believe that utilitarian solutions to the 
Decision Problem are incorrect. It seems to me that getting clear 
about the blame-conditions for manufacturers could plausibly 
strike-off some candidate solutions to the Decision Problem, 
making it a more manageable ethical challenge. 
 For these two reasons, I believe we have good 
methodological reason to address the Blame Problem first. 
 
3 ANSWERING THE BLAME PROBLEM 
 
I shall not attempt to provide a complete answer to the Blame 
Problem. Instead, I focus on one of its three components: The 
conditions under which manufacturers can be excused from 
blame. I argue that the conditions under which driverless car 
manufacturers can be excused from blame in Catch-22 
Collisions are different, in at least one respect, to the analogous 
conditions for drivers in ordinary vehicles. Consider again, 
Necessarily Fatal Collision (NFC): Jane is driving in icy 
conditions. There is a cyclist in front, who skids on the ice, 
falls, and lands in the middle of the road. Jane can (1) swerve 
off the road, saving the cyclist but killing herself; or (2) hit 
the cyclist, killing them, but saving herself; and 
Necessarily Fatal Auto-Collision (NFAC): A driverless car is 
driving in icy conditions with one passenger on board, call 
her Sue. There is a cyclist in front. The cyclist skids on the 
ice, falls, and lands in the middle of the road. The vehicle can 
(1) swerve off the road, saving the cyclist but killing Sue; or 
(2) hit the cyclist, killing them, but saving Sue. 
 NFC and NFAC are analogous in at least two respects: First, 
in each case, there are two decision-alternatives, and on each 
alternative, exactly one person will die. Second, in each case, 
one potential recipient of harm is inside the vehicle, and the 
other is outside the vehicle.   
 NFC and NFAC are dissimilar in the following respect: In 
NFC, the decision-maker is a driver, Jane, who must choose 
between saving her own life or that of a stranger. In NFAC, the 
decision-maker is the manufacturer, who must choose to save the 
passenger, Sue, or a stranger, the cyclist. Given this, there is a 
distinction in the logic of the conflict cases that underlie NFC 
and NFAC. We can distinguish: 
 Logic-NFC There are two agents, A and B, and A must 
save exactly one of A and B. 
 Logic-NFAC There are three agents, A, B and C, and A 
must save exactly one of B and C. 
 Most philosophers would agree that it is morally permissible 
for an agent to save themselves, when forced to choose between 
their own life and that of a stranger [11, 12].  I call this the ‘right 
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to self-preservation’.4 Given Jane’s right to self-preservation, 
one of the blame-conditions for Jane in NFC is that she can be 
excused from blame if she chooses to save herself, even if this 
means falling short of her obligation not to expose other road-
users to a risk of death. 
 The logic of NFAC does not permit the same argument. It is 
not the case that saving the cyclist would require the 
manufacturer to sacrifice themselves, so the manufacturer’s right 
to self-preservation is not relevant to NFAC. Had the 
manufacturer programmed the driverless car to kill the cyclist 
even if the car had no passengers on board, then the 
manufacturer would be straightforwardly to blame for the 
cyclist’s death. It seems, then, that one condition which can 
excuse drivers from blame for causing harm is not applicable to 
driverless car manufacturers. 
 It might be objected that, true, the manufacturer’s right to 
self-preservation is not relevant in NFAC. But the passenger 
Sue’s right to self-preservation is relevant, and the relation 
between Sue and the manufacturer is such that the manufacturer 
can excuse blame for killing the cyclist given Sue’s right to self-
preservation. It does not seem altogether implausible to think 
that there exist some cases where one agent can excuse blame for 
causing harm given another agent’s rights. However, I do not 
think that the relation between Sue and the manufacturer is 
sufficient to establish that the manufacturer can appeal to Sue’s 
right to self-preservation to excuse blame in NFAC-type cases. I 
shall consider two arguments against my position. The first 
concerns 
Ownership: Sue’s ownership of the driverless car is sufficient 
to establish that the manufacturer can appeal to Sue’s right to 
self-preservation to excuse blame for killing the cyclist. 
 The plausibility of this argument depends on the inference 
from: 
(H) A person owns a driverless car; to 
(I) The manufacturer can excuse blame for causing harm 
given that person’s right to self-preservation.  
 However, the inference from (H) to (I) faces a plausible 
counterexample. Consider, 
The Old Switcheroo: The cyclist is the owner of the driverless 
car and she allows Sue to have a test-ride. The cyclist is 
cycling in front, she skids, falls onto the ice, and the car must 
either (1) swerve, killing Sue, but saving the cyclist, or (2) hit 
the cyclist, killing her, but saving Sue. The car is programmed 
to (1) kill Sue to save its owner. 
 I remain silent on whether the manufacturer is blameworthy 
for killing Sue in these circumstances. But it seems counter-
intuitive to argue that the reason the manufacturer is not 
blameworthy is the cyclist’s right to save herself in interpersonal 
trade-off cases. Such an argument merits a complaint from Sue: 
Plausibly, the fact that the car was driving on Sue’s behalf 
provides stronger moral reason for the manufacturer to appeal to 
Sue’s right to self-preservation, rather than the cyclist’s. 
                                                 
4 This is distinct from the right to self-defence, which requires, at least, a 
perceived threat from another. The right to self-preservation is the right 
that an agent has to save themselves in cases where they must save 
themselves or a stranger. The legal analogue is derived from the defence 
of necessity, wherein a person can be excused for causing harm where 
not committing that harm would expose them to potential death or 
serious harm. The legal analogue is not the defence of self-defence, 
where a person can be excused for causing harm to a perceived 
aggressor.  
 It is, at least, unclear whether the manufacturer has stronger 
moral reason to appeal to the cyclist’s right to self-preservation 
(given ownership) or Sue’s right to self-preservation (given the 
car was driving on her behalf). But a robust defence of the 
ownership argument requires a decisive reason in favour of 
choosing the cyclist’s right to self-preservation, rather than 
Sue’s, in Switcheroo cases like the one above. In the absence of 
such a reason, the ownership argument fails. 
 The second argument purports to show that because the 
driverless car is driving on Sue’s behalf, the manufacturer can 
appeal to Sue’s right to self-preservation to excuse blame for 
killing the cyclist in NFAC. The inference here is from: 
(J) A driverless car is driving on behalf of a person; to 
(K) The manufacturer can appeal to that person’s right to 
self-preservation to excuse blame for causing harm in 
collisions.  
 I think this argument also faces a plausible counterexample. 
Consider,  
Two Passenger Railroad Case: Georgina and Bob are in a 
driverless taxi. Georgina is heading to destination D, and Bob 
is heading to destination D’. Because the destinations are 
close to one another, Georgina and Bob agree to share a taxi. 
The car is therefore driving on behalf of both Georgina and 
Bob. The car drives over a railway crossing, when suddenly 
the barriers shut and the car is stuck on the tracks. There are 
three separate tracks, and the car is presently parked over the 
middle track. On this middle track, two trains are heading 
from the left and the right, and both Georgina and Bob are 
certain to die if the car stays put. If the car reverses, then a 
train on the track behind will smash into the car from the left, 
almost certainly killing Georgina, but possibly saving Bob. If 
the car drives forward, then a train on the track in front will 
smash into the car from the right, almost certainly killing 
Bob, but possibly saving Georgina.  
 This case is fanciful, but I believe the logic of the case is 
sufficient to undermine the driving on the passenger’s behalf 
argument. The logic of this case is such that the manufacturer, A, 
must save exactly one of B or C, or both will die. It does not 
seem to be the case that B or C’s right to self-preservation is 
relevant to this case. If A saves B by appeal to B’s right to self-
preservation, then C has a moral complaint: A could equally well 
have appealed to C’s right to self-preservation, and there was no 
good reason to appeal to B’s right instead. The same holds in 
reverse. Thus, it seems that the fact (J) that a driverless car is 
driving on a person’s behalf is not sufficient to establish that (K) 
the manufacturer of the car can appeal to that person’s right to 
self-preservation to excuse blame in Catch-22 Collisions. The 
driving on someone’s behalf argument therefore fails. 
 Given the failure of ownership and driving on the passenger’s 
behalf to establish that a manufacturer can appeal to another’s 
right to self-preservation to excuse blame in collisions, I believe 
we are justified in thinking that the blame-conditions for drivers 
and manufacturers are different in at least one respect. There 
exists a condition under which drivers can be excused from 
blame, namely the driver’s right to self-preservation, where this 
right cannot be used to excuse manufacturers from blame. 
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4 APPLICATIONS  
I now consider the implications of the argument in Sections 2 
and 3 for driverless car regulators and manufacturers. There are, 
I think, two points worth mentioning. 
 First, there is a discussion in the legal literature over how, if 
at all, manufacturer’s liability law can be extended to the case of 
driverless cars [13, 14]. Though we have good reason to get to 
the bottom of the problem, we must also consider manufacturer’s 
liability in Catch-22 Collisions where the harm caused by the 
driverless car does not arise from a software failure. Standard 
manufacturer’s liability law is not equipped for such cases. In 
order to develop a comprehensive regulatory framework for 
driverless car collisions, we must think carefully about the 
obligations that can reasonably be ascribed to manufacturers 
programming driverless cars to respond to Catch-22 Collisions, 
and the conditions under which manufacturers can be excused 
from blame when driverless cars cause harm in these cases. 
 Second, the argument in Section 3 plausibly has implications 
for the Decision Problem. It might be assumed that 
manufacturers are justified in programming driverless cars to 
save their passengers in collision scenarios which require saving 
either the passengers or some other group of road-users. I have 
not shown that this position is incorrect. However, I have raised 
a serious challenge to one line of argument that might attempt to 
establish this position. If the passenger’s right to self-
preservation is not straightforwardly relevant to driverless car 
collisions, then manufacturers looking to ‘save the passengers’ 
owe either a substantive objection to the argument in Section 3, 
or a justification for the ‘save the passengers’ solution that does 
not rely on the passenger’s right to self-preservation. 
5 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I explained two ethical questions relevant to 
driverless car collisions where at least some harm is inevitable: 
The Decision Problem, and the Blame Problem. I then provided 
a partial answer to the Blame Problem, arguing that the 
conditions under which manufacturers are blameworthy for harm 
caused by driverless cars in Catch-22 Collisions are different to 
the conditions under which drivers are blameworthy for causing 
harm in Catch-22 Collisions. I argued that whilst drivers can 
excuse blame for causing harm given their right to self-
preservation, there is good reason to think that manufacturers 
cannot appeal to the right to self-preservation to excuse 
driverless cars causing harm in the same circumstances. I then 
considered the applications of this finding for regulators and 
manufacturers investigating the ethics of blame and decision-
making in driverless car collisions. 
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Understanding and Controlling Artificial General
Intelligent Systems
Jirˇı´ Wiedermann1and Jan van Leeuwen2
“The product of the human brain has escaped the con-
trol of human hands. This is the comedy of science.”
Karel Cˇapek, 1920 [3]
Abstract. Artificial general intelligence (AGI) systems are advanc-
ing in all parts of our society. The potential of autonomous systems
that surpass the capabilities of human intelligence has stirred debates
everywhere. How should ‘super-intelligent’ AGI systems be viewed
so they can be feasibly controlled? We approach this question based
on the viewpoints of the epistemic philosophy of computation, which
treats AGI systems as computational systems processing knowledge
over some domain. Rather than considering their autonomous devel-
opment based on ‘self-improving software’, as is customary in the
literature about super-intelligence, we consider AGI systems as op-
erating with ‘self-improving epistemic theories’ that automatically
increase their understanding of the world around them. We outline a
number of algorithmic principles by which the self-improving theo-
ries can be constructed. Then we discuss the problem of aligning the
behavior of AGI systems with human values in order to make such
systems safe. This issue arises concretely when one studies the so-
cial and ethical aspects of human-robot interaction in advanced AGI
systems as they exist already today. No general solution to this prob-
lem is known. However, based on the principles of interactive proof
systems, we design an architecture of AGI systems and an interac-
tive scenario that will enable one to detect in their behavior devia-
tions from the prescribed goals. The conclusions from our analysis
of AGI systems temper the over-optimistic expectations and over-
pessimistic fears of singularity believers, by grounding the ideas on
super-intelligent AGI systems in more realistic foundations.
1 INTRODUCTION
The developments in robotics and AI and their extrapolations are
pointing to the ever more credible scenario of highly advanced intel-
ligent artifacts that outperform humans in all imaginable tasks. It is
especially the role of philosophy to anticipate potential avenues for
the further development of AI, envisage possible future problems,
predict the related risks and look for ways how to harmonize the
progress in AI with the interests of society. In their most advanced
form, all these problems come concentrated in the general notion of
superintelligence.
1 Institute of Computer Science of Czech Academy of Sciences and Czech
Institute of Informatics, Robotics and Cybernetics of Czech Technical Uni-
versity, Prague, Czech Republic email: jiri.wiedermann@cs.cas.cz
2 Center for Philosophy of Computer Science, Utrecht University, the Nether-
lands email: J.vanLeeuwen1@uu.nl
Oxford philosopher and futurist Nick Bostrom defines superin-
telligence as “an intellect that is much smarter than the best hu-
man brains in practically every field, including scientific creativity,
general wisdom and social skills” [2]. Although it is not sure at all
whether such a high level intellect can exist, and the more so, how
superintelligence could be achieved, considerations about possible
existential risks for mankind from constructing superintelligent sys-
tems possessing such abilities are abundant. They fill monographs,
popular books, scientific papers, and general media and give scenar-
ios for catastrophic sci-fi movies. Unfortunately, such considerations
are rarely underpinned by more serious analyses based on findings
from computability theory, computational complexity theory, the the-
ory of AI and related sciences. Therefore the conclusions from such
debates cannot usually be taken at face value.
Epistemic approach In this paper we approach the problem of un-
derstanding artificial general intelligence (AGI) from the viewpoint
of the newly emerging philosophy of computation in which compu-
tational processes are understood as processes provably generating
knowledge. This philosophy is presented in a number of recent pa-
pers by the authors, cf. [18], [19], [20], and [15]. Rather than analyz-
ing HOW a computation is performed, the idea is to concentrate on
WHAT is being computed, i.e., on what knowledge is generated in
the course of computation (cf. [18] for the substantiation of this ap-
proach). So far, the framework has enabled us to deal formally with
the problem of observer-relativity [19] and to tackle the problem of
epistemic creativity [20]. A first formalization of the underlying the-
ory with some basic results, is given in [15]. An overview of the ap-
proach is given in [20]. In the present paper we continue this line of
research, now aimed at a deeper understanding of the self-improving
mechanisms of AGI systems and the ways to control them.
Under the new view, knowledge generation becomes the hall-
mark of any computation and AGI and superintelligent systems both
present but special cases of computational systems in which the abil-
ity to generate new knowledge is pushed to its maximum — such
systems are able to generate knowledge over arbitrary epistemic do-
mains corresponding to large parts of the sciences or the real world.
This is in stark contrast with the practice of contemporary AI sys-
tems which are often specialized to particular, mostly quite restricted
domains (cf. [12]). Also, each of them is usually developed in isola-
tion from other systems. Such an approach does not easily support a
unified view and hence, a unified theory of such systems.
Albeit quite general, our approach offers new insights in the nature
of AGI systems. This is because the epistemic view of computation
requires certain prerequisites that force a more detailed look at the
underlying processes. The most important requirement is that behind
any computation there must be a so-called epistemic domain over
which computations are performed. The knowledge about a selected
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part of this domain is described by means of an epistemic theory that
can be more or less formal, or entirely informal. Axioms in this the-
ory describe basic knowledge corresponding to the (representations
of the) objects within the epistemic domain and of their basic proper-
ties. With the help of the inference rules the derivations within such
a theory describe the ways how to construct objects corresponding
to new pieces of knowledge. In a sense, new knowledge is gener-
ated by applying knowledge (in the form of inference rules) to old
knowledge. The underlying computational processes are bound to
the epistemic theory through the following condition: whatever can
be derived within the theory must be supported by the underlying
computational processes (and vice versa). If this condition is met,
then what knowledge can and what knowledge cannot be generated
over an epistemic domain and the “quality” of the generated knowl-
edge (i.e., its compliance with the observations) depend solely on the
underlying epistemic theory.
Self-improving theories The ability of a system to generate new
knowledge in that system is thus catalyzed by the presence of mech-
anisms that allow changes in the underlying epistemic theory. Such
changes can either extend the existing theory (by adding new pieces
of truthful knowledge or new axioms), or “repair” it when a flaw is
discovered in it — a discrepancy between the observed facts and the
knowledge generated by the system. The ways how to construct such
self-improving theories will be described in this paper.
The idea of self-improving theories stands in stark contrast with
the generally accepted ideas in theoretical AI claiming that su-
perintelligence should be achieved via so-called “recursively self-
improving software” (cf. [2], [22]) that will help to overcome the
level of human intelligence. Our modeling reveals that the idea of
software self-improvement is not aiming at the core of the problem
— in order to increase their intellectual potential, superintelligent
systems have to continuously strive for increasing and repairing their
knowledge, not software, related to their domain of interest.
Controlling safety The epistemic approach to computation opens
interesting perspectives on controlling the safety of AGI systems
w.r.t. the alignment of their actions with human values. Namely, we
can imagine an AGI system that “observes” an other AGI system
and checks whether its actions are safe. Unfortunately, no general
solution of this problem is known, general in the sense that it would
work for observing any AGI system. The respective control problem
is widely considered in the “theory of superintelligence” [2] where
it is called the value loading problem. In this respect Stuart Russell,
in one of his interviews [11], posed an interesting, and deep question
— namely, whether it is necessary to worry about undecidability for
AI systems that rewrite themselves.
Nevertheless, we can offer at least a partial solution of the value
loading problem. This solution is based on the existence of an ob-
server that can detect a deviation in the behavior of an observed sys-
tem from its original goals as described in the observee’s underlying
epistemic theory. Based on these ideas and the ideas of interactive
proof theory we design an architecture of an AGI (or “superintelli-
gent”) system whose behavior can be controlled w.r.t. its alignment
with its original values as given in its underlying epistemic theory.
We also propose a scenario for interacting with such a system en-
abling its control and guidance toward the required results.
Perspective Before proceeding a word of caution is in place.
Namely, from the context of our paper dealing with AGI and su-
perintelligent systems one may get an impression that we are dis-
cussing matters at the frontiers of AI, to be current in a distant future
when human level AI will be attained or even surpassed. But such
an impression is misleading. That is to say, our findings have their
say already now, in the current state-of-the art, e.g., in the context
of robotics and related issues, like human-robot interaction and the
social and ethical aspects of it. Obviously, each robot is controlled
by some sort of AI system and, with the exception of simple fixed
environments, the control system of robots must be flexible, able to
adapt to new situations in a changing environment and under chang-
ing requirements of users. Hence, a control system for such robots
must “tend” towards a full-fledged AGI system. Examples of such
robots are robot companions, robots in personal care and health care,
robots in search and rescue, etc.
Outline Interaction between humans and such robots is a nec-
essary condition, and it is a natural requirement that all actions of
robots should be justified w.r.t. the the current circumstance of the
robots. This means that the actions and behavior of a robot must be
rooted in some more- or less-formal “theory” capturing the epistemic
domain in which a robot at hand operates. These ideas are at the heart
of the epistemic approach to computation described in Section 2 of
this paper. Next, a reasonable, although a highly non-trivial require-
ment to implement is that advanced robots must be able to adapt
their behavior to the changing conditions in which they work. In our
setting of epistemic computation, this prerequisite is translated into
the requirement of self-improving epistemic theories that govern the
behavior of the robots at hand. The principles of self-improving theo-
ries are described in Section 3. A conditio sine qua non when dealing
with robots and in general, with AGI systems is, of course, safety.
Any such system must not act against human interests. This is an in-
tensively studied problem in social and ethical aspects of robotics.
We discuss this problem in Section 4 where we indicate what ob-
stacles lay on the road towards finding a reasonable solution of the
problem of alignment a robot’s actions with human values. Never-
theless, we will argue that, what can be done is checking that robot’s
behavior for its alignment with a given epistemic theory capturing
robot’s eligible behavior (Section 5).
All our results point towards the fact already noticed in the
Cˇapek’s quotation at the beginning of this paper — i.e., that time has
come when we should see that the products of our brain — AI tech-
nologies — will not escape from our control. We have to change our
approach to the technology risk from reactive to proactive (cf.[14]).
Providing a balanced, well-founded and realistic view of the possi-
bilities and limits of AI and robotics, of their benefits and threats,
is indispensable for the positive social perception of the underlying
technologies.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is an introduc-
tory part giving brief preliminaries needed to understand the main
ideas behind the epistemic approach to computation. In Section 3 we
explain the idea of self-improving epistemic theories and sketch the
mechanisms that take care of such abilities in AGI systems. The dis-
cussion concerning the existence of observers deciding the problem
whether the behavior of an observed AGI system is aligned with the
given set of values is given in Section 4. Section 5 deals with the
possibilities of supervising AGI systems and devises a schema that,
to a certain extent, solves the problem in a scenario asking for a con-
tinuous surveillance of a system’s activities. Section 6 contains the
conclusions.
2 AGI systems as knowledge generating systems
We assume that any AGI system is a computational system. We do
not want to make any more specific assumptions concerning the na-
ture of the underlying computations. In particular, we do not want
to restrict our considerations to the currently known computational
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systems. In order to make our approach independent of an underly-
ing model of computation, we concentrate on the epistemic aspects
of computations. Namely, we will not be primarily interested HOW
a computation is performed, by what mechanism, by what compu-
tational model. Rather, we will be asking WHAT computations are
doing. This is the approach taken in the so-called epistemic theory of
computations coined by the authors in recent works, cf. [18], [19],
[20], and [15].
The basic idea of this theory is the claim that computation is any
process provably generating knowledge.That is, knowledge is the
product of a specific process that, once it satisfies certain conditions,
is termed as computation. These condition are: compositionality and
justifiability. Compositionality means that a result of one computa-
tion can be used as an input to an other computation. Justifiability
means that a computation must produce is results provably. The de-
tails are as follows.
Computation as knowledge generation A computation (i.e.,
the underlying process) works with knowledge belonging to some
knowledge domain denoted as D. In many cases the knowledge do-
main is a representation of (a part of) the real world. D can be given
in a formal way — like in the case of mathematical or logical the-
ories, or entirely informally — like in the case of knowledge do-
mains described in a natural language capturing phenomena in the
real word. Intermediate cases — a mix of formal and informal the-
ories — are also acceptable. Theories may e.g. describe domains
which are of interest in natural sciences like physics, biology, chem-
istry, etc. We even allow informal knowledge domains whose pieces
of knowledge are pictures, paintings, music, poems, plans, maps, etc.
In all cases, for each knowledge domain there must be so-called rules
of inference which, when applied to pieces of knowledge, allow one
to construct and to infer other pieces of knowledge.
The rules take the form of relations over pieces of knowledge. We
require that each knowledge domain is closed w.r.t. the rules of in-
ference (which means that by applying inference rules to a piece of
knowledge one cannot get out of the underlying domain). A knowl-
edge domain together with the corresponding inference rules forms
an epistemic theory. The set of all axioms forms the core of D. In
general, we do not require that an epistemic theory must be free of
contradictions or that it must agree with all known facts (cf. [1] for
similar ideas in the context of cognitive processing in organisms).
In order for a computation to generate knowledge there must be
evidence (e.g., a proof) that explains that the computational process
works as expected. The evidence must ascertain two facts: (i) that the
generated knowledge can be derived within the underlying epistemic
theory, and (ii) that the associated computational process generates
it. The latter considerations are the key to the following, more formal
definition (cf. [19]). (Do not forget that, although the notation used
in the definition resembles the one used in formal theories, we will
also be using it in the case of informal epistemic domains.)
Definition 1 Let T be a theory, letω be a piece of knowledge serving
as the input to a computation, and let κ ∈ T be a piece of knowledge
from T denoting the output of a computation. Let Π be a computa-
tional process. Then we say that process Π acting on input ω gener-
ates the piece of knowledge κ if and only if there is an explanation
E such that the following conditions hold:
• (T, ω) ` κ, i.e., κ is provable within T from ω, and
• E is a (causal) explanation that Π generates κ on input ω.
The device or mechanism realizing process Π is called a computer.
Note that our definition of computation is machine independent,
since it holds for whatever process Π satisfying the conditions. It is
also algorithm free, since we did not bother how process Π is re-
alized. Last but not least, it is representation independent since the
definition did not assume any particular representation of knowledge.
An important consequence of our definition is that knowledge is
composable (since the processes generating knowledge are compos-
able). An other important consequence is that a computation can be
seen at various levels of abstractions. This is because process Π can
again be seen as a process generating knowledge at a lower level of
abstraction than implied by (T, ω) ` κ. The former process can be
seen as a computation working in a more fine-grained epistemic do-
main, consisting, e.g., of machine instructions. Of course, this view
of levels of abstractions can be iterated, with computations on a given
level of abstraction being implemented via computations at a lower
level. For more details, cf. [15].
AGI systems Thanks to its generality our definition of computa-
tion holds not only for well formalized, so-called theory-full knowl-
edge domains, but also for knowledge domains and inference rules
that are hard to formalize. Such domains will be called theory-less
domains. A typical example of a domain with informal inference
rules is the domain describing the real world. Its objects, phenom-
ena, actions in it and relations among the elements of this domain are
described in a natural language. Knowledge about such domain can
be described in the sentences of a natural language. The inference
rules used in the natural language are the rules of rational thinking
and behavior. These rules are based on the facts and reasoning that
can be captured in a natural language. Typically, theory-less domains
have extremely large knowledge bases (e.g., think of the contents of
the Internet) and the inference chains (derivations) within such do-
mains are relatively short.
The prime example of an intelligent system showing human-level
intelligence is the brain, along with natural language. The brain sup-
ports inference processes in the informal theory formed by the natu-
ral language. In principle, instead of the brain one can think of any
computer, even a computer not yet known or not yet existing. What
we get will be an AGI system possessing human-level intelligence.
It is the strength of our modeling of computations that it gives the
means for working even with such poorly defined notions and comes
with new understanding which has not been accessible through other
approaches.
The view of AGI systems as systems provably generating knowl-
edge brings an other bonus over the “classical” view of computa-
tions that sees superintelligence as actions of some super-algorithmic
mechanism. Namely, Bostrom has reportedly argued that thought
processes of superintelligent machines would be as alien to humans
as human thought processes are to cockroaches [6]. Our approach
reveals that this need not be the case: revealing the underlying epis-
temic theories and insisting on delivering proofs and explanations
with each piece of derived knowledge would make the thoughts pro-
cesses of AGI systems accessible to humans or at least to their current
information processing technologies. We will make use of this fact
in Section 5 when considering the possibilities of keeping the AGI
systems under human control.
Note that the idea of controlling the operation of an AGI system
via its proof checking works well in systems whose main task is
“thinking”, i.e., solving some purely intellectual problems. However,
when an AGI system in question is a robot whose main purpose is
to perform some prevailingly physical tasks requiring in addition to
speech recognition and interaction a lot of vision and motor capabil-
ities this approach is less suitable. This is because such tasks require
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senso-motory and language skills that cannot, probably, be captured
in a sufficiently formalized manageable theory that would drive the
behavior of the robot at hand. In such cases the solution could prob-
ably be a hybrid approach delegating the realization of skills to spe-
cialized, pre-trained, “trusted” (deep) neural nets whose actions need
not be checked each time when they are invoked. Their ability to per-
form the designated task follows from their construction after they
were trained on large sets of data. The cooperation of these nets is
then governed by some epistemic theory with checkable proofs (cf.
[7] for a similar approach).
3 AGI systems with self-improving theories
Given an AGI system, the amount and quality of the knowledge it
can generate depends on its underlying epistemic theory. A system
endowed by the ability to change its underlying epistemic theory can
thus influence its own “intelligence”.
A system with a given epistemic theory can improve its ability to
generate new knowledge in two basic ways:
(i) it can extend the core of its knowledge base by adding new
knowledge to it, or
(ii) it can discover an “epistemic flaw” in its current epistemic the-
ory and repair it by changing its flawed part or the entire theory.
The remaining option seems to be an extension of the repertoire
of the AGI system’s derivation rules by rules which could lead to
shorter derivation chains. In our further analysis we will not concen-
trate on this option since centuries of practice in human reasoning
have lead to a stable set of rules of reasoning, which indicates that
this need not be reconsidered as a first option. There are many rea-
sonable sets of inference rules known and all of them appear to be
fit for use as far as their “derivation power” is concerned. Therefore,
for knowledge derivation their change cannot have a dramatic effect
measured in terms of “what can be derived”. What a change of rules
can influence is the efficiency of the inference process, but this is
of secondary concern. However, it should not be overlooked that a
system can change its mode of reasoning, i.e., change the type of un-
derlying logic it uses. E.g., it can transit from purely deterministic
reasoning to some probabilistic, fuzzy, modal, quantum, etc., way of
reasoning. The use of non-standard logics is bound to specific epis-
temic domains (especially, in mathematical logic) and we will not
consider it as a primary mean of amplifying the “power” of epistemic
theories.
Changing theories We now consider the ways of changing epis-
temic theories in more detail.
(i) The first possibility of improving the ability of a system to gen-
erate new knowledge is the extension of the core of its epistemic
theory. That is, adding of new knowledge to its core that cannot be
inferred from the knowledge already existing in the knowledge base.
Such new knowledge will play the role of new axioms. It can be ob-
tained in two ways.
First, it can be delivered through sensors by which an AGI system
interacts with its environment. Depending on the type of a sensor, the
information provided by that sensor will be placed into the core as
a new piece of knowledge. Note that what a sensor does is not com-
putation, since a sensor realizes a mapping from the outside, “real
world” into the knowledge domain D (that is, a sensor does not im-
plement a mapping from D to D).
Second, new “ready made” knowledge, whose truthfulness is
taken for granted, can enter an AGI system as an input from the out-
side. Such a piece of knowledge will become an axiom. Note that
it shares the same characteristics as a piece of knowledge obtained
through a sensor — it cannot be computed by the system at hand.
The extension of a theory in the above mentioned ways can be
“automatized” as follows. An embodied AGI system, equipped with
the necessary sensors and effectors, can by its own means propose
and realize observations, measurements, experiments and in this way
gain new information that can enter its knowledge base in form of ax-
ioms. Such a system can also ask an other systems (or humans) to as-
sist it in getting the necessary information (cf. the scenario proposed
at the end of Section 5). In any case, what happens is the injection
of non-computable information (i.e., of information non-derivable in
the given system) into the core of the epistemic base.
It is worth to observe that back in nineteen sixties M. Arbib [1]
was already thinking along the lines of “how an intelligent organism
may become more intelligent”. To this end he invoked what he called
the Go¨del speed-up theorem, stating that if we add a new axiom to
the existing axiomatization, not only are there truths which become
theorems for the first time, but, also, that theorems which were al-
ready provable in the old system may have shorter proofs in the new
system. In [1] he writes: “If we make the highly artificial assump-
tion that the contents of the memory of an organism corresponds to
the axioms, and the theorems so far, of a formal system — with the
ability to add axioms by induction — then Go¨del’s theorem reminds
us that the virtue of adding new data to memory is not simply that
that particular piece of information now becomes available to the
organism, but also that the organism may compute other information
much faster than it could otherwise, even though that information
was denied to the organism before.”
(ii) The second possibility for improving the epistemic theory of a
system is to discover an epistemic flaw in it and to repair it accord-
ingly. E.g., a system may discover a discrepancy between its knowl-
edge and some facts gained via observations and/or argumentation.
This has been the case of the discrepancy between the geocentric
and heliocentric theory. An AGI system can be designed so as to
purposefully chase after such discrepancies, e.g., by actively verify-
ing the “known truths” about the real world by its own means or in
cooperation with humans (cf. the proposal of the interactive research
scenario in Section 5). A system asked to find an explanation of some
phenomenon can formulate a hypothesis — a missing link in a chain
of explanations — and prove it by its own means. In order to do so
a system must exhibit a high degree of epistemic creativity which, in
this context, is seen as the ability to solve problems [21].
At this point a second historical digression is in place. Namely,
the idea of “falsificationalism”, i.e., of finding epistemic flaws in
a theory serving as a refutation of that theory, has gained attention
in philosophy since the work of K. Popper [10]. Popper envisioned
the progress in science as a sequence of successive rejections of fal-
sified scientific theories. In fact, our idea of “repairing” the flawed
epistemic theories extends Popper’s ideas from theory-full domains
of scientific theories towards a more general setting of theory-less
epistemic domains.
The combined effect of both theory extension and repairs has the
consequence that the epistemic domainD is enlarged and in this way
the system keeps increasing its “understanding” of its environment.
Could there be a better evidence for the intelligence growth of such
an AGI system?
Returning back to Arbib’s “highly artificial assumption”, in the
case of the AGI systems this assumption is becoming quite a natural
one and in the form of self-improving theories leads to ... superintel-
ligent artificial entities.
In addition to the previously described ideas of self-improving the-
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ories, there is one more way of improving the efficiency of AGI sys-
tems without twiddling with the inference rules or the underlying
theory. This is the idea of self-adjusting the often performed infer-
ences w.r.t. the expected derivations. Such changes will not improve
the worst cases, but can help in “average” cases. This can be imple-
mented in many ways, e.g., by making the often derived intermediate
results of inference a part of the knowledge base (in this way, later on
they will be treated as axioms and there will be no need to repeat the
respective derivations), by aligning the searches with the user prefer-
ences (as done by Google+), etc.
Some consequences There is a profound difference between our
ideas of increasing the intelligence of AGIs and the generally ac-
cepted ideas of the “recursive self-improvement” of software. Intu-
itively, the difference between the ideas of “self-improving software”
and “self-improving theories” seems to lie in the view of the underly-
ing agencies: software is in principle uncontrolled and uncheckable,
whereas theories are controlled and governed by checkable rules. But
there is more to it: while the idea of self-improving epistemic theories
is well founded in the epistemic approach to computations and can
provably lead to qualitatively more powerful systems (through the
increase of the amount of generated knowledge or the repair of incor-
rect theories), the idea of self-improving software leading to higher
intelligence is quite vague and misguiding. Without a further pro-
viso what parts of software are to be made more efficient and how,
it can lead at best to quantitatively more efficient systems that would
possibly be faster than the previous versions of the system. But such
improvements will increase neither the knowledge capacity of the
underlying system nor cure their knowledge flaws. Moreover, the of-
ten proclaimed idea of designing superintelligent systems that would
have the ability of “getting better in getting better” cf. [22], [5], [2])
through software self-improvement has its limits derived from the
limits of computations. The computational potential of physically re-
alistic systems is upper-bounded by the Σ2 class of the arithmetic hi-
erarchy [16]. On the other hand, the idea of self-improving theories
works as long as there are new aspects of the real or artificial worlds
(like in mathematics) that are worth to be investigated. Our analysis
clearly shows that what has to be primarily improved in order to gain
greater intelligence, is not the software, but the epistemic data — the
underlying knowledge base of the epistemic theories.
The latter considerations on self-improving theories also make
more precise the ideas of so-called Seed AI (cf. [2]). Here, Seed AI
should be seen as an AGI system which improves upon its own de-
sign, thus creating a smarter seed AI even more able to improve itself,
and so on. Initially this program would likely have a minimal intel-
ligence, but over the course of many iterations it would evolve to
human-equivalent or even super-human intelligence. From our pre-
vious thoughts the following picture of Seed AI unfolds. Such a sys-
tem must rest on the ability to extend and repair epistemic theories
by some automated process, the ability to integrate the new improved
theories in processes of learning, reasoning and action, shortening of
its decision sequences and proofs, all of that supported by the inter-
play between a knowledge base and computation.
Our approach to superintelligence via self-improving theories al-
lows the following proposition about the asymptotic convergence of
the processes of well formalized epistemic theories:
Proposition 1 In a stable well-formalized epistemic domain whose
subsets are described by finite epistemic theories, in the long run
all epistemic self-improving theories will converge towards theories
generating equivalent knowledge.
Proof (Sketch): Sooner or later, if there is a possibility to extend
or repair the underlying epistemic theory, any AGI system based on
such a theory will discover this possibility and improve its theory. In
this way, all theories will keep disposing of their drawbacks. At the
same time, of course, the theories keep extending their knowledge
via refinement of the previously achieved knowledge. Assuming that
theory improvement is confluent here, the AGI systems converge to-
wards the equivalent epistemic theories under the stated conditions.
2
It follows from the proposition that from a certain time on, sooner
or later, any self-improving theory will only evolve as a so-called
normal science (cf.[9]) in which no theory extensions or repairs will
occur and the explicit knowledge generated by that theory will grow
only through a refinement of the previously achieved knowledge. The
proposition as it stands thus gives a certain support to J. Horgan’s
ideas concerning the end of science [8].
Proposition 1 may be compared with what Yampolskyi calls
“Recursive Self-Improvement Convergence Theory” (RSI Conver-
gence Theory) [22]. This theory hypothesizes that, regardless of the
specifics behind the design of the Seed AI used to start an recursive
self-improvement process, all such system, attempting to achieve
superintelligence will converge to the same software architecture.
While not specifying what is meant by the software architecture of a
superintelligent system and lacking any theoretical framework, such
a hypothesis must remain intuitive. Contrary to this, Proposition 1
is founded on the epistemic theory of computations and captures a
different aspect of such an intuition — namely the one based on the
epistemic view of AGI systems.
4 Observing AGI systems
The most tantalizing problem for AGI systems, and especially for su-
perintelligent systems, is the issue of their safety. This is the question
of how to construct AGI systems whose actions will be, and remain,
aligned with human values (i.e., which would not harm human inter-
ests) while still allowing them enough freedom to change their goals
in the course of their self-improvement.
There are two problems related to this question. First, there is no
clarity on how to compose and represent a list of human values that
AGI systems should preserve. As a first approximation the set of
all laws, constitutions, human rights, treaties, religious books, etc.,
could be used. Obviously such a set might be be contradictory and
incomplete. Determining any final form of it is bound to be full of
political, philosophical and ethical issues.Therefore the implied theo-
ries implied will not be uniquely determined, subject to further (self-)
improvement, and potentially diverge.
Unfortunately, even if we had an acceptable list of human values,
there is a second problem: how to ensure that the behavior of the AGI
systems will not deviate from the implied standard of well-behaved
intelligence? No solution to these problems has been proposed until
now [2]. Could it be possible to design a special AGI system O that
would “observe” any other AGI system and raise an ‘alarm’ once it
notices behavior that is going against the human values as agreed for
this AGI?
Deciding safety In order to model this situation in our epistemic
framework, let us think of two AGI systems working over the same
knowledge domain, possibly with different theories. One is the sys-
tem A— an AGI system to be observed, making use of theory TA,
and the other is the systemO observingA— with the goal of raising
an alarm whenever A acts against human interests. We assume that
O has an accepted list of human values, and that it has the ability to
create hypotheses about TA.
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In this context, “observing” means that O can observe the in-
put/output behavior of A, through appropriate sensors. It is conceiv-
able thatO can also access (a part of) the description, specification or
even the ‘code’ ofA, for inspection. Does this mean thatO can “de-
cide” at all times whether A obeys the human values from its list? If
there exist more observers of A, with the same goals as O and equal
‘lists’ of human values, will their verdicts concerning the behavior of
A always agree?
These problems are all very hard. To begin with, it is clearly im-
possible forO to decide whetherA conforms to a given specification
by just observing its input-output behavior for a limited time. Even
code inspection may not be sufficient, as computability theory learns
that it is generally impossible to decide non-trivial properties of a
system from its code. This will be even more the case if A is al-
lowed to self-improve, constantly renewing the theory that drives its
actions. Thus,O seems forced to monitorA continually, and to keep
track of any changes to TA as they happen.
Even when it does so, the observer may have great difficulty to tell
by observation whether A adheres to his list of human values. Ade-
quate formalization seems required, but how to keep this compatible
with changes inA’ behavior and signals? Without understanding the
way A acquires new knowledge (and new behavior) O will never
know if the AGI will continue to adhere to human values under all
circumstances. Even code monitoring may not be sufficient, as be-
havioral properties may be impossible to decipher from code.
Due to the current lack of formalization and perhaps our poor in-
sight we are not able to prove whether the properties which observers
must “decide” are computationally undecidable. Nevertheless, we
may counter this by attacking some of the assumptions on which
the argumentation is based. Short of abandoning the whole idea that
AGIs can be kept aligned with human values, the only alternative is
to impose limitations and restrict their range of behavior.
5 Restraining the behavior of AGI systems
Although we are not able to prove the nonexistence of the general
algorithm solving the value learning problem for any AGI that poten-
tially can change its goals, we can prove the existence of an observer
that can detect in the behavior of a given AGI system a deviation
from its fixed goals, whatever they are.
In order to do so, the observer, having at its disposal the current
theory governing the behavior of the observed system, simply checks
whether the input/output behavior of the observed system is aligned
with the behavior described by the theory at hand. Note the difference
with the previous scenario — now the task of the observer is not to
judge whether the behavior of the observed system is aligned with
the list of acceptable behavior (“human values”). Rather, the observer
has merely to check whether the observee does what is he expected
to do according to the theory available to the observer.
Doing such a check, the observer need not replicate the observee’s
computations. Rather, for the observer it is enough to get from the
observee the result of its computation together with the proof of the
derivation of the result within its underlying theory. Checking such a
proof is usually substantially easier than its discovery. Therefore, the
observer can be a much simpler system than the observed system. In
fact, the observer cannot generate any other knowledge than answers
YES or NO concerning the correctness of the examined derivation.
In particular, an observer cannot overwrite its theory.
Interactive proof systems We will make the previous thoughts
more clear by using ideas from the theory of interactive proof sys-
tems. In computational complexity theory, an interactive proof sys-
tem is an abstract machine that models computation by the exchange
of messages between two parties. The parties, the verifier and the
prover, interact by exchanging messages in order to ascertain whether
a given string (fact) belongs to a language or not. The prover is all-
powerful and possesses unlimited computational resources, but can-
not be trusted, while the verifier has bounded computation power.
Messages are sent between the verifier and prover until the verifier
has an answer to the problem and has ”convinced” itself that it is
correct.
In our setting, the AGI system to be controlled will play the role of
a prover while the checking observer will play the role of a verifier.
The prover is all-powerful in the sense that it can generate what-
ever knowledge that can be derived within its epistemic theory T.
Although the prover possesses unlimited computational resources it
cannot be trusted — it can change its underlying theory (as explained
in Section 3) and thus its derivations can deviate from those described
by epistemic theory T that is available to the verifier. Thus, the “lan-
guage” recognized by the verifier is the set of all proofs of statements
in theory T. We assume that a bounded computational power of the
verifier is enough for checking the proofs in theory T. In this way
the verifier can detect whether the prover, in deriving its results, has
used the original theory T (and thus, it did not change it), or not.
This, of course, cannot prevent the prover to think about whatever
it wants according to whatever theories it has developed. We do not
care and we have no way of detecting it unless such ideas are pre-
sented to the verifier which will detect them as ideas not agreeing
with the watched theory. Rather opposite is true — such thinking
outside of the framework of the guarded theory may help the prover
to increase its creativity and to find solutions that could possibly be
transformed into the framework of the verifier’s theory and presented
to the verifier as proofs in the supervised theory.
Suppose now that the original AGI systemA has been governed by
a “fixed” theory T0. This means that (so far) A has no mechanisms
to modify T0 and suppose further that we, humans, as creators of A,
after experiencing with A for some time come to a conclusion that
this system is safe, aligned with human values. Now, let us allow
changes of T0. From this time on A is allowed to self-improve its
underlying theory to get a different theory T1. The verifier, having
still theory T0 to its disposal, can detect the deviation in behavior of
A should the latter system use the derivations lying outside of T0.
This, of course, would not necessarily mean thatA is no longer safe,
nevertheless it could be the case.
Safe design The previous considerations together lead to the fol-
lowing design of a “safe” AGI system. The prover must be boxed
(cf.[2]) so no information, except that serving for communication
with the verifier, can escape from it. In order not to restrict its knowl-
edge generating power giving rise to its creativity (cf. [20]), we as-
sume that the prover has access to a fixed knowledge domain of some
sort, or even to a copy of the entire Internet that is kept up-to-date.
The prover starts its operation within the underlying epistemic the-
ory T0 that is considered to be safe by the operators of the system
and is known to the verifier. The cooperation of both systems then
proceeds in rounds. In each round, the verifier poses a “question” to
the prover who has to find an answer and provide it to the verifier to-
gether with a proof that the verifier can check for correctness. Then
the next round can start. This basic scenario can, of course, be made
more detailed and can come in several variants. E.g., what to do if
the prover is not able to find an answer in a reasonable time. Setting
a time bound and allowing answers “I do not know” can solve this
problem. We may also require that the prover will inform the verifier
that it has discovered a new fact, or has “changed its mind” leading
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to the change of its underlying epistemic theory. The operators of the
system can then decide whether the new theory is safe or not. The
prover can also propose to the operators to make an experiment and
provide him with the results.
The scenario is guaranteed to be safe only when the following two
assumptions are met.
(i) First, the quarantine of the AGI must be perfectly tight. For in-
stance, if output of the prover could be accessible on the web, other
AGI’s could interpret the proofs as holding secret messages and thus
conspire unnoticed to the verifier who believes that the box is tight.
There are many other possibilities for scenarios of interactions be-
tween the prover, verifiers and operators of the entire system as well
as many possibilities how information from the prover could leak out
of the box. Thus, it appears that the true issue is whether a superin-
telligent system can always remain boxed in. E.g. unfriendly powers
could release it. This may be unsolvable by our arguments but it does
lead to the question how the architecture that is proposed can be en-
forced. A large number of possible scenarios and their strong- and
weak points have been described in the Bostrom’s book [2] in the
section considering oracles and query-answering systems.
(ii) If the first assumption is fulfilled then the burden of verifica-
tion rests on theory T0. It must not allow any form of cheating from
the side of prover. Especially, the verifier must not accept any false,
incomplete “justifications” revealing only partial reasons for the so-
lution proposed by the malicious prover not mentioning other rea-
sons that might not be aligned with human values. A defense against
such malicious attacks can only rest in a thorough inspection of all
justifications provided by the prover and asking the prover for ren-
dering the proofs that all aspects have been taken into account in the
proposed solution.
Interaction When thinking about concrete interactions with su-
perintelligent systems, it seems that any process of self-improvement
should be guided and monitored with care. For example, it is proba-
bly not the best idea to want AGI’s to solve complex problems in one
shot — such as “cure cancer by discovering a process which elim-
inates cancerous cells from a human body without causing harm to
the humans” (example taken from [13]), or “explain dark matter” [4].
A better idea seems to be to interact with the system, to devise a
project for solving such a problem, a project counting on the cooper-
ation with human teams of specialists. Such a proposal should con-
sist of the introductory study on the status quo in the field at hand,
identification of the current obstacles, indication of the promising
ways to solve the problem, and their justification or explanation. Af-
ter consulting this with humans, one could then interact and develop
a methodology, a work plan stating what has to be done, what exper-
iments and how and by whom they should be performed, stating hy-
pothesis about what is to be expected, what will be the checkpoints,
milestones, deliverables, risks, expenses, etc. Such an iterative incre-
mental process will enable verification of the intermediate results,
elimination of blind alleys, and above all — will keep AGI’s under
control, without trespassing human values (keeping us in the game
as well as equal partners). The substantial novelty of our approach is
the presence of the formal verifier which, together with the operators,
can guard the safety of the system.
6 Conclusions
We have shown that the epistemic approach to computations enables
a fresh look at AGI systems in general and at superintelligence in par-
ticular. This approach calls into question some generally proclaimed
characteristics of superintelligence. First, it knocks down the idea
that the thought processes of superintelligent systems will be so alien
to human thinking that they become incomprehensible for people.
The reason is that any system generating knowledge must have a
proof that its inferences are correct within some epistemic theory,
and this proof and the theory could be made accessible to humans.
Second, the epistemic approach allows to identify the true source of
self-improvement of superintelligent systems. It consists primarily
in the self-improvement abilities of the underlying epistemic theo-
ries rather than in general and vague ideas about “recursively self-
improving software”. It is especially the epistemic data of which the
quality and quantity must be raised, in order to improve the intel-
ligence of AGI systems. Third, taking into account our inability to
find an efficient solution of the alignment the AGI systems with hu-
man values, our approach to computation leads to new scenarios for
constructing safe AGI systems. One such scenario, consisting in in-
teractive monitoring the agreement of a system’s actions with an ac-
ceptable epistemic theory and in intellectual partnership between hu-
mans and AGI systems, has been described in this paper. We believe
that our conclusions moderate both the over-optimistic expectations
of superintelligence fans and over-pessimistic concerns of superin-
telligence opponents, by grounding the ideas on singularity in more
realistic foundations.
To conclude, the results of this investigation illustrate the strength
of the epistemic approach to computation. In an elegant way, it al-
lows a liberation from thinking in the frames of computational mod-
els, from the design of concrete algorithms underlying the actions of
the AGI systems, and from the related representational issues. Un-
der this approach, AGIs are seen as implementations of epistemic
theories ‘working’ over epistemic domains that capture properties
of the world. The resulting unifying framework allows one to study
non-trivial general properties of AGI systems and leads to a deeper
insight into the knowledge-producing mechanisms behind their op-
eration. As far as we are aware, existing studies of AGI- and superin-
telligent systems (cf. [2]) do not offer such a general approach, with
the same explanation potential.
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Progress report on the Turing-inspired
Meta-Morphogenesis project
Aaron Sloman1
Abstract. The Turing-inspired Meta-Morphogenesis project was
proposed in the final commentary in Alan Turing - His Work and
Impact a collection of papers by and about Turing published on the
occasion of his centenary[6]. The project was also summarised in
a keynote talk at AISB2012, suggesting that an attempt to fill gaps
in our knowledge concerning evolution of biological information
processing may give clues regarding forms of computation in animal
brains that have not yet been re-invented by AI researchers, and this
may account for some of the enormous gaps between current AI and
animal intelligence, including gaps between ancient mathematicians,
such as Euclid and current AI systems. Evolution of information
processing capabilities and mechanisms is much harder to study than
evolution of physical forms and physical behaviours, e.g. because
fossil records can provide only very indirect evidence regarding
information processing in ancient organisms. Moreover it is very
hard to study all the internal details of information processing
in current organisms. Some of the reasons will be familiar to
programmers who have struggled to develop debugging aids for very
complex multi-component AI virtual machines. The paper presents
challenges both for the theory of evolution and for AI researchers
aiming to replicate natural intelligence, including mathematical
intelligence. This is a partial progress report on attempts to meet
the challenges by studying evolution of biological information
processing, including evolved construction-kits.
1 INTRODUCTION
This partial progress report on the Meta-Morphogenesis (M-M)
project, now also called the Self-Informing Universe project2,
extends ideas presented at AISB2012 (Turing Centenary)3.
The M-M project was based partly on my interest in defending
Kant’s philosophy of mathematics since my 1962 DPhil thesis [20]4,
and partly on a conjectured answer to the question: “What would
Alan Turing have worked on if he had not died two years after
publication of his 1952 paper on Chemistry and Morphogenesis
[31]?”, reproduced and discussed in Part IV of [6] — the most cited
of his publications, though largely ignored by philosophers, cognitive
scientists and AI researchers. It has stimulated research in physics,
chemistry, mathematics and biology, especially in the last decade. In
it, Turing demonstrated mathematically that, in principle, interaction
between two liquids diffusing at different rates through a developing
organism could produce a very wide variety of surface patterns and
3-D structures, including many found in living forms.5
1 Computer Science, Univ. of Birmingham. email: a.sloman@cs.bham.ac.uk
2 http://goo.gl/9eN8Ks
3 http://events.cs.bham.ac.uk/turing12/sloman.php
4 http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/sloman-1962
5 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reaction%E2%80%93diffusion system
I suspect that if Turing had lived on he would have tried
to understand forms of information processing needed to control
behaviour of increasingly complex organisms. Controlled production
of complex behaving structures needs increasingly sophisticated
information processing, both in the processes of growth and
development and for control of behaviour of complex organisms
reacting to their environment, including other organisms.
In simple cases control uses presence or absence of sensed matter
to turn things on or off or sensed scalar values to specify and modify
other values (e.g. chemotaxis6). Many artificial control systems are
specified using collections of differential equations relating such
measures. One of several influential attempts to generalise these
ideas is the “Perceptual Control Theory (PCT)” of Powers[18].
Turing’s Morphogenesis paper also focused on scalar (numerical)
changes, but as a pioneer of modern computer science he was well
aware that the space of information-using control mechanisms is not
restricted to numerical control systems.
In the last half century human engineers have discovered, designed
and built increasingly complex and varied additional forms of control
in interacting physical and virtual machines, including control
based on grammars, parsers, planners, reasoners, rule interpreters,
problem solvers and many forms of automated discovery and
learning. Long before that, biological evolution produced and
used increasingly complex and varied forms of information in
construction, modification and control of increasingly complex and
varied behaving mechanisms. [26] suggested that if Turing had lived
several decades longer, he might have produced new theories about
intermediate forms of information in living systems and intermediate
mechanisms for information-processing: intermediate between the
very simplest forms and the most sophisticated current forms of life.
This might fill a gap in standard versions of the theory of natural
selection: namely, it does not explain what makes possible the many
forms of life on this planet, and all the mechanisms they use,
including the forms that might have evolved in the past or may
evolve in the future. It merely assumes such possibilities and explains
how a subset of realised possibilities persist and consequences that
follow. For example, the noted biologist Graham Bell wrote in [1]:
“Living complexity cannot be explained except through selection and
does not require any other category of explanation whatsoever”. This
ignores the need to explain (a) what mechanisms make possible all
the options between which choices are made, and (b) how what is
possible changes, and depends on previously realised possibilities.
6 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemotaxis
SYMPOSIUM X. 10TH AISB SYMPOSIUM ON COMPUTING AND PHILOSOPHY 364
Co
nfe
re
nc
e
ed
itio
n
2 USES OF EVOLVED CONSTRUCTION KITS
To meet this criticism, the M-M project was expanded in 2014
to include investigation of (a) the nature and potential of the
“Fundamental Construction Kit” (FCK) provided by physics and
chemistry before life existed and (b) the many and varied “Derived
construction kits” (DCKs) produced by combinations of natural
selection and other processes, including asteroid impacts, tides,
changing seasons, volcanic eruptions and plate tectonics.7
As new, more complicated, life forms evolved, with increasingly
complex bodies, increasingly complex changing needs, increasingly
broad behavioural repertoires, and richer branching possible actions
and futures to consider, their information processing needs and
opportunities also became more complex. Somehow the available
construction kits also diversified, in ways that allowed construc-
tion not only of new biological materials and body mechanisms,
supporting new more complex and varied behaviours, but also new
more sophisticated information-processing mechanisms, enabling
organisms, either alone or in collaboration, to deal with increasingly
complex challenges and opportunities.
Deep discoveries made by evolution include designs for DCKs
that make new forms of information processing possible, with im-
portant roles in animal intelligence, including perception, conceptual
development, motivation, planning, problem solving and topological
reasoning about effects and limitations of possible continuous
rearrangements of material objects: much harder than planning
moves in a discrete space. Different species, with different needs,
habitats and behaviours, use information about different topological
and geometrical relationships, including birds that build different
sorts of nests, carnivores that tear open their prey in order to feed,
and human toddlers playing with (or sucking) body-parts, toys, etc.
Later on, in a smaller subset of species (perhaps only one species?)
new meta-cognitive abilities gradually allowed previous discoveries
to be noticed, reflected on, communicated, challenged, defended and
deployed in new contexts. Such “argumentative” interactions may
have been important precursors for chains of reasoning, including
the proofs in Euclid’s Elements.8
This is part of an attempt to explain how it became possible for
evolution to produce mathematical reasoners. (The importance for
science of explanations of possibilities and limits of possibilities was
discussed in Chapter 2 of [22].9)
Deeper theories, explanations, and working models than we can
now produce should emerge from investigation of preconditions,
biological and technological consequences, limitations, variations,
and supporting mechanisms for biological construction kits of
many kinds. For example, biologists (e.g. Coates [5]) have pointed
out that specialised construction kits, sometimes called “toolkits”,
supporting plant development were produced by evolution, making
upright plants possible on land (some of which were later found
useful for many purposes by humans, e.g. ship-builders). Specialised
construction kits were also needed by vertebrates and others by
various classes of invertebrate forms of life. Construction kits for
biological information processing have received less attention. One
of the early exceptions was Schro¨dinger[19].
More general construction kits that are tailorable with extra
7 http://goo.gl/eFnJb1
8 E.g. http://goo.gl/Zz2O1l and http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/
cogaff/misc/trisect.html
9 http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/crp/#chap2) While fi-
nalising this paper I learnt that the physicist David Deutsch is developing
what he calls “Constructor theory”, making related points. Use search
engines to find recent videos and publications.
information for new applications can arise from discoveries of
parametrisable sub-spaces in the space of possible mechanisms – e.g.
common forms with different sizes, or different ratios of sizes, of
body parts, different rates of growth of certain body parts, different
shapes or sizes of feeding apparatus, different body coverings, etc.
Using a previously evolved construction kit with new parameters
(specified either in the genome, or by some aspect of the environment
during development [11]) can produce new variants of organisms in a
fraction of the time it would take to evolve that type from the earliest
life forms.
Similar advantages have been claimed for the use of so-called
Genetic Programming (GP) using evolved, structured, parametrised
abstractions that can be re-deployed in different contexts, in contrast
with Genetic Algorithms (GAs) that use randomly varied flat strings
of bits or other basic units.10
Instead of using only continual modification of parameters of
a fixed pattern to control development of individuals from birth
or hatching, evolution sometimes produces specifications for two
or more different designs for different stages, e.g. one that feeds
for a while, and then produces a cocoon in which materials are
transformed into a chemical soup from which a new very different
adult form (e.g. butterfly, moth, or dragon fly) emerges, able to travel
much greater distances than the larval form to find a mate or lay eggs.
These species use mathematical commonality at a much lower level
(common molecular structures) than the structural and functional
designs of larva and adult, in contrast with the majority of organisms,
which retain a fixed, or gradually changing, structure while they grow
after hatching or being born, but not fixed sizes or size-ratios of parts,
forces required, etc.
Mathematical discoveries were implicit in evolved designs that
support parametrisable variable functionalities, such as evolution’s
discovery of homeostatic control mechanisms that use negative
feedback control, billions of years before the Watt centrifugal
governor was used to control speed of steam engines.11 Of course,
most instances of such designs would no more have any awareness
of the mathematical principles being used than a Watt-governor, or
a fan-tail windmill (with a small wind-driven wheel turning the big
wheel to face the wind) does. In both cases a part of the mechanism
acquires information about something (e.g. whether speed is too high
or too low, or the direction of maximum wind strength) while another
part does most of the work, e.g. transporting energy obtained from
heat or wind power to a new point of application.
Such transitions and decompositions in designs could lead to
distinct portions of genetic material concerned with separate control
functions, e.g. controlling individual development and controlling
adult use of products of development, both encoded in genetic
material shared across individuals.
Very much later, some meta-cognitive products of evolution
allowed individuals (humans, or precursors) to attend to their
own information-processing (essential for debugging), thereby “re-
discovering” the structures and processes, allowing them to be
organised and communicated – in what we now call mathematical
theories, going back to Euclid and his predecessors (about whose
achievements there are still many unanswered questions).
If all of this is correct then the physical universe, especially the
quantum mechanical aspects of chemistry discussed by Schro¨dinger
in 1944[19], provided not only a construction kit for genetic material
implicitly specifying design features of individual organisms, but
10 http://www.genetic-programming.org/
11 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governor (device)
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also a “Fundamental” construction kit (FCK) that can produce a
wide variety of “derived” construction kits (DCKs) some used in
construction of individual organisms, others in construction of new,
more complex DCKs, making new types of organism possible.
Moreover, as Schro¨dinger and others pointed out, construction-
kits that are essential for micro-organisms developing in one part of
the planet can indirectly contribute to construction and maintenance
processes in totally different organisms in other locations, via
food chains: since most species cannot synthesise the complex
chemicals they need directly from freely available atoms or sub-
atomic materials. So effects of DCKs can be very indirect.
Functional relationships between the smallest life forms and the
largest will be composed of many sub-relations. Such dependency
relations apply not only to mechanisms for construction and
empowerment of major physical parts of organisms, but also to
mechanisms for building information-processors, including brains,
nervous systems, and chemical information processors of many sorts.
(E.g. digestion uses informed disassembly of complex structures to
find valuable parts to be transported and used or stored elsewhere.)
So far, in answer to Bell, I have tried to describe the need for
evolutionary selection mechanisms to be supported by enabling
mechanisms. Others have noticed the problem denied by Bell,
e.g. Kirschner and Gerhart[15]12 adding some important biological
details to the theory of evolved construction-kits, though not (as far
as I can tell) the ideas (e.g. about abstraction and parametrisation)
presented in this paper. Ganti’s “chemoton” theory [8], is also
relevant, as is Kauffman [14], possibly also [7, 10, 33]. and probably
others unknown to me!
3 BIOLOGICAL USES OF ABSTRACTION
As organisms grow in size, weight and strength, the forces and
torques required at joints and at contact points with other objects
change. So the genome needs to use the same design with changing
forces depending on tasks. Special cases include forces needed
to move and manipulate the torso, limbs, gaze direction, chewed
objects, etc. “Hard-wiring” of useful evolved control functions with
mathematical properties can be avoided by using designs that allow
changeable parameters – a strategy frequently used by human
programmers. Such parametrisation can both allow for changes
in size and shape of the organism as it develops, and for many
accidentally discovered biologically useful abstractions that can be
parametrised in such designs – e.g. allowing the same mechanism
to be used for control of muscular forces at different stages of
development, with changing weights, sizes, moments of inertia, etc.
Even more spectacular generalisation is achievable by re-use of
evolved construction-kits not only across developmental stages of
individuals within a species, but also across different species that
share underlying physical parametrised design patterns, with details
that vary between species sharing the patterns (as in vertebrates, or
the more specialised variations among primates, or among birds, or
fish species). Such shared design patterns across species can result
either from species having common ancestry or from convergent
evolution “driven” by common features of the environment, e.g.
aspects of spatial structure and visual perception of structure
common to all locations on the planet, despite the huge diversity
of contents. Such use of abstraction to achieve powerful re-usable
design features across different application domains is familiar to
engineers, including computer systems engineers.
12 Briefly reviewed in http://www.americanscientist.org/bookshelf/pub/
have-we-solved-darwins-dilemma
The Darwin/Wallace idea that variations between partly similar
species can evolve by splitting a lineage, without each variant having
to evolve separately from the most primitive organisms, implicitly as-
sumes re-use of important design abstractions in evolution. “Design
sharing” explains why the tree of evolution has many branch points,
instead of everything having to evolve from one common root node.
Symbiosis also allows combination of separately evolved features. 13
Similar “structure-sharing” often produces enormous reductions
in search-spaces in AI systems. It is also common in mathematics:
most proofs build on a previously agreed framework of concepts,
formalisms, axioms, rules, and previously proved theorems. They
don’t all start from some fundamental shared axioms.
A different kind of abstraction can be found in connection with
what are sometimes (misleadingly) called “non-functional require-
ments” or “ilities”, e.g. engineering design requirements such as
usability, maintainability, repairability, efficiency, understandability,
... that are not specific to particular functions or designs. They were
labelled “meta-functional requirements” in [28].
If re-usable abstractions can be encoded in suitable formalisms
(with different application-specific parameters provided in different
design contexts), they can enormously speed up evolution of diverse
designs for functioning organisms. This is partly analogous to
the use of memo-functions in software design (i.e. functions that
store computed values so that they don’t have to be re-computed
whenever required, speeding up computations enormously, e.g. in
the Fibonacci function). Another type of re-use occurs in (unfortu-
nately named) “object-oriented” programming paradigms that use
hierarchies of powerful re-usable design abstractions, that can be
instantiated differently in different combinations, to meet different
sets of constraints in different environments, without requiring each
such solution to be coded from scratch: “parametric polymorphism”
with multiple inheritance.
This is an important aspect of many biological mechanisms. For
example, there is enormous variation in what information perceptual
mechanisms acquire and how the information is processed, encoded,
stored, used, and in some cases communicated. But abstract com-
monalities of function and mechanism (e.g. use of wings) can be
combined with species specific constraints (parameters).
Parametric polymorphism makes the concept of consciousness
difficult to analyse: there are many variants depending on what sort
of thing is conscious, what it is conscious of, what information is
acquired, what mechanisms are used, how the information contents
are encoded, how they are accessed, how they are used, etc.14 Math-
ematical consciousness, still missing from AI, requires awareness of
possibilities and impossibilities not restricted to particular objects,
places or times – as Kant pointed out in [12]. (See examples in
Note 8.)
Mechanisms and functions are also shared across groups of
species, such as phototropism in plants, use of two eyes with lenses
focused on a retina in many vertebrates, a subset of which evolved
mechanisms using binocular disparity for 3-D perception. That’s
one of many implicit mathematical discoveries in evolved designs
for spatio-temporal perceptual, control and reasoning mechanisms,
using the fact that many forms of animal perception and action occur
in 3D space plus time, a fact that must have helped to drive evolution
of mechanisms for representing and reasoning about 2-D and 3-D
structures and processes, as in Euclidean geometry.
13 Compare the theory of symbiogensis
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbiogenesis
14 An overview is in preparation here: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/
projects/cogaff/misc/family-resemblance-vs-polymorphism.html
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In a search for effective designs, enormous advantages come from
(explicit or implicit) discovery and use of mathematical abstractions
that are applicable across different designs or different instances
of one design. For example a common type of grammar (e.g. a
phrase structure grammar) allows many different languages to be
implemented including sentence generators and sentence analysers
re-using the same program code with different grammatical rules.
Evolution seems to have discovered something like this.
Likewise, a common design framework for flying animals may
allow tradeoffs between stability and maneouvreability to be used
to adapt to different environmental opportunities and challenges.
These are mathematical discoveries implicitly used by evolution.
Evolution’s ability to use these discoveries depends in part on the
continual evolution of new DCKs providing materials, tools, and
principles that can be used in solving many design and manufacture
problems. In recently evolved species, individuals e.g. humans and
other intelligent animals, are able to replicate some of evolution’s
mathematical discoveries and make practical use of them in their own
intentions, plans and design decisions, far more quickly than natural
selection could. Only (adult) humans seem to be aware of doing this.
Re-usable inherited abstractions allow different collections of
members of one species, e.g. humans living in deserts, in jungles,
on mountain ranges, in arctic regions, etc., to acquire expertise
suited to their particular environments in a much shorter time
than evolution would have required to produce the same variety
of packaged competences “bottom up”. This flexibility also allows
particular groups to adapt to major changes in a much shorter time
than adaptation by natural selection would have required.
This requires some later developments in individuals to be delayed
until uses of earlier developments have provided enough information
about environmental features to influence the ways in which later
developments occur, as explained later in Section 3.3. This process
is substantially enhanced by evolution of metacognitive information
processing mechanisms that allow individuals to reflect on their own
processes of perception, learning, reasoning, problem-solving, etc.
and (to some extent) modify them to meet new conditions.
Later, more sophisticated products of evolution develop meta-
meta-cognitive information processing sub-architectures that enable
them to notice their own adaptive processes, and to reflect on
and discuss what was going on, and in some cases collaboratively
improve the processes, e.g. through explicit teaching – at first in a
limited social/cultural context, after which the activity was able to
spread far and wide – using previously evolved learning mechanisms.
As far as I know only humans have achieved that, though some other
species apparently have simpler variants. These conjectures need far
more research! Human AI designs for intelligent machines created
so far seem to have far fewer layers of abstraction, and are far more
primitive, than the re-usable designs produced by evolution. Studying
the differences is a major sub-task facing the M-M project (and AI).
This requires a deep understanding of what needs to be explained.
3.1 Designing designs
Just as the designer of a programming language cannot know
about, and does not need to know about, all the applications for
which the programming language will be used, so also can the
more abstract products of evolution be instantiated (e.g. by setting
parameters) for use in contexts in which they did not evolve. One
of the most spectacular cases is reuse of a common collection of
language-creation competences in a huge variety of geographical
and social contexts, allowing any individual human to acquire any
Figure 1. Many discontinuities in physical forms, behavioural capabilities,
environments, types of information acquired, types of use of information and
mechanisms for information-processing are still waiting to be discovered.
of several thousand enormously varied human languages, including
both spoken and signed languages. A striking example was the
cooperative creation by deaf children in Nicaragua of a new sign
language because their teachers had not learned sign languages
early enough to develop full adult competences. This suggests that
what is normally regarded as language learning is really cooperative
language creation, demonstrated in this video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pjtioIFuNf8
Re-use can take different forms, including re-use of a general
design across different species by instantiating a common pattern,
and re-use based on powerful mechanisms for acquiring and using in-
formation about the available resources, opportunities and challenges
during the development of each individual. The first process happens
across evolutionary lineages. The second happens within individual
organisms in their lifetime, as explained later, in Section 3.3.
Social/cultural evolution requires intermediate timescales.
Evolution seems to have produced multi-level design patterns,
whose details are filled in incrementally, during creation of instances
of the patterns in individual members of a species. If all the members
live in similar environments that will tend to produce uniform
end results. However, if the genome is sufficiently abstract, then
environments and genomic structures may interact in more complex
ways, allowing small variations during development of individuals
to cascade into significant differences in the adult organism, as if
natural selection had been sped up enormously. This was recognised
in plants in [11]. A special case is evolution of an immune system
with the ability to develop different immune responses depending on
the antigens encountered. Another dramatic special case is the recent
dramatic cascade of social, economic, and educational changes
supported jointly by the human genome and the internet!
3.2 Changes in developmental trajectories
As living things become more complex, increasingly varied types
of information are required for increasingly varied uses. The
processes of reproduction normally produce new individuals that
have seriously under-developed physical structures and behavioural
competences. Self-development requires physical materials, but it
also requires information about what to do with the materials,
including disassembling and reassembling chemical structures at a
sub-microscopic level and using the products to assemble larger body
parts, while constantly providing new materials, removing waste
products and consuming energy. Some energy is stored and some
is used in assembly and other processes.
The earliest (simplest?) organisms can acquire and use infor-
mation about (i.e. sense) only internal states and processes and
the immediate external environment, e.g. pressure, temperature,
and presence of chemicals in the surrounding soup, with all uses
of information taking the form of immediate local reactions, e.g.
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allowing a molecule through a membrane.
Changes in types of information, types of use of information
and types of biological mechanism for processing information have
repeatedly altered the processes of evolutionary morphogenesis that
produce such changes: a positive feedback process. An example is
the influence of mate selection on evolution in intelligent organisms:
mate selection is itself dependent on previous evolution of cognitive
mechanisms. Hence the prefix “Meta-” in “Meta-Morphogenesis”.
This is a process with multiple feedback loops between new designs
and new requirements (niches), as suggested in [23].
As Figure 1 suggests, evolution constantly produces new or-
ganisms that may or may not be larger than predecessors, but
are more complex both in the types of physical action they can
produce and also the types of information and types of information-
processing required for selection and control of such actions. Some
of that information is used immediately and discarded (online
perceptual intelligence) while other kinds are stored, possibly in
transformed formats, and used later, possibly on many occasions
(offline perceptual intelligence) — a distinction often mislabelled
as “where” vs “what” perception. This generalises Gibson’s theory
[9] that perception mainly provides information about “affordances”
rather than information about visible surfaces of perceived objects.
These ideas, like Karmiloff-Smith’s[13], suggest that one of the
effects of biological evolution was fairly recent production of more
or less abstract construction kits that come into play at different
stages in development, producing new more rapid changes in variety
and complexity of information processing across generations as
explained below in Section 3.3 and Figure 2.
It’s not clear how much longer this can continue: perhaps
limitations of human brains constrain this process. But humans
working with intelligent machines may be able to stretch the limits.
At some much later date, probably in another century, we may be
able to make machines that do it all themselves – unless it turns out
that the fundamental information processing mechanisms in brains
cannot be modelled in computer technology developed by humans.
Species can differ in the variety of types of sensory information
they can acquire, in the variety of uses to which they put that
information, in the variety of types of physical actions they can
produce, in the extent to which they can combine perceptual and
action processes to achieve novel purposes or solve novel problems,
and the extent to which they can educate, reason about, collaborate
with, compete against conspecifics, and prey or competitor species.
As competences become more varied and complex, the more
disembodied must the information processing be, i.e. disconnected
from current sensory and motor signals (while preserving low level
reflexes and sensory-motor control loops for special cases). This
may have been a precursor to mathematical abilities to think about
transfinite set theory and high dimensional vector spaces or modern
scientific theories. E.g. Darwin’s thinking about ancient evolutionary
processes. was detached from particular sensory-motor processes.
This applies also to affective states, e.g. compare being startled
and being obsessed with ambition. The fashionable emphasis on
embodied cognition may be appropriate to the study of organisms
such as plants and microbes, or even insects, but evolved intelligence
increasingly used disembodied cognition, most strikingly in the
production of ancient mathematical minds. (Compare Kirsh[16]).
3.3 Variations in epigenetic trajectories
The description given so far is very abstract and allows significantly
different instantiations in different species, addressing different sorts
Figure 2. Cascaded, staggered, developmental trajectories proposed in [3].
Early genome-driven learning from the environment occurs in loops on the
left. Downward arrows further right represent later gene-triggered processes
du ing individual development modulated by results of earlier learning via
feedback on left. (Chris Miall suggested the structure of the original diagram.)
of functionality and different types of design, e.g. of physical forms,
behaviours, control mechanisms, reproductive mechanisms, etc.
At one extreme the reproductive process produces individuals
whose genome exercises a fixed pattern of control during develop-
ment, leading to “adults” with only minor variations.
At another extreme, instead of the process of development from
one stage to another being fixed in the genome, it could be created
during development through the use of more than one level of
design in the genome. E.g. if there are two levels then results of
environmental interaction at the first level could transform what
happens at the second level. If there are multiple levels then what
happens at each new level may be influenced by results of earlier
developments.
In a species with such multi-stage development, at intermediate
stages not only are there different developmental trajectories due to
different environmental influences, there are also selections among
the intermediate level patterns to be instantiated, so that in one
environment development may include much learning concerned
with protection from freezing, whereas in other environments
individual species may vary more in the ways they seek water
during dry seasons. Then differences in adults come partly from the
influence of the environment in selecting patterns to instantiate. E.g.
one group may learn and pass on information about where the main
water holes are, and in another group individuals may learn and pass
on information about which plants are good sources of water.
If these conjectures are correct, patterns of development will auto-
matically be varied because of patterns and meta-patterns picked up
by earlier generations and instantiated in cascades during individual
development. So different cultures produced jointly by a genome and
previous environments can produce very different expressions of the
same genome, even though individuals share similar physical forms.
The main differences are in the kinds of information acquired and
used, and the information processing mechanisms developed. Not all
cultures use advanced mathematics in designing buildings, but all
build on previously evolved understanding of space, time and motion.
Evolution seems to have found how to provide rich developmental
variation by allowing information gathered by young individuals not
SYMPOSIUM X. 10TH AISB SYMPOSIUM ON COMPUTING AND PHILOSOPHY 368
Co
nfe
re
nc
e
ed
itio
n
merely to select and use pre-stored design patterns, but to create
new patterns by assembling fragments of information during early
development, then using more abstract processes to construct new
abstract patterns, partly shaped by the current environment, but
with the power to be used in new environments. Developments
in culture (including language, science, engineering, mathematics,
music, literature, etc.) all show such combinations of data collection
and enormous creativity, including creative ontology extension (e.g.
the Nicaraguan children mentioned above in Section 3.1).
Unless I have misunderstood her, this is the type of process
Karmiloff-Smith[13] called “Representational Re-description” (RR).
The general idea is crudely depicted in Figure 2 (extending the
version published in 2007[3]). Genome-encoded previously acquired
abstractions “wait” to be instantiated at different stages of devel-
opment, using cascading alternations between data-collection and
abstraction formation (RR) by instantiating higher level generative
abstractions (e.g. meta-grammars), not by forming statistical gener-
alisations. This could account for both the great diversity of human
languages and cultures, and the power of each one, all supported by
a common genome operating in very different environments.
Jackie Chappell (co-author of [3]) noticed the implication that
instead of the genome specifying a fixed “epigenetic landscape”
(proposed by Waddington[32]) it provides a schematic landscape and
mechanisms that allow each individual (or in same cases groups of
individuals) to modify the landscape while moving down it (e.g.
adding new hills, valleys, channels and barriers). In such cases
measures of percentage contributions of genome and environment
to cognition are nonsensical, unlike descriptions of influences.
Though most visible in language development, the process is not
unique to language development, but occurs throughout childhood
(and beyond) in connection with many aspects of development of
information processing abilities, construction of new ontologies,
theory formation, etc. This differs from forms of learning or
development that use uniform statistics-based methods for repeatedly
finding patterns at different levels of abstraction.
Instead, Figure 2 indicates that the genome encodes increasingly
abstract and powerful creative mechanisms developed at different
stages of evolution, that are “awakened” (a notion used by Kant
in [12]) in individuals only when appropriate, so that they can
build on what has already been learned or created in a manner
that is tailored to the current environment. For example, in young
(non-deaf) humans, processes giving sound sequences a syntactic
interpretation develop after the child has learnt to produce and to
distinguish some of the actual speech sounds used in that location.
It is a remarkable fact that young humans seem to be able to learn
two (or more) languages with different speech sounds and different
grammatical structures in parallel. However, there must be an upper
limit to the number of languages a child can acquire concurrently.
In social species, the later stages of Figure 2 include mechanisms
for discovering non-linguistic ontologies and facts older members
of the community have acquired, and incorporating relevant subsets
in combination with new individually acquired information. Instead
of merely absorbing the details of what older members have learnt,
the young can absorb forms of creative learning, reasoning and
representation that older members have found useful and apply them
in new environments to produce new results. In humans, this has
produced spectacular effects, especially in the last few decades.
The evolved mechanisms for representing and reasoning about
possibilities, impossibilities and necessities were essential for both
perception and use of affordances[9] and for making mathematical
discoveries, something statistical learning cannot achieve.
3.4 Space-time
An invariant for all species in this universe is space-time embed-
ding, and changing spatial relationships between body parts and
things in the environment. The relationships vary between water-
dwellers, cave-dwellers, tree-dwellers, flying animals, and modern
city-dwellers. Representational requirements depend on body parts
and their controllable relationships to one another and other objects.
So aeons of evolution will produce neither a tabula rasa nor
geographically specific spatial information, but a collection of
generic mechanisms for finding out what sorts of spatial structures
have been bequeathed by ancestors as well as physics and geography,
and learning to make use of whatever is available (McCarthy[17]):
that’s why embodiment is relevant to evolved cognition.
Kant’s ideas about geometric knowledge are relevant though he
assumed that the innate apparatus was geared only to structures in
Euclidean space, whereas our space is only approximately Euclidean.
Somehow the mechanisms conjectured in Figure 2 eventually (after
many generations) made it possible for humans to make the amazing
discoveries recorded in Euclid’s Elements, still used world-wide by
scientists and engineers. If we remove the parallel axiom we are left
with a very rich collection of facts about space and time, especially
topological facts about varieties of structural change, e.g. formation
of networks of relationships, deformations of surfaces, and possible
trajectories constrained by fixed obstacles.
It is well known (though non-trivial to prove!) that trisection of
an arbitrary angle is impossible in Euclidean geometry, whereas
bisection is trivial. However, some ancient mathematicians (e.g.
Archimedes) knew that there is a fairly simple addition to Euclidean
geometry that makes trisecting an arbitrary angle easy, namely the
“neusis” construction that allows a movable straight edge to have two
marks fixed on it that can be used to specify constraints on motion
of the edge.15 They proved this without modern logic, algebra, set
theory, proof theory etc. However, there is no current AI reasoner
capable of discovering such a construct, or considering whether it
is an acceptable extension to Euclid’s straight-edge and compasses
constructs.
If we can identify a type of construction-kit that produces
young robot minds able to develop or evaluate those ideas in
varied spatial environments, we may find important clues about
what is missing in current AI. (See the documents referenced in
Note 8.) Long before logical and algebraic notations were used in
mathematical proofs, evolution had produced abilities to represent
and reason about what Gibson called “affordances”[9], including
possible and impossible alterations to spatial configurations: such
as the (topological) impossibility of solid linked rings becoming
unlinked, or vice versa. I suspect brains of many intelligent animals
make use of topological reasoning mechanisms that have so far not
been discovered by brain scientists or AI researchers.
Addition of meta-cognitive mechanisms able to inspect and
experiment with reasoning processes may have led both to enhanced
spatial intelligence and meta-cognition, and also to meta-meta-
cognitive reasoning about other intelligent individuals.
3.5 Other species
I conjecture that further investigation will reveal varieties of in-
formation processing (computation) that have so far escaped the
attention of researchers, but which play important roles in many
intelligent species, including not only humans and apes but also
15 http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/trisect.html
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elephants, corvids, squirrels, cetaceans and others. In particular,
some intelligent non-human animals and pre-verbal human toddlers
seem to be able to use mathematical structures and relationships (e.g.
partial orderings and topological relationships) unwittingly.
Mathematical meta-meta...-cognition seems to be restricted to
humans, but develops in stages, as Piaget found16, partially confirm-
ing Kant’s ideas about mathematical knowledge in [12]. However, I
suspect that (as Kant seems to have realised) the genetically provided
mathematical powers of intelligent animals make more use of
topological and geometric reasoning, using analogical, non-Fregean,
representations, as suggested in [21] than the logical, algebraic, and
statistical capabilities that have so far dominated AI and robotics.
(NB “analogical” does not imply “isomorphic”.) For example, even
the concepts of cardinal and ordinal number are crucially related
to concepts of one-one correspondence between components of
structures, most naturally understood as a topological relationship
rather than a logically definable relationship [22, Chap.8].
All this shows why increasing complexity of physical structures
and capabilities, providing richer collections of alternatives and
more complex internal and external action-selection criteria, requires
increasing disembodiment of information processing.
The fact that evolution is not stuck with the Fundamental
Construction Kit (FCK) provided by physics and chemistry, but
also produces and uses new “derived” construction-kits (DCKs),
enhances both the mathematical and the ontological creativity of
evolution, which is indirectly responsible for all the other known
types of creativity [2]. This counters both the view that mathematics
is a product of human minds, and a view of metaphysics as being
concerned with something unchangeable. The notion of “Descriptive
Metaphysics” presented by Strawson in [29] needs to be revised.
I also conjecture that filling in some of the missing details in
this theory (a huge challenge) will help us understand both the
evolutionary changes that introduced unique features of human
minds and why it is not obvious that Turing-equivalent digital
computers, or even asynchronous networks of such computers
running sophisticated interacting virtual machines, will suffice to
replicate the human mathematical capabilities that preceded modern
logic, algebra, set-theory, and theory of computation.17 It will all
depend on the precise forms of virtual information processing
machinery that evolution has managed to produce, about which I
suspect current methods of neuroscientific investigation cannot yield
deep information. Compare [25].
Current AI cannot produce reasoners like Euclid, Zeno,
Archimedes, or even reasoners like pre-verbal toddlers, weaver birds
and squirrels. This indicates serious gaps, despite many impressive
achievements. I see no reason to believe that uniform, statistics-
based learning mechanisms will have the power to bridge those gaps.
Whether the addition of logic-based reasoners will suffice is not
clear, for reasons given in [22, Chap 7]. The discoveries made by
ancient mathematicians preceded the discoveries of modern algebra
and logic, and the arithmetisation of geometry by Descartes.
Section 3.3 gave reasons for believing that evolved mechanisms
that use previously acquired abstract forms of meta-learning with
genetically orchestrated instantiation triggered by developmental
changes, may do much better. These mechanisms depend on rich
internal languages that evolved for use in perception, reasoning,
learning, intention formation, plan formation and control of actions
16 He did not know enough about computation to characterise the stages
accurately
17 Why did Turing write in his [30] that chemistry may turn out to be as
important as electricity in brains?
before communicative languages.18 This generalises claims made by
Chomsky in [4], and his later works, focused only on development
of human spoken languages, ignoring how much language and non-
linguistic cognition develop with mutual support [27].
3.6 The importance of virtual machinery
Building a new computer for every task was made unnecessary
by allowing computers to have changeable programs. Initially each
program, specifying instructions to be run, had to be loaded (via
modified wiring, switch settings, punched cards, or punched tape),
but later developments provided more and more flexibility and
generality, with higher level programming languages providing re-
usable domain specific languages and tools, some translated to
machine code, others run on a task specific virtual computer pro-
vided by an interpreter. Later developments provided time-sharing
operating systems supporting multiple interacting programs running
effectively in parallel performing different, interacting, tasks on a
single processor. As networks developed, these collaborating virtual
machines became more numerous, more varied, more geographically
distributed, and more sophisticated in their functionality, often
extended with sensors of different kinds and attached devices for
manipulation, carrying, moving, and communicating.
These developments suggest the possibility that each biological
mind is also implemented as a collection of concurrently active non-
physical, but physically implemented, virtual machines interacting
with one another and with the physical environment through sensor
and motor interfaces. Such “virtual machine functionalism” could
accommodate a large variety of coexisting, interacting, cognitive,
motivational and emotional states19, including essentially private
qualia as explained in [24] and [25].
Long before human engineers produced such designs, biological
evolution had already encountered the need and produced virtual
machinery of even greater complexity and sophistication, serving
information processing requirements for organisms, whose virtual
machinery included interacting sensory qualia, motivations, inten-
tions, plans, emotions, attitudes, preferences, learning processes, and
various aspects of self-consciousness.
4 THE FUTURE OF AI
We still don’t know how to make machines able to replicate the
mathematical insights of ancient mathematicians like Euclid – e.g.
with “triangle qualia” that include awareness of mathematical pos-
sibilities and constraints20 or minds that can discover the possibility
of extending Euclidean geometry with the neusis construction (see
Note 15). It is not clear whether we simply have not been clever
enough at understanding the problems and developing the programs,
or whether we need to extend the class of virtual machines that can
be run on computers, or whether the problem is that animal brains
use kinds of virtual machinery that cannot be implemented using the
construction kits known to modern computer science and software
engineering. As Turing hinted in his 1950 paper: aspects of chemical
computation may be essential.
Biological organisms also cannot build such minds directly from
atoms and molecules. They need many intermediate DCKs, some of
18 http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#talk111
19 http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/
20 http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/
triangle-theorem.html
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them concrete and some abstract, insofar as some construction kits,
like some animal minds, use virtual machines.
Evolutionary processes must have produced construction kits for
abstract information processing machinery supporting increasingly
complex multi-functional virtual machines, long before human en-
gineers discovered the need for such things and began to implement
them in the 20th Century.21 Studying such processes is very difficult
because virtual machines don’t leave fossils (though some of their
products do). Moreover details of recently evolved virtual machinery
may be at least as hard to inspect as running software systems without
built-in run-time debugging “hooks”. This could, in principle, defeat
all known brain scanners.
“Information” here is not used in Shannon’s sense (concerned
with mechanisms and vehicles for storage, encoding, transmission,
decoding, etc.), but in the much older sense familiar to Jane Austen
and used in her novels e.g. Pride and Prejudice22 in which how
information content is used is important, not how information bearers
are encoded, stored, transmitted, received, etc. The primary use of
information is for control. Communication, storage, reorganisation,
compression, encryption, translation, and many other ways of
dealing with information are all secondary to the use for control.
Long before humans used structured languages for communi-
cation, intelligent animals must have used rich languages with
structural variability and compositional semantics internally, e.g.
in perception, reasoning, intention formation, wondering whether,
planning and execution of actions, and learning.[27]
We can search for previously unnoticed evolutionary transitions
going beyond Figure 1 – e.g. between organisms that merely react to
immediate chemical environments in a primaeval soup, and organ-
isms that use temporal information about changing concentrations in
deciding whether to move or not, or new mechanisms required after
the transition from a liquid based life form to life on a surface with
more stable structures (e.g. different static resources and obstacles
in different places), or a later transition to hunting down and eating
mobile land-based prey, or transitions to reproductive mechanisms
requiring young to be cared for, etc.? Perhaps we’ll then understand
how to significantly extend AI.
Compare Schro¨dinger’s discussion in [19] of the relevance of
quantum mechanisms and chemistry to the storage, copying, and
processing of genetic information.23 I am suggesting that questions
about evolved intermediate forms of information processing are
linked to philosophical questions about the nature of mind, the nature
of mathematical discovery, and deep gaps in current AI.24
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AI and Affordances for Mental Action 
Dr Tom McClelland1 
 
Abstract. To perceive an affordance is to perceive an object or 
situation as presenting an opportunity for action. The concept of 
affordances has been taken up across wide range of disciplines, 
including AI. I explore an interesting extension of the concept of 
affordances in robotics. Among the affordances that artificial 
systems have been engineered to detect are affordances to 
deliberate. In psychology, affordances are typically limited to 
bodily action, so the it is noteworthy that AI researchers have 
found it helpful to extend the concept to encompass mental 
actions. I propose that psychologists can learn from this 
extension, and argue that human subjects can perceive mental 
affordances, such as affordances to attend, affordances to 
imagine and affordances to count. 
1 INTRODUCTION1 
The relationship between behavioural 
psychology and artificial intelligence is 
reciprocal: just as AI researchers can apply 
lessons from psychology to artificial behaviour, 
psychologists can apply lessons from AI to 
human behaviour. In some cases, these 
interactions will have a cyclic structure, with 
one discipline inspiring new ideas in the other, 
then those ideas in turn being taken up by the 
original discipline. Although this reciprocal 
arrangement has yielded a wealth of results, 
there are doubtless a vast range of lessons that 
remain unrecognised. Put another way, there are 
surely insights in each discipline that could be 
fruitfully taken up by the other, but which have 
not yet been extracted. My aim in this paper is to 
extract one such lesson from AI and to present 
some proposals about how it might be applied to 
human behaviour. I start with an insight from 
psychology – the role of affordance perception 
in human behaviour – and consider how this 
insight has stimulated new ideas in AI. I then 
consider how one of these ideas – Raubal’s [11, 
12] notion of mental affordances in robotics – 
moves beyond the understanding of affordances 
offered by psychologists. Finally, I explore how 
                                                 
1 Dept. of Philosophy, University of Warwick CV4 7AL 
t.mcclelland@warwick.ac.uk 
the notion of mental affordances might be 
applied in human psychology, and how it might 
be further developed in AI. 
2 APPLYING AFFORDANCE THEORY TO AI 
The concept of affordances was introduced by 
the ecological psychologist J.J. Gibson, and his 
most fully developed articulation of the concept 
can be found in his 1979 work The Ecological 
Approach to Visual Perception [1]. In that book,  
Gibson introduces the concept of affordances 
as follows: 
The affordances of the environment are what 
it offers the animal, what it provides or 
furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb to 
afford is found in the dictionary, but the 
noun affordance is not. I have made it up. I 
mean by it something that refers to both the 
environment and the animal in a way that no 
existing term does. It implies the 
complementarity of the animal and the 
environment. [1, p.127] 
Classic cases of affordances are those 
pertaining to basic bodily actions such as 
walking, gripping or catching. A path might 
afford walking, a stick might afford gripping 
and a ball might afford catching. Whether 
something has these affordances depends on the 
body and abilities of the agent: a ball that 
affords catching for one agent might not afford 
catching for another. 
At the heart of the concept of affordances is 
a specific understanding of the relationship 
between action and perception. Gibson’s key 
theoretical claim is that agents do not perceive 
an action-neutral environment then infer what 
actions are available to them in an environment 
with those properties. Instead, agents can simply 
perceive opportunities for action.  
SYMPOSIUM X. 10TH AISB SYMPOSIUM ON COMPUTING AND PHILOSOPHY 372
Co
nfe
re
nc
e
ed
itio
n
For Gibson, this claim was part of a radical 
understanding of behaviour according to which 
internal processes are unnecessary for 
perception, or for the transition from perception 
to action. Agents can pick-up affordances by 
directly perceiving optical patterns in the 
environment, and these affordances can directly 
guide action without the need for mediating 
processes. 
Some in the ecological school of psychology 
have sought to retain this radical understanding 
of behaviour. However, the majority of those 
who have taken up Gibson’s concept of 
affordances have left these bolder claims behind. 
AI is no exception to this. Horton et al [7] note 
that AI researchers understand affordance 
perception in terms of internal representations of 
opportunities for action – a concession to 
dualism that Gibson would doubtless have 
resisted. But if perceiving and acting on 
affordances is taken to require internal 
representation, what value is there in the 
concept? Horton et al outline the application of 
affordances to AI as follows: 
In designing artificial agents, several 
successful patterns for control and 
coordination of perception and action have 
emerged. Some of these approaches share an 
important characteristic - a clear emphasis on 
utilizing the environment, and the agent’s 
interaction with it, to reduce the complexity 
of representation and reasoning. This 
characteristic is founded on an ecological 
view of the agent - an entity embodied in a 
world rich with observable cues that can help 
guide the agent’s behavior. [2, p.71] 
By programming behaviour in a way that’s 
sensitive to environmental affordances, one can 
thus minimize the need for internal 
representations. This is a valuable result even if 
the Gibsonian dream of eliminating internal 
processing entirely is deemed unattainable [2, 
p.79]. An especially interesting consequence of 
affordance-based programming is that agents 
with such programming engage in exploratory 
behaviour. This behaviour is not directed toward 
any specific goal, but by interacting with items 
in the environment in a variety of ways the agent 
discovers the opportunities for action presented 
by that object, and by other objects of the same 
kind. Stoytchev [16], for instance, offers a 
distinctive approach to tool-learning in robotics 
that involves the robot engaging in random 
‘dabbling’ behaviour toward a presented tool. 
The robot performs a variety of random actions 
on the tools and learns the results of these 
actions. By engaging in this behaviour, the robot 
is then able to perform a tool-using task that 
they would have been unable to perform without 
the lessons learned from their earlier goal-
independent exploration. 
3 MENTAL AFFORDANCES IN AI 
The affordances discussed by Gibson (and by 
the vast majority of those who have picked up 
on his term) are affordances for bodily action. 
As mentioned above, classic affordances include 
affording walking, affording gripping and 
affording catching. The affordances explored in 
AI research are almost universally affordances 
for bodily action in the sense that they involve 
some kind of physical movement on the part of 
the artificial agent (whether it be virtual 
movement in a simulation or actual movement 
through an artificial body). Examples include 
affordances for poking, pushing, pulling, 
rotating and lifting [2, p.73]. However, in a 
small number of cases AI researchers talk about 
affordances for mental action. Consider the 
following passage from Raubal & Moratz: 
…a public transportation terminal affords for 
a person to enter different buses and trains. It 
also affords to buy tickets or make a phone 
call. A path affords remembering and 
selecting, a decision point affords orienting 
and deciding, etc. In general, such situations 
offer for the person the mental affordance of 
deciding which of the perceived affordances 
to utilize according to her goal. [11, p.3] 
Some of the affordances cited in this passage 
are affordances for bodily actions, such as the 
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bodily act of getting on a specific bus. But the 
‘mental affordances’ are affordances for mental 
action, such as the mental act of deciding what 
to do. Raubal & Moratz offer an affordance-
oriented robot architecture that includes 
sensitivity to these mental affordances. They 
explain this architecture as follows: 
Mental affordances (Maff) arise for the agent 
when perceiving a set of physical and social-
institutional affordances in an environment 
at a specific location and time. Affordances 
offer possibilities for action as well as 
possibilities for the agent to reason about 
them and decide whether to utilize them or 
not, i.e., mental affordances. The agent needs 
to perform an internal operation Op (Int) to 
utilize a mental affordance.  Internal 
operations are carried out on the agent’s 
beliefs (including its history and 
experiences) and lead to an internal outcome 
O (Int). In order to transfer such outcome to 
the world, the agent has to perform an 
external operation Op (Ext), which then 
leads to an external outcome O (Ext), i.e., 
some change of the external world. [11, pp. 
95-96] 
So besides being sensitive to specific 
affordances for physical action, the robot is 
sensitive to situations in which a decision is 
required [11, 12]. The opportunities for physical 
action can be understood as first-order 
affordances. The situations in which a decision 
is required can be understood as second-order 
affordances, as they are affordances to decide 
between first-order affordances. Raubal & 
Moratz argue that this architecture better enables 
robots to respond to a dynamic environment. 
Furthermore, the process of explicit deliberation 
allows them to communicate plans before they 
are acted upon. Although they don’t draw 
explicitly on Raubal & Moratz, Saratha & 
Scheutz have also recently argued that uptake of 
such second-order affordances enhances 
performance in various ways [14]. 
4 DEVELOPING MENTAL AFFORDANCES 
Raubal & Moratz [11] emphasise that one of the 
advantages of their mental affordance-based 
architecture is that it better corresponds to the 
architecture of human behaviour. However, 
when one looks at how the concept of 
affordances is used in the psychology literature, 
one finds virtually no reference to affordances 
for mental actions such as affording 
deliberation. Psychology did AI a service with 
the notion of affordances. Perhaps here AI can 
return the favour. I propose that the notion of 
mental affordances opens up a range of 
promising avenues of enquiry for the 
understanding of human behaviour. 
Raubal & Moratz’s [11] example of 
affording deliberation is an obvious initial 
target. Do human agents perceive opportunities 
to make a decision? Does the concept of 
affordances for deliberation allow us to offer 
better explanations of when and how humans 
engage in explicit decision making? It certainly 
seems to fit with our phenomenology that 
situations afford deliberation: just as we 
experience a single open path as demanding to 
be walked down, we experience a fork in the 
path as demanding an act of explicit deliberation 
about which path to take. Although affordance-
based theories are ultimately answerable to the 
empirical data, their phenomenological 
plausibility is responsible for a great deal of 
their appeal [6]. If the notion of mental 
affordances tallies with our phenomenology, this 
would be an important point in its favour. 
Moving beyond affordances for deliberation, 
we can explore the possibility of other 
affordances for mental action. I introduce three 
kinds of affordance: affording covert attention; 
affording covert bodily actions; and affording 
counting. 
Certain stimuli present opportunities for us 
to perform the act of attending, and some of 
these stimuli positively call out to be attended 
to. Consider the experience of trying to 
concentrate on some work when a radio is being 
played outside. The radio calls out for our 
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attention but with effort we can keep our 
attention trained on our work. 
The way that stimuli invite attention is 
naturally described in terms of affordances. 
Attending is an act, and the radio outside 
presents an opportunity to perform this act. Our 
sensitivity to such opportunities is perceptual. 
One doesn’t hear the loud bang and infer that 
one ought to direct one’s attention to it: one is 
aware of the radio as a suitable target for 
attention without the need for any such 
inference. Furthermore, if the radio’s claim on 
our attention were just a matter of believing that 
the radio should be attended to then it would be 
easy to reason ourselves out of being distracted 
by the noise. However, like many (if not all) 
perceptual states the representation of the radio 
as demanding attention is cognitively 
impenetrable. Crucially though, this does not 
mean that attention is outside our voluntary 
control. When we hear a loud bang, we cannot 
help but attend to it, but this is not the scenario 
under discussion. In our scenario, we succeed in 
keeping our focal attention trained on our work. 
As such, the radio does not trigger an obligatory 
involuntary act of attending. What is 
involuntary, however, is our perception of the 
radio as affording attention: we are free to 
ignore its call, but powerless to silence that call. 
These considerations indicate that we 
perceive opportunities to attend. But is the act of 
attending mental or bodily? Overt attention is 
the bodily act of directing one’s sense organs 
toward a particular stimulus, property or region. 
Covert attention is the mental act of 
concentrating on a particular perceived stimulus, 
property or region. These two layers of attention 
typically coincide: the focus of our gaze is 
normally the focus of our covert attention. That 
said, the two activities must nevertheless be 
distinct since they are dissociable: one can 
deliberately direct one’s covert attention toward 
things other than the target of one’s overt 
attention. Stimuli that afford attention thus 
afford not just a bodily act, but a mental act. 
Alternatively, we might say that when stimuli 
afford attention they afford a complex act that is 
at least partly mental. This would still be a 
significant departure from the straightforwardly 
bodily acts normally cited in the affordance 
literature. 
Some objections might be raised against this 
conclusion. First, one might object that stimuli 
only afford overt attention. On this view, a loud 
noise affords the bodily act of turning one’s 
head toward it but does not afford the mental act 
of covertly attending to it. Against this 
objection, I would respond that when a stimulus 
affords overt attention is clearly affords covert 
attention too. We do not, for instance, find 
ourselves suddenly turning toward a loud noise 
whilst keeping our concentration firmly on a 
prior task. In response to this, one might object 
that we perceive affordances for overt attention, 
and that when we overtly attend to something 
our covert attention follows suit. As such, our 
covert attention is not guided by perceived 
affordances for to perform the mental act of 
covertly attending. Rather, it is guided by overt 
attention which is in turn guided by perceived 
affordances to perform the bodily act of overtly 
attending. The difficulty with this response is 
that it is at odds with the empirical data. Covert 
attention has been found to precede involuntary 
eye movements [9], so it cannot be the case that 
covert attention merely rides on the coat-tails of 
overt attention. 
I suggest that the concept of affordances for 
covert attention could be of value to 
psychologists. And continuing the cycle of 
innovation, affordances for covert attention may 
prove useful in AI. Researchers have already 
programmed artificial agents with a capacity for 
covert attention [17]. As with any action that an 
artificial agent is able to perform, there are 
different ways of programming how and when 
the agent elects to exercise that capacity. We 
have already touched on the benefits obtained 
when an artificial agent is programmed to 
exercise its capacities for physical behaviour in 
response to perceived affordances in the 
environment. Perhaps parallel benefits could be 
SYMPOSIUM X. 10TH AISB SYMPOSIUM ON COMPUTING AND PHILOSOPHY 375
Co
nfe
re
nc
e
ed
itio
n
obtained by making an artificial agent’s capacity 
for covert attention responsive to affordances to 
attend in the environment. 
Moving on from covert attention, I suggest 
that we might also perceive affordances to 
mentally rehearse a bodily action. Sometimes 
we perform bodily acts in our mind: we rehearse 
them in imagination without actually performing 
them. Interestingly, the neural realisation of an 
imagined bodily act overlaps extensively with 
the neural realisation of actually performing that 
act [8]. This suggests that to imagine an action is 
simply to perform that action ‘off-line’. If we 
can perceive affordances to perform a bodily 
action overtly, there could also be affordances to 
perform that same action covertly.  
Consider a situation in which someone is 
sitting opposite you at a table, and you wish to 
know how the items on the table are arranged 
from their perspective: for instance, from their 
perspective is the fork to the right of their plate 
or the left? To work this out you could rotate 
your body round to the other agent’s position 
and observe how the items appear from this new 
position. A more economical alternative, 
however, is to perf rm such self-rotation 
mentally and ‘see’ how those items appear 
without having to move a muscle. Psychologists 
such as Kessler & Thomson [8] have provided 
experimental evidence that when we adopt 
another agent’s spatial perspective we perform 
exactly this kind of mental self-rotation. The 
situation described thus presents an opportunity 
for mental self-rotation. Do we perceive this 
opportunity to perform the relevant mental act or 
only infer it? The existing data does not offer a 
definitive answer to this question. Anecdotally 
though, it does not seem that we first perceive 
our situation then infer that mental self-rotation 
would reveal the desired information about the 
other agent’s perspective. Rather, the 
availability of this mental act is immediately 
apparent to us: it is perceived not inferred. 
If this line of thought is sound, then the 
notion of affordances to perform off-line bodily 
activities could be of theoretical value in 
psychology. Again though, there could also be 
interesting applications in AI. Many artificial 
agents exploit off-line rehearsal of physical 
actions [15]. Programming agents to be 
responsive to affordances to perform such 
rehearsals could yield the same kind of cognitive 
advantage achieved by agents that are 
responsive to affordances to perform overt 
bodily actions. 
My final proposed mental affordances are 
affordance to count. Counting is a mental act. 
Sometimes we count in a way that involves a 
bodily act of pointing to items and numbering 
them out loud. Sometimes we count in a way 
that involves doing those bodily acts off-line e.g. 
by pointing and numbering in our heads. It is 
implausible, however, that the act of counting is 
exhausted by such overt or covert bodily action. 
We can count things without performing either 
of these acts, and we have a brain area – the 
intraparietal sulcus – that is directly associated 
with arithmetic without being directly 
implicated in those bodily acts [3]. My target 
here is what you might call unassisted counting: 
a way of counting that depends on neither overt 
nor covert bodily action. Our environment can 
present opportunities for counting. Consider a 
pile of pennies, or the leaves on a clover, or the 
cards remaining in a poker deck. 
A strong consideration in favour of 
affordances for counting comes from 
pathological cases. To appreciate this evidence, 
we must first consider how pathological cases 
have informed our understanding of affordances 
for bodily action. Utilization behaviour is a 
disorder caused by specific brain damage to the 
frontal lobe and is characterised by subjects 
being compelled to ‘utilize’ any items that they 
see [1]. When presented with an apple, subjects 
eat it even when they are not hungry. When 
presented with a toothbrush, they use it to brush 
their teeth regardless of the context. When they 
are presented with pens, they draw with them 
even if there is no paper to draw on. This 
disorder has been explained with reference to 
affordance perception: subjects perceive an 
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opportunity to act but are unable to suppress the 
impulse to exploit this opportunity [13, 2]. 
Where a typical subject perceives that the apple 
affords eating, there is evidence that the motor 
pathways responsible for grabbing and eating 
the apple are triggered. If the agent elects to eat 
the apple, these motor signals result in the 
bodily action, but more often the agent will 
suppress this signal: they perceive the 
opportunity to eat but do not act on it. However, 
due to their frontal lobe damage, agents 
suffering from utilization behaviour are unable 
to suppress these signals so perform whatever 
act they perceive to be afforded. Parallel claims 
have been made in the context of OCD: the 
compulsive behaviour of sufferers of OCD can 
be described in terms of the distinctive ways in 
which they perceive and act on environmental 
affordances for bodily action [5]. 
How do these considerations about the role 
of affordance perception in certain kinds of 
pathological behaviour help us in our project of 
exploring the possibility of mental affordances? 
Many of the pathological behaviours discussed 
by researchers are bodily acts and, 
correspondingly, are explained in terms of 
affordances for bodily action. Some behaviours, 
however, are more plausibly regarded as 
pathological mental actions. Plausibly, such 
behaviour could be explained in terms of how 
subjects perceive and act on affordances for 
mental action. The patient suffering from 
utilization behaviour discussed by Brazzelli & 
Spinnler also showed a ‘compulsion to count’ 
[1, p. 350].2 If her compulsive consumption of a 
                                                 
2 A complication here is that the cases of counting 
observed by Brazzelli & Spinnler are, of course, cases of 
overt counting. One might claim that it is this bodily act 
that is afforded rather than the mental act of counting. 
However, the burden of proof would be on the objector to 
say why this is so. Ordinary subjects perform these bodily 
acts to assist a mental act of determining how many of 
something there is, and there is no obvious reason to doubt 
that the patient is doing the same. Put another way, the 
patient is most likely compelled to make bodily gestures 
that aid counting precisely because she is compelled to 
perform the mental act of counting. 
presented apple is to be explained in terms of 
her perception of the apple as affording eating, 
and her subsequent failure to suppress the 
impulse to eat, then her compulsive counting 
should be explained in terms of her perception 
of items as affording counting, and her 
subsequent failure to suppress the impulse to 
count. 
It is worth noting that the patient’s 
symptoms are not naturally explained in terms 
of atypical behavioural urges: the characteristic 
feature of the disorder is that the patient’s 
behaviour is environment led, meaning that she 
acts on perceived opportunities for actions even 
if she has no desire to perform those actions. 
Consequently, the fact that she performs the act 
of counting on certain stimuli indicates that she 
perceives those stimuli as presenting an 
opportunity to count. Again, parallel conclusions 
can be reached about the explanation of 
compulsive counting in OCD patients [10]. 
Whether stimuli afford counting is ultimately 
answerable to empirical evidence that is not yet 
available. Again though, it seems that there 
would be something ad hoc about 
countenancing affordances for bodily action and 
not for mental action. If the compulsive bodily 
actions of Brazzelli & Spinnler’s patient are to 
be understood in terms of affordance perception 
then, other things being equal, the same view 
ought also to be taken toward her compulsive 
mental actions [1].  
If there can be affordances for counting, why 
not for other arithmetical actions? A pile of 
sweets, for example, might present an 
opportunity for division. And stimuli in the 
language of mathematics can present 
opportunities for far more sophisticated 
arithmetical actions. A maths exam paper, for 
instance, might present opportunities to square, 
to factorise and to exponentiate. 
Many artificial agents have within their 
repertoire the ability to perform mathematical 
operations on their environment. Armed with the 
concept of affordances for mathematical action, 
perhaps programmers could create artificial 
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agents that are responsive to environmental 
opportunities to perform this mental act, with all 
the cognitive advantages entailed by such 
responsiveness. 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Psychology’s introduction of the concept of 
affordances has had valuable applications in 
artificial intelligence. One of these applications 
has been to extend the notion of affordances 
beyond bodily action to include mental acts such 
as deliberating about a choice. I have argued that 
this notion of mental affordances promises to 
have fruitful applications in human psychology, 
and to have useful further applications within 
artificial intelligence. To put this to the test, 
further work must be done on the ways in which 
agents recognise opportunities for mental action. 
In artificial intelligence, there is an 
opportunity to develop new cognitive 
architectures. Just as artificial agents 
programmed to perceive and act on affordances 
for bodily action have shown a range of 
advantages over more traditionally structured 
artificial agents, artificial agents programmed to 
perceive and act on affordances for mental 
action will enjoy parallel advantages. 
In human psychology, there is an 
opportunity to test whether and how human 
subjects perceive and act on opportunities for 
mental actions. A variety of experimental 
paradigms have been employed to establish 
whether and how we perceive affordances for 
bodily action, and many of these paradigms can 
be applied to investigate affordances for mental 
action. 
When considering affordance perception in 
both organic and artificial subjects, one 
important question is what value there is to 
perceiving affordances rather than inferring 
what opportunities for action are available from 
action-neutral perceptual inputs. One 
particularly promising line of enquiry is to 
explore the link between affordance-based 
architectures and exploration-based learning. If 
goal-independent physical dabbling with 
external objects allows agents to learn the 
affordances for physical action offered by 
external objects [16], perhaps goal-independent 
mental dabbling with external objects allows 
agents to learn the affordances for mental action 
offered by those objects. Many mental actions 
are performed on symbols, including linguistic 
and mathematical symbols. When we ‘play’ 
with symbols might we be learning about the 
mental actions they afford? One might even 
move beyond perceptible external stimuli and 
speculate that we can perform goal-independent 
mental dabbling with our own internal states. 
Perhaps such dabbling reveals opportunities for 
self-directed mental action that would not 
otherwise be recognised. 
This is just one of a host of promising 
avenues of enquiry opened up Raubal’s 
innocuous concept of affordances for 
deliberation. I hope that the full theoretical 
import of mental affordances will emerge over 
time, and yield valuable insights in psychology 
and AI alike. 
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Communication Breakdown? Reasoning about Language
and Rational Agents
Rodger Kibble1
Abstract. This paper examines different approaches to rationality
in analytic philosophy and AI, in the light of Bermu´dez’s proposal
that a full account of rationality must aim to explain how agents can
both select and explain actions, as well as assessing them against
some normative standard. We briefly survey instrumental, linguis-
tic and discursive accounts of rationality, and conjecture that Haber-
mas’s notion of the “three roots” of epistemic, teleological and com-
municative rationality comes closest to providing a satisfactory ac-
count, or at least the ingredients of such an account. This is contrasted
with the widely-accepted BDI model of rational agency in AI, which
we argue falls short of a full model of rationality and in particular,
fails to provide a convincing model of linguistic communication.
1 Introduction
A major paradigm in AI research has been the development of so-
called ‘rational’, ‘autonomous’ agents, with a degree of consensus
around the BDI architecture [28, 29, 39] which aims to develop soft-
ware entities that are capable of pro-attitudes such as Beliefs, Desires
and Intentions. As Bermu´dez notes, the concept of rationality finds
applications in various disciplines
from economics to political science, fron philosophy to psy-
chology, and from management science to sociology [2, p. 1]
while it is not clear whether the word is used with the same sense in
all these different contexts. In this paper we will explore how ratio-
nality is understood and applied within Artificial Intelligence, against
the setting of a brief survey of accounts of rationality from analytic
philosophy.
The ability to conduct fluent natural language conversation has
been considered a hallmark of human-level AI (or AGI) since Tur-
ing’s classic paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” [37],
while there is a long-standing view in some schools of philosophy
that thinking, rational agents must be able to express their thoughts
in language and interpret the speech and thoughts of other agents.
One strand of research in computational linguistics (CL) builds on
Searlean Speech Act Theory (SAT), and formalisations of SAT as
a CL programme fed in turn into development of communication
languages for artificial software agents (Agent Communication Lan-
guages or ACLs) [26].
1.1 Outline of the paper
We begin in Section 2 by sketching some different conceptions of
what is meant by rational agents in AI and philosophy, discussing
1 Goldsmiths University of London, UK, email: r.kibble@gold.ac.uk
instrumental, linguistic and discursive notions of rationality. Section
3 very briefly summarises some essential characteristics of Anglo-
American Speech Act Theory, and Section 4 deals with some clas-
sic formalisations of SAT. Section 5 shows how some of this work
fed into the specification of communication languages for artificial
agents. Throughout the paper we note a tension between agent au-
tonomy and the requirements of successful communication, and con-
clude in section 6 that this tension is never fully resolved.
2 What are Rational Agents?
As noted above, a significant strand of AI research over the last cou-
ple of decades has concerned the development of autonomous agents,
which may consist of software-controlled robots or of “disembod-
ied” software entities [28, 39]. Agents are said to be autonomous
and rational to the extent that they act independently of specific in-
structions from their human operators or “principals” and do not rely
on extensive built-in knowledge, but make their own decisions based
on logical and/or mathematical reasoning using information derived
from their perceptions of the state of the world [29]. The term “ratio-
nal agents” has been used somewhat loosely, and this section looks at
some differing ideas of what it means for a system, agent or person
to be considered rational.
2.1 Desiderata for rational agents
Bermu´dez (op. cit.) questions whether there is a unitary notion of
rationality, and proposes that any satisfactory account must serve
“three different explanatory projects”:
• The project of guiding action: given an agent’s information
about the state of the world, the actions which can be per-
formed and the expected consequences of these actions in
the given conditions, a theory of rationality should idenify
a “privileged subset” of actions which will bring about the
preferred outcome. This is the notion of rationality which,
according to Bermu´dez, most interests decision theorists.
• The project of normatively assessing action: what falls un-
der assessment is not only the agent’s choice of actions, but
the quality of their information-gathering, probability judg-
ments, whether they have succumbed to “framing effects”
and so on. Many philosophers think of rationality in these
terms; some would interpret “normativity” more broadly to
encompass social norms of what is considered to be appro-
priate behavious (e.g. Brandom [3, 4]).
• The project of explaining/predicting action: this involves ei-
ther working back from an agent’s observed actions to a
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characterisation of their beliefs, desires and other psycho-
logical states, or working out what an agent is likely to do
given a knowledge of their psychological profile [9]. This is
stated to be the aspect of rationality of most interest to psy-
chologists and economists.
The question poses itself: which conception of rationality is most
relevant to AI? We might well answer: all of them. Bermu´dez in fact
concludes that the three dimensions are interpendent, and a satisfac-
tory theory must address them all. However, he argues persuasively
that decision theory cannot serve the three explanatory projects si-
multaneously, and so cannot form the basis of a unitary theory of
rationality. In what follows we look at various existing accounts of
rationality, and consider whether they can be carved up in a way that
corresponds to these projects.
2.2 Instrumental rationality
A leading AI textbook [29] defines a “rational agent” as an entity
that perceives and acts in an environment, and acts so as to maximise
the expected value of some performance measure. There are various
levels of agency:
1. A reflex agent responds directly to percepts according to a series
of if-then rules which could be encoded as a lookup table, without
planning ahead or modelling any aspect of the environment other
than its immediate percepts.
2. A model-based reflex agent keeps track of the state of the world
via internal representations.
3. A goal-based agent acts in order to achieve certain goals. An ex-
ample would be a self-driving car, which has the goal of transport-
ing people or goods from one location to another: the agent would
need a repertoire of actions and a knowledge base of how to re-
spond to certain types of percepts, in order to reach its destination
safely without contravening any rules of the road or causing harm
to its occupants or other persons.
4. A utility-based agent tries to maximise some measure of utility or
“happiness”: for instance if there are different ways of achieving
the same goal, a utility-based agent may aim to select the method
which involves the least effort or cost. For example, a self-driving
car might present its user with different options for a performance
measure: taking the fastest route, or one which is predicted to con-
sume the least fuel, the route with the most agreeable scenery, and
so on.
This “egocentric” concept of rationality is known as instrumental,
goal-oriented or strategic and is generally accepted within “classic”
AI, rational choice theory and certain schools of social science [24].
This approach is clearly tailored to the action-guiding dimension;
though within AI the action-guiding and explanatory/predictive di-
mensions may sometimes collapse if we assume that actions can be
simulated within an exact virtual model of the physical environment,
and the agent architecture includes notions of “desire” and “belief”.
2.3 Linguistic rationality
It has long been argued that only language-using agents can be capa-
ble of reasoning and abstract thought2. One proponent of this view is
2 For example, in HG Wells’ novella The Island of Doctor Moreau the epony-
mous Dr achieves human-level intelligence in animals by operating on
their vocal tracts so that they are physically capable of articulating human
speech.
Donald Davidson [11], who maintains that a “rational animal” is one
that has propositional attitudes such as belief, desire and intention.
His argument is that in order to hold even one propositional attitude,
an agent must possess a substantial body of beliefs and conceptual
knowledge, and be capable of making logical inferences using these
concepts. Only a language-using agent can show evidence of this
kind of knowledge, and so only this class of agents can be acknowl-
edged as rational. This line of argument extends to actions:
Intentional action is action that can be explained in terms of
beliefs and desires whose propositional contents rationalize the
action. [11, p. 99]
It is not immediately clear whether a utility-based agent as desribed
in section 2.2 could be extended with these capabilities without rad-
ically redesigning the agent architecture. As Davidson points out,
agents such as unmanned autonomous drones behave in the way they
do not because they have personal desires or intentions to attack a
particular target, but because they are designed and operated by hu-
mans who have these desires3. He argues in his earlier [10] that this
“intentional” interpretation of rationality is more appropriate for ac-
tion explanations:
. . . I think that compared to attribution of of desires, preferences
or beliefs, the axioms of decision theory lend little empirical
force to explanations of action (p. 273)
So we may argue that linguistic rationality is a minimal requirement
for the project of explaining/predicting actions, if not sufficient in
itself. Davidson concludes that rationality is essentially a social trait:
“only communicators have it”.
It is worth noting at this point that John Searle [32] would not ac-
cept complex verbal behaviour as sufficient evidence of consicous-
ness or intentionality, since he argues that the architecture and phys-
ical make-up of digital computers render them incapable of such
states. Davidson [11] declines to address the question of “whether
all that prevents computers from being rational is their genesis”, and
we will likewise leave this question to one side for the present.
2.4 Discursive or argumentative rationality
Another approach may be termed discursive rationality, and charac-
terises agents that are capable of giving reasons for their actions and
asking for reasons from other agents. Two proponents of variants of
discursive rationality are Robert Brandom [3, 4, 5] and Ju¨rgen Haber-
mas [17, 18, 19, 20]. Both propose that agents who utter speech acts
are taking on certain kinds of commitments, including a commitment
to provide evidence for the truth or acceptability of one’s assertions.
Of course, in many circumstances it would not be reasonable to
call someone out on these commitments: as Brandom puts it, some-
times doubts too need to be justified. A reviewer gives the example
“it’s five o’clock and I’m in a hurry writing a paper” - one can un-
derstand they would be annoyed if asked to substantiate this claim.
Steinhoff [35] likewise argues that the statement “Yesterday I was at
home alone” would be“quite believable” in the absence of any proof.
This of course depends on the context: if someone answering my
description had been caught on CCTV stealing some rare jazz LPs
at the same time, a police officer investigating this larceny might be
less inclined to give me the benefit of the doubt. Steinhoff also ar-
gues that one can be subjectively certain of a claim without being
3 A distinction which is known in the literature as original versus derived
intentionality; see e.g. [12].
SYMPOSIUM X. 10TH AISB SYMPOSIUM ON COMPUTING AND PHILOSOPHY 381
Co
nfe
re
nc
e
ed
itio
n
in a position to justify it to others: “If aliens were to ‘beam’ me to
their planet in another galaxy without anyone else noticing, and then
‘beam’ me back shortly thereafter, then for me the thesis that aliens
exist would be a very well-justified thesis, without my being able to
justify it to others.” I would argue to the contrary that an episode
like this which would be quite outside my previous experience, and
which if true would violate my understanding of the laws of physics,
would be more reasonably interpreted both by myself and others as
a vivid dream or hallucination rather than a “first contact” with ex-
traterrestrial beings unless some robust independent evidence were
available.
It can be seen that the specifications for goal- and utility-based
agents do not include this ability to reflect on and reason about the
speech acts of oneself or others. Davidson does not explicitly address
this issue in the cited paper but it is arguable that an agent would
need the capacity to engage in argumentation in order to qualify for
“linguistic rationality”.
Brandom’s approach is concerned with “deontic” attitudes of hear-
ers, and of speakers as self-monitors, rather than intentional attitudes
of speakers as in classic Speech Act theory. In place of beliefs and
desires, Brandom discusses “doxastic” (propositional) and practical
commitments, which interacting agents may acknowledge or ascribe
to one another.
The normative dimensions of language use according to Brandom
comprise responsibility - if I make a claim, I am obliged to back
it up with appropriate evidence, argumentation and so on - and au-
thority - by making a claim to which I am assumed to be entitled, I
license others to make the same claim. The essential idea is that mak-
ing an assertion is taking on a commitment to defend that assertion
if challenged. There are obvious shared concerns with the notions of
commitment developed by [21, 38]. Brandom’s elaborations include
the notion of entitlement to commitments by virtue of evidence, ar-
gumentation etc; the interpersonal inheritance of commitments and
entitlements, and the treatment of consequential commitments and
incompatibility. Brandom has a similarly “holistic” conception of se-
mantics to Davidson, maintaining that in order to hold one belief it is
necessary to hold several, and to be capable of articulating inferential
relations among beliefs.
The mechanism for keeping track of agents’ commitments and en-
titlements consists of deontic scoreboards maintained by each inter-
locutor, which record the set of commitments and entitlements which
agents claim, acknowledge and attribute to one another (claims and
acknowledgements are forms of self-attribution). Scoreboards are
perspectival and may include both explicitly claimed commitments
and consequential commitments derived by inference. Thus an agent
may be assessed by others as being committed to propositions which
are entailed by his overt commitments, whether or not he acknowl-
edges such commitments. In principle, Brandom’s framework does
not necessitate imputing mental states to agents, as deontic statuses
are constituted by agents’ public or implicit attributions of commit-
ments and entitlements to one another, and he states at one point “I do
not officially believe in belief” [4]. In practice however, he regularly
slips into mentalistic talk, particularly when discussing intentions [3,
Ch. 3].
According to Habermas, interlocutors in a dialogue implicitly
make validity claims pertaining to each utterance:
• A claim that the propositional content of an assertion is true
(wahr) or that in the case of non-declarative utterances, the ex-
istential presuppositions of the propositional content are satisfied;
• A claim that the speaker is truthful (wahrhaftig) or reliable;
• A claim that the utterance is appropriate (richtig) according to any
applicable social norms.
What makes an agent rational is the ability and disposition to re-
spond appropriately to challenges to validity claims, by offering var-
ious forms of argumentation and evidence, with the aim of reaching
mutual understanding or rational consensus. Discursive rationality
presupposes the validity of a normative background of
institutions, roles, socioculturally habitualized forms of life –
that is, of conventions [18, p. 76]
Social norms of this kind are resistant to formalisation and, I would
argue, cannot be reduced to considerations of instrumental reasoning
[25]. If we accept the idea that speech acts raise these kinds of valid-
ity claims, it would seem reasonable to extend this to actions: agents
would be taken as implicitly claiming that their actions are appropri-
ate and effective. Brandom goes some way towards a unitary account
of propositional and practical commitments: to perform an action is,
at least implicitly, to claim an entitlement to being committed to that
action, and may also count as redeeming a commitment and/or tak-
ing on further commitments. To take a banal example, if you park
your car by the side of the road you are likely to be thereby com-
mitted to paying a fee to the local council; if you make appropriate
signalswhile driving you are committed to manoeuvring your vehi-
cle in various ways, and so on. In Habermas’s framework, we could
perhaps construe a rational, intentional action as raising claims to be
effective, deliberate and appropriate to prevailing social norms, cor-
responding to the discursive claims of truth, truthfulness and “right-
ness”.
2.5 Habermas’s Three Roots of Rationality
Habermas in his earlier work [17, 18] makes a distinction between
strategic and communicative uses of speech acts: the former is in-
tended by the speaker to achieve some end through its perlocutionary
effects, which need not be transparent to the hearer, while the latter
is intended to reach agreement or understanding with hearers and in-
volves a readiness to vindicate any validity claims as well as to take
seriously the claims of others. This classification can be argued to
have its roots in ethical considerations as well as communicative ef-
ficiency. Kant’s practical imperative enjoins us to treat ourselves and
other people as ends in themselves rather than means to an end [23],
while strategic action can involve treating others as means. And the
requirement to justify validity claims when challenged increases the
likelihood of arriving at a rational consensus [17].
One could take this further and argue that the possibility of achiev-
ing consensus assumes a reciprocal recognition of interlocutors as
persons with equal rights to offer and challenge validity claims. Lin-
guistic philosophers tend to abstract away from such considerations:
Searle stipulates as one of the preconditions for successful execution
of speech acts that “normal input-output conditions obtain”, mean-
ing that the interlocutors speak the same language and can hear each
other clearly; neither is physically impaired or under duress, acting
in a play, telling a joke and so on. Brandom’s framework of commit-
ments and entitlements appears to tacitly assume that participants in
discourse accord each other the same rights and opportunities to be
heard and to raise questions.
In later work [20], Habermas recognises three “roots of ra-
tionality” which in some ways reflect the distinctions above be-
tween instrumental, linguistic and discursive rationality, as well as
Bermu´dez’s projects of selecting, explaining/predicting and assess-
ing actions:
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• Epistemic rationality concerns propositional or procedural
knowledge of facts about the world and ways of doing things,
which informs rational, goal-directed actions. This seems to ap-
proximately correspond to Davidsonian linguistic rationality, and
is arguably a requirement for the project of explaining/predicting
actions.
• Teleological rationality concerns the deliberate and purposeful
selection and implementations of means to achieve a desired re-
sult, on the basis of particular preferences. This is somewhat sim-
ilar to what we have labelled as instrumental rationality, except
that Habermas claims that this deliberation necessarily rests on
linguistically structured knowledge, intentions and inferences.
• Communicative rationality is essentially what we have called
“discursive rationality”: the ability and disposition to raise, chal-
lenge and defend validity claims of truth, truthfulness and appro-
priateness. This could be argued to be a prerequisite for the nor-
mative assessment of actions.
These three roots are conceptually distinct but are claimed to be
equally fundamental to the constitution of rational agents. At some
risk of forcing the similarities, one could conjecture that this three-
pronged approach equips us to tackle Bermu´dez’s three explanatory
projects - though of course this remains to be worked out in detail. By
contrast, the BDI framework aims to build linguistic agents “on top”
of utility-oriented, goal-seeking agents or planning systems. Within
the confines of this paper, we will look at one line of development in
languages for artificial agents and conclude that it does not succeed
in modelling successful communication.
2.6 The BDI framework
The BDI framework [28, 39] seems to combine elements of Haber-
mas’s epistemic and teleological rationality, in that agents are said to
be rational if they choose actions which are
in [their] own best interests, given the beliefs [they have] about
the world. [39, p. 1]
The framework claims to model agents with “mental states” such
as beliefs, desires and intentions, but it is not clear that these enti-
ties possess or manipulate propositional or conceptual knowledge as
stipulated by Davidson and Brandom as a prerequisite for rational-
ity. Rather, “beliefs” in these systems are data structures represent-
ing some aspects of the state of the world, while “desires” and “in-
tentions” represent preferences and a currently chosen course of ac-
tion. Agents can be considered “rational” according to the BDI model
without necessarily having linguistic capabilities: these are typically
implemented by treating language itself as a kind of action, follow-
ing variants of Austin and Searle’s Speech Act theories as discussed
below. It is generally assumed in these models that intentions are con-
strained by beliefs and desires: that is, an agent’s intended or planned
actions will be governed by what it believes the current state of the
world to be, how it desires the state of the world to change and what
actions it believes can be successfully executed. It might be more
psychologically plausible to consider in addition whether beliefs can
be moulded by desires and intentions, particularly when agents have
powerful desires and their beliefs are based on partial or inconsis-
tent evidence: for example a political leader wishing to overthrow a
tyrant might be more disposed to give credence to claims that the
tyrant possesses fearsome weapons which can be readily mobilised
[33].
3 Communicating Agents
This section looks at some applications of Speech Act Theory to the
specification of communication languages and protocols for intelli-
gent software agents (ACLs) originating with Cohen and Perrault’s
seminal 1979 paper [8]. Some desiderata for agent communications
were listed by Cohen and Levesque [7]:
A language for interagent communication should allow agents
to enlist the support of others to achieve goals, to commit to
the performance of actions for other agents, to monitor their
execution, to report progress, success and failure, to refuse task
allocations, to acknowledge receipt of messages, etc.
Cohen and Perrault proposed that the essential characteristics of
speech acts as described by Searle [30] can be captured using clas-
sic AI planning operators and knowledge representation, techniques
which fall under the headings of goal- and utility-oriented agents
as outlined above. The question thus arises whether linguistic and
discursively rational agents can be developed within an architecture
for instrumental agency. We discuss below whether work in compu-
tational linguistics and agent design following on from Cohen and
Perrault has succeeded in in modelling successful communication
among autonomous agents, and we conclude that no convincing so-
lution has been found. Firstly, in the next section we briefly outline
some essentials of Speech Act theory.
3.1 Speech Acts and Communicative Action
The idea that utterances or “locutions” can have the effect of actions
which change the state of the world goes back at least to Hegel’s
Lectures on the Ph losophy of History [22]:
Reden aber sind Handlungen unter Menschen und zwar sehr
wesentlich wirksame Handlungen.
Speeches, it must be allowed, are veritable transactions in the
human commonwealth; in fact, very gravely influential trans-
actions.
Hegel here considers the impact of speech on the world-historical
level; the 20th-century Anglo-American programme of Speech Act
Theory, which developed out of Oxonian “ordinary language” phi-
losophy, showed that it could be fruitful to view utterances as actions
on a more parochial level. A special case of speech acts or illocu-
tionary acts is the performative, where pronouncing a sentence has
the effect of performing the action it appears to describe or refer to:
1. I pronounce you man and wife.
2. I promise I will come to the seminar.
Whether such acts are performed successfully or appropriately de-
pends on factors such as the speaker’s social role, their sincerity and
so on: for instance only an ordained minister or authorised govern-
ment employee can correctly utter (1). Other types of speech acts
lack the performative feature but may still be seen as actions which
change the world in some way: for example, questions or requests
can have the effect of imposing some obligation on the hearer, when
uttered in appropriate circumstances:
3. What is the capital of Peru?
4. Please come to the seminar.
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3.2 “Classic” Anglo-American Speech Act Theory
The essence of Speech Act Theory is the assumption that agents as
speakers (S) typically produce utterances with the intention of bring-
ing about some change in the beliefs of a hearer (H), and that Hs
recognition of this intention is crucial to the success of the speech
act. Speech acts are sub-categorised by their preparatory conditions
and essential conditions; for instance the preparatory conditions for
assertion of a proposition p are that S has evidence for the truth of
p and it is not obvious that H knows p, while the essential condition
is that uttering an assertion counts as an undertaking to the effect
that p represents an actual state of affairs [30]. For Habermas [18]
the illocutionary force serves to establish a social relation between
interlocutors: for instance a request to borrow money seeks to set up
a relation between creditor and debtor.
Speech act theory since [1] has distinguished between illocution-
ary effects including changes in the hearers beliefs which are con-
ventional consequences of an utterance, and perlocutionary effects
including consequences of an act which may or may not have been
intended by the speaker. According to Searle [30], utterances can be
broken down into their propositional content and their illocutionary
force, which classifies acts as assertions, requests, questions, com-
mands and so on.
3.3 Agents and Agent Communication
We shall see in the following survey that there is a tension between
agent autonomy and the requirements of successful communica-
tion. Wooldridge [39] points out a paradox in mentalistic speech act
based semantics for the inform locution in communication between
autonomous software agents:
If I am completely autonomous, and exercise complete control
over my mental state, then nothing you say will have any effect
on my mental state (. . . ) if you are attempting to inform me of
some state of affairs, then the best you can do is convince me
that you believe this state of affairs.
As observed by [26], it is not clear that this roundabout approach
succeeds in resolving the “paradox of communication”. If the hearer
agent is “completely autonomous”, then convincing it that you be-
lieve P or even that you intend it to believe P seem just as problem-
atic as getting it to believe P itself: both of these are still an attempt
by the speaker to bring about a change in the hearer’s mental state.
4 Initial formalisations of Speech Act Theory
Searle’s [30] formulation of necessary and sufficient conditions for
illocutionary acts is certainly an advance over Austin’s [1] origi-
nal proposals in its relatively explicit and systematic nature. Indeed,
Searle with Daniel Vanderveken [31] developed a formalization of
the theory known as Illocutionary Logic. However, subsequent im-
plementations of Speech Act Theory in computational dialogue mod-
elling and intelligent agent communication did not develop directly
from this work, but rather from work rooted in the AI tradition of
planning, reasoning and knowledge representation. Cohen and Per-
rault [8] showed in a now classic paper that there is a compelling
similarity between Searle’s necessary and sufficient conditions for
performance of speech acts and the pre-and post-conditions used to
define planning operators in AI. Cohen and Perrault were explic-
itly concerned to develop the beginnings of a “competence theory
of speech act communication” by presenting planning operators and
inferential rules for plan construction that “should lead to the gener-
ation of plans for those speech acts that a person could issue appro-
priately under the same circumstances”.
In order to be able to model the successful performance and up-
take of selected speech acts, they adopt a simplifying assumption of
complete cooperativity among interlocutors, such that for example to
request someone to do something is sufficient to get them to want to
do it.
In Cohen and Perrault’s system the preconditions for planning op-
erators capture Searle’s preparatory and sincerity conditions, while
the effect models the essential condition. The authors state that
speakers “cannot influence their hearers beliefs and goals directly”,
and the INFORM act is accordingly defined so that it can be per-
formed successfully without the hearer necessarily actually coming
to believe the asserted proposition. The CONVINCE act is defined to
demonstrate that perlocutionary effects can be achieved if we assume
that agents have complete trust in informants’ truthfulness and relia-
bility. There is a snag here, however. The definition of INFORM still
specifies that the hearer’s mental state is updated as a result of the
action, with the belief that the speaker believes what they say. This
runs contrary to the principle that other agents’ world models cannot
be directly modified by communicative actions.
While a speaker often has performed illocutionary acts with
the goal of achieving certain perlocutionary effects, the actual
securing of those effects is beyond his control (Op cit: 187)
It turns out that in a multi agent environment, the securing of illocu-
tionary effects on the recipient may also be beyond the control of a
communicating agent. Thus we may question whether the distinction
between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts is a useful one in this
context.
Cohen and Levesque [6] have the ostensible aim of presenting a
logical theory which “predicts dialogue phenomena” and can be ap-
plied to the development of “algorithms for human-computer inter-
action in natural language”. In fact the theory is presented at some
level of abstraction from any natural language constructions: the pa-
per contains very few natural language examples, mostly simple im-
peratives such as “Open the door”.
Note that C&L treat all communicative acts as “attempts”, i.e.
nothing in the definition of an act entails any changes in the ad-
dressee’s goals or intentions, which would be incompatible with the
addressee’s status as an autonomous agent. Success of an illocution-
ary act requires not only that the utterer has performed the act cor-
rectly, but in addition that interlocutors can be assumed to be sincere
and helpful; formal definitions of both of these characteristics are
provided.
In summary, Cohen and Levesque’s system does not seem to be
vulnerable to the objections we have noted as applying to Cohen and
Perrault [8] since they do not define actions which directly modify
the state of another agent; rather, the success or failure of an ac-
tion depends on the addressee’s level of helpfulness and the extent to
which the addressee regards the hearer as sincere. Interestingly, the
authors define two degrees of success criteria which seem to match
the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary effects: a re-
quester is committed to his request being understood, in that he will
be likely to repeat it if it seems that the addressee has not heard him
clearly; but it is not required that the agent is committed to the per-
locutionary goal of getting the addressee to perform the required ac-
tion. Essentially, it appears that an illocutionary act may be accepted
or rejected by a recipient, while the sender has the option of repeat-
ing the same action or giving up. There appears to be no mechanism
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for receivers to challenge or query on action on specific grounds, or
for the sender to present an argument or further evidence to persuade
the receiver to accept a request.
5 Communication languages for software agents
The most ambitious programme for developing an artifical com-
munication regime along the lines of SAT was the FIPA ACL
[16, 15, 14, 13]. Communicative acts are specified in terms of
their feasibility preconditions (FP) which correspond to Searle’s
preparatory and sincerity conditions, and rational effect (RE) spec-
ifying the intended outcome of a CA. The latter corresponds to the
perlocutionary effect: for example the RE of an assertive act is that
the hearer comes to believe the asserted proposition, not simply to be
aware that the speaker believes it. Since perlocutionary effects are not
under the direct control of the sender, REs are generally not regarded
as deterministic but are qualified with statements like the following
[14]:
Whether or not the receiver does, indeed, adopt belief in the
proposition will be a function of the receivers trust in the sin-
cerity and reliability of the sender.
This in fact seems rather too loosely worded, as surely the receiver
would also take into account any independent evidence it has as to the
truth of the proposition: the sender may be utterly sincere and nor-
mally reliable, but simply mistaken in a given instance. And given
that the sender may not be aware how much it is trusted by the re-
ceiver, it is not clear how it should decide whether to update its model
of the receivers beliefs – in any case this is not covered in the specifi-
cations. Illocutionary effects are not specified for individual commu-
nicative acts but are partially implemented via an over-arching axiom
called Property 4: “When an agent observes a CA, it should believe
that the agent performing the act has the intention (to make public
its intention) to achieve the rational effect of the act. This is called
the ’intentional effect’” [14]. To spell things out: an agent i should
believe that if agent j has performed an action a of a particular type,j
intends that the defined rational effect of this type of action should
come about.
The FIPA specifications envisage that agents will have the capacity
to reason about other agents’ knowledge and beliefs; for example, an
agent i seeking to inform agent j of proposition p should choose one
of three different communicative acts, depending on its model of j’s
prior beliefs or lack of belief concerning p.
How can agents reason about each others’ beliefs? Some sources
of evidence are utterances that agents have produced, and utterances
they have received. In the first case, an agent’s beliefs should match
the preconditions for any communicative acts that it executes, and
these beliefs are assumed to persist after the act has been performed
according to an axiom designated “Property 5” [14]. In the latter
case, the agent’s beliefs may match the REs of communications they
have received, though this would count as weaker evidence.
Preconditions which require the sender to have knowledge of the
receivers state of mind are not realistic as the sender cannot verify
whether they actually hold; nor, a fortiori, can the sender directly
determine whether the RE has been achieved. It turns out however
that the full specifications do not assume that agents’ behaviour is
based solely on semantic reasoning; rather a number of predefined
protocols are available which mandate response to particular mes-
sage types [13]:
The protocol parameter defines the interaction protocol in
which the ACL message is generated. This parameter is op-
tional; however, developers are advised that employing ACL
without the framework of an interaction protocol (and thus di-
rectly using the ACL semantics to control the agents generation
and interpretation of ACL messages) is an extremely ambitious
undertaking.
The FIPA ACL specification includes interaction protocols for cer-
tain common sequences of message exchanges, enabling agents to
cut down on the extent of reasoning required at any step: rather than
forward-chaining from the current state of a model to find appropri-
ate actions to achieve their goals, they can apply backward-chaining
from a restricted set of available options specified by the protocol in
order to find which, if any, has FPs that match the current state.
A running theme of this paper has been the tension between agent
autonomy and the requirements of successful communication, which
manifests itself in several ways: genuinely autonomous agents can
never be certain that an interlocutor’s mental state matches the pre-
conditions for an utterance, nor that the required effects have been
achieved. As Poslad [27] observes, the specifications for commu-
nicative acts in FIPA ACL require the sender to respect the FPs in
order to send a message, but do not oblige the receiver to respect the
RE:
The actual interpretation of the sender’s i tentional effect in
the receiving agent is considered to be relative to each agent
and to be customizable by each agent. Algorithms for BDI rule
engines to interpret the sender’s intent at the receiver are not
specified by FIPA, although, this has been proposed and dis-
cussed several times at FIPA meetings. The semantics is un-
derspecified in the sense that whilst receiving agents receive
CAs concerning the intentions and beliefs of the sender, receiv-
ing agents are free to carry out their internal actions, such as
changing beliefs, which may be consistent or inconsistent with
the sender’s CA.
We have seen variants of assertive actions which seem to fall be-
tween two stools: on the one hand they aim only at causing the re-
ceiver to believe that the sender believes the asserted proposition,
rather than getting the receiver to believe the proposition itself; on
the other, even this modest goal is actually too strong if we take agent
autonomy seriously. In fact it is doubtful whether BDI agents are ac-
tually implementable in their “pure” form [27]:
BDI models have incomplete axiomizations and can be com-
putationally complex or even intractable. The BDI model fo-
cuses on private belief and intention transfer between individ-
uals. It doesnt take into account third party or societal inter-
action and associated constraints. BDI models seldom focus
on pragmatic issues such as belief and intention management.
These can make the model computationally complex or even
intractable.
Finally we should briefly mention Singh’s [34] social semantics
for agent communication languages, which is explicitly designed to
avoid having to attribute mental states to artificial software agents
and is not explicitly intended to model human communication. Singh
claims to follow Habermas in distinguishing three levels of validity
claim that are raised with each communication: objective (the claim
is true), subjective (the sender is sincere, and believes the content
of the communication) and practical (the sender is justified in send-
ing the communication, e.g. in taking on a particular commitment,
or making a request or prohibition). The cited paper includes for-
malisations of communicative acts such as inform, request, permit,
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forbid, promise and declare. However, although these formalisations
include specifications of the agents’ commitments or validity claims,
there seems to be no locution or protocol for challenging or justi-
fying these claims, so the model cannot claim to faithfully reflect
Habermas’s original notion of communicative rationality.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper has looked at various ideas of what makes up a rational
agent, and we have discussed some evidence that rationality requires
three separate, if linked, capabilities:
1. Ability to select actions in order to achieve some aim, whether by
maximising utility or formal practical reasoning;
2. Ability to explain and predict one’s own actions or those of other
agents;
3. Ability to assess actions against some normative standards.
We have conjectured that this distinction roughly corresponds to the
classification of rationality models as instrumental, linguistic and dis-
cursive, and to Habermas’s “three roots of rationality”. Habermas is
the only one of the researchers we have considered who attempts to
pull together different dimensions of rationality within a unitary ac-
count, though further work will be needed to establish whether his
approach can adequately tackle these three explanatory projects. Fi-
nally, we have looked at one particular strand of work in AI which
aims to construct rational agents, and argued that the resulting arte-
facts fall short of being fully rational according to the above criteria.
David Traum’s observation still holds true [36]:
While a comprehensive theory of speech acts will strain most
contemporary theories of rational agency, requiring a very ex-
pressive theory of action and mental state, it also provides a
good testbed for a theory of agency in a multi-agent world.
In fact it is doubtful whether any ACL specification can so far be
said to incorporate a “comprehensive theory of speech acts”, as many
questions have been left unresolved. It has proved chellenging to
specify exactly how the intended outcomes of communicative acts
should be specified in ways that take full account of the receivers
autonomy. The systems we have considered tend to assume an ego-
centric model of goal-directed agency, in contrast to Habermas and
Brandom’s conceptions of rational agency which postulate a norma-
tive background for communicative action. Each of the implementa-
tions and formalisations we have considered turns out to rely on some
external mechanism to secure uptake, such as norms of sincerity and
cooperativity or mandated communications protocols.
To return to where we started: there is an interesting connection
between the notion of discursive rationality and Turing’s [37] pro-
posal that the ability to conduct unrestricted conversation in natural
language could be taken as indicative of intelligence. This ability
would have to encompass giving reasons or justifications for claims
as well as demanding them. This is precisely what is missing from
the various “chatbots” which have been entered for the annual Loeb-
ner Prize: see for example this exchange involving “Mitsuku”, the
most successful entrant in the 2016 competition4.
Judge: The cat tried to climb in the box but got stuck because it
was too big. What was too big?
Mitsuku: Well at least they tried their best. Large, above aver-
age in size or number or quantity or magnitude or extent.
4 See http://www.aisb.org.uk/events/loebner-prize#Results16
The reader will recall that Turing offered few substantive arguments
in favour of his proposal, focussing instead on rebutting a series of
anticipated objections. If the claims of this paper are accepted, dis-
cursive abilities can be taken as a necessary if not sufficient condition
for agents to be considered to be rational, adding a positive argument
for Turing’s proposal alongside his negative ones.
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Self-organising connected dynamical systems for
learning temporal dependencies
Karla Parussel
Abstract. A novel architecture for a self-organising agent
controller is presented here. It consists of a network of self-
organising systems that can interact with one another. Each
node in the network is implemented as a dynamical system
with a state coordinate that traverses a dynamic energy land-
scape formed from attractors whose strength and position
change over time. Connections exist between attractors of dif-
ferent landscapes allowing the dynamical systems to perturb
one another as they settle into a stable state. The agent con-
troller is given cost and reward actions that, if successfully
used, change the strength of subsequent input signals. The
controller is also given a set of enabler actions that must be
used for specific cost and reward actions to have an effect in
the next turn. The cost and reward actions have no effect if
the specific enabler action they rely upon is not used in the
previous turn. The enabler actions that the cost and reward
actions rely upon changes randomly over time.
1 Motivation
The brain can be understood as a self-organising system, [15]
[25]. The way that a brain functions internally is not directly
determined by an external controller. Instead the brain re-
acts to sensory signals. It is an open system that senses the
environment and acts within it, thereby changing it.
Living organisms are made up of cells and their evolution
has been shaped accordingly. These systems are radically dif-
ferent to the computer architectures that are used for pro-
cessing biologically inspired models such as artificial neural
networks.
The motivation for the work presented here was to find an
abstract model that was more suitable for processing on a
computer, whether because it is more efficient or because it is
easier to understand and reason about. The aim was to pro-
vide an abstraction of the underlying computation or process
inherent in many self-organising systems rather than to claim
biological plausibility. By modelling our understanding of how
self-organising systems function we can verify and clarify our
assumptions about how real-world systems function.
The idea of using a single dynamical system for autonomous
agents and embedded cognition is not new [8]. But no self-
organising system is completely self-contained. Every self-
organising system, and also every directed system, is ulti-
mately one of many parts of a larger self-organising system.
The theory of autopoiesis [19] holds that there is no real
boundary between an agent and its environment because the
agent is a part of its environment. Beer describes how the
nervous system of an agent, its body and the environment it
inhabits can be considered coupled dynamical systems [2] [3].
Olds and Milner were able to influence the actions of a rat in
a skinner box by injecting a current into its pleasure centres
[12]. It could be argued that the rat’s brain was no longer
self-organising, but the rat, scientists, lever and apparatus
injecting the current together formed a self-organising system.
We are all part of a society, world, solar system and galaxy
that is each self-organising because they all act in accordance
with the laws of thermodynamics [5] [6] [7] [13].
Even though a self-organising system can be made up of
constituent components which are themselves self-organising,
each component can still be considered a distinct entity, for
example, an economy is formed from a network of buyers and
sellers. What then is the nature of the connections between
self-organising systems?
Real-world open self-organising systems settle into stable
states by minimising the input of free energy. Energy leaves
the system in a higher entropic state than when it entered
[11] [23]. Energy flows can take many different forms. For
example money can be considered a currency of free energy
in an economy because it enables work to be performed and
can be converted to other forms of real-world energy. The
term free energy is used here in its broadest sense to refer to
any energy that can perform work because of the presence of
a thermodynamic gradient.
If each system is ultimately part of a larger self-organising
system, then conversely, it is possible to reduce some self-
organising systems into networks of smaller systems that are
connected by energy flows. For example, distinct regions in
the brain interact with each other via connections from pyra-
midal neurons. A biologically plausible model of a neuron re-
ceives inputs of energy which leak away over time, but are
expelled as action potentials if it reaches a voltage threshold
[26] [17]. Dendritic self-organisation can be explained as the
minimisation of free energy [16].
We can consider a pyramidal projection from one area of
the brain to another to be persistent whereas the synaptic
connections between cells in a neuronal network as transient.
This is because the latter connections strengthen and weaken
over time due to synaptic drift and weight change. There is
effectively little difference between two neurons which are not
connected and two joined by a synapse that is unlikely to
release a neurotransmitter. A self-organising system contain-
ing persistent connections might be better modelled using a
network of smaller systems containing only transient connec-
tions. This could be a modelled as a network of dynamical
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systems that would then both perturb and be perturbed by
other systems that they are connected to.
The connections between dynamical systems in a network
would act as energy flows between self-organising systems.
Light and heat from the sun to the earth, photons reaching
the eyes or signals being carried along pyramidal projections
from one area to another, or connections between interneurons
within the same circuit, are all examples of self-organising
systems that perturb each other via the flow of energy.
2 Model
The architecture presented here consists of a network whereby
each node is an individual self-organising system modelled by
a dynamical system. These systems attempt to settle inter-
nally into stable states, but by doing so can disturb other sys-
tems external to themselves via connections, which are also
attempting to settle into stable states.
The network of dynamical systems is used here as an agent
controller. One system is designated the output node and de-
termines which actions are to be performed. Sensory stimuli
can be injected into any system as a collection of real values.
2.1 Methodology
A useful working definition of intelligence is the ability to
adapt to an unknown environment. If the environment is fully
known in advance then an agent can perform equally well, or
better, by merely following hard coded rules. It is difficult to
argue that such an agent is acting intelligently.
Self organising systems are made up of many components
that can be arranged in a myriad of different ways. How they
self-organise in practice is determined by the flow of free en-
ergy that its environment provides.
Therefore an intelligent self-organising agent must be able
to adapt to an unknown function external to itself. This func-
tion can be an external environment for an embodied agent,
or a particular task that a system is applied to. It cannot
be assumed a-priori how an intelligent self-organising agent
can most effectively adapt because it is in effect performing a
search of which of its internal states is the most stable given a
particular input. For the same reason it cannot be assumed in
advance which components or mechanisms will be required for
a self-organising intelligent agent to most successfully adapt
to an unknown task or environment.
148 different versions of the code were tested for how well
they performed a variety of different experiments. The code
was evolved each time for different experiments and stopped
once an initial idea was obtained as to how well it performed.
In this way different algorithms or choice of functions could be
compared. If they did not show a general increase in perfor-
mance then they were discarded. Each evolutionary run could
take a day or longer to provide an initial idea of fitness, and
many weeks to fully complete.
The system was designed so that each dynamical system
could settle into a stable state, but by doing so could dis-
turb other systems with the network of systems either even-
tually finding a compromise, or oscillating between stable
states. Consideration was given as to how a system might
need to adapt by modulating its own properties. Algorithms
and functions that required fewer parameters to be optimised
were preferred because it meant that evolutionary runs would
be shorter. Algorithms also needed to be consistent with the
overall concept to make it easier to understand how the model
was adapting. One of the motivations for discarding biologi-
cal plausibility was to make an adaptive system more easily
understood, reasoned about and engineered. If a bug in the
code meant that it was not functioning as intended, then it
was corrected even if this led to a decrease in fitness. This
was because it could have been compensating for other bugs
elsewhere in the code. It is expected that there will be ways
in which the model can be further optimised and extended to
be applied to other tasks. It is also possible that ideas that
were previously discarded may find a use when the model is
applied to other tasks.
2.2 Energy landscape
Each dynamical system is effectively an energy landscape [11]
[10, pp21]. Kauffman uses the landscape concept to describe
dynamical systems as consisting of attractors, disjoint from
each other in state space, acting as lakes with drainage basins
[14, pp 176].
Using an analogy of a ball rolling alo g a peak, ridge or
plateau, given sufficient energy it will roll down a slope and
minimise its own potential energy. The ball will not be able
to later return unless its kinetic energy is first increased. This
process will continue until the ball comes to a stop at the
bottom of the landscape, or within a local depression that
requires more kinetic energy than the ball currently has for
it to escape. Valleys correspond to attractors in a dynamical
system, the speed that the system moves into them being
determined by the steepness of the slope.
The space in which the energy landscape resides is imple-
mented as a continuous toroidal space of three dimensions.
Any location within it can be pin-pointed using a coordinate
where each dimension is within the range [0 : 1]. Attractors
are placed randomly within the space to form the energy land-
scape. The state of the system is specified using a state coordi-
nate which has a velocity. Attractors influence the trajectory
of the state coordinate within the space by pulling it towards
themselves. Each cycle, the dynamical systems process input
signals, update the position of their state coordinate, send
output signals and then update their internal state.
Calculations involving two coordinates within the toroidal
space always use the shortest Euclidean distance possible.
This is achieved by comparing the absolute difference of each
dimension between one coordinate and the other. If the ab-
solute difference is greater than 0.5 then −/ + 1 is added to
reduce it.
Each attractor has a strength value and this affects how
strongly it can pull the state coordinate. The strength param-
eter changes over time and can also become negative whereby
the attractor will act as a repulsor pushing the state coor-
dinate away. Attractor strength is constrained to be in the
range [−1 : 1].
Attractor strength decays over time. It can either be in-
creased by input signals arriving via connections or directly
injected in. Directly injected signals modify attractor strength
before those from input connections. Signals directly injected
I are multiplied by an evolved scaling parameter and ap-
plied to attractor strength AS , either by AS = I¯, AS + I¯
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or (AS + I¯)/2, the choice of which is evolved.
2.3 Connections
Attractors can send signals out over connections. Connec-
tions can be either excitatory or inhibitory. Inhibitory con-
nections invert their signals to be negative. Connections are
not weighted. Each output connection originates from a source
attractor.
Signal strength is determined by distance of the state coor-
dinate to the centre of the source attractor. The stronger the
attractor, the more it can attract the state coordinate and
the stronger its output signal. Signal strength is calculated as
1.0 − normalise(m), where m is the Euclidean distance be-
tween the position of the attractor AP and the position of the
state coordinate •SP , normalised to be in the range [0 : 1].
•SP has a shorter Euclidean distance to AP than SP using
the method described above.
There are various types of connections between dynamical
systems with each type having a different effect. Some types
modify a property of a specific attractor in the target sys-
tem; strength (StrengthSignal, CopyStrengthSignal) and re-
ceptivity to input (ReceptivitySignal). Other connection types
change the properties of the entire target system; acceleration
of the state coordinate (GainSignal), the rate at which at-
tractors move (AttractorMovementSignal) and whether con-
nections should change the attractors they connect to (Con-
nectionLearningSignal) and whether the output signals of the
target system should be inhibited (OutputInhibitionSignal).
The average signal strength is calculated for each connection
type.
There are three forms of connectivity between source and
target dynamical systems. One to one connectivity between
each corresponding attractor, full connectivity from each
source attractor to each target attractor, and sparse connec-
tivity which is like full connectivity but with an evolved prob-
ability of a connection being created.
2.4 Updating state
The position of the state coordinate is then updated. The
direction to move the state coordinate is the unit vector sˆ =
normalise(•AP − SP ).
The unit vector is then scaled up to account for strength
of attraction and how close the state coordinate is to the
attractor. If the inverse square law were to be used to emulate
the effect of gravity then it would produce numbers within the
range [1 :∞], whereas what is required are numbers [0 : 1]. So
instead attraction of the state coordinate is calculated as Sa =
sˆ · (1− n)2 · A¯S , where A¯S is attractor strength multiplied by
an evolved scaling parameter and n is the Euclidean distance
between •AP and SP normalised to be in the range [0 : 1].
An evolved decay rate is multiplied by n and applied to
the strength of each attractor to act as a form of habituation.
The closer the attractor is to the state coordinate the faster
its strength decays.
The attraction of the state coordinate to each attractor is
added to the state coordinate’s velocity as normalise(
∑
Sa) ·
Cs, where the sum of attraction is normalised to be a unit
vector and Cs is an evolved constant acceleration for the state
coordinate. If this results in values outside the range [−1 : 1],
then the velocity is constrained by normalising it so that the
largest dimension has an absolute value of 1.
The new velocity is then multiplied by a gain modifier set
to the mean of input signals of type GainSignal if any are
present. The velocity is added to the state coordinate before
being multiplied by a genetically determined decay rate. The
new state coordinate is wrapped to keep it within the toroidal
space.
2.4.1 Sending outputs
Dynamical systems then send signals over their output con-
nections to be processed in the next cycle. If the output con-
nection is of type CopyStrength then the strength of the source
attractor is used instead without relation to its distance from
the state coordinate. This is added to the strength of the tar-
get attractor as if the connection was of type StrengthSignal.
Dynamical systems can inhibit the output signals of other
systems if they connect using OutputInhibitionSignal connec-
tions. After the output force of an attractor is calculated, it
is multiplied by the output force inhibition modifier. At the
beginning of each cycle the modifier is set to 1 and ordinarily
has no effect. Unlike the other connection types which calcu-
late the average signal strength, OutputInhibitionSignal con-
nections add their excitatory or inhibitory signal strengths to
this modifier before the modifier is thresholded to be within
the range [0 : 1].
2.4.2 Updating connections
Once the input and output signals are processed, the inter-
nal state of each dynamical system is updated. Even though
connections are not weighted, there is a pressure on them to
change which attractors they connect to and from. Connec-
tions that update a property of the dynamical system cannot
adapt in this way. The strength of the signal they send is com-
pared with the strength of the target attractor, 0.5 or above
is strong, below is weak.
• If both the target attractor and connection signal are strong
then the pressure is reduced.
• If one strength is strong and the other weak then the pres-
sure is increased.
• If both strengths are weak then no change is made.
The change to the connection-change pressure is ran-
domised with a number drawn from [0 : evolvedmaximum].
If the connection is inhibitory then the change is inverted. For
the purpose of updating connections,‘ when retrieving a sig-
nal strength from a connection the value returned is either 1
or 0 depending on whether the it is above or below an evolved
threshold.
The connection pressure is multiplied by the connection
learning modifier. This modifier is set to the mean of input
signals of type ConnectionLearningModifer if any are present,
otherwise it defaults to 1. If a random number drawn in the
range [0 : pressure] is greater than the evolved threshold
then the pressure is reset and the connection connects to or
from another attractor depending on whether it is an input or
output connection. The new attractor to connect to is chosen
at random.
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2.4.3 Updating attractor position
Each attractor is pulled towards other attractors, or pushed
away from attractors that have flipped to become repulsors.
The total attraction and repulsion is summed up for each
attractor before their positions are updated. Each attrac-
tor’s position Pi is pulled towards or pushed away by ev-
ery other attractor Pj . This is calculated to be a unit vector
aˆ = normalise(
∑
((•Pj − Pi)(Rj +Ri − 1)))
R is the output force recorder function of an attractor. This
decays alongside attractor strength using an evolved decay
rate. When calculating the attractor output force when send-
ing a signal over a connection, if it is greater than an thresh-
old then an increase is added to the recorder function. Both
threshold and increase are evolved.
The unit vector is added to the attractor’s velocity as aˆ ·Ca
where Ca is an evolved constant acceleration. If this results in
values outside the range [−1 : 1], then the new velocity is nor-
malised so that the largest dimension has an absolute value of
1. The velocity is then multiplied by an attractor movement
modifier. This modifier is set to the mean of input signals of
type AttractorMovementSignal if any are present, otherwise
it defaults to 1. The velocity is added to the attractor’s co-
ordinate before being multiplied by a genetically determined
decay rate. The coordinate is wrapped to keep it within the
toroidal space.
Attractor strength is used when calculating attraction of
the state coordinate, the output force recorder function is
used when calculating attraction of other attractors.
2.4.4 Scaling
The range of values used for describing distance, attractor-
and signal strength were chosen to be in the range [0 : 1] for
practical reasons. There is nothing inherent in the model that
makes these ranges relevant to one another. Therefore scale
parameters are evolved so they can be applied to one an-
other. A pair of scale parameters are evolved together, a base
[0 : 2] raised to the power of an exponent. When calculating
attraction of an attractor on a state coordinate, the attrac-
tor strength is scaled before being applied to the unit vector.
Directly injected inputs are also scaled before modifying or
setting attractor strength. Connections which modify global
parameters of whole dynamical systems (GainSignal, Attrac-
torMovementSignal, ConnectionLearningSignal, OutputInhi-
bitionSignal) have the signal they deliver scaled by a single
real parameter in the range [0 : 2]. Connections between at-
tractors (StrengthSignal, CopyStrengthSignal, ReceptivitySig-
nal) are also scaled by another parameter in the range [0 : 2].
2.4.5 Pruning
The network needs to be pruned before first use. Pruning
makes the network more efficient and easier to visualise. All
systems with output connections that ultimately connect to
the output system are marked as active. Inactive systems are
then removed from the network along with their input and
output connections.
Depending on how it has evolved, some dynamical systems
will not receive any sensory signals either by direct injection
or via input connections from other systems. These systems
may be active and have output connections that affect the
average input signal in other systems. It was found that prun-
ing these systems reduced performance but also allowed the
agent controller to differentiate more effectively between sub-
optimal actions. Only the inactive systems were pruned when
obtaining the results in section 4.
2.5 Parameter Optimisation
The parameters of the networks are optimised using an evolu-
tionary algorithm. Once these evolutionary runs are finished
the parameters are used to generate and test a population of
450 agents in order to determine the average performance of
the model. An average fitness is required because the mapping
from genotype to phenotype is stochastic.
The fitness function used during parameter optimisation
was (2 · Resource) + Age. Age is important for the fitness
function during parameter optimisation when agents are more
likely to die before the end of their evaluation. Each agent
was tested for a consistent number of cycles unless it died
prematurely.
3 Experiments
The artificial life animat concept was abstracted to provide
the simplest possible context for testing the model. An agent
was created that can neither sense an environment nor be
affected by one. It only interacts with a body that contains
a resource level (see figure 1). An example of a network of
dynamical systems can be seen in figure 2.
Actions
Body
Agent
controller
Figure 1. The agent controller receives input signals derived
from the state of the body. It then attempts to choose one action
to be performed. The action directly alters the body state of the
agent. This leads to different input signals being passed to the
agent controller in the next turn.
Each change in resource level was passed to the agent con-
troller as an input signal. Before being input, they were scaled
to the largest increase and decrease that had occurred to each
resource so as to be within the range [0 : 1]. They were then
inverted so that desirable changes, such as increases to a re-
source level, resulted in a reduced signal to the agent con-
troller. This allows the network to act as a minimal distur-
bance system as it settles upon actions that reduce its total
input activation.
Each attractor in the output dynamical system corre-
sponded to a different action. At the end of a cycle, the action
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Figure 2. The semi-transparent cubes with edges each
represent a single dynamical system. Each is a 3D space
containing attractors (coloured spheres) and a single state
coordinate (white sphere). Connections between attractors, or
attractors and systems, are represented with semi-transparent
arrows. The width of the connections and the size of each
attractor signifies its current strength. Only the active systems are
shown. The dark cubes label each system. The seventh dynamical
system has a recurrent connection to and from the same system.
of the attractor that is closest to the state coordinate was per-
formed. If there was a tie then then one of the winners was
chosen at random.
How does intelligence differ from other natural self-
organising phenomena? It is proposed here that as with all
self-organising systems, free energy is minimised so the sys-
tem can settle into a stable state. But in the case of intelligent
systems, unlike a stimulus / response agent, neutral, or even
costly actions can be performed if it means that the minimisa-
tion of free energy is greater when averaged over time. By this
means an intelligent system is more able to escape local min-
ima within an energy landscape. If correct, this would suggest
that if it is possible for an intelligent system to develop, then
it is likely to given sufficient time because such systems can
settle into states that are more stable.
The agent controller was given the task of learning tempo-
ral dependencies to test whether it could learn to perform
a sequence of neutral actions that subsequently enabled a
cost or reward. It was given a set of four reward and four
cost actions that increased or decreased the resource levels by
0.5/1.0/1.5/2.0 points respectively. The agent was also given
eight enabler actions that had no effect except to allow a cost
or reward action to have an effect if it was used in the next
cycle. If the corresponding enabler action had not been used
then the cost / reward action would have no effect.
There was a 0.1% chance for each cost / reward action at
the end of the cycle to change which enabler action it de-
pended upon to be allowed to be successfully performed. En-
abler actions were chosen at random so it was possible that
some enabler actions could allow more than one other cost /
reward action while some enabler actions allowed none.
4 Results
During the evolutionary run, agents were run for 2,000 cy-
cles before a fitness score was added to the running average
of its genotype. At the end of the evolutionary run, all the
genotypes in the population were evaluated the same num-
ber of times and the best one was selected. This was then
tested in a run lasting 1,000,000 cycles with the fittest geno-
type used to create a population of 450 agents. The results
are slightly different for each agent because there is a stochas-
tic mapping between genotype and phenotype. The genotype
was tested for an extended period because cost and reward
actions change which enabler action they rely upon randomly
over time. Running it for 1,000,000 cycles means that we can
rule out luck when evaluating. Fitness levels plotted for each
agent in the population show that all agents were able to
adapt successfully 3.
The results for the population of agents expressed from
the best genotype are in table 1. The first eight actions are
neutral and enable one, some or none of the next eight cost
or reward actions. The third column is the frequency with
which the action was performed, with all values adding up
to 100%. The fourth column specifies the success rate the
agents had when performing that action. If an action was
successfully performed because the enabler action that it was
reliant upon was performed in the previous cycle, then both
its success rate and that of the enabler action it is reliant
upon were incremented.
The most salient result is that the best reward action was
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Figure 3. Figure sorted in order of ascending fitness. The run
lasted 1,000,000 cycles. The results are slightly different for each
agent because there is a stochastic mapping between genotype
and phenotype.
attempted more frequently than the other actions (25%) and
more often successfully (84% of the time). The enabler actions
were attempted more often than the cost and reward actions,
and the reward actions marginally more often than the cost
actions. But the agents learnt to perform the reward actions
successfully more often than the cost actions.
Action Amt Freq Success
Enabler 0 6.67% 48.89%
Enabler 0 6.17% 44.28%
Enabler 0 6.24% 44.86%
Enabler 0 6.08% 43.80%
Enabler 0 6.73% 49.18%
Enabler 0 5.57% 38.69%
Enabler 0 6.40% 46.82%
Enabler 0 6.21% 44.84%
Cost -2.0 3.45% 4.17%
Cost -1.5 3.45% 418%
Cost -1.0 3.44% 4.19%
Cost -0.5 3.44% 4.16%
Reward 0.5 3.62% 6.82%
Reward 1.0 3.61% 6.84%
Reward 1.5 3.62% 7.00%
Reward 2.0 25.30% 84.49%
Table 1. Average frequency of enabler, cost and reward actions
chosen by a population of 450 agents and how successfully they
were used.
The experiment was repeated using the same genotype, but
this time a base cost of -0.5 was applied when using an action.
If the cost or reward actions were used successfully then the
base cost was not applied. The two smallest cost and reward
actions (-/+ 0.5 respectively) were replaced with two non-
sequence neutral actions which never applied a base cost. An
agent could settle into a stable state by using only these two
actions, but if it were to reduce the input signal even more,
it would first have to perform another action that increased
it. The results are shown in table 2.
The agents did not perform the neutral non-sequence action
any more frequently than any of the other actions. The great-
est reward action was performed most frequently and success-
fully even though this meant that the agents first needed to
Action Amt Freq Success
Enabler -0.5 6.27% 10.52%
Enabler -0.5 6.31% 11.60%
Enabler -0.5 6.25% 10.80%
Enabler -0.5 6.17% 9.56%
Enabler -0.5 6.18% 9.91%
Enabler -0.5 6.20% 10.05%
Enabler -0.5 6.40% 12.73%
Enabler -0.5 6.23% 9.89%
Cost -2.0 5.80% 6.60%
Cost -1.5 5.79% 6.62%
Cost -1.0 5.80% 6.59%
Non-sequence 0 5.77% 100%
Non-sequence 0 5.76% 100%
Reward 1.0 5.80% 6.26%
Reward 1.5 5.77% 6.28%
Reward 2.0 9.53% 36.18%
Table 2. Average frequency of enabler, cost and reward actions
with a base cost when unsuccessfully used. Also includes two
non-sequence neutral actions.
perform a sequence action that carried a base cost.
5 Discussion
There is a paradox with life. If life is by nature thermodynam-
ically far from equilibrium [4] [1] then how did it self-organise
by minimising free energy? Life reduces the thermodynamic
gradient between the hot sun and cold space [23, pp 8]. The
existence of a thermodynamic gradient means that there is a
pressure to perform work. The more fully the thermodynamic
gradient can be exploited the more entropy is produced and
the more the gradient is reduced over time.
Shro¨dinger used the concept of entropy and Gibbs free en-
ergy to describe how life increases entropy by the act of feed-
ing. Food is relatively ordered and after being used to pro-
duce energy for the organism is returned in a simpler state to
the environment [24]. Feeding and breeding allows for more
entropy to be increased over time than a single agent that
starved to death and decayed.
Maybe intelligence avoids the dark room problem [9] in the
same way? Organisms seek to maximise their consumption
of resources and chance of breeding rather than hide in a
dark chamber avoiding surprises, but in so doing they in-
crease entropy over the life-time of the agent. In both cases
a thermodynamic pressure is succeeding in performing work,
thereby increasing entropy, until the components on which it
acts upon settle into a state stable enough to persist.
Although entropy is not represented in the dynamical sys-
tems described here, they do function by settling into stable,
or metastable states. The stronger the reward, the weaker
the directly injected input signal. In this way disturbance is
minimised, which can be seen as equivalent to minimising free
energy. The agent controller learnt to perform the correct neu-
tral enabler action that would allow it to successfully perform
a rewarding action, but it could also learn to perform a costly
enabler action first so as to gain a greater reward later. In
doing so the agents successfully avoided a local minima in
the energy landscape and minimised more disturbance when
averaged over time.
Information theory and thermodynamics share the concept
of entropy, and an information theoretic approach to AI has
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proven extremely useful. This approach though ignores the
fact that brains are examples of self-organised physical sys-
tems that change their structure over time. Understanding
how and why they do so will help us to understand how they
function, and consequently, how artificial versions can be en-
gineered.
For example when discussing the dark-room problem Fris-
ton et al. refer to free energy in terms of information theory.
It could be argued though that surprise generates neural ac-
tivity and the difference between expectation and actual sen-
sory input could be understood as disturbance that needs to
be minimised. The difference between an information focused
and activity- or disturbance focused approach may be con-
sidered conceptual rather than actual, but as designers the
concepts that we use determine how we reason about and
engineer such systems.
Biologically inspired self-organising neural networks devel-
oped previously were explained as settling into a stable state
by finding the lowest point on an energy landscape [22] [21]
[20]. Modelling this understanding explicitly as a network of
connected dynamical systems demonstrates that it is a useful
concept when engineering self-organising systems.
LeDoux [18] pp16 describes a distinguishing characteristic
of cognitive processing as flexibility of response to the envi-
ronment. Emotions provide a counter-balance to this by nar-
rowing the response of an agent in ways that have a greater
evolutionary fitness. Based on this, [20] proposed that emo-
tions can be defined in terms of whether they drive an agent
out of a stable state or help enforce it.
An approach similarly inspired by non-equilibrium thermo-
dynamics focused on the idea of activity as disturbance that
can be minimised by a system settling into stable states may
also be fruitful for modelling cognition.
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Cognitive Phenomenology: a Challenge for 
Neuromodelling  
Igor Aleksander1 
Abstract.  Cognitive Phenomenology (CP) is the suggestion that 
conventional (or Sensory) Phenomenology (SP) only deals with 
the “what it’s like” of sense/feeling experience (such as being 
conscious of a red rose or having a headache) but is silent on the 
“what it’s like” of cognitive experience (such as ‘understanding’ 
a mathematical equation) that is, a cognitive type of 
phenomenology. The existence or otherwise of CP is the subject 
of a contemporary controversy and the nature of this is briefly 
discussed in order to show that modelling via neural automata 
suggests a resolution of the controversy. To achieve this, 
previously introduced neural automata models used with SP are 
recalled to indicate that CP might be identified as a particular use 
of the state structures of the SP neural automaton. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Bayne and Montague [1] and Galen Strawson [2] among others 
contend that cognitive experiences and experiential, sense/feeling 
ones are mutually exclusive.  That is, there is something it is like 
to understand an image which is different from the something it is 
like to be conscious of that image. Finding computational models 
of this is important as cognitive mechanisms of understanding, 
thinking and finding meaning are areas of weakness in 
computational domains. Dissenters object to CP for several 
reasons ranging from assertions that cognitive experiences have 
no phenomenology (i.e. there is nothing it is like assign meaning 
to a perception) to the belief that cognitive states are conscious 
only by virtue of their association with perceptual events (the 
cognitive assignation of meaning is part of the perceptual act). 
These diverging views are summarised further in section 2 of this 
paper. In section 3 we trace earlier work on neural automata 
models of consciousness. It is indicated that these are based in the 
creation of experience-representing attractors in the state space of 
the neural automaton and that these are the basis for the presence 
of SP. In section 4 we extend the state space analysis to CP 
indicating that unconventional trajectories between attractors and 
experience-representing trajectories may support the cognitive 
element. In the summary of section 5 we indicate how this result 
might affect the cognitive philosophy debate.   
2 PROS AND CONS OF COGNITIVE 
PHENOMENOLOGY 
Cognitive Phenomenology has come into philosophical 
discussion as being a form of phenomenology of non-sensory, 
non-affective, non-bodily mental event. This is distinct from but 
complementary to phenomenology which can be said to be of a 
sensory, feeling, or bodily mental experience, that is SP. So it is 
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convenient to recall that the word ‘phenomenology’ entails ‘the 
something it’s like to be in a conscious mental state’.  There is 
something it is like to be conscious of a beautiful sunset, as there 
is something it is like to recall last night’s movie.   CP is then the 
study of ‘the something it is like’ to have understood a phrase 
spoken in a known language as there is something it is like to not 
understand a phrase in an unknown language and other cognitive 
events of this kind. Essentially, the something it is like to have 
understood a sentence is separate from the content of the sentence 
(which is dealt with by SP) and is present whenever language is 
understood.  In common with SP, verbal reports can express CP 
events. In [1] (Introduction) one finds examples such as ‘I want to 
eat an ice cream’; ‘I am a fine fellow’; ‘Sept 2 is the date I fell in 
love’, which refer to events that are not a form of immediate SP. 
More recently, Chudnoff [3] provided a useful illustration in 
quoting the well-known example of the image of black and white 
dots in which one suddenly discovers the presence of a Dalmatian 
hound. This is entirely an experiential change in the SP domain. 
However the step from seeing “If a<1, then 2-2a>0” and being 
able to report that it is true, is entirely due a cognitive “what it’s 
like” change that goes under the heading of understanding in the 
CP domain. Indeed, following Strawson [2] it is accepted here that 
there are three central CP experiences that define the concept: 
understanding, meaning and thought and it is these that feature in 
the modelling targets of this paper.  
 So far we have addressed CP from the point of view of 
those who deem that the sensory nature of classical 
phenomenology does not adequately cater for the phenomenology 
of conceptual thought.  But there are also strong voices against 
this view.  One attack comes from Carruthers and Veillet [4].  
Primarily, they argue that phenomenology as a concept is not 
entirely meaningful in conjunction with cognitive content, having 
been defined for sensory/bodily/emotional content in the first 
place.  As evidence, they point out that there is an ‘explanatory 
gap’ relationship between a perceptual external source and 
phenomenological sensation, which seems not to exist for an 
internal cognitive source and phenomenology should there be any. 
In earlier contributions it was suggested that the explanatory gap 
can be bridged through a formal assessment of physical structure, 
learned functions and resulting informational structure in a 
machine (see, for example Aleksander [5]). More of this later.    
Also, Tye and Wright [6] argue that thoughts have no 
phenomenology as they are processes rather than states. Here it is 
argued that thoughts are phenomenal states that are detached from 
perceptual influence. 
 
3 NEURAL AUTOMATA AND 
PHENOMENOLOGY 
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Here, the hypothesis that a neural automaton can have internal 
states that are phenomenological by virtue of being depictive of 
perceptual experience, is developed beyond previous work. As 
explained below, for the automaton there is ‘something it is like’ 
to perceive a red rose precisely because there are groups neurons 
that actually depict the red rose. Chrisley and Parthmore [7] have 
defined ‘synthetic phenomenology’ and what is proposed fits in 
with the role of this concept as “any attempt to use an artefact to 
help specify phenomenal states independently of whether such 
states are possessed by a naturally conscious being or an artefact”. 
The description of the function a neural automaton (more 
precisely, a neural finite state machine) chosen here is shown in 
Fig. 1. 
            
Figure 1. State diagram of a generic finite state neural 
automaton. 
 
The internal state is the firing pattern of a set neurons. As a 
modelling choice here this internal state is in the same circle as 
the output state (that which the automaton communicates to the 
external world) which is another set of neurons, the output set, the 
circle indicating that the output set is closely coupled to the 
internal set in te sense that while many internal states can have 
the same output state, every internal state has only one output 
state. The input state is a representation of all external influences 
of the world on the automaton which is due to the firing of an  
input set of neurons. Note that fig 1 does not relate to brains – it 
is the beginning of some theory. 
 To make this useful to a discussion of being conscous, 
the internal state is made depictive of the input state and  output 
state (note that this is specific to the model that is being developed 
in this paper and not a feature of our earlier work). The way that 
such depictions are achieved for the internal state (described in 
some detail in [8] (Chapter 5)) can briefly be indcated in what 
follows. The key issue is that the input state not only feeds the 
inputs of the internal set of neurons but also forces the perceptual 
pattern on the outputs and the mapping between the two is learnt. 
The situation is shown in Figure 2 (a).  
 
 
Figure 2: Making the state depictive of a rose. 
 
In 2(b) it is indicated that hrough a similar process, an output state 
(‘Rose’ as speech, or writing action) can become part the internal 
state. Also further iconic training can make the state persist even 
in the absence of input, that is a presence of noise at the input 
(shown as an oval). This creates a stable inner state that  given the 
right connectedness among neurons (a carefully studied topic as 
integrated information, see, [8]) becomes an attractor in the sense 
that similar perceptions may lead to a stable entry into the one 
depictively acquired state.  
At this point phenomenology is illustrated purely as it might exist 
in a neural automaton which gathers experience on the basis of the 
creation of state spaces that relate intentionally to an external 
world through the process of depiction as illustrated above.  It is 
assumed that the neual automaton is a robot that can articulate 
speech and execute outward actions that include motion. As an 
illustration, the system in Figure 3 is examined.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Example of experience acquisition in an exploratory 
robot 
 
In 3(a) a ‘world’ is shown to consist of numbered areas where the 
number indicates an item that is perceived. This perception 
(currently 13) is an input to a neural automaton as shown in 3(b). 
In 3(c), the leftmost state is an initialisation where (?) refers to 
some arbitrary coding. The input state (13) causes an entry into a 
state which by iconic learning has been encoded as the 
phenomenal depiction of the input 13.  As this is an exploratory 
automaton, the direction in which it will move is selected at 
random in the action part of the internal state. Here it is assumed 
that either through learned or through inherited (that is, designed 
in the artificial domain) constraints, there are only five actions that 
can be learned (U)p, (D)own, (L)eft, (R)ight and (S)till. In figure 
3(c), the automaton is ‘perceiving’ 13 and therefore iconically 
learns to encode 13 and being (S)till . It is assumed that the salient 
action part of the state is S which causes a re-entry into the 13 
inner state creating S a stable internal state (an attractor). The 
automaton will remain in state 13 until the action indication 
changes. Arbitrarily this is U and 13 U is entered and iconically 
learned and the consequently the automaton moves to 9. 
 However, an important question of sequentiality now 
arises and this has to be considered before a general expression of 
experience acquisition may be suggested.  The question is ‘what 
if the automaton returns to a previously visited position in the 
world’. As part of our phenomenology we have a keen sense of 
time and event (see [9] for a philosophical discourse and [10] for 
a neurological one).  An evening memory of being on the bus in 
the afternoon is not the same as the memory of the same bus in 
the morning or even less the previous day or further in the past. It 
is therefore necessary to associate a sense of occasion with the 
inner state. Interestingly, issues of time and sequence centrally 
occupied the thought of classical phenomenologists. Michael 
Kelly [11] points out that Husserl, embraced a notion of ‘internal’ 
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time that achieves a moment to moment experience of events in 
the world.  In other words within the CP debate, being conscious 
of time would be seen as a speial form of Sensory 
Phenomenology. Internal time is  recognised in the further 
development of our model as follows. 
 It is suggested here that internal time  should have two 
components within the internal state: epoch and sequence  (within 
an epoch). This is inspired by the fact that as living entities 
experience epochs within one can build experience occur during 
periods of conscious existence, that is, between periods of 
unconscious existence such as sleep or anaesthesia, or simply a 
change of location. But then, during an epoch, an event-driven 
sequentiality cuts in.  So, ignoring many facets that could reate 
epochs (context, location etc.) a highly simplified scheme for the 
automaton to have a sense of time and event it is suggested. 
Despite being oversimplified, ths indicates ways in which more  
relistic ‘chunking’ of experience may be tackled in future work on 
CP. Say that the encoding of this information The involves P and 
Q, two fields of neural firing patterns of e(P)och and se(Q)uence.  
Therefore every state contains a neural firing encoding of 
elements of the following sets: 
I,  a set of depictions of I’ the set of perceptual world inputs (this 
includes all modalities and assumes successful chunking – e.g. 
words such as rose in figure 2). 
P, an epoch indicator 
Q, a sequence indicator 
and A, a set of actions that includes Φ the element for no actions 
at all.  
 To complete the description of experience gathering one 
needs to note that, as in figure 2, an attractor for a depictive 
representation of an external percept is created when no action is 
taken and the perceptual inputs are randomised. Therefore the 
experience of the automaton may be described as a state-space 
structure of ordered (by Q) strings of phenomenal states 
interspersed by action states, one string for each epoch P. That is, 
looking at figure 3, the entire experience of the automaton is a 
collection of state structres such as that shown but extended to the 
end of the epoch, there being as many state structures as epochs. 
To help the discussion this can be generalised and stylised as 
shown in fig. 4 where only attractors are shown.  
 
Figure 4 A stylised sketch of acquired expeience in the neural 
automaton. It is not implied that the epochs have the same length. 
 
Something needs to be said about this structure and its growth 
with respect to language. So far it has been suggested that the 
structure grows in respect to actual experienced events.  Language 
however creates new mechanisms. As in fig. 2,  an experienced 
state that forms an attractor may also be named. Without 
demonstration it is also possible to assert that non-noun terms  
form part of such structures. This is part of current research. 
 A comment on the nature of attractors is necessary. 
Their major content is the internalization (i.e. phenomenal nature 
of) some external event. Now, there can be many attractors that 
share the same or similar content but are found in different epochs. 
For content G of an attractor, the set thst contains similar attractors 
is said to be the ON(G) set .  There are also most epochs that do 
not contain this particular attractor. This fact features in the next 
section 
 
4 COGNITIVE PHENOMENOLOGY 
 
Now it is assumed that the eperience of the automaton is mature, 
that is, the structure in figure 4 does not suffer many more 
changes. To discuss CP it is assumed that the three major CP types 
raised in [2] need to be addressed.  These are meaning experience, 
understanding experience and thought experience. Bearing in 
mind the state structure that represents gained experience (Figure 
4) it is necessary to ask whether, and if so, how, within this 
structure, an act of sensory phenomenology (SP) may differ from 
a cognitive one (CP). Take an SP act that is characterised by the 
statement: “I am conscious of X ”.  In terms of experiential state 
structure and assuming that all states in that state structure lead to 
conscious experience, the functional description behind the above 
statement is that the entity has entered a depictive attractor state X 
(from I) for a perceptual input X’ (from I’).  In contrast,  the report 
of a related thought experience CP act might be: “While being 
conscious of observing X , I thought of Y ”.  Thought not related 
to current perception is in the CP category [2]. This means that in 
the experiential state space, the state has ‘jumped’ to an attractor 
representing Y. There are many technical reasons that make such 
jumps possible (noise and inattention to input, for example). But 
it is not primsrily the content X or Y that determines CP but ….  
 …. the central contention of this paper is that a sense of the 
shape of the state trajectory when the input becomes 
unattended causes the ‘thought’ CP.  
 
 
Figure 5: A sketchy illustration of a ‘thought’ experience. 
 
The concept of an unattended input (indicated by  Ψ) is therefore 
central to this discussion. This arose in Figure 2b and was 
described as noise at the perceptual input. Technically the 
inattention could be encoded at the perceptual input to the neural 
automaton through noise. The important issue is that, whatever 
the technique, it causes the generation of input-independent 
attractors as suggested in Figure 2.   
 Turning now to understanding and meaning eperience, 
consider two linguistic  sentences, which, as hinted in section 3, 
can create epoch-like state sequences,   
 
[The dog] [ate][a bone] .. 
[Ian][shot][a buck] 
The fact that these appear to ‘make sense’ which, in terms of 
figure 4, exist as linked structures.  Now a sentence such as  
SYMPOSIUM X. 10TH AISB SYMPOSIUM ON COMPUTING AND PHILOSOPHY 397
Co
nfe
re
nc
e
ed
itio
n
[The cat][shot][a bone], despite the fact that the elements may 
well exist in the state structure, the shape of the trajectory (Figure 
6) is felt as being illegitimate given that only transitions within 
epoch shapes or ON sets of epochs would be legitimate. In other 
words, the lack of legitimacy is not a sensory event, but a 
cognitive one. So, as suggestd earlier it is the shape of the 
trajectories that is a matter for CP and not necessarily the content 
of the states involved.  
 
Figure 6: The input sequence that forces transitions that do not 
exist in the existing state structure are  experiencced as ‘not 
underrstood’ and hence in CP (while trajectories that follow 
existing structure define SP). 
 On meaning in general, it is recalled that attractors carry 
both perceptual and linguistic representations hence understood 
sequences in figure 6 carry a meaningful (i.e. imagined or 
experienced) perceptual vignette, whereas one that is not 
understood would not do so. This is the subject of a current 
programme of demonstratinal simulations. 
 
5 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 
This paper is merely a sketch of how a learning neural automaton 
model might be helpful in searching for a functional distinction 
between Sensory Phenomenology (SP) and Cognitive 
Phenomenology (CP). It has been pointed out that CP is the basis 
of debate in philosophy as to whether such a concept needs to 
exist. Here it has been seen that this distinction can have physical 
correlates which is important not only because it contributes to a 
philosophical discussion, but also because issues of thought, 
meaning and understanding still raise important computational 
questions. 
 Phenomenology as previously studied through learning 
neural automata has been discussed showing that there is an 
iconic/depictive methodology that enables a dynamic neural 
automaton to create an inner state structure that is an accessible 
representation of an out-there world. Such a structure, it has been 
suggested, consists of attractor states that depict perceptual input 
in any modality, including linguistic coding. Such attractors are 
arranged into epoch sequences that have been encountered during 
perceptual wakefulness or literary activity.  As it stands this 
models enacts Sensory Phenomenology (SP) (there is something 
it is like to be conscious of events in the out-there world or within 
bodily sensations).  Then, the concept of Cognitive 
Phenomenology (CP) according to [2] assumed to be distinct from 
SP set the task for his paper: is there a distinction between the two 
seen in the state behaviour pertaining to each? 
  The answer given is that following the assertion that 
depictive attractor states and the learnt trajectories between them 
that is, the state structure laid down within the automaton as 
experience, is developing SP. That is, the entity is 
phenomenologically conscious of the world and some inner 
bodily processes, because existing state structure is entered in the 
act of being Sensorially Conscious and acting strictly according 
to the acquired state structures. The distinct nature of CP was first 
illustrated through the need for the entity to take state space 
trajectories not determined by the exiting state structure of past 
experience through mechanisms of inattention of the perceptual 
input. That is, if I am conscious of a rose I can unleash a de-
attention mechanism that frees the automaton to jump to other 
parts of the state structure and know that this has happened. On 
the other hand meaning is discerned by a sensation of existing 
state structure being followed. Lack of meaning or understanding 
of something comes from the inability of the entity to follow 
incoming percepts within existing state structure leading to there 
being no depiction of input events. 
 In the controversy about the very existence of CP the 
automaton model shows that SP occurs as precepts map into 
depictive states and constitute conscious experience. But no 
depictive states exist for de-attention activity (thought), or a state 
path meandering (lack of understanding and lack of meaning). 
Therefore CP events like state jumps between epochs and the 
presence of de-attention are part of conscious experience within 
the automaton not related to depiction and is therefore distinct 
from SP. However, this paper only points to a framework for a 
great deal of further theoretical work and simulation that needs to 
be done to develop models of machine phenomenology that 
include the CP that appears to be helpful in human 
phenomenology. 
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Simulation of Consciousness, 
and pragmatic accounting for 
language 
Dr. Stephen Rainey
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Abstract 
The possibilities for the simulation of consciousness are 
convincingly critiqued by Chinese Room type arguments. This 
paper discusses what meaning the simulation of consciousness 
could have anyway, in terms of objectivity and subjectivity. In 
terms of an attempt to create in silico (or otherwise) a simulation 
of consciousness this means seeing how ascriptions of such 
terms ought to be made. Drawing upon Sellars, Kant, and 
Merlau-Ponty, it is argued that whether or not something really 
manifests consciousness is not the only question worth pursuing 
(firstly needing clarification). Further, it suggests that it is 
plausible that pragmatic accounts of meaningful language use 
could pose novel questions for Chinese Room type arguments in 
moving from syntax-plus-semantic accounts of language to an 
account based in the deployment of abilities. 
Introduction 
Chinese Room type arguments can be framed as successfully 
problematizing claims to subjectivity for the system by denying 
syntax is sufficient for semantics [1], [2] – there is no meaning to 
the system’s activity so no relevant subjectivity in it. However, 
the question remains as to the objectivity of subjectivity [3]. 
Where meaning and subjectivity are linked it is worth asking 
how, and to what extent, what kinds of things can contribute to 
that meaning – including what objects. 
 
The brain is a very interesting object not least owing to the 
apparent role it plays in the manifestation of consciousness. 
Somehow, the brain seems to be involved in whatever it takes to 
think, perceive, feel emotions, and generally to be a locus for 
uniquely conscious perspectives. Some may take it that the brain 
itself is a structure that is intrinsically conscious [4], [5]. Others 
may reject that, suggesting the brain has a role in a more 
distributed account of consciousness, maybe one crossing the 
brain/body/world boundary or even one that connects to a non-
extended world of thought [6], [7]. 
 
The Human Brain Project (HBP) is a European research 
initiative that aims to integrate neuroscientific research in order 
to “…advance neuroscience and medicine and to create brain-
inspired information technology.” [8, p. 574] This motivates an 
analysis of cognition and computation, and the technical 
possibilities of their interplay. 
Understanding the brain 
Where ‘understanding the human brain’ is an aim, the idea of 
looking at consciousness most likely arises. This is because the 
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brain appears to be related tightly to conscious activity and 
processes. This is salient as the majority of objects routinely 
encountered in the universe do not appear to relate to 
consciousness in the way the brain does. It is very widely 
proposed that the brain is at least somehow, if not exhaustively, 
responsible for conscious phenomena. This presents a 
subject/object dichotomy that can be explored with reference to 
Wilfrid Sellars. 
 
The Manifest and the Scientific Image 
There are at least two ways to account for how human beings 
can conceive of and experience the world around them. One of 
Wilfrid Sellars’ main preoccupations concerns this apparently 
dual nature of human experience and knowledge. This dual 
nature is characterised by the ‘manifest image’ and the ‘scientific 
image’. The former is a set of experiences and knowledge 
concerning how it is to be a person in a world of experience – 
lessons from living. The latter is a set of insights into the 
workings of the world from an experimental point of view – 
lessons from physics, chemistry and so on. Both images appear 
to be well founded, and yet they are in tension with one another 
in important ways [9]. 
 
The manifest image is seemingly immediate, objective, complete 
and real. However, being knowledgeable about scientific 
theories and discoveries, it is also apparent that the object before 
us is part of a system of physical entities with properties and 
interactions themselves not apparent. The scientific image lets us 
know that the experience we have can be accounted for 
differently, and not incorrectly, especially by reducing it to 
various sub-properties. Colour is the reflection and absorption of 
light by surfaces, for example. These reductive, sub-properties 
aren’t experienced as such, yet they stand in a system of 
explanations for the experience, as if explaining the obvious in 
terms of the inscrutable [10]. 
 
Two of the tensions between the images can be labelled in 
general as tensions of authenticity, and tensions of 
instrumentality. Authenticity of experience is diminished in the 
scientific image from the perspective of the manifest. 
Instrumentality is diminished in the manifest image from the 
perspective of the scientific. So a reductive account of the colour 
pink, in terms of wavelengths absorbed and reflected by plane 
surfaces, misses what makes the manifest experience of pink an 
experience of pink – it seems inauthentic. An authentic account 
of the manifest experience of pink gives nothing to the scientific 
image to work with – ‘it is pink, what now?’ could be the 
question here. This sketch of Sellars’ perspective here perhaps 
suggests that there is considerable difficulty to be found in 
resolving the manifest and scientific images. Effectively, prior to 
much reflection and theorising, the world appears 
stereoscopically – there are subjects and there are objects. A 
synoptic vision, if possible, is not apparent in experience. 
Simulation and Sellars 
Is it the manifest image of the other that ought to be re-created in 
technical projects, or the scientific? This question seems pressing 
where, for instance, artificial intelligence is sought. Do such 
endeavours aim to re-create the manifest image of being a mind 
in the world, or to re-create sets of processes and properties 
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constituting a scientific image of a mind (whatever this might 
be)? 
 
To create the manifest mind we would need to create something 
that can be taken for a mind. To create the scientific mind we 
would need to create something that reproduced processes and 
properties that enabled a mind to develop. In either case, what a 
mind is must be known. This is no simple question. 
 
On an internalist account, consciousness is produced somehow 
by the intrinsic structures and properties of the brain itself – its 
structures, the material from which it is hewn etc. If thought of 
in an externalist way, consciousness arises not exclusively from 
the brain, but by worldly relations in which the brain, its 
structures and properties find themselves. In either case, the 
brain is important in an account of consciousness. Understanding 
the brain, therefore, should have implications for understanding 
consciousness – perhaps minimally by weighing in on the 
internalist / externalist debate. This might also be stated the other 
way around: perhaps without an account of consciousness, the 
brain can’t properly be understood in the first place. The role for 
prior theory is illustrated next. 
From Crick and Koch [4] it is hypothesised that a key element in 
understanding consciousness in human beings at least comes 
from the synchronous oscillations of the brain during visual 
stimulation. These occur in the 40-70Hz range during visual 
experience and are held to be explanatory of the binding of 
visual stimulations into a visual experience. In looking at 
synchrony as key for consciousness, Thompson and Varela [6, p. 
418] argue for the essential importance of environment in 
conjunction with the body, and its states in a ‘seamless’ way. 
Clark [11] meanwhile, concludes that only an internalist account 
of consciousness could explain the speed at which the brain 
activity occurs. The seamlessness of any relation still could not 
provide the necessary proximities for the time-scales observable. 
Which kind of account, internalist or externalist, should we 
choose to account for conscious experience here? Given these 
interpretations of the data, it seems an open question. In the first 
instance, the complex dynamism of an organism’s 
embeddedness in an environment prompts the conclusion that 
conscious experience must be thought of as extending beyond 
the confines of the head. In the second, though, the detail of the 
conscious experience are held to prompt the conclusion that it 
can only by explained as an internalist phenomenon. 
A synoptic vision 
Between Sellars, and the equivocal nature of evidence depending 
on prior theory, what can be said of the objective reality of 
subjectivity? This is a key question especially where technology 
would aim to re-create something like a human other, a locus of 
subjectivity. As [12] suggest, using non-humans in order to gain 
insight into humans is not only possible, but can be acutely 
useful in particular cases, e.g. “by implementing neurocognitive 
mechanisms in androids and then evaluating their interactions 
with people, androids have the potential to help researchers 
bridge the gap between cognitive neuroscience and the 
behavioral sciences, leading to a new way of understanding 
individuals.” [12, p. 321] 
Here, perhaps surprisingly, Merleau-Ponty has an interesting 
contribution. If we ask ourselves what makes a self a self at all, 
“I say that it is another, a second self, and this I know in the first 
place because this living body has the same structure as mine. I 
experience my own body as the power of adopting certain forms 
of behaviour and a certain world, and I am given to myself 
merely as a certain hold upon the world; now, it is precisely my 
body which perceives the body of another, and discovers in that 
other body a miraculous prolongation of my own intentions, a 
familiar way of dealing with the world. Henceforth, as the parts 
of my body together comprise a system, so my body and the 
other’s are one whole, two sides of one and the same 
phenomenon, and the anonymous existence of which my body is 
the ever-renewed trace henceforth inhabits both bodies 
simultaneously." [3, p. 412] 
In this can be read a summary of the reality of objectivity from a 
Kantian point of view, along with the necessity of a unity of 
apperception – this description seeks to elucidate the dual nature 
of purportedly individual experience. The interesting 
contribution here is that subjectivity, or intentionality, is 
transformed from what might be assumed to have an essential 
nature. Merleau-Ponty instead presents it as anonymous and 
shared. This anonymous shared subjectivity revealed in the 
objective apparent ‘prolongation of one’s own intentions’. 
The reality of subjectivity is revealed in the otherness of the 
objective agent with whom I am presented. The ‘hold’ the 
subject has on the world is recognised as the apparent exercise of 
agency in objectivity to the extent that this can be seen 
emanating from the other. The objectivity of a (minimally) 
binary ‘us’ revealed in the moment of recognition in action 
convinces oneself of oneself. To the extent that it succeeds in 
describing the objectivity of subjectivity, it re-draws the 
problematic from Sellars but with a Kantian optimism – the idea 
that one can only act at all in the unprovable faith that one’s 
action can affect a transcendent reality – positing a synoptic 
vision of scientific and manifest image. Experience in the 
immediate sense is complemented at the same time in a question 
about the other and their position as significantly like, yet other 
than, oneself. 
This can be taken as a way of grounding an appreciation of 
cognition, of consciousness, of intelligence, in the simulation of 
behaviour. It requires an ethical position that is neutral between 
subjects and objects in terms of potential ascription of worth. It 
requires that the world of experience be seen as a space of 
reasons, in which existential as well as descriptive status are 
matters of discourse not essence. 
 
Pragmatic accounting for language 
Robert Brandom accounts for human linguistic ability in terms 
of human beings as ‘concept-mongers’. This means that human 
beings have an aptitude for operating in a world of reasons, 
which manifests in practical abilities around inference. Implicit 
in much of human behaviour are such practical inferences, and 
these form a basis for concluding that human behaviours, such as 
communicative use of language, are meaningful. 
Where an account of consciousness is pursued along the lines 
drawn above – in terms of discourse, evaluative, and on matters 
existential and description – might novel questions arise for 
Chinese Room type arguments? These arguments succeed in 
showing the inability of a syntax engine to manifest semantic 
content, hence the impossibility of machine consciousness. But 
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pragmatism takes a world relation from action to meaning – not 
the manifestation of meaning from a formal basis. 
Where a ‘hold’ upon us can manifest through the recognition of 
anonymous second self-hood where we can apprehend action, 
might this not extend to matters of understanding? 
Communicative language is after all action. 
Especially where an android type scenario is envisioned, it is 
plausible that prima facie speech actions could manifest such 
that they at least appear to be meaningful. It could thus be argued 
that, from a pragmatic account of language, meaningful abilities 
could be simulated so as to manifest apparent conscious acts. 
Where consciousness is accounted for as anonymous and shared, 
appearances may be all that is required, as such appearances are 
sufficient to prompt, or to sustain, a discourse on the very idea of 
consciousness. Where consciousness isn’t possessed by the 
conscious agent, but is partaken in as a kind of questioning, this 
is an issue worthy of further exploration. 
Grasp of a concept is an aptitude to deploy inferential abilities, 
including giving and asking for reasons. [13, p. 89] This is 
because any number of justifications for one utterance or another 
is possible: the inclusion of particular inferential transitions 
grounding, or accounting for, some utterance is contingent upon 
the particular meaning being deployed and is in principle not 
knowable in a complete sense. Giving offence, for instance, 
through deploying a term like ‘Irish’ to mean perplexingly 
obtuse, or daft [14, p. 327], is not contained within the concept 
‘Irish’ but it can be so deployed where the will exists to shore it 
up with particular explanations [15]. 
More resources for evaluation are required, this being the case, 
when it comes to assessing the appearance or not of meaningful 
conceptual deployment. Validity of conceptual inference 
depends on more than propositional calculus. It requires 
understanding of context, which in turn includes a practical 
ability to assess practical abilities. 
Non verbal ‘justification’ 
‘Knowing how to go on’ is one practical way in which one could 
be said to be justifying one’s action in some context. Raising my 
hand at an oncoming bus lets the driver know I want to board, 
and demonstrates I know how to catch a bus. Improvising a 
piece of music demonstrates my knowledge of key, rhythm, 
tone, and makes a tune. It might be that the majority of ‘know 
how’ put to work in a day is this kind of tacit, non-verbally 
explained sort [16]. 
Example: Karate Roboy 
For context, we are to imagine a human who is taught karate, but 
quite obliquely.[17] A master of the art takes on the student only 
to confound them by making them carry out chores such as 
painting the fence, waxing the car, and sweeping the floor. The 
master is fastidious about how the movements must be carried 
out, to the near-exasperation of the student. Upon almost having 
enough, the student finally protests, only for the master to reveal 
that these movements constituting the chores were exactly those 
required to carry out essential karate moves. This is 
demonstrated to the student by demanding the chore movements, 
which are seen to be sufficient for deflecting punches, kicks etc. 
Without really knowing it, by learning how to do chores, the 
student has learned how to do karate. From the context of chores, 
with only a change of context into that of being attacked, the 
student’s movements are no longer ‘painting the fence’, but 
‘blocking a strike’, and so on. The student knows karate, having 
learned chores. 
Now we transmute the scenario into a robot of a particular kind. 
A non-von Neumann architecture is pres nt in an embodied 
robot; the control centres of the machine are neuromorphic (with 
neuronic firing, synapse-like modifications etc.).[18] The 
embodiment is in a “Roboy”, a specific kind of robotic platform 
predicated on smooth actuation, based on a bio-mimetic 
approach.[19] 
Roboy learns chore-movements by taking in the visual stimuli, 
of chores being carried out. These are not ‘seen as’ chores, 
simply as dynamic orientations in space. Roboy can mimic the 
movements well. It just so happens that these movements – 
painting a fence, waxing a car, sweeping the floor – are identical 
with those of some key karate moves – deflections, strikes etc. 
The chor  movements are all Roboy has ‘learned’. Suddenly, 
Roboy finds itself in a karate scenario – nefarious bots from a 
rival lab appear and are programmed to strike. If Roboy does 
what it can, deploys its abilities in the new context, is it now 
doing karate or merely doing chore-like movements out of 
context? How would we assess this question? 
 
KaratePractices ChorePractices
KarateVocabularies ChoreVocabularies
SeeingPractices
Necessary
Necessary
Sufficient
Necessary
Sufficient
 
Figure 1 Practices and vocabularies 
 
In the above figure, we see a depiction of how the practices of 
carrying out chores and necessary for the ability to discuss how 
chores ought to be done – Chorevocabularies. We see that it 
transpires KaratePractices are grounded sufficiently in the same 
movements. The karate practices are necessary for the 
vocabularies of karate, which are in turn sufficient for those of 
chore vocabularies. The relation between chore practices and 
karate vocabularies is not clear. Neither is it clear, and this is the 
area for discussion, how Roboy’s watching of ChorePractices links 
with karate practices whereby the nature of the thought 
experiment Roboy does no ‘seeing as’. 
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MIT researchers have developed a neural net that can deploy a 
justification for output [20]. Does Roboy’s processing constitute 
such a justification? The neuromorphic processing of movement 
in space produces a readout that could be taken as a justification 
of why this movement now, given that movement then. What is 
the difference between this kind of sufficiency and a meaningful 
deployment of conceptual ability? 
More besides a descriptive account of an action is required, it 
seems, and that relies on the manifest image account of things. 
This is presumably missing both for the MIT moral machine, and 
for Roboy’s karate: there is no account of the propriety of this or 
that action, there is just an account of this or that action. 
Nevertheless, there appears to be an interesting case for 
pragmatic accounts of language in dealing with simulation of 
behaviour and genuine action. 
Conclusion 
Simulation of behaviour might be capable of prompting in the 
actually conscious a realisation of the objectivity of subjectivity. 
It might not be subjectivity, however. The content of pragmatic 
accounting for language suggests ‘knowing how to proceed’ 
could be a marker of conceptual grasp, and so perhaps of 
meaningfulness. Combined with the apparent objective 
manifestation of anonymous subjectivity it might be seductive to 
conclude meaningful subjectivity can be created and evidence in 
action. But without the proper relations among actions – 
including a grasp of the propriety among actions – this is only a 
superficial suggestion. 
Roboy learning karate via copying chores won’t demonstrate a 
counter-example to Chinese Room objections to artificial mental 
states, but it might be a warning that kung-fu zombie robots are a 
near-future possibility. 
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The question of bias in philosophy and computing 
	  
Yasemin J. Erden 1 
 
Abstract 1 
During a discussion about racism, a colleague once asked why 
can’t we stop talking about race? More than a question it was an 
expression of frustration; the topic is old, the subject well 
covered, why aren’t we post-race, in a utopia of one human 
race? This is not an unfamiliar question nor position, and it tends 
to occupy the same intellectual territory as remarks like, I don’t 
see colour, or that’s not my experience.2 In this paper I begin 
from these ideas in order to explore topics like implicit bias, 
diversity, and why some areas (like philosophy and computing) 
struggle more than others in tackling the problems that arise as a 
result. To do this, the paper will explore particular instances of 
bias in philosophy and in technology, and offer reasons for such 
tendencies and outcomes. The paper offers that while there is a 
relation between language and bias, the correlation needs to be 
understood in the context of culture and practice, or in 
Wittgenstein’s terms, the language-games in which words are 
meaningful. Given this, the paper concludes that any attempt to 
solve problems of bias via management of language will have 
only limited success, especially if the context within which such 
problems occur is not given sufficient attention.  
1 BIAS AT THE HEART OF REASON 
In 2013, a researcher sought to compare the rate at which the 
work of male philosophers and female philosophers are cited. 
His study looked at the “most-cited items from 1993 to mid-
2013” in top philosophy journals. By top we can understand 
ideas like well-known, high circulation, high impact, good 
reputation, and so on. These journals were Nous, Mind, Journal 
of Philosophy, and Philosophical Review. Of the 520 top cited 
items in these journals during a 20 year period, only “19 are by 
women—3.6 percent of the total” from “15 women authors in 
total”. In comparison, “6.3 percent of the items are by David 
Lewis” [13] 
In a similar vein, another study [4] measured the number of 
publications by black philosophers in the US (US BIPs), across 
15 journals (including some of those publications noted above) 
between 2003-2012 [cf. 9; 16; 25]. The author found that 
publications by black authors were few. In fact,  
 
there were 30 publications by US BIPs for all journals during 
this period. By contrast, there were 10659 publications overall 
during this period. This means that publications by US BIPs 
were 0.28% of the publications during this period. Of the 30 
publications, 15 were research articles as opposed to book 
reviews. There were 7638 research articles overall in this 
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2 Another such example is neatly described in one article by a young 
(white) student who wishes the conversations on race would stop. She 
implores, “When we stop pointing out the racial differences in people 
and decide instead to treat all races the same, in both positives and 
negatives, race will no longer have such a grand impact.” [11] 
period, meaning that research articles by US BIPs were 
0.19% of the research articles published. 
 
While it is difficult to establish causation, there does seem to 
be some bias at play.3 The question of how this is possible 
strikes at the very heart of the nature of philosophy, a discipline 
which is apparently an ‘intellectual inquiry in which anything is 
open to critical challenge and scrutiny. This, at least, explains 
many of its salient features. Philosophy is subversive. Time and 
again, philosophers have shot at religions, political systems, 
public mores. They do this because they are prepared to 
challenge things which everybody else takes for granted, or 
whose rejection most people do not countenance’ [18, p. 202, 
italics added] 
Thus we seem to have a contradiction, where the idea of a 
neutral, objective, reason-based approach in philosophy, meets 
the stark reality of at worst intentional negative bias or prejudice, 
and at worst (lazy?) habit. Because while it is not evident that the 
work of women or black philosophers in philosophy is 
overlooked intentionally, but that such work is overlooked, if it 
even gets as far as publication, remains. Where other attributes 
are taken into account, such as inclusion of those with 
disabilities, the numbers dwindle only further. Consider for 
instance, that in 2012/2013 disabled people comprised only ‘4% 
of full-time faculty in philosophy departments in the US’ and 
‘less than 1% of full-time faculty in philosophy departments in 
Canada.’ [23] Wh le causes may be difficult to establish, the 
disparity remains evident.  
The ramifications of this supposedly self-critical, self-aware, 
subversive discipline failing to recognise its own subjective 
biases, and thus objective limitations, is one that is matched by 
the un-self-critical attempts toward a kind of value neutrality in 
computing and technology. It is to the outcomes of this sort of 
approach (whether intentional or otherwise) that we now turn.  
2 BIAS IN PRACTICE 
In 2015, Google image recognition software tagged the faces 
of two black people as gorillas. When this happened, the person 
who’d uploaded the images took to Twitter to voice their disgust. 
While this example is already rich as an example of bias, I am 
particularly interested in the reply by a Google representative 
soon after the initial Tweet. This response seems to have 
followed along the lines that they would “stop using the label 
‘gorillas’ as a category. Later, they'll figure out how to make 
their algorithms more sensitive to language that could be 
offensive.” So the issue as it was seen in that first moment was 
not that the algorithm had failed to characterise a human as a 
human, but that the language was offensive, and by extension, 
the categorisation that followed. To fix this, at least in the short 
term, the researchers would simply change the language [17].  
                                                
3 The alternative position (that these categories of researcher do not 
produce work of sufficient quality, or similar) will need to be made by a 
different author.  
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What this example suggests is that the broader issue, whereby 
a system fundamentally fails to recognise the variety and 
complexity of human faces, is ignored at least in the short term. 
The focus is on preventing future categorisation from being 
offensive, or in other words, to keep the system working. As a 
result, and as with the examples in philosophy noted above, the 
issues that are not being tackled are those that stem from a lack 
of both representation (in terms of images) and recognition, but 
also diversity more generally. Indeed, if the error is fixed, such 
issues may never again come to the fore where Google’s 
programming is concerned. At least, not until another mistake is 
made.4 This does not mean the issues of representation and 
diversity are addressed.  
The next issue concerns gender stereotypes, examples of 
which are not hard to come by. For our purposes we’ll consider 
the computer game Grand Theft Auto. This games doesn’t only 
perpetuate certain stereotypes; it makes a feature of them. For 
instance,  
 
female characters are treated as sex objects rather than as 
individuals worthy of respect. GTA main male characters are 
always depicted as hyper-masculine, dominant, and 
aggressive men. In contrast, the female characters are 
portrayed as sexual objects—usually prostitutes or pole-
dancers—who are peripheral to the game narrative and whose 
sole purpose is to entertain the main male characters. For 
example, after paying a prostitute for sex, players can kill her 
and get their money back. Rather than being punished for 
such behaviors, players are often rewarded (e.g., through 
points, extra health to their character, etc.). [12] 
 
Translation tools have also shown such biases, as seen in 
statistical machine translation (SMT) systems which ‘reflect 
existing gender stereotypes’:   
 
Translations to English from many gender-neutral languages 
such as Finnish, Estonian, Hungarian, Persian, and Turkish 
lead to gender-stereotyped sentences. For example, Google 
Translate converts these Turkish sentences with genderless 
pronouns: “O bir doktor. O bir hems¸ire.” to these English 
sentences: “He is a doctor. She is a nurse.” A test of the 50 
occupation words used in the results presented in Figure 1 
shows that the pronoun is translated to “he” in the majority of 
cases and “she” in about a quarter of cases; tellingly, we 
found that the gender association of the word vectors almost 
perfectly predicts which pronoun will appear in the 
translation.’ [5, p. 11] 
 
In another sphere, but resulting none the less in bias, data 
capture caused headaches for Amazon recently. The problem 
centred on Amazon Prime’s Free Same-Day Delivery service, 
which was shown to pointedly include some zip codes while 
excluding others, primarily along the lines of historical racial 
divides. For instance, ‘In New York City, same-day delivery is 
available throughout Manhattan, Staten Island, and Brooklyn, 
but not in the Bronx and some majority-black neighbourhoods in 
Queens. In some cities, Amazon same-day delivery extends 
many miles into the surrounding suburbs but isn’t available in 
some ZIP codes within the city limits’ [14]. Though the issue 
was acknowledged by Amazon, and stated to be one arising from 
data (e.g. how many users by area), the issue of perpetuating 
racial divisions cannot be avoided [see also 1; 2; 3; 6; 7; 22].  
                                                
4 Another example that suggests a lack of diversity in representation are 
the HP cameras that assume an East Asian person must be blinking 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/jozjozjoz/3529106844/  
These examples suggest there is a case to be made for further 
consideration, and also to seek causes. But as we will see in the 
next section, attributing causes, or establishing cause and effect 
is rarely simple. And even where reasons rather than causes may 
be found, this may not result in solutions.  
3 THE PROBLEM WITH CAUSE & EFFECT 
In the effort to face these issues head on, some psychologists 
and philosophers have sought to establish causes or reasons for 
bias. One such method is the attempt to uncover implicit bias. As 
Saul [19, p. 40] notes: 
 
Psychological research over the last decades has shown that 
most people—even those who explicitly and sincerely avow 
egalitarian views—hold what have been described as implicit 
biases against such groups as blacks, women, gay people, and 
so on. This is true even of members of the ‘targeted’ group... 
So, for example, women as well as men are biased against 
women. These biases are manifested in, for example, 
association tasks asking subjects to pair positive and negative 
adjectives with black or white faces: Most are much speedier 
to match black faces with negative adjectives than with 
positive ones. 
 
To this she adds, [19, p. 41]: 
 
Academics are clearly affected by implicit bias, even if (as 
seems likely) explicit commitments to egalitarianism are 
widespread. First, take the case of journal submissions. 
Anonymous review is apparently only rarely practiced in 
ecology and evolution journals. But one such journal, 
Behavioural Ecology, recently decided to do it. They found 
that it led to a 33 percent increase in representation of female 
authors. 
 
It’s important to note that this account is not unproblematic, as 
noted by Singal [20] who argues that some of the tests to 
establish implicit bias lack reproducibility, among other flaws 
(though see also Schwenkler et al [21] for further discussion of 
this issue, plus Tversky and Kahneman [24] on cognitive bias).  
Indeed, the issue is not only with attempting to find causes, 
but in our expectations of what we can do once (if) a cause is 
established. For instance, can a person simply ignore their bias? 
Caliskan-Islam et al [5] make the claim that, ‘language itself 
contains recoverable and accurate imprints of our historic 
biases’, which, as a result, means that any Natural Language 
Processing tool will ‘share the same biases humans demonstrate 
in psychological studies’.  
Interesting though these ideas are, the fatalism of such claims 
requires that language stands still in a way that is not borne out 
by evidence. While it is true that languages express biases, it is 
simplistic to conclude that such biases are necessarily encoded in 
that language. For instance, the term hysterical was originally 
applied to women (with the womb at its core as an indication of 
an apparent tendency towards exaggerated emotion). Yet in more 
recent times it has begun to lose some of this historical meaning. 
For instance, while it may be true to say that the original 
meaning often remains when used in relation to a person (and a 
man is rarely described as hysterical), it seems not to be so when 
applied to a situation (consider that comedian was hysterical, in 
instances where the comedian is male). This is unlike the term 
bossy which, though without an obviously gendered origin is 
nevertheless sometimes synonymous with women who take 
charge or are managers. That these associations ebb and flow 
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seems indisputable, even if in a particular time there may be 
inherent linguistic biases (e.g. a woman is bossy while a man is 
assertive, and so on).  
The problem of context and meaning is not a new one, and it 
more obviously comes to the fore where insults or profanities are 
traded. The term gorilla is not offensive in and of itself, but 
when applied to a group of people, this term is embedded in a 
Wittgensteinian language game [27], and a particularly horrible 
one at that. More specifically this term as applied in this instance 
taps into a context of systemic racism, oppression, abuse, as well 
as a history of dehumanising certain groups of people for the 
purposes of slavery. As insults go, whether intentional or 
otherwise it is more than simply abhorrent; it is also very 
harmful.  
In the terms Wittgenstein offers, we can see biases in 
language as reflections of social and political biases, embedded 
in cultures and enacted by societies. The semantics of a language 
can change just as quickly as a culture is willing or able to 
change its values and priorities. Such approaches include where 
terms are reclaimed, as by minority groups and communities, or 
in other instances are appropriated, with terms and meanings 
altered (it remains odd to some native Italian speakers that ragu 
is generally called Bolognaise, as in Spaghetti Bolognaise, in the 
UK).  
Thus it is the context in which language is meaningful, and 
which imbues language with meaning. Wittgenstein’s idea os 
that our use of language represents an activity, and these 
activities or forms of life are varied. Accordingly the biases 
within languages, especially those which lead to negative 
consequences, are not self-evident or necessary. Meanings, as 
well as rules for their use, are determined by the contexts or 
activities in which they are used (e.g. in giving or obeying 
orders, thanking, cursing, joking etc.). Our practices, traditions, 
and habits enforce these non-determinate, yet rule based 
language-games [27, §199 and §202], and it is to these that we 
should direct our attention. Beginning first with the practice of 
dialogue. 
4 WHY CAN’T WE JUST…?  
“If it isn’t my experience, it couldn’t possibly be yours.” 
 
So why can’t we just move on from dialogues on racism, 
gender, disability, and so on? Well, part of the issue concerns the 
we that is encompassed in the above statement. Though it seems 
to offer an inclusive grouping of humans generally, in fact it 
includes only those in a position to move on from such 
discourse. In other words, if you don’t see the need to talk about 
it, chances are you’re not the one it’s affecting. Philosophy (as 
with computing, and a great many other disciplines and fields of 
research, particularly in the sciences, but not only) has a problem 
with inclusivity. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
know why, I can offer the following observations.  
First, philosophy and computing have at their hearts 
principles of reason and of logic, and in philosophy the aim is 
often towards truth in objective terms (or as objective as we 
might hope we can be). As Dotson notes [, ‘A great deal of what 
passes for philosophical engagement is some form of criticism. It 
is fairly common to witness in those newly awakened to the 
world of academic philosophy the attitude that “being 
philosophical” amounts to “being critical” of others and their 
beliefs’ [8, p. 404]. Such criticism-heavy approaches rely on 
technical skills, unimpassioned debate, and a somewhat 
adversarial method.  
Yet philosophical debate, research, and engagement cannot, 
and never will be value neutral; we bring our biases, 
preferences, prejudices, opinions, hopes, and wishes with us. 
And this comment applies equally well to the sciences and 
computing. As Feng notes, with regard to design and technology 
[10, p. 212], 
 
the determination of the “best” design results from a complex 
set of factors including cultural assumptions, economic 
interests, political considerations, organizational constraints, 
and so on. In a very deep sense, the design of technology has 
to be seen as a value–laden activity. 
 
Similarly, Wittgenstein disputed the idea that academics (or 
anyone else for that matter) can somehow view things sub specie 
aeterni. In a note written to Sraffa in 1935 he describes the 
thinking of ‘Cambridge people’:  
 
Here are people who try to speak in a queer way ‘impartially’ 
about things, they pretend to be able to slip out of their own 
skins and they speak as though they could understand 
everybody’s feelings, wishes, tendencies etc. [15, p.235 n.7] 
 
It is partly out of these kinds of concerns that he develops the 
motif of the Language-game, which evokes a sense in which, 
understanding language requires involvement in that language. 
Just as we understand a game—how it is played and the rules—
through playing/watching the game, we understand a language 
by using it. We can no more view our language from an 
objective perspective than we can slip out of our skin. This has a 
very definite impact on academic practice, because it shows 
why, at the core, some disciplines may be full of biases. The 
argument goes that if diversity is limited in these fields, so too 
will be the sorts of voices heard, as well as representations of 
these kinds of voices. And in these respects, few of the details 
above regarding Google, Amazon, or philosophy departments 
are particularly surprising, at least not to those of us who are 
marginalised.  
The second observation concerns what Saul refers to us 
stereotype threat, and it is sometimes grouped in with something 
called a self-fulfilling prophecy. This highlights the somewhat 
uncomfortable link between the stereotype that someone wants 
to avoid, yet in so doing they find themselves in the firing line. 
As Saul notes, this occurs when, for instance, “Victims of 
stereotype threat underperform on the relevant tasks because 
they are unconsciously preoccupied by fears of confirming the 
stereotypes about their group.” In other words, and to clarify 
what is meant by underperformance, “some people face barriers 
that impede their performance. These people underperform in the 
sense that their performance is negatively affected by these 
barriers” [19, p. 41]. In other words, if the expectations are that a 
field like philosophy or computing offers objective arguments, 
with results that are somehow neutral, logical, reasonable, then 
this can perpetuate the view that the problems exist elsewhere. In 
the case of publications, for instance, if the belief is that these 
processes are fair, with the outcomes that fewer minority groups 
are included, then this can perpetuate the belief that minorities 
are not good at philosophy. Such experiences among 
marginalised groups can perpetuate the belief that publishing in 
such journals is for certain groups only.  
Finally, and in concrete terms, representation requires 
presence. In short, to be an academic requires the time and effort 
to get to that position, as well as the resources, and even then it 
requires that people believe in, invest in, and support you. There 
is a wealth of evidence to suggest that marginalised groups often 
lack these support systems, whether inside or outside the 
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academy, and as a result representation will necessarily be 
lacking. This impacts on research, on development, on what is 
included, what excluded. The qualia of what it is to be 
marginalised has not (so far) been represented (or even 
translated) in the academy, which has resulted in certain 
monocultural areas. Philosophy and computing are some 
examples, and until this changes it is unlikely the tendency 
towards certain kinds of bias or prejudice will diminish. As 
Caliskan-Islam et al [5, p. 10] note,  
 
if AI is to exploit via our language the vast knowledge that 
culture has compiled, it will inevitably inherit human-like 
prejudices. In other words, if AI learns enough about the 
properties of language to be able to understand and produce 
it, it also acquires cultural associations that can be offensive, 
objectionable, or harmful. These are much broader concerns 
than intentional discrimination, and possibly harder to 
address.’ 
 
These biases are perpetuated by those who would seek to silence 
voices, or to downplay the experiences of those who are other to 
them. If this conversation is avoided in academia, we cannot 
assume it will somehow happen elsewhere. As Winner notes, 
‘scientific knowledge, technological invention, and corporate 
profit reinforce each other in deeply entrenched patterns that 
bear the unmistakable stamp of political and economic power’ 
[26, p. 126], and we cannot rely on those with power to simply 
share it.  
5 CONCLUSION 
This paper has sought to contribute to a wider debate on the 
issue of bias, primarily in terms of negative bias (whether in 
intention or in outcome) that can be found in both philosophy 
and technology, and to relate this to the issue of a lack of 
diversity. I sincerely hope that the question why can’t we just 
stop talking about race? has been answered to some extent. That 
said, as this is the first incarnation of this paper, I expect I’ve 
only begun to scratch the surface of an answer to such a big 
question. If it is somewhat lacking and in need of further 
development, I hope that the participants of AISB will see an 
argument worth engaging with, and an invitation to contribute to 
the debate.  
I’ll close with two quotations from Winner [26], both of 
which offer prudent advice with regard to the issues noted above. 
First concerns where we locate the source (or even cause) of 
problems like bias, and second covers the reasons for which we 
might expect harm to occur. On the first issue he who offers 
stern advice to those who would attribute political qualities to 
technical artefacts in and of themselves: 
 
What matters is not technology itself, but the social or 
economic system in which it is embedded. This maxim, 
which in a number of variations is the central premise of a 
theory that can be called the social determination of 
technology, has an obvious wisdom. It serves as a needed 
corrective to those who focus uncritically on such things as 
“the computer and its social impacts” but who fail to look 
behind technical things to notice the social circumstances of 
their development, deployment, and use. This view provides 
an antidote to naive technological determinism—the idea that 
technology develops as the sole result of an internal dynamic, 
and then, unmediated by any other influence, moulds society 
to fit its patterns [26, p. 122] 
 
It is at least partly as a result of this sort of view that my paper 
suggests we neither locate the problem in the technology, nor 
even in the language, as though the issues somehow lie outside 
of our own practices and customs. His second piece of advice is 
that we should note that 
 
many of the most important examples of technologies that 
have political consequences are those that transcend the 
simple categories of “intended” and “unintended” altogether. 
These are instances in which the very process of technical 
development is so thoroughly biased in a particular direction 
that it regularly produces results counted as wonderful 
breakthroughs by some social interests and crushing setbacks 
by others. In such cases it is neither correct nor insightful to 
say, “Someone intended to do somebody else harm.” Rather, 
one must say that the technological deck has been stacked 
long in advance to favour certain social interests, and that 
some people were bound to receive a better hand than others. 
[26, pp. 125-6] 
 
More than 35 years later, this point remains as pertinent as it 
ever was. Or perhaps more so, given we’ve had so much more 
time to reflect on what we might need to do differently. The 
question is what we’re prepared to accept in the short term, and 
when we will say that that short term measures are no longer 
acceptable. After all, there comes a point where whatever we 
keep doing becomes entrenched as what we do. Disciplines with 
reason at their core would do well to avoid such dogmatic 
slumbers.  
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